City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

2000

Wittgenstein and the Grammar of Physics: A Study of Ludwig
Wittgenstein's 1929-1930 Manuscripts and the Roots of His Later
Philosophy
Anton Alterman
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1819
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

U MI
MICROFILMED 2000

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the
text directly from the original or copy submitted.

Thus, some thesis and

dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of
computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and
photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment
can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and
there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright
material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning
the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to
right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in
one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white photographic
prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for
an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

W ittgenstein

and

the

G rammar

of

P by sics

A Study of Ludwig Wittganstain's 1929-1930
Manuscripts and tha Roots of His Latar Philosophy

by

Anton Altaraan

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of
New York

2000

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number 9986298

Copyright 2000 by
Alterman, Anton
All rights reserved.

UMI*
UMI Microform9986298
Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

Bell & Howell information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

© 2000

ANTON ALTERMAN
All Rights Reserved

ii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate
Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation
requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

'I 3 r -jL&g.g ----

Date

Date /

Chair of Examining Committee

/

Executive Officer

Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT
WITTGENSTEIN AND THE GRAMMAR OF PHYSICS
A Study of Ludwig Wittgenstein's 1929-1930
Manuscripts and the Roots of His Later Philosophy

by

Anton Alterman
Advisor: Arthur Collins

In 1929 Wittgenstein began to work on the first
philosophical manuscripts he had kept since completing the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) in 1918. The impetus
for this was his conviction that the logic of the TLP was
flawed: it was unable to account for the fact that a
proposition that assigns a single value on a continuum to a
simple object thereby excludes all assignments of different
values to the object (the "color exclusion" problem).
Consequently Wittgenstein's "atomic propositions" could not
be logically independent of one another.
Initially he thought he could replace the "logically
perfect language" of the TLP with a "phenomenological
language" in which experiential propositions about various
"spaces" (e.g., "visual space") would form systems. The
system described by a phenomenological language would be
independent of the one described by ordinary "physicalistic"
iv
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language; the physical "world" was known only by inference
from the phenomenological. But he soon realized there was a
fundamental error in this conception: phenomenology has to
describe the same world as physics or it fails to provide a
foundation for it. This suggests that there is only one
world, and one language with two different modes of
expression. Wittgenstein's now comes to his fundamental
insight: ordinary language is biased towards the description
of physical objects and their relations, hut it is our only
method of expressing phenomenological or abstract concepts.
Failure to recognize this difficulty leads to the
misapplication of physicalistic concepts, i.e., to
grammatical errors.
This insight had the following impact: (a) the task of
philosophy is not to invent logical or phenomenological
languages, but to understand the grammar of ordinary
language; (b) the notion of a language of pure experience
was itself connected with a false, physicalistic idea of the
soul as an observer of a private world; (c) the conception
of analysis that had guided philosophy since Frege was based
on a misused metaphor taken from the grammar of physics: the
analysis of an object into its parts or chemical
constituents. These ideas reach their ultimate expression in
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Thus his
"later" work actually begins with these 1929-30 manuscripts.

v
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PRXFACI
In 1929 Wittgenstein began to work on the first
philosophical manuscripts he had kept since completing the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) in 1918. The impetus
for this was a growing conviction that something was amiss
with the logic of the TLP. After discussions with Frank
Ramsey and others he became convinced that not all necessary
truths could be expressed as tautologies: for example, the
proposition that two colors cannot occupy the same spot at
the same time had to be a tautology if the TLP was correct,
but it was clearly a proposition of experience, which are
distinguished from logical truths in the TLP. This is now
known as the "color exclusion problem". Considering the
implications of this, Wittgenstein realized that in everyday
experience we constantly meet with assignments of value on a
continuum (e.g., the color spectrum or the real number
series). Consequently, one could not assume that simple
propositions were always, or perhaps even typically,
"logically independent" of one another, as he had supposed.
They must come in systems, with some propositions in a
system entailing others.
When Wittgenstein began his new manuscripts he thoughte
he could replace the "logically perfect language" of the TLP
with something on the order of a "phenomenological
language", which would be roughly a language that would show
the necessary relations within systems of propositions about
vi
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various sensory or experiential "spaces", such as "visual
space". The problem had always been that the grammar of
ordinary language is misleading as to the logical form of
the thoughts expressed. The systems described by a
phenomenological language would provide a kind of
epistemological foundation for ordinary language
propositions about the physical world, which (he thought)
were known or given sense only through their connection with
phenomenological propositions.
The outcome of this project, and its implications for
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, are the main subject of
this essay. Wittgenstein says at the beginning of the
Philosophical Remarks, which was drawn from his first four
1929-30 manuscripts, "I no longer have a phenomenological
language, or 'primary language’ as I called it, in mind".
Some have concluded that his entire earlier work, including
the TLP, was based on the phenomenological program; but from
what has been said above it should be clear that that
interpretation is rejected here. Others have concluded that
from 1929 on Wittgenstein remained a phenomenalist
throughout his career, counting only phenomenological truths
as knowable. Some have suggested that towards the end of
1929 he replaced his phenomenological language with a
physicalistic one. Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka, in
particular, have defended all three of the above ideas, and
others, such as John W. Cook, have held some version of more
vii
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than one of them. Yet none, on the view defended here, have
fully understood the nature of the insights that led
Wittgenstein away from the phenomenological language project
and into his later philosophy.
On my view, Wittgenstein was struck within a year by a
series of compelling insights that caused him to abandon his
phenomenological language project and revolutionized his
philosophy. First of all, phenomenology has to describe the
same world as a ordinary "physicalistic" language (which
Wittgenstein simply calls "physics") or it cannot provide
any grounding for propositions about the physical world.
Second, a language of immediate experience is a
contradiction in terms: a language is a representation in
ordinary space and time and cannot convey the immediacy of
experience. Thus ordinary language is the only language that
is available in philosophy, as anywhere else. From this
critique of the phenomenological language project emerges
the fundamental insight that leads Wittgenstein to his later
philosophy: ordinary language is biased towards the
description of physical objects and their relations, but it
is our only method of expressing phenomenological, abstract
or mental concepts. Failure to recognize this difficulty
leads to the misapplication of physicalistic concepts, i.e.,
to grammatical errors. As he puts it himself, "all our forms
of speech are derived from normal physical language and are
not used in epistemology or phenomenology without casting a
viii
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distorting light on the object." This is found in his
manuscripts in October 1929 and is the pivotal point of
transition from a failed phenomenological program to the
rich flow of ideas we find in his later work.
This insight had the following impact: (a) the task of
philosophy is not to invent logical or phenomenological
languages, but to understand the grammar of ordinary
language; (b) the notion of a language of pure experience
was itself connected with a false, physicalistic idea of the
soul as an observer of a private world; (c) the conception
of analysis that had guided philosophy since Frege was based
on a misused metaphor taken from the grammar of physics: the
analysis of an object into its parts or chemical
constituents. These ideas reach their ultimate expression in
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Thus his
"later" work actually begins with the critique of the
phenomenological language program in these 1929-30
manuscripts.

The present work is the first in-depth study of
Wittgenstein's manuscripts based on the transcription of
them published as the Wiener Ausgahe (Vienna Edition) . This,
I believe, has worked in my favor in comparison with
previous studies, permitting me to constantly compare
passages from any part of the manuscript with any other,
without having to resort to manipulating microfilm or
ix

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

working from xeroxes of selected pages written in
Wittgenstein's difficult script. In addition, some passages
of a personal nature which reveal Wittgenstein's state of
mind at critical junctures were blocked out in the
microfilm; they are printed however, in the Wiener Ausgabe,
with Wittgenstein's coded remarks decrypted. If I have made
any advance on the work of previous authors who have dealt
with this material some of it may be attributable to the
advantage of having the Wiener Ausgabe available.
In connection with the manuscripts it is necessary to
acknowledge the importance of the work of the Hintikkas in
their book Investigating Wittgenstein in the formation of my
own interpretation. The Hintikkas were the first to look at
the manuscripts and identify the philosophical crisis that
Wittgenstein went through in October 1929; to see that as a
result his philosophy was fundamentally altered; to ascribe
this result to his recognition that the notion of a
"phenomenoloogical language" was incoherent; and to suggest
that he then came to realize the importance of physicalistic
language. In all these respects I have followed their lead.
If in other respects I direct a good deal of criticism at
their interpretation this must be understood in light of the
fact that their pathbreaking work helped sail my boat.
I must also acknowledge another intellectual debt,
though it comes in a much more roundabout way. In his book
Wittgenstein's Metaphysics John W. Cook offers what I
x
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consider to be a badly mistaken interpretation of
Wittgenstein, i.e., that he was a lifelong phenomenalist (or
what Cook refers to as a "neutral monist"). Nevertheless, in
trying to defend this interpretation (against all odds, I
should say) Cook strongly emphasizes the error of thinking
that Wittgenstein believed that the superficial form of
ordinary "physicalistic" language is a good guide to
meaning. Though Cook in effect turns this insight on its
head by trying to demonstrate that Wittgenstein thought the
language of physical objects really refers to phenomena, my
conclusions about the direction of Wittgenstein's philosophy
stem partly from attempting to set the basic insight back on
its feet in a way that did not have Wittgenstein believing
in a ghostly world of phantom objects.

xi
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A Not* on Stylistic Natters
Z. Translations
There are many citations from Wittgenstein's work in
the following text. Most are from published works that have
been translated into English; but many, especially in
Chapters 3 and 4, are from manuscripts that have been
published only in German editions, and a few are taken
directly from microfilm copies of manuscripts and
typescripts. I am primarily responsible for the translations
of all passages that were not previously translated. In the
case of previously translated works, I have in almost every
case except the TLP, altered the published translation.
There are several reasons for this: (1) the published
translations are meant for wider audiences and are therefore
less literal than scholarship often demands; (2) the
published translations are sometimes plainly inaccurate; (3)
the published translations are not consistent from one work
to the next; and (4) sometimes an alternative translation is
equally accurate with the published one but makes it easier
to make a philosophical point, e.g., when the alternative
retains a root syllable that is present elsewhere in the
passage with different prefixes or suffixes.
In retranslating sometimes well-known passages from any
work one leaves oneself open to the criticism that the
translation has been tendentiously altered in a way that
creates illegitimate support for one's position. I hope that
xvii
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there are no such cases here; in any case, with the
exception of the Wiener Ausgabe edition of the manuscripts,
which is available only in a few libraries, the original
German texts are in most cases fairly widely available, so
those who have the ability to do so can decide for
themselves whether there has been any foul play. I have
tried as often as possible to provide the original German
word in parentheses wherever I felt there might be a
legitimate dispute over the English substitute.
I am not a German scholar, nor even especially fluent
in German. I have usually referred to existing translations
for the basic syntax of the most complex sentences, where
such a translation was available. Most of all, though, I
have depended heavily on the Harper-Co11ins German
Dictionary (Standard Edition) (London and New York: Collins,
Harper & Row, 1980). Without the extraordinary attention to
contextual details provided with the translation of almost
every word in this dictionary, I would not have been able to
make the scholarly decisions that were often required by the
text. It was an indispensible tool.
IX. Notation
There are very few special notations in this text. If a
quoted remark from Wittgenstein's text ends and the next
remark I cite comes after one or more remarks that I have
left out, after the first remark I insert a backslash
followed by an ellipsis (/...) which should be read: "End of
xviii
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this remark; one or more remarks following this one are left
out." My editorial insertions into a quoted passage are
enclosed in square brackets: [...text...]. Any other
parentheses are in the original text. I never italicize
words in citations which are not italicized or emphasized in
the original. I believe that this popular editorial device
forces the reader to read a passage in a way it was not
intended to be read.
ZIZ. References
References to Wittgenstein's works are included in the
text; all others are in footnotes. References to the Wiener
Ausgabe edition of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts are given as
nWA" followed by the volume, page, and remark number. These
must be distinguished from references to Wittgenstein's
manuscript volumes themselves: when reference is made in the
text to "Band X" or any other volume in Wittgenstein's
manuscript series this is to be understood as a reference to
the name of the manuscript, not to the Wiener Ausgabe volume
in which it is transcribed. In general there are two
manuscript volumes to each Wiener Ausgabe volume; thus Band
I - Band II are in WA I, etc. Wittgenstein’s works are
usually referred to by abbreviations, a list of which
follows.

xix
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Notts on tho Abbreviations
In the above list, where "Date" is given in parentheses the date
is stated in the text only when where it is relevant to the point that
is being addressed; otherwise only the page number is given.
O.K. Bouwsma's Wittgenstein; Conversations 1949-1951 and G.E.
Moore's "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33" (which is referenced by
page # in PO) are referred to as works by their respective authors, as
they are only in part intended as transcriptions of Wittgenstein’s own
words.
I have used only the German (Suhrkamp) edition of Wittgenstein
und der Wiener Kreis (WK) . All page reference to WK are from this
edition and all translations from it are my own.
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HYLAS: Explain to me now, Philonous, how it is possible there
should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in your
mind. Can extended things be contained in that which is
unextended?...
PHILONOUS: Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing
in the mind or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood
in the gross literal sense, as when bodies are said to exist in a
place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is
only that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is
affected from without, or by some being distinct from itself.
This is my explication of your difficulty...
HYLAS: Well, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use
can be made of it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of
language in this?
PHILONOUS: None at all: it is no more than common custom, which
you know is the rule of language, has authorized: nothing being
more usual, than for philosophers to speak of the immediate
objects of the understanding as things existing in the mind. Nor
is there anything in this, but what is conformable to the general
analogy of language; most of the mental operations being
signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is plain in
the terms comprehend, reflect, discourse, etc. which being
applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross original
sense.
- George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and
Philonous in Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists

We need new concepts and we continually resort to those of
physicalistic language.
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks

xxii
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CHAPT1R 1
INTRODUCTION: THI GRAMMAR OP PHYSICS
"All our forms of speech are taken from normal
physicalistic language and cannot be used in
epistemology or phenomenology without casting a
distorting light on their objects.
The very manner of speaking 'I perceive x' is already
taken from the physicalistic mode of expression, and x
should be a physical object - e.g., a body - here."
(Philosophical Remarks VI,57,88)
"Perhaps the main reason why we are so strongly
inclined to talk of the head as the locality of our
thoughts is this: the existence of the words 'thinking'
and 'thought' alongside of the words denoting (bodily)
activities, such as writing, speaking, etc., makes us
look for an activity, different from these but
analogous to them, corresponding to the word
'thinking'". (The Blue Book, p.7)
1.1

General Remarks

Ludwig Wittgenstein retired from his position as
Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge University in 1947. Not
too long afterwards his chair was given to John Wisdom,
another Cambridge philosopher. Wisdom had as much
opportunity as anyone to encounter Wittgenstein's philosophy
first-hand: he heard Wittgenstein lecture in the mid-1930's,
often spoke with him personally, and heard him deliver
impassioned defenses of his views at the Cambridge Moral
Science Club. He also developed his own brand of philosophy
based largely on Wittgenstein's later teachings. It is fair
to say he was an exceptionally well-informed and sympathetic
exponent of Wittgenstein's views. Upon the death of his
colleague and mentor in 1951 Wisdom wrote a brief note on
Wittgenstein for the journal Mind. In it he discusses the
1
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statement, which he attributes to Wittgenstein, that "we
have the idea that the meaning of a word is an object." He
also mentions other "models suggested in our language" that
Wittgenstein derided: "the idea that the soul is a little
man within, the model for our minds of the closed picture
gallery, the model for causation of the wire connection.1,1
What ties these models together is that concepts we would
usually take to be metaphysical or conceptual - meanings,
the mind or soul, and causation - are described in terms of
the spatial or mechanical "pictures" we have of the world of
physical objects. Apparently, one of the things that
impressed wisdom most about Wittgenstein was his insistence
on discovering and challenging these physicalistic models we
use to talk about mental or abstract things2.
On the interpretation of Wittgenstein to be presented
here, the simple examples Wisdom selected provide more than
a little insight into the later thought of a philosopher
whose work has often been considered to be difficult and
obscure. Indeed, if this reading is correct, they constitute
a kind of axis around which much of his later work revolves.
Our use of physicalistic metaphors is not always confusing
or philosophically interesting. But to offer up the mind as
a kind of sealed box full of private objects, or the
infinite as an unimaginably large collection of things, or
meanings as persistent entities that simply lack the quality
of substance, and to then generalize and make inferences
from these models, is to indulge in a way of speaking that
ends in philosophical paradoxes and metaphysical
2
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difficulties. That, in my view, is the insight that drives
much of what Wittgenstein tried to say in his later work. It
is not hard to show that it is at least the point from which
he took off, and to which he often returned. But I will
endeavor to demonstrate that it is more than this: that his
effort to expose the insertion of models and metaphors
derived from our everyday interaction with the physical
world into our abstract conceptions, be they mathematical,
logical, phenomenological, theoretical, mental, or
metaphysical, runs through his later work like a single
unifying thread woven through an entire garment.
In the present work my aim is to document the road by
which Wittgenstein arrived at this conception, and to show
that it explains much that remains otherwise obscure,
ambiguous, or disconnected in his later work. We will see
that in his first writings after his return to philosophy in
1929, Wittgenstein was led along various paths of
investigation which all converged around the idea that
philosophical misconceptions are generated when we adhere to
physicalistic models in contexts where these models are
misleading. He begins by distinguishing what he calls
"visual space", and other phenomenological spaces, from the
"space" of physics and physicalistic concepts. The
distinction is reinforced by a variety of criticisms and
self-criticisms pursued in his work after 1929. He
criticizes Frege’s idea of bringing all grammatical
substantives under the title "objects". He rejects
extensional theories of infinity, which compare the latter
3
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with classes of objects, and his own earlier extensional
theory of generality. He rebukes himself and Russell for
having taken up a conception of logical analysis that
follows from the analysis of physical substances
("atomism"). Somewhat later on, he rejects "sense-data" as
an error of talking about the look of objects as if looks
were objects themselves, and he tirelessly attacks the idea
that meanings or mental phenomena bear a physical, or
causal, relationship to the world. All of these critiques
figure in the development of the idea that philosophical
problems arise from imposing physicalistic patterns of
thought on abstract concepts. This is then developed into a
general philosophical position which culminates in the
Philosophical Investigations (PI), the most important work
of Wittgenstein's later period.
1.2

The Hintikkas' Thesis

Many years after Wisdom’s articles, Jaakko and Merrill
B. Hintikka wrote of Wittgenstein’s new direction in 1929
that "he had changed his standpoint so as to make a
physicalistic language and physical objects primary in
relation to a phenomenological language and phenomenological
objects."3 This, and the Hintikkas' defense of this idea
throughout their book, shows that Wisdom’s insight was not
completely lost on future generations of Wittgenstein
scholars. Wittgenstein did, in a sense, recognize the
centrality of our concepts of the physical world and the
language we use to talk about it. The Hintikkas must be
credited with being the first to take a close look at
4
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Wittgenstein's 1929 manuscripts and offer a credible account
of the transition in his philosophy based on these. They
say, for example:
From Wittgenstein's notes it is seen that it is his
investigation of perceptual space and of its relation
to physical space that gradually forced him to focus
his attention to [sic] the contrast between
phenomenological and physical languages. In the course
of this investigation he finds more and more
differences between the two kinds of space.*
This is an accurate, if partial, picture of the direction of
Wittgenstein's philosophy, and much of what we have to say
here could be construed as taking this observation and
demonstrating that it was ramified into nearly every area of
his later work.
But the Hintikkas' approach is also more problematic
than Wisdom's simple observation, for several reasons. Much
of what Wittgenstein wrote in 1929 was motivated by a desire
to solve a problem, originally pointed out by Frank Ramsey
in his "Critical Notice" of Wittgenstein's Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus (TLP), which has become known as the “color
exclusion problem". The problem was that the logic of the
TLP could not account for all the necessary truths about our
experience of the world, such as the fact that two colors
cannot be in the same place at once; i.e., it could not
provide a phenomenology, or more generally, account for
inference relations among "elementary" propositions.
Wittgenstein's initial reaction in 1929 was to try to
develop the grammatical basis for a "phenomenological
language". The project was referred to, if somewhat
obliquely, in the 1929 article "Some Remarks on Logical
5
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Form" (SRLF); but for all practical purposes it was
abandoned within a year. The second remark in his 1930
typescript, which has been published as the Philosophical
Remarks {PR), reads: "A phenomenological language or
'primary language', as I called it, I do not now have in
mind as a goal" {PR 1,1,51; WA 11,118,6).
The editors of Wittgenstein's posthumously published
works have generally agreed that the phenomenological
project originated in the 1929 manuscripts, and this has
remained the standard interpretation5. But the Hintikkas
refused to accept that the need for such a language was
driven by, and therefore postdated, his recognition of the
color exclusion problem, and tried to show instead that the
phenomenology that was rejected was that of the TLP itself.
This cannot be right for many reasons, the simplest of which
is that what Wittgenstein says about color exclusion in the
TLP rules out the possibility that simple color attributions
are elementary propositions, and with it the possibility
that the building blocks of Tractarian facts are
phenomenological6. Just as seriously, they missed the tone
and much of the content of Wittgenstein's references to
physicalistic language. He was not "changing his basis
language from a phenomenological language to a physicalistic
one"7; he simply began to recognize the pull of
physicalistic thinking on the rest of our concepts8. He did
not try to establish a physicalistic mode of speech as
"primary", as the Hintikkas believe. Wittgenstein's

6
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transition from 1929 on is the result of an insight, not a
program.
Nor did he take the physical character of language
itself - a theme that plays a very minor role in his post1929 work - as a ground for his new conception of the
relationship between language and the objects of the world.
The Hintikkas extrapolate from some remarks Wittgenstein
made about verification and suggest that he thought we must
directly compare propositions with the physical world. They
think he was concerned that it was impossible to do this
with phenomenological propositions, and on this basis they
say that "the requirement of direct comparability leads
Wittgenstein to the thesis that only a physicalistic
language is possible"9. They then draw the conclusion, on
Wittgenstein's behalf, that "if language itself belongs to
the realm of physical objects, its sentences can be compared
in the intended strong sense only with what is physical"10.
This idea, which seems to be based on little more than a
category mistake about "comparing", they extend to matters
which goes to the heart of the PI, e.g., the relationship
between names and objects: "his switch from a
phenomenological language to a physicalistic one made it
impossible for him to define all his irreducible objects
ostensively"11. He eventually got over this hump, they
think, by appealing to definition by means of a rule12.
On our account it seems that the deeper the Hintikkas
get into the nature of Wittgenstein's transition the more
they recede from their own initial insight. It was
7
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fundamentally a recognition of the difference between the
grammar of physics and phenomenology that drove much of
Wittgenstein's development. It is unlikely that he would
have overlooked the difference between the character of
language as a physical medium of communication and as the
symbolic form of propositions, as the Hintikkas' thesis
would more or less require him to have done. Wittgenstein
showed that we are often misled by superficial grammatical
similarities, most often by the similarity between the terms
in which we describe the physical world and those we use to
describe other things which may be called abstract, logical,
or conceptual, including language. He thought that our
tendency to be misled had much to do with our
conceptualizing things like mathematics, logic, the mind,
language, or the appearances of things, in physicalistic
terms. What we say about physical things often presupposes
concepts which pertain only to physical objects: their
positions and movements in space; their persistence and
reidentification through time and qualitative change; their
causal interaction with other physical things; and the
possibility of empirically verifying propositions about
them. According to Wittgenstein, the more we bring ideas
like these into our analysis of more abstract conceptions,
the more we are likely to end up with philosophical
confusions rather than solutions.
1.3

An Overview of Wittgenstein'■ Now Perspective

We can illustrate Wittgenstein's new view by taking as
an example the way he applied it to one of the foundations
8
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of analytic philosophy. For the purposes of exposition we
will mainly be summarizing rather than quoting views that
are found in many places in his 1929 manuscripts; in later
chapters we will see much of this expressed in
Wittgenstein's own words. Every high school student knows
that any noun, including names for both concrete and
abstract things, can appear in the subject position of a
sentence. For practical purposes, there is nothing
particularly confusing about this. How then might it lead to
confusion in philosophy? Suppose we decide to call any term
that falls in this position an "object", to which some
predicate (or "concept") is applied in the rest of the
sentence or clause. Now, there is already something a little
puzzling about this; we know the use of the word "object"
from ordinary applications to chairs and apples and other
physical entities, and we don't typically use it for
whatever is denoted by words like "red", "beauty", or
"thinking", for example - all of which can be grammatical
subjects. But let us avoid getting entangled in this problem
right now, for what it leads to is really the whole of
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Let's say, for the time
being, that designating a certain syntactical position as
the position of an "object" is a mere convention; if we
understand the convention we should be able to avoid being
misled.
But suppose someone goes a step further, and proposes
that all assertoric propositions are reducible to sentences
of this "concept-object" form. Now we have a second,
9
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potentially deeper, level of confusion: we receive the
impression that this "reduction" gets at the real nature of
such propositions, that the "concept-object" form, which has
after all been derived from the superficial subjectpredicate form, gives us the ultimate logical analysis of
the sentence. According to Wittgenstein, "these forms are
the norms of our particular language into which we project
in ever so many different ways ever so many different
logical forms" (SRLF 30-1). How then can this provide us
with an analysis? Here we invite confusions born of failing
to make fine enough distinctions between the real forms of
sentences. "This stone is hard" and "Sue is thinking" look
like they have a common form in that a predicate is
"applied" to a subject, or an object "falls under" a
concept. But if we look a little closer we can see that the
senses of "applied" or "falling under" are not at all the
same: "thinking" is not a property of Sue in the same sense
that hardness is a property of the stone.
But this is still not the end of the story, or the
muddle. For now, having purportedly discovered the logical
form of all such sentences, one may go on to develop a
theory of quantification which tells us what is actually
being asserted in using such sentences. The logical form of
a sentence like, "A red circle is in my visual field" will
then be properly rendered as, "There is something that is a
red circle and it is in my visual field". The former
sentence can be used without ontological commitments, e.g.,
to red circular objects of one kind or another; and so long
10
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as we understand the sentence to mean only that a certain
symbol is present to consciousness we might be inclined to
leave things just that way. But the "analyzed" form gives a
much stronger impression that the visual image is a
"something" in the sense that a circle made of a bit of red
paint on a piece of paper is a "something", and we might
therefore expect it to obey the grammatical rules that such
objects usually do13. Aside from having properties described
by Euclidean geometry it will have those of any other
physical thing: we will say, for example, that the visual
object can be created and destroyed, and in this case we
might go further and propose an "act of mind" as a "cause"
of its existence or nonexistence. It must be able to retain
its identity while being moved about; here we will be
inclined to suggest that we "point" to it with our mind.
With these conceptions we have abandoned our ontological
neutrality and brought the object of consciousness under the
grammar of physics. As Wittgenstein might have put it in his
later work, we are using the rules of a type of language
game that pertains to physical objects to describe the
subject matter of another game altogether. In this way one
ends up asking meaningless questions and getting nonsensical
answers. This is a third level of confusion, and one that
grips us with the power of a fully developed philosophical
theory.
The problem we have gotten into may be described by an
analogy with board games; Wittgenstein often used such
analogies in his later work. Imagine we were intent on
11
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playing chess but had only a scrabble set. We might
designate the Z as king, the Q as queen, the K ’s as knights,
etc., and set them up in positions more or less like the
ones they would be in on a chess board. This would be like
trying to play a language game with mental objects but using
the rules appropriate to the language game of physics. What
if a dispute arose as to where the king should go when
someone castles? We could there and then decide on any
arbitrary rule, and create a brand new game; but suppose
someone insisted that the debate had to be settled by the
rules of chess? At that point we would have to say the
dispute was nonsense, just as if someone said they had a
mental image of a red circle and we insisted that they
measure its diameter with a mental ruler.
One of the things we can see from our first example is
that language itself is one of the main reasons for the kind
of confusions we are talking about. The subject-predicate
form is adequate in practice for the representation of many
different types of thoughts; but it makes them look very
much the same. This is true even if we ignore complications
like the different uses of the verb "to be" (the "is" of
predication, identity, etc.). According to Wittgenstein, if
we use this form as a model for analysis we are courting
danger, because we then have difficulty extracting ourselves
from the quagmire of submerged differences in logical form.
Although neither Russell, nor Frege, nor Wittgenstein in his
early work were under the impression that every assertoric
sentence is as it stands a subject-predicate sentence, they
12
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did think that if you could express a sentence as a
concatenation of simple sentences of this form, or the
relational form, and you had a determinate meaning for each
part of each sentence, you were through with your analysis.
This is what Wittgenstein now questions. (See Appendix I for
a discussion and translation of Wittgenstein's remarks on
subject-predicate form.)
Let's consider another example. Take the two sentences,
"A mind is a heap or collection of perceptions"14 and "The
medulla oblongata is a wondrous and beauteous object"15.
They appear to have similar grammatical forms,* roughly, a
subject with a split predicate. Yet it would make complete
nonsense to substitute the subject of one for the other.
This suggests that there are significant logical differences
between these assertions. Now, no one, hopefully, would be
so dull as to justify a philosophical theory - for instance,
a materialist theory of consciousness - solely on the fact
that "the mind" and "the medulla oblongata" can both be
grammatical subjects. It would take many more premises and
arguments before one was willing to say, e.g., "The belief
that dogs bark is just a particular physical state of the
brain", or some such thing. Nevertheless, in Wittgenstein's
view, if materialism is indeed a mistake, the best method of
discovering where it went wrong is to describe the actual
grammatical forms of meaningful propositions about mental
phenomena and contrast them with the superficial grammatical
forms that we adopt when speaking from our experience of the
physical world. This procedure, which he tirelessly pursues
13
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in the PI and all of the works leading up to it, reveals
both the actual grammar of our concepts, as in the first
quote at the head of this chapter, and the grammatical
errors that result from leaning on superficial forms, like
the one described in the second quote,
A very clear example of this perspective is found in
notes taken from a lecture Wittgenstein gave in 1930, only
about a year after he began working out his new philosophy.
The example is especially useful because the lectures were
given in English. He is expounding the idea that "thought is
a symbolic process" rather than a physiological one. In this
context he says:
It may involve images and these we think of as being
"in the mind". This simile of "inside" or "outside" the
mind is pernicious. It is derived from "in the head"
when we think of ourselves as looking out from our
heads and of thinking as something going on "in our
head". But we then forget the picture and go on using
language derived from it. Similarly man's spirit was
pictured as his breath, then the picture was forgotten,
but the language derived from it retained. We can only
safely use such language if we consciously remember the
picture when we use it. (WL30 25)
The remarks about mental images are almost certainly
directed at Russell, who based an entire theory of mind on
mental images in The Analysis of Mind {AM) (1921) . The
picture of consciousness as breath may be ancient but had
recently been used by William James in a famous essay16.
Wittgenstein is therefore far from inventing straw men.
What, then, is he saying about these alleged errors? That
they are based on the use of a picture that is derived from
extremely basic linguistic habits, habits so simple that we
ignore them for being too obvious. We have a picture that
14
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consists of a brain, physical processes in the brain, and a
world of external objects that bear some causal relation to
these internal processes. Now we say: mental "objects" are
"in" the mind, applying the double metaphor of taking the
representation of an external object as an "object" and
assigning thoughts a position "in" the mind. Wittgenstein
says that so long as we remember that "in the mind" is
derived from "in the head” and the picture that goes with
it, we will easily see where the true forms of the two
phrases diverge, and avoid nonsensical extensions of the
picture. But suppose we retain the picture and forget its
origin? Now we are off in search of private mental objects,
causal relations between mental terms, "mentalese"
sentences, etc. At this point philosophy has made the leap
into a morass of puzzles and paradoxes.
If the above example provides a straightforward outline
of Wittgenstein’s basic idea, the following is an instance
of the kind of passage that can only be rightly understood
by keeping in mind these more explicit expressions. This
passage is from The Blue Book (BIB) , a series of dictations
also given in English. Its complexity may be partly
attributable to the fact that by the time it was composed,
in 1933-4, Wittgenstein had already worked out his ideas in
several thousand pages of manuscripts, at least twice
compiled them into typescripts with a view toward
dissemination, lectured on them at Cambridge for five years,
and argued them in numerous philosophical colloquia and
private conversations. Complex ideas are compressed into a
15
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phrase or two, as if his audience already knew what he
meant. Thus he writes to Russell, to whom he sent a copy of
these dictations a couple of years later, "I think it's very
difficult to understand them, as so many points are just
hinted at. They are meant only for the people who heard the
lectures" (BIB vii). The passage in question comes after he
has just distinguished “propositions of which we may say
that they describe facts in the material world (external
world)" (BIB 46)

and those "describing personal experiences"

(BIB 47). Of the former he says,
Roughly speaking, they treat of physical objects:
bodies, fluids, etc. I am not thinking in particular of
the laws of the natural sciences, but of any such
proposition as "the tulips in our garden
arein full
bloom", or "Smith will come in any moment". (BIB 46)
This is an important remark to keep in mind: by
physicalistic language, or what he simply calls "physics" at
some points, Wittgenstein does not mean anything technical
or even any general proposition about physical objects or
their behavior; he means the ordinary language we use to
talk about the physical world (language which simply takes
for granted that there is a physical world) as opposed to,
say, our perceptions of it. By the second sort of
proposition Wittgenstein understands descriptions of
someone *s "sense-experiences":
say his visual experience, independent of what bodies
are actually before his eyes and, n.b., independent
also of any process which might be observed to take
place in his retina, his nerves, his brain, or any
other parts of his body. (That is, independent of both
physical and physiological facts.) (BIB 47)

16
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The dichotomy, then, is between propositions that are bound
up with physical objects and those that are "independent" of
physical objects and also of any assumptions about physical
causes of phenomena.
This much is reasonably clear; but what he says after
it is not so obvious. We will give the paragraph in full:
At first sight it may appear (but why it should can
only become clear later) that here we have two kinds of
worlds, worlds built of different materials; a mental
world and a physical world. The mental world in fact is
liable to be imagined as gaseous, or rather aethereal.
But let me remind you here of the queer role which the
gaseous and the aethereal play in philosophy,- when we
perceive that a substantive is not used as what in
general we should call the name of an object, and when
therefore we can't help saying to ourselves that it is
the name of an aethereal object. I mean, we already
know the idea of ’aethereal objects' as a subterfuge,
when we are embarrassed about the grammar of certain
words, and when all we know is that they are not used
as names for material objects. This is a hint as to how
the problem of the two materials, mind and matter, is
going to dissolve. (BIB 47)
How is the problem of dualism going to "dissolve"? Why does
he call the shadowy existence of abstract objects or mental
concepts a "subterfuge"? What is the "queer role which the
gaseous and the aethereal play in philosophy"? How are we
"embarrassed"? What I hope to accomplish with the present
reading of Wittgenstein is to make the understanding of
passages like these, and other yet more hermetic remarks,
more easily available by reading them in the light of
statements like the one above from the 1930 lectures. What
Wittgenstein is saying in the Blue Book is at bottom the
same as what he was saying in the earlier lectures. We have
language games that involve physical objects; they are very
much our ordinary form of speech. We also have a grammar for
17
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phenomenological objects; yet the very word "object", except
in philosophy, already suggests the grammar of physics. The
"object of vision" is a tree or a cloud or a painting; but
when we try to describe it as a phenomenon independent of a
physical basis we come up with "visual objects" that are not
trees or clouds but images of them, sense-data, or something
like that17. Then the philosophical question arises: what
kind of objects are these? What are their properties? We
will begin with the little firm ground we have (or think we
have), by following the intuitions that arise from the fact
that their names, like those of any other noun, are
grammatical "substantives". Even if we do not immediately
make the leap to calling these objects "substances" we will
conduct our investigation under the impression that they
share much of the grammar of the names of ordinary physical
objects. But we encounter obvious difficulties in pursuing
this. So, like the image of God as an aethereal man who sits
on a cloud and wields unusual powers, we resort to the idea
that the world is partly comprised of mental or phenomenal
objects that are like ghosts of physical ones and have
ghostly properties. This is our "subterfuge", our
"embarrassment": having gotten ourselves into a bind by
taking names for physical objects as a model for all
substantives, even those that refer to non-spatiotemporal
concepts, and being in the uncomfortable position of having
to describe the unusual new material of which part of the
world is supposed to be made, we take refuge in ghostly
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metaphors: phenomenal objects are to physical ones as gasses
are to solids - aethereal, intangible, but somehow real18.
Here again, there is no straw man. From the Cartesian
soul and Locke's "something I know not what", to the
predictable anti-materialist responses of Berkeley and Hume,
the history of modern philosophy is strewn with examples of
the alternating swings of dualism and skepticism around this
issue. In Wittgenstein's time the issue turned on the
question of ''sense-data'', the putative cognizable emanations
of material objects. Russell and Moore, Wittgenstein's two
main pedagogues as a philosophy student, spared no effort in
this regard, trying time and again to say exactly whac
sense-data were. Once Wittgenstein realized the implications
of the grammatical philosophy he was developing he saw that
he could reject the dichotomy of "the two materials"
altogether. The problem of dualism will "dissolve" when we
retrace our steps and recognize the picture (the model, or
metaphor) that led us to talk this way in the first place.
Then we can save what is useful in it and reject the
fallacious inferences we made along the way.
An integral part of the view presented here is that
Wittgenstein held these ideas right through his later work,
and that they culminated in the PI. Thus I will hold that
some of the most famous parts of the PI including the
opening passages and the private language argument, are
expositions of these same views. This will not be the first
time such ideas have been noticed in the PI. John Hunter,
speaking of Wittgenstein’s discussion of pain and private
19
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language, writes that the "unifying thread" in these
sections is the idea that "nearly all the philosophical
perplexity about pain derives from construing the grammar of
the words like 'pain' on a typical model of object and
name", or simply from construing pain as "a something"19.
Here an important component of our interpretation of
Wittgenstein is applied to one of the most famous and
central passages in his work. Stanley Cavell has noticed the
same thing with regard to Wittgenstein's ideas about
ostensive definition20. If the view presented here is
correct, it can be taken as one of the "unifying threads" of
the entire work.
1.4

Advantages of the Present Reading

I try to show in what follows that with these thoughts
in mind, one may unlock a great many apparent difficulties
of Wittgenstein's work. Aside from the applications
mentioned above, there are also many more subtle ways in
which the views about the grammar of physics make their way
into his work, and they often render his texts obscure
unless one knows what is going on. For example, throughout
his work, analogies are constantly being made with
mechanical devices, tools, boxes, chemical processes, and
ordinary physical objects (chairs, apples, hats, etc.). The
point of these analogies often rests partly or wholly on the
fact that the pictures described involve paradigmatic
physical relations. Wittgenstein doesn't say this; but he
attempts to show us, with these analogies, the misleading
formulations that result when this kind of relation is taken
20
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as a model for other things, i.e., when the grammar of
physics is misapplied.
Another example can be seen from the two quotes at the
head of this chapter. The meaning of the first is fairly
obvious, so long as one is reasonably familiar with the
attempts of Russell, Moore, and others to describe what we
can know of the world in terms of perceptible "sense-data".
Wittgenstein says that when we speak in the ordinary, nonphilosophical way we usually talk about objects in the world
and not about inferences from them; if we say "I perceive a
such-and-such" we usually mean a tree and not some sensory
emanation from a tree. Now if we keep this mode of speech
but start talking about "perceiving" the emanations (i.e.,
the sense-data) rather than the tree we are on the verge of
falling into an abyss of confusion and nonsense. In the
second passage, though, it almost looks as if Wittgenstein
wants to deny that we do any such thing as "thinking"! But
if we decline to attribute this absurd doctrine to him the
passage threatens to turn into an essay in obscurantism. It
is only by making a series of inferences about his meaning,
along the lines suggested here, that it once again becomes
comprehensible. We have names for physical processes that
involve bodily motions which we can observe, and these names
are comparable to names for observable physical objects. We
can call these motions "activities". But "thinking" seems to
be very much on a par with "writing" and "speaking", the
only difference being that it has no comparable physical
manifestation. So we will treat the word "thinking" as a
21
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name for an "activity" that is just not observable. But if
the activities of speaking and writing take place in the
body, where is the analogous place for thinking? Of course,
it is "in the head". Now the analogy is complete, and the
grammar of physics has been neatly transferred to
epistemology and phenomenology - with the result being a
primitive Cartesian picture. In this and similar ways, the
reading of Wittgenstein given here can help draw off the
veil of obscurity from parts of his work that can seem quite
perplexing.
Aside from this, many wild and fantastic ideas which
have been attributed to Wittgenstein, as well as some quite
sane and standard views, must be false if the present
reading is correct. An example of the latter is the work of
the Hintikkas already mentioned; of the former, we may take
John W. Cook’s Wittgenstein 's Metaphysics, in which
Wittgenstein is made out to have been a lifelong
phenomenalist who denied the existence of physical objects
and causes (a position Cook describes - inaccurately - as a
version of "neutral monism"). Cook presents many examples of
passages which support the interpretation of Wittgenstein
offered here, such as those in which Wittgenstein points out
that we can only talk about sense-impressions by talking
about physical objects; but then he typically draws
conclusions like, "he obviously [concludes] that, when one
speaks of a tree or a hand, one is speaking (in the only way
one can) of sense-impressions"21. What Cook says here may be
literally true: Wittgenstein thinks that if we can talk
22
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

about sense-data at all it is by referring to physical
objects in a peculiar way. But what Cook means is that
according to Wittgenstein all that exists is sense-data,
which is wrong. Except perhaps for a very short period
immediately after his return to philosophy in 1929,
Wittgenstein was no more a phenomenalist than a physicalist;
nor yet was he a neutral monist or "New Realist" in the
proper sense, i.e, someone who believes that a single type
of element is the basic component of all reality, the
distinction between physical and mental being a matter of
the purpose or perspective of the observer on a given
occasion. Indeed, the passage cited above from the Blue Book
is immediately followed by a denial of this central thesis
of neutral monism (BIB 48). Wittgenstein believed that
dualism and neutral monism were both the result of
grammatical misunderstandings, and it is no more likely that
he subscribed to the one than the other22.
Another advantage of our reading is that many of
Wittgenstein's more famous ideas and remarks, which are
perhaps in some sense admirable for their variety,
nevertheless gain a kind of unity that is not usually found
in other views of this philosopher. Some of this will be
obvious from what has been said above. From his critique of
the Tractatus to his remarks on mathematical concepts to his
ideas about private language, the notion of confusion over
the grammatical relationship between the physical and non
physical provides a vantage point from which to survey his
views. It is a simple matter to show that he brings in this
23
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idea at some point in most of the important topics he
considers from 1929 until the PI. It is more difficult to
demonstrate that there is a higher level of unity here, that
many of the ideas and insights actually flow from his ideas
about the grammar of physics and how it interferes with
philosophical discourse. By the end of this work I hope to
have at least made plausible the claim that this is indeed
the case.
1.5

Rule-Following, Intenaionality, and tha Xnfinita

One important question we have not yet addressed is how
this perspective relates to Wittgenstein's conception of
rule-following, which is usually taken to be central to his
later philosophy. The most concise description of this
relation is that over the course of his efforts from 1929 on
Wittgenstein came to treat rule-following as standing in
dialectical opposition to the grammar of physics. Two
related ideas actually emerged in tandem, though
Wittgenstein did not fully appreciate the connection until
later. One was the notion that our ideas and expressions
about abstract concepts are often distorted by physicalistic
presuppositions. The other was the idea that many concepts
which we tend to think of as extensional, i.e., as being
instantiated in some class of objects, are really
intensional concepts whose complete description is given by
a rule. The connection is apparent if we allow that even
when the individuals in the extension of some class term
would not normally be thought of as physical, the very idea
of an "extension" suggests a denumerable set of items, a
24
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bounded area, a temporal sequence of events, or even, for
instance, a mental state or image which is again conceived
physicalistically23. Wittgenstein saw that in many cases,
where thinking of a term as denoting a class of objects
could lead to physicalistic misconceptions, the same term
can be better understood as a rule for the generation of
other terms. The latter terms are only "constructions" as
Wittgenstein puts it, not "objects". Thus in one broad
motion he was able to sweep away one set of philosophical
assumptions based on the relation of name and object and
replace it with one based on the concept of a rule.
Wittgenstein’s study of rules and numerical series
begins only a few pages into his first 1929 notebook (Band
I), in an account of an exchange with Ramsey. He says, "I
once said there was no extensional infinity". Ramsey, by way
of counterexample, had asked if one could not imagine a man
who simply never dies. Wittgenstein says he can imagine a
wheel that keeps on turning, but that a difficulty remains:
It seems to me nonsense to say that infinitely many
bodies are in a space as, so to speak, something
accidental. On the other hand I can imagine
(mir...denken) an intensional infinite law (or infinite
rule) through which they are always newly produced - ad
infinitum - but naturally only what a rule can produce,
namely constructions.
And now it seems that the infinite rotations of a
wheel are constructions, whereas I cannot construct new
objects.24 {WA 1,8,6)
The basic opposition - object vs. product of a rule - was
thus understood right from the start, though there is no
indication in this first notebook how important this
distinction will be as it is unfolded in his later work.
25
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The remarks on infinity are resumed beginning with the
very last remark in Band I, again with reference to a remark
of Ramsey's, and the study of infinity, generality, rules
and series is pursued vigorously throughout the next
manuscript, Band II. The possibility of an intensional
solution is repeated again and again, in relation to the
meaning of both infinity and generality. For instance, he
says, "All paradoxes of infinity are solved when one
observes (einsieht) that in the area of infinite numberseries only intensional generality has sense" (WA 1,115,2).
The discussion rarely strays very far from the distinction
between the extensional interpretation of a series and the
intensional one, and the problem of grammatical confusion
caused by viewing infinity or generality through the lens of
physics is explicitly noted at many points along the way,
e.g.:
To the objection: "but if there were nevertheless
infinitely may things" one can only answer: "but there
aren'tI" And what makes us think that perhaps there are
is that we confuse the things of physics with the
elements of knowledge. {WA 1,140,6; PR XII,147,168)
Here the phrase “elements of knowledge" refers to the
phenomenological, which he also sometimes calls the
"primary", or the world of "data" [PR XII,147,169; WA
1,23,2), as in "sense-data". So what is suggested here is
once again the physics-phenomenology distinction, but this
time in the context of pointing out the wrong way of
conceiving the nature of a rule or series.
Wittgenstein's interest in the concept of infinity
begins early and continues through his work in the early
26
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1930s. He is reported to have begun sounding like his later
self after a lecture in March 1928 by L.E.J. Brouwer,
entitled "Mathematics, Science, and Language"; it has even
been said that this lecture is what prompted his return to
philosophy25. Brouwer deals with the concept of infinity at
various points in this lecture, especially in the third
section, where he defends the intuitionist rejection of the
law of the excluded middle.26 Russell commented that what
Wittgenstein says on infinity "is always in danger of
becoming what Brouwer has said" {WA I,x). What this suggests
is that what Wittgenstein wrote on infinity was largely
influenced by his exposure to Brouwer’s ideas, even if in
certain ways he disagreed with Brouwer27. As his thoughts on
this subject developed, they mutated into that aspect of his
later philosophy that is usually referred to as the concept
of "following a rule". This explains why the concept of
infinity occupies a place in his early work out of all
proportion to what one would expect in manuscripts
putatively devoted to the study of visual space and
phenomenology. Wittgenstein gave a lecture on infinity in
place of delivering "Some Remarks on Logical Form"28 at a
meeting of the Aristotelian Society in 1929, rejecting a
defense of his earlier views in favor of a hint of his later
ones. He included lengthy sections on infinity in the PR;
Chapter XII is entirely devoted to this subject, and Chapter
XI, on generality, touches on it at many points29. The socalled Big Typescript (BT) ends with a section of more than
40 pages on "The Infinite in Mathematics". In short, the
27
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concept of infinity, as well as the idea of generality,
which is closely related to this in Wittgenstein's work, was
not only one of his main interests in returning to
philosophy but one of the most important areas in which his
ideas about rule-following were developed. If what we have
said here shows that the distinction between extensional and
intensional interpretations of the infinite was the main
point of these explorations, then it also justifies us in
saying that rule-following became the dialectical partner of
the grammar of physics, showing us the correct grammar of
many of our concepts where physicalistic language is
misleading.
Another important pursuit of his middle period, which
eventually overtook and surpassed the concept of infinity in
the number of remarks devoted to it, is the concept of
expectation, and related ideas about recognition and
fulfillment. Work on this begins in earnest in his Band III
manuscript, and comprises an important part of the
discussion in the PR, the BT, the Philosophical Grammar
(which is basically a part of the BT incorporating some of
Wittgenstein's editorial revisions, plus some other
material), and to a lesser extent, the PI. These ideas are
originally developed as a defense of the picture theory
against a causal theory of meaning put forward by Russell
(in AM) and C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards in The Meaning of
Meaning30. Wittgenstein’s comments on this subject amount to
an attempt to apply the picture theory to the concept of
intentionality: the main idea is that an expectation or
28
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intention is a picture of its fulfillment, so the notion of
a "recognition" of the fulfillment is otiose. The theory
that holds that a separate act of "recognition" is necessary
brings in a third element to justify, so to speak, the
reoccurrence of the picture as fulfillment. But then the
question is, how do we match the recognition-picture against
the expectation-picture? Do we need yet another picture?
This leads to a psychological regress, of the sort that is
alluded to in the first section of the PI.
This whole subject of expectation, or intentionality,
in Wittgenstein’s work is complex and, in general, beyond
the scope of the present work. But it is worth pointing out
that a rule is not only an intension but an intention, that
is, it is like a picture that anticipates some future
fulfillment (the values of a series, for example). The
converse is also true: an intention is a kind of rule for
the formation of pictures. The idea of intentionality as
rule-following can relieve us of the notion that a thought,
concept, or intention is a kind of object in the mind; it
diverts us from such unhelpful inquiries as what it is, how
it is stored, or how we manage to locate it in our mental
warehouse (all ideas which presuppose that terms denoting
mental phenomena are extensional), and turns our attention
towards questions like how we learn it, what we might
normally call using or following it, and what its role is in
our practices. These matters will have some bearing on the
PI and the private language argument.

29
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But we need not explain every aspect of Wittgenstein’s
work as directly parasitic on his ideas about the grammar of
physics; it is enough that the relationship, however
indirect, is clear. The idea of rule-following became in the
later work a way of describing much about the world that is
not enlightened but rather obscured by being construed on a
physical model. It is a testament to the variety and
fecundity of Wittgenstein's thought that such diverse topics
as the nature of infinity and the grammar of intentionality
could be usefully explored within the framework of a
dialectic between rule-following and the grammar of physics.
1.6

Anticipations of tha Praaant Perspective

Although the views I am attributing to Wittgenstein
have not gone unrecognized as they pertain to particular
aspects of his thought, they have rarely been taken as a
fundamental insight out of which much of his work flowed.
The brief articles by Wisdom mentioned above are among the
few exceptions. Many leading interpreters of Wittgenstein,
including some of his students, have paid little attention
to the developments we are focusing on. Other scholars have
taken the evidence for them to be just one among many
interesting (or peculiar) ideas that Wittgenstein had over
the course of his career. Some, however, have hit upon
aspects of the present view and expounded them in ways that
support our interpretation. Here we will briefly survey some
of the more significant examples, in addition to the abovementioned work of Wisdom, the Hintikkas, and Hunter.
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Ernst Konrad Specht, in The Foundations of
Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy (1963), one of the earliest
published interpretations of Wittgenstein's later work,
stressed the continuity of Wittgenstein's concern with the
ontology of objects from the TLP to the PI. In this context
he points out in various ways how Wittgenstein sought, in
his later work, to show us that the "objects" of every
language game cannot be understood on the model of naming or
ostensive definition31. Though I do not entirely agree with
Specht's ontological interpretation of both the early and
the later work, he anticipated some of what I have to say
about the transformation of Wittgenstein's philosophy in
1929. He stresses the new grammatical formation rules for
objects in the PI as a replacement for the ontology of the
TLP. I suggest below that there was a breakup of the uniform
ontology of Tractarian logical objects into objects
particularized to different "spaces", or different
grammatical rules. Though I give more of a genealogy than he
does, we end up at approximately the same place.
David Pears, in The False Prison, V.2 (1988) has
focused on the role of Wittgenstein’s rejection of the
scientific model of philosophy in the transition to his
later work. It is his later rejection of theorizing,
according to Pears, that forms the backdrop to the change in
his philosophy, and this rejection is aimed at the
methodology of the TLP, among other things. This thesis
compliments in certain ways what we will say about
Wittgenstein's rejection of the Tractarian model of
31
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analysis. It also places a little too much emphasis, in my
view, both on the anti-theoretical stance of the later work
and on the adoption of scientific method as a model for
philosophy under the banner of "logical atomism" in the TLP.
But constructing theories is paradigmatically something we
do to understand the physical world, a method that
"penetrates phenomena and reveals their underlying
structure", as Pears puts it32. To this extent,
Wittgenstein's rejection of philosophical theorizing and of
any appeal to the "method of physics" in philosophy is part
and parcel of his recognition that the grammar of physics
tends to be misleading when it is made the implicit basis of
philosophical explanation.
Stuart Shanker has written excellent essays on
Wittgenstein's rejection of Russell's causal theory of
meaning in AM and the role this played in the transition to
Wittgenstein's later philosophy33. The rejection of causal
explanation in the philosophy of mind is a hallmark of
Wittgenstein's later work, and like the objections to the
scientific model and to universalizing the name-object
relationship, it is an integral component of the picture I
am trying to give of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. These
stand on common ground with all the other ways in which
Wittgenstein tried to distinguish the patterns of thought
and language we apply in dealing with the physical world
from the grammar of all other spheres of discourse. Causal
explanation is so much a part of our understanding of the
world around us that it hardly seems like a leap at all to
32
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suggest, for instance, that the meaning of a word is an
object which causes us to have an image or concept. We think
of causal explanation as being at least categorically
appropriate, if not automatically correct, wherever an
explanation of any sort is called for. But if Wittgenstein
is right it is as much a category mistake when dealing with
psychological concepts as behaviorism or physicalism. It is
a part, indeed a basis, of the grammar of physics, and it
leads us away from a description of the grammar of mental
concepts (which is all we can properly hope to give) down
the garden path of scientific explanation.
Two authors, P.M.S. Hacker, in Insight and Illusion and
(with G.P. Baker) Understanding and Meaning, and David
Stern, in Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, have touched in
so many ways on themes that are emphasized here that it
would be difficult to summarize all the ways in which they
anticipate this work. Hacker, for instance, like Hunter and
Specht, has said a great deal about Wittgenstein's rejection
of the idea "that every word is the name of an object"34,
but in a somewhat different vein than Specht's ontological
approach. Stern has considered Wittgenstein's emphasis on
the distinction between physical and nonphysical "space"35,
and the many ways in which we place our phenomenological
concepts in physical time, as if in something that "flows"
like a river36. I could easily have cited numerous passages
from both their works in support of claims made here.
Moreso that anyone else, Robert Alva NoS has
anticipated the account given here of Wittgenstein's
33
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phenomenological period and its place in his transition. In
his article "Wittgenstein, Phenomenology and What it Makes
Sense to Say" he put forth a view of the transition in
Wittgenstein's philosophy that accords with the present one
in numerous details. He emphasizes the importance of the
physics-phenomenology distinction and the errors of
construing things on the model of physicalistic language. He
understands the importance of the shift that took place when
Wittgenstein suggested, in SRLF, that we must look at the
phenomena themselves ("in a certain sense a posteriori")
rather than guessing at logical possibilities. His reaction
to the Hintikkas' work is similar to mine. He understands
the basic movement from the color exclusion problem, to the
philosophy of "spaces", to philosophical grammar. He also
understands that the advent of the grammatical philosophy
was the demise of a concept of analysis to which
Wittgenstein had subscribed in his early work. In these and
many more specialized points we are in complete agreement,
and there are few major points in his article to which I
would not subscribe.37 His article could serve as an
introduction to most of the matters under discussion here.
But it would be unfair to all these authors to suggest
that they would necessarily fall in line behind all my
claims. The fundamental point to be defended here is that
all these themes are facets or manifestations of a single
basic insight regarding our misapplication of the grammar of
physics. Herein lies a difficulty. The thesis that all these
trends in Wittgenstein's thought are connected admits only
34
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of being made plausible, not of demonstration on the order
of proof. No amount of textual evidence (of which we can
only offer selections from the abundant examples that could
be brought in to support our view) nor the testimony of any
number of experts can establish beyond any doubt that a
single insight runs throughout much of Wittgenstein's later
work. I therefore try to encircle rather than slay the
beast, by demonstrating several less elusive points: that
such a metanarrative can be reconciled with a number of
different prominent themes in his work; that he frequently,
and in many different contexts, stated explicitly the
fundamental idea I am attributing to him - without, however,
saying that it is the trunk to which many of the branches of
his philosophy are attached; and that keeping this
perspective in mind can help unravel many knotty passages in
Wittgenstein’s notoriously elusive prose. On these arguments
rides the success or failure of my project.
The fact that we can show that Wittgenstein states his
view forthrightly in several contexts protects us from at
least one type of misadventure, i.e., that of picturing
Wittgenstein as a crank with a hidden agenda. For instance,
Cook’s above-mentioned work has, on the surface, a similar
form to ours: he gathers a plethora of textual evidence from
Wittgenstein’s work to demonstrate that Wittgenstein held a
particular view, which Cook calls "neutral monism" but which
is in fact a naive phenomenalism, that he does not
explicitly attest to owning. Because Wittgenstein does often
discuss phenomenology without explicitly committing himself
35
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to one view or another, Cook is able to prod Wittgenstein’s
texts, with the help of numerous interpolations and
extrapolations, into saying what he wants them to say. I am
confident that the present thesis has nothing in common with
this methodology: the task is to argue that the insights
which are explicitly stated by Wittgenstein have a larger
scope than is obvious from individual contexts. Others, like
Eric Stenius and Saul Kripke, have offered more credible and
interesting interpretations which, nonetheless, faltered due
to one or another serious misunderstanding38. One can never
be sure that anything worthy of the name interpretation will
not so falter; but in this case it can at least be said that
if someone wishes to deny the ground on which the
interpretation rests they will have a rough time explaining
away the evidence for it.
1.7

Arm Wittgenstein'■ Views Sound?

The question of the merit of the views I am ascribing
to Wittgenstein is a difficult one. I have tried to expound
sympathetically what I believe to be his philosophical
views, and I have not made any effort to avoid committing
myself to the proposition that they are least useful and
insightful. Since the object here is mainly exegetical
introducing lengthy justifications or criticisms in the body
of the text would interrupt the flow of the argument beyond
any tolerable limit, given its already tortuous task of
following the several routes by which (I argue) Wittgenstein
arrived at this view. The main danger of this elision is
that Wittgenstein’s sympathizers will withdraw from, and his
36
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critics celebrate, the apparent simplicity (or
alternatively, naivetd) of what I am calling his basic
insight. My reaction to this is that the greatest and most
influential philosophers are those who have taken a simple
insight and clung to it as to a rock in raging sea, applying
the fundamental idea to diverse areas of thought; think of
Plato, Descartes, Kant and Hegel, for example, in this
connection. Since this may not convince everyone though, I
conclude Chapter 6 with some evaluative thoughts
Wittgenstein's ideas.
Whether they will ultimately be accepted and whether
they are the best method for philosophy I do not pretend to
know. One reason his views may have had a hard time gaining
general acceptance is that they seem to come in a package,
and many philosophers don't like what they find at the
bottom of it. If one accepts his claims about the nature and
cause of philosophical problems (at least if one does so on
the basis of what he himself says) one is more or less
committed to accepting the validity of his grammatical
method. Granting that, one has more or less been drawn into
his view of the nature of philosophy as sorting out
grammatical errors. But this in turn leads directly to the
idea that the only valid work to be done in philosophy, now
or in the future, is to unearth misplaced metaphors and
mislaid pictures; and very few philosophers want to believe
that. As Wittgenstein himself suggests (in a somewhat
different context) at the end of the TLP, the correct method
in philosophy would turn out to be something that seems to
37
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have nothing to do with philosophy. I do not share this
worry. To the extent that Wittgenstein's philosophy would
make some of the endless circular debates about ontology or
epistemology obsolete, I am all for it. But nothing
Wittgenstein says in his later work would keep us from doing
ethics, aesthetics, or political philosophy, or from
discussing what philosophers have said through the ages, or
investigating the nature of scientific inquiry or
mathematical truth, or learning new ways to apply and extend
formal logic; or taking the course that Wittgenstein himself
pursued and investigating the grammar of our psychological
concepts. This seems like enough to keep philosophers in
business indefinitely.
1.8

Caveats

As with any proposal that looks like an architectonic
view of a philosopher's work, there is a danger of
exaggerating the claims. It may be thought that I am
suggesting a kind of magic key that with enough force or
ingenuity can be used to unlock every word Wittgenstein
wrote, every idea he had. I sincerely doubt that anyone will
find such a key, and I hardly claim to have done so myself.
Wittgenstein's own thought displays the very variety and
complexity to which he constantly drew attention in our use
of language. It would be astonishing if every one of his
ideas were driven by exactly the same insights or
considerations. He goes down too many streets, and his blind
alleys and dead ends are often more interesting than the
parkways and boulevards of other philosophers. There is no
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hidden agenda, be it the grammar of the physical, some
putative phenomenalism, latter day German idealism, or any
other, whose discovery opens the door to his every
utterance. I believe that my metanarrative of his work
reveals a great deal about it, but it does not force
everything he says into a mould and put future scholarship
to rest.
Thus, if someone wishes to point to a particular
passage and challenge the idea that it could be explained by
his belief that we transfer conceptions from the physical
sphere, I do not feel compelled to insist that it must be
so. His ideas about culture (many of them published in
Culture and Value) are one obvious category of writings
which probably owe little to the present perspective. I am
not sure that his ideas in On Certainty or the Remarks on
Color owe much to it either, though one can certainly find
connections. While I have tried to show that his ideas about
rule-following and the nature of intentions are related to
the present discussion, they do not flow directly from the
points I am making but act as complementary ideas. Moreover,
much of the richness of his discussion has to do with the
limits of rule-following, and this is largely independent of
the dialogue with extensionalism. There is a train of
thought in the PI that Pears has referred to as
"naturalism"39 that has little to do, so far as I can see,
with the grammar of physics. The concept of interpretation
that he explores at length in the Remarks on the Philosophy
of Psychology is more directly related to the rule-following
39
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idea than to the grammar of physics. There is much in the
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics that can be
enlightened by the view presented here. For instance, in the
discussion of possibility, compulsion, trying, etc. (Part I,
roughly 117-132) the argument turns on the difference
between the possibility or necessity of movement in a
mechanical system (the grammar of physics) and the logical
possibility or necessity of producing new instances of a
series ("the hardness of the logical must" (121)). Still, it
would be absurd to say that everything, or even most, of
what Wittgenstein says about mathematics follows from his
views on the grammar of physics. There may be other
important areas of his thought that I have not mentioned
that do not proceed directly from his ideas about the
grammar of physics.
I claim only that one cannot hope to understand what
continuity there is in his later philosophical writings on
mind, language, logic and mathematics without realizing that
he takes ordinary language to be largely based on the
grammar, or conceptual structure, of the language games we
use to describe physical objects and processes; and he
believes we go wrong in philosophy when we uncritically
pursue analogies based on this grammar in our theories of
mental and abstract concepts. However much may not be
explained by this perspective, there is little or nothing in
his work that contradicts it and a great deal of very
explicit evidence for it. If by the end of this work we have
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shown this to be a plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein
the project may be deemed a success.
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NOTKS
1. Wisdom, "Ludwig Wittgenstein", in Fann (1978), pp.46-47.
On the idea that "the soul is a little man within" see also
Anthony Kenny, "The Homunculus Fallacy", pp.156-7.
2. Wisdom considered this so central to what Wittgenstein
had to say that he returned to and elaborated this theme
several years later in the article "A Feature of
Wittgenstein’s Technique".
3. Hintikka and Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p.144.
4. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p.163.
5. See the note by B.F. McGuinness in WK 45n6; and Rush
Rhees, "Editor's Note" in PR p.349. Michael Nedo suggests
that the remarks about phenomenology refer to conversations
with the Vienna Circle and he relates these to Mach's
phenomenalism (WA I,vii). Whatever the merit of this view,
it at least locates these references within the period we
are talking about. See also NoS, "Wittgenstein,
Phenomenology..."; Newen, ”Die Entwicklung der
Wittgensteinschen Sprachphilosophie"; and Stern,
Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, p. 15.
6. See TLP 6.3741; and NB 8 January 1917, p.91. Cf. G.E.M.
Anscombe, An Introduction..., pp.27-29; P.M.S. Hacker,
Insight and Illusion, p.87; and Irving Copi, "Objects,
Properties, and Relations in the Tractatus", p. 183.
7. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p.144.
8. The Hintikkas occasionally show a dim awareness of this
idea, without having a clue to its significance. For
instance, they say: "In his early middle-period writings,
Wittgenstein often argues that this or that concept has been
illicitly extended from its normal uses in physicalistic
contexts to a purely phenomenological application"
(Investigating Wittgenstein, p.242) . But they mention this
only to demonstrate (allegedly) that Wittgenstein’s
arguments against phenomenological languages were not very
strong at this time.
9. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p.165.
10.

Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, pp.165-6.

11. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p.184.
12. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p. 186.
13. See WL32 pp.68-9 where Wittgenstein makes the same point
in his own words.
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14. Hume, more or less; see A Treatise of Human Nature
(i,iv,2; p.207).
15. Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p.401.
16. James, "Does Consciousness Exist?", in James (1967)
p.37.
17. This point is made frequently in Wittgenstein1s later
work. His 1936 lectures, published by Rush Rhees as "The
Language of Sense Data and Private Experience" (LSDPE), are
largely devoted to this topic. See especially pp.312,356-7;
also PR V,49,82, and VI,57, 88; BIB 64.
18. Cf. RFM Part 1,119,83: "'But I can infer only what
actually does follow.' - That is to say: what the logical
machine really does produce. The logical machine - that
would be an all-pervading ethereal mechanism. - We must give
warning against this picture." Wittgenstein also uses the
metaphor of the "gaseous" soul in WL32 (p.32).
19. Hunter, Understanding Wittgenstein, pp.126-127
20. Cavell, "Notes and Afterthoughts...", p.274.
21. Cook, Wittgenstein's Metaphysics, p.92; see also the
examples on p.91 and his statement that "one must not...
take what he says here to show that he had abandoned
phenomenalism". But of course this is just what they do
show.
22. The most thorough effort to refute Cook’s views is
Philip Dwyer's "Cooking the Books: John W. Cook on
Wittgenstein's Purported Metaphysics". Most reviews of
Wittgenstein’s Metaphysics were equally skeptical of his
main contentions; see e.g., those by Lars Hertzberg and
Oswald Hanfling.
23. Thus, for instance, the extension of "Minotaur" might be
thought of as an object which is either a mental image or a
type which generates mental images; and the mental images
are thought of as each having a spatiotemporal location. The
difficulty is most obvious in its Platonic variety, in which
the relationship between concept and extension is explicitly
that of participation in the Form by temporal objects and
properties. But it is not eliminated just by substituting
Peircian types for Forms. The type-token relationship is
supposed to be a logical one; but so is the concept of a
class in set theory. What is in question is not how the
relationship between class and instance or type and token is
explained in theory or applied in formal logic, but how it
is applied in ordinary language and in epistemological or
metaphysical theories. The charge is that in applying such
relationships we have a natural tendency to fall back on our
spatiotemporal predispositions.
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24. In a later manuscript, which was published as an
appendix to the PR ("Infinitely Long") Wittgenstein gives a
somewhat different, more verificationist, response to
Ramsey's counterexample. He cites Ramsey's remark and the
first line of his own response and says: "What a peculiar
argument: 'I can imagine...'! Let's consider what experience
we would regard as confirmation or proof of the fact that
the wheel will never stop spinning" (PR Apdx.I 304-5). There
is also an intermediate version of this idea, without direct
citation of Ramsey's remark, in PR XII,145,165-6.
25. See von Wright, Wittgenstein, p.25, citing Herbert
Feigl; also Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein, p.249. Hallett writes
that according to C. van Peursen, Wittgenstein also attended
a lecture by Brouwer "on technical problems of intuitionist
mathematics" which was not published (Companion, p.762). See
also Karl Menger, "Wittgenstein, Brower [sic], and the
Circle", in Reminiscences of the Vienna Circle and the
Mathematical Colloquium, pp.129-139. Menger says that
Brouwer gave a second lecture, entitled "The Structure of
the Continuum", and that Wittgenstein did not attend this
lecture (p.138). It is not clear whether this is the lecture
that Peursen claimed Wittgenstein did attend. Monk (Ludwig
Wittgenstein) makes no mention of his attending a second
lecture by Brouwer. In any case, the lecture he did attend
was published as the article "Mathematik, Wissenschaft und
Sprache".
26. See Brouwer, "Mathematik, Wissenschaft und Sprache”,
pp.161-4.
27. See Menger, Reminiscences..., p.135.
28. See e.g., Anscombe's note to the reprint of SRLF in Copi
and Beard, Essays, p.31; also Rhees, "Editor's Note" in PR
(p.349).
29. See Appendix II, The Organization of the Philosophical
Remarks.
30. See Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, p.51ff.
31. See Specht, Foundations, Chaps. IV-VI.
32. Pears, The False Prison, V.2, p.199.
33. See Shanker, "Wittgenstein Versus Russell on the
Analysis of Mind", and "The Enduring Relevance of
Wittgenstein's Remarks on Intentions".
34. Baker and Hacker, Understanding and Meaning, p.33.
35. Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, p. 142.
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36. Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language; see, e.g.,
pp.150- 156.
37. No6 emphasizes the continuity between the
phenomenological investigation and the goals of the TLP;
this is perfectly reasonable but it is only one side of a
definitely two-sided coin. He is rather more forgiving than
I would be of the apparent contradiction in Wittgenstein's
idea of looking for a priori relationships among objects of
experience - without, all the while, recanting his earlier
view that there is no synthetic a priori. But I do not
attempt to pass judgement on this particular set of views
here. On various non-essential points I have small
differences with No6. Some more significant differences are
noted in Chapters 3 and 4. I came upon NoS's article in June
1999, after I had already formulated and written up my views
on most of these topics. Nevertheless his clear and concise
exposition of them has helped me further clarify my own
thoughts on several issues.
38. Stenius' Wittgenstein's Tractatus. which is not without
many interesting insights, is marred especially by the view
that Wittgenstein believed relations to be among the objects
of the Tractatus. More recent work on Wittgenstein's
critique of Russell’s 1913 theory of knowledge, and a better
understanding of his theory of logical syntax, demonstrates
beyond a reasonable doubt that this was not the case. See
Copi, "Objects, Properties, and Relations in the Tractatus";
Pears, "Russell’s 1913 Theory of Knowledge Manuscript"; and
Thomas Ricketts, "Pictures, Logic, and the Limits of Sense".
Kripke's famous work Wittgenstein on Rules and Private
Language attributes to Wittgenstein the discovery of a
"skeptical" paradox and a solution to it which are now
widely (though not quite universally) thought to be far from
what Wittgenstein had in mind. The literature on this
subject is vast; see George Wilson’s "Semantic Realism and
Kripke’s Wittgenstein" and Arthur Collins’s "On the Paradox
Kripke Finds in Wittgenstein" for relatively recent pro and
con views (respectively) on Kripke's interpretation.
39. See Pears, "Wittgenstein’s Naturalism".
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CHAPTER 2
SPACE AMD THE GRAMMAR OP PHYSICS
"We need new concepts and we continually resort to
those of physicalistic language." (PR XX,213,266)
"The visual table is not composed of electrons." (PR
111,36,72)
2.1

Proa Color Exclusion to tho Oruair of Physics

Wittgenstein makes extensive use of the term "space" in
his manuscripts beginning in 1929 and continuing until
roughly 1931, after which it fades in importance in his
work. The term is used to denote a system of related
concepts or interlocking propositions. "Visual space", for
instance, is what we describe when we say how color,
position, and other properties are related in our visual
field; the propositions we use to describe them are "in"
visual space, and in a different sense so is a red circle
that is in my visual field. "Physical space" is of course
the material universe; but it is also the domain of the
concepts with which we describe it, such as empirical
propositions and causal laws. Each space has a certain set
of rules which guide us in formulating propositions
pertaining to that space; these rules constitute the grammar
of the space. Thus the proposition:
(1) No two colors can be at place p at time t in the
visual field
which I will hereafter refer to as the "color exclusion
principle", is a grammatical rule of visual space. It has
that status because it is (allegedly) a necessary truth1;
46
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whereas, "The moon looks larger when it is closer to the
horizon" is a contingent proposition about visual space,
probably defeasible and certainly not logically necessary.
Though it was a fairly short-lived idea, all but gone
from his vocabulary by the mid-1930's, the notion of "space"
is vital to understanding the emergence of Wittgenstein’s
later philosophy. Moreover, it is essential to understanding
the context in which his ideas about the grammar of physics
arose. In distinguishing physical space from visual space
and other spaces he began to notice the tendency to think of
other spaces in terms more appropriate to physical space.
This distinction is related to the one he makes between
"phenomenology" and "physics", which is the subject of some
of the first few remarks in his first 1929 notebook and many
later remarks as well. In phenomenology we describe the
world of our actual experience, by means of the necessary
truths that we learn after investigating the grammar of our
phenomenological concepts. In physics we instead give
empirical, perhaps causal, explanations to describe the
world of contingent relationships among physical objects and
forces. In the next chapter we will be examining this
distinction and the development of a grammar of phenomena,
or what Wittgenstein initially called a "phenomenological
language". It is useful to keep this framework in mind here,
because as Wittgenstein marks the differences between
various conceptual spaces he is simultaneously thinking in
terms of the distinction between the grammar of the
phenomenological realms in general and the grammar of
47
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physics. This is the initial step in his journey towards the
idea that philosophical problems result from the intrusion
of the grammar of physics into other (not just
phenomenological) language games.
2.2

"Visual Space and Other Things"

On 18 February 1929 Wittgenstein wrote to Schlick that
he had "decided to stay in Cambridge to work on visual space
and other things" {WK 17). He was given a small grant by
Cambridge and was asked to give a series of lectures. The
manuscripts in which he began, almost immediately, to record
his ideas on these subjects were, as far as we know, the
first philosophical notebooks he had kept in more than a
decade, since the completion of the TLP. They consisted,
initially, of four large bound volumes, known as Band I
through Band IV, and classified as MSS 105-108 in von
Wright’s numbering system.2 The first more or less completed
work to emerge from these volumes was the article "Some
Remarks on Logical Form", which was drawn mainly from the
earlier remarks in Band II. Although this article was
quickly repudiated by Wittgenstein, it is of great
historical interest, and not merely because it is the only
work published in his lifetime after the TLP. In it he
attempts to resolve the color exclusion problem and gives
his first sustained defense of the phenomenological program,
and his only defense of it in terms of formulating a
phenomenological language.
At the end of the first academic year in which
Wittgenstein had taught at Trinity College the college
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council asked G.E. Moore, who chaired the Philosophy
Department, for a justification for renewing the grant.
Moore in turn asked Russell, who then met with Wittgenstein
to discuss his work. At this time he apparently secured from
Wittgenstein a promise to deliver a sample of his recent
work in fairly short order. From Band I-III and part of Band
IV Wittgenstein pulled a number of remarks to form a
typescript known as TS 208. This typescript was a
chronologically ordered selection from the manuscript
remarks dating from February 1929 through April 1930. From
this typescript Wittgenstein created TS 209, in which the
original remarks were completely rearranged3. This
typescript was given to Russell in May 1930. Russell was
apparently ill at the time and read only about a third of
the manuscript; but he did recommend the renewal of
Wittgenstein's grant. A copy of the typescript that had been
in G.E. Moore's possession was eventually obtained by Rush
Rhees and published in 1964 as the Philosophische
Bemerkungen, using a title Wittgenstein himself had put on
Band I. The original typescript was then apparently lost4,
but the text of the German edition was translated and
published in 1975, again under Rhees' supervision, as the
Philosophical Remarks (PR). The published edition includes a
"Foreword" by Wittgenstein dated November 1930. The tone of
the "Foreword" suggests that he was considering the
manuscript for publication; but there is no record of his
ever having tried to get it published, and he soon took
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another copy of TS 208 and began to work it into a new book
which is now known as the Big Typescript {TS 213).
Wittgenstein's reference to "visual space" in his
letter to Schlick, his references to phenomenological
analysis in the article "Some Remarks on Logical Form"
(SRLF), and his remarks on phenomenology at the beginning of
Band I, show that phenomenology had emerged as a central
concern of his at this time. He thought at first that the
color exclusion problem and other threats to the atomistic
logic of the Tractatus could be dealt with by showing that
each elementary proposition describing some part of a
phenomenal space brings in all the other propositions in
this space as a kind of system. This led him to turn to the
analysis of the logic of phenomena. "Visual space" was the
first such analysis he would attempt; this is why he
conceived of his new project as working on "visual space and
other things".
In the context of his new philosophical tasks it may
appear that Wittgenstein's interest in phenomenology in
general, and visual space in particular, was also entirely
new. But while the emphasis on it was new, phenomenological
problems had appeared before and had led him to consider
certain aspects of the nature of visual space. There were
several comments on "visual space" in the NB and the TLP.
Moreover, the notion of "logical space" that played such a
central role in the TLP provides additional background for
the later studies. Logical space could be described as "the
space of all logically possible propositions"; it was in
50
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this context that the idea of visual space was introduced in
the TLP as, more or less, the space of all logically
possible propositions about the visual field. An examination
of the early work on visual space will not only give us
grounds for saying what was and was not new in his 1929
approach but will establish some significant continuities in
his perspective.
2.3

Visual Spaca in tha Carly Work

In the NB Wittgenstein refers to "visual space"
(Gesichtraum) (NB 64,85-6), as well as to the visual field
(Gesichtfeld). Though later on he distinguishes the visual
field from visual space (NLPESD 221), the distinction does
not seem to exist at this point. The remarks about visual
space which illustrate that "the knowing subject is not in
the world, that there is no knowing subject" (NB 86; TLP
5.631) are originally made as remarks about the visual field
(NB 80). When these remarks and others in the NB are all
taken together it appears that Wittgenstein had a
significant interest in the topic even at this time. Much of
this material is also found in some form in the TLP, among
comments on solipsism (5.633, 5.6331), infinitude (6.4311),
and logical necessity (6.3751).
Wittgenstein's early remarks about visual space amount
to a recognition that there is a particular logic to what we
can say about visual phenomena. His first series of remarks
on the subject are the most detailed. They occur in the
context of an effort to understand the implications of the
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idea that there must be simple objects. Thus he ruminates on
the following problem:
But what if a simple name signifies an infinitely
complex object? We say, for example, something about a
patch in our visual picture (Gesichtsbilds), e.g., that
it lies to the right of a line, and we assume that each
patch in our visual picture is infinitely complex. If
we say, then, of a point in that patch that it lies to
the right or left of the line, then this proposition
follows from the previous, and if infinitely many
points lie in the patch then infinitely many
propositions of different content follow Logically from
that first one. (NB 18 June 1915, p.64)
Like the color exclusion problem which would haunt him
later, the problem here is that a logical relationship among
phenomena appears to threaten the atomistic logic he is
trying to work out. Just as the logical exclusion of
simultaneous color attributions threatens the logical
independence of atomic propositions, the infinite
multiplicity of the proposition about the patch threatens
the idea that the sense of the proposition is determinate.
In this remark he sets up the problem in a way that says
something about the grammar, logic, or entailment relations,
of propositions about visual space. If patches are
infinitely complex (i.e., they are composed of infinitely
many individual points) and I say "Patch P in my visual
field is to the left of line L", I am committed to saying
that an infinite number of points pt..,pn are to the left of

This rudimentary conception of visual space is modified
almost immediately:
But now it is naturally very possible that in reality
infinitely many different propositions do not follow
from one such proposition, because our visual field
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perhaps - or probably - does not consist in infinitely
many parts - rather, that continuous visual space is
first constructed subsequently... (NB 18 June 1915,
p.64)
This is already a refinement, and shows some degree of
understanding that visual space is neither exactly like
geometrical space, which is logically capable of infinite
division, nor like physical space, which (at least on the
Newtonian account) is not subsequently constructed5. Now he
goes on to say, "It seems to me entirely possible that
patches in our visual field are simple objects, in that we
do not perceive any single point of the patch separately..."
(NB 64). So here he has worked his way out of a problem (at
least for the time being) through a meditation on the nature
of the visual field. The apparent infinitude of propositions
following from the first is the result of what he would
later have called a grammatical error concerning the objects
of visual space. As visual objects they are not infinitely
divisible; that property follows only on some kind of
construction of the visual field out of logically
infinitesimal points, not on the nature of visual space
itself.
It is of considerable interest that Wittgenstein
returns to this idea near the beginning of his 1929
manuscripts. In fact, his first extended remarks on visual
space discuss and confirm his view of 14 years earlier that
patches, rather than infinitesimal points or minima
visibilia, are the simplest components of the visual field.
Thus he writes:
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Somehow it seems to me as if each single-colored
patch in the visual field were simple and as if their
composition (Zusammengezetzheit) out of smaller parts
were only an apparent one. (WA 1,5,5)
It appears as if one cannot see a single-colored
patch as complex (Zusammengezetzt) unless one does not
have a single-colored impression (sich nicht einf&rbig
vorstellt) of it. (WA 1,5,7)
That would mean: the simple components of visual
fields are single-colored patches. (VIA 1,5,8)
Can one say that the smaller patch is simpler than
the larger?
Let’s assume one sees a single-colored circle, in
what should the greater simplicity of smaller circles
consist?/... (VIA 1,5,11)
Thus it seems to me: the smaller patch is not simpler
than the larger. (VIA 1,6,2)
In the PR Wittgenstein begins Chapter XX, which is on the
grammar of visual space, with some of these comments6. Thus
the earlier observations about visual objects actually
provide a context for the later work on the analysis of
visual space: they form the background on which more
detailed investigations, e.g., those on the grammar of
division and composition in visual space, can proceed. His
remarks on visual space were an important milestone in the
early work in that he was able to avoid a contradiction
between atomism and determinacy of sense. That these earlier
discussions figure in his later work too marks an important
line of continuity between the phenomenology of 1929 and the
earlier logical discussions which led to the TLP.
The importance of the notion of logical space in the
early work was that it gave a clear sense to the idea that a
proposition pictures the same state of affairs as its
negation. The proposition delimits a certain area in logical
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space by affirming it, while the negation does the same by
excluding that same area. This resolved a major issue in the
development of the picture theory, the question of how a
nonexistent state of affairs can be pictured. In the TLP, in
the remarks at 2.013ff, the logic of color is very closely
tied to the notion of logical space: color space and tone
space are logical spaces, and objects in these spaces
contain the combinatorial possibilities appropriate to the
logic of such spaces. In order for an object to have a
logical form that permits it to form propositions in these
spaces it must have the right kinds of hooks, so to speak,
to link up with other such objects. In this sense the logic
of the TLP already contains a kind of phenomenological
grammar: each phenomenal space gives the rules for the
formation of propositions that have sense in that space,
through defining the nature of the objects that can form
propositions there.
2.4

The Logical Independence of Spaces

What, then, constitutes the difference between his
earlier and later conception of space and phenomenology? In
his early work he had thought that "color space" and other
perceptual spaces, whatever their particular characteristics
might be, could be comprehended as part of one architectonic
logical structure, i.e., as sectors of logical space.
Phenomenological spaces were facets of the logical
properties of objects (2.0131, 2.0251); they did not make an
independent contribution to those logical properties. He
says in the TLP, "Every picture is also a logical picture.
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(On the other hand, e.g., not every picture is spatial.)"
(TLP 2.182) Propositions acquire sense by picturing the
world, and what allows them to do so is that their logical
structures are isomorphic with the facts they represent.
Whether they also have the structure of spatial propositions
depends on whether they are composed of objects which can
comprise spatial facts; but there is no specifically spatial
logic that is not accounted for by isomorphism, i.e., by
Tractarian logic in general. Thus in 6.3ff he even maintains
that the propositions of Newtonian physics and other general
laws are a priori, i.e., logical, forms of physical
propositions. The same applies to phenomenal spaces: in
6.3741 he famously claims that the principle of color
exclusion is due to "the logical structure of color”, which
is to say that at bottom the color exclusion principle is
based on an ordinary tautology. The particular properties of
color space may appear to be the final cut, but if the logic
of the TLP is right, they are not.
This conception of logical space has at least been
radically modified, if not yet dropped completely, by the
early 1930's. In Waismann's 1930 Thesen, which were supposed
to be the basis of a popular introduction to the TLP
incorporating some of Wittgenstein's later views, the
following statement is found in the section entitled
"Logical Space": "In a logical space lie all facts of the
same form" (WK 161). If this is an accurate expression of
Wittgenstein's view at this time (including the emphasis on
the indefinite article), it suggests that he thought there
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were any number of logical spaces correlated with the
various forms of facts. Such a thesis directly contradicts
the earlier assignment of all facts to an undifferentiated
logical space. This is consistent with the idea that each
proposition brings in a whole system of propositions which
together form a space. In a 1931 lecture Wittgenstein says,
"The place of a word in logical space fixed by grammar is
its meaning" (WL30 61) . Though it sounds a little like the
older conception of logical space, given what he now means
by "fixed by grammar" it cannot be the same thing; for there
is no doubt that grammar is here conceived of as particular
to a specific conceptual realm. By the time of the PI he has
surely given up the idea of logical space altogether, in
favor of local relationships within language games.
In the PR, due to the rapid development of his ideas in
the period leading up to it, the relationship between the
atomistic logic of the TLP and the phenomenology of spaces
is somewhat ambiguous. Parts of Tractarian logic often show
up in the discussions, for many of these remarks had been
written while he still hoped to salvage much of the TLP.
Chapter III is largely given to a kind of defense of the
picture theory (or to the defense of a kind of picture
theory). In Chapter VIII he appears to be defending the idea
of an elementary proposition: he affirms that "two
elementary propositions cannot contradict one another" {PR
VIII,81,109), and attempts to show that "the grammatical
rules for ’and', 'not1, 'or', etc. are not exhausted by what
I said in the Tractatus; rather, there are rules for the
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truth functions which also deal with the elementary part of
the proposition” (PR VIII,82,109). Though they are still
truth-functional, some of the truth-possibilities of
elementary propositions will be excluded by their internal
relationship with others in the same space. Thus he says
that "I do not place a proposition as a yardstick against
reality, rather the system of propositions" (PR
VIII,82,110). He goes on at some length with the idea that
even the denial of a proposition brings the entire space
with it, ending with an observation about recognizing the
fulfillment of an expectation: "'The sense lies in the
recognizability', but this is a logical possibility. I must
be located (mich... Befinden) in the space in which what is
expected lies" (PR VIII,82,111). In light of this, it must
be recognized that he had not completely given up Tractarian
logic by 1930. The logic of various spaces was not yet
entirely divorced from the architectonic logic of the world
advanced in the TLP.
Nevertheless, the impulse to give it up was already
there, even apart from his realization that the logical
independence thesis could not be maintained. For example,
the above remark is immediately followed (in the PR, not the
manuscript) by the remark, "The concept of an 'elementary
proposition' now in general loses its earlier significance"
(PR VIII, 83, 111)7. He realizes that this also means that his
basic conception of analysis was flawed (see e.g. BT 28,100,
"ElementarsStze"; also in PG I,Apdx 4A, 210-1) . In a
manuscript remark dated 2 December 1929 he asks ominously:
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"How far will logic become insecure (unsicher) through the
uncertainty over the analysis of elementary propositions? What stands fast?" (WA 11,146,3) Moore mentions another form
of rejection of Tractarian logic, Wittgenstein’s criticism
of his earlier notion of inference8. He also frequently
laces into the extensional conception of generality offered
in the TLP; and of course the concept-object idea, which was
never far from his own conception even if he did not overtly
embrace it, was rejected as early as SRLF. Many other
remarks in this period undercut one or another assumption of
Tractarian logic.
In place of this general logic he began to emphasize
the grammar of each particular space. This is evident in the
idea that "we have to do with yardsticks, and not so to
speak (quasi) with isolated graduation marks” (PR
VIII,84,112), meaning that propositions which form logical
groups must be taken together. A very revealing remark in
this regard is his statement that "each assertion then would
be like setting together (Einstellen) a number of
yardsticks". This remark is followed by a diagram of several
parallel yardsticks with a perpendicular line drawn through
them, and the explanation: "That would be, e.g., the claim
that a colored circle of color... and radius... lies in the
position..." (PR VIII,84,112; ellipses in the original
text). The proposition thus consists of elementary
propositions which mark out positions in color space,
Euclidean space, and physical space (these spaces are what
the yardsticks represent) , and each such proposition brings
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in the entire logic of the space to which it belongs. This
is confirmed by the comment:
In my old conception of elementary propositions there
was no determination of the value of a coordinate;
although my remark that a colored body is in a color
space could have directed me to this. {PR VIII,83,111)
The "value of a coordinate" is a position on a yardstick. He
is saying that at TLP 2.0131 he more or less recognized that
there was a space for each kind of proposition but failed to
draw out the implications of this. Following through on that
idea would have meant realizing that a position in color
space determines a coordinate as opposed to all other
possible coordinates in that space.
Thus, even if he still believed that there is some
overarching logical space (surely he believed that no
thought can contradict modus ponens, for example) and held
on to some hope for an ultimate reductive analysis, he
realized already that no general logic would suffice to
explain, for example, why the color exclusion principle is a
tautology. The color exclusion problem had led him to
conclude that spaces are at least semi-autonomous. Since
that problem had forced him to acknowledge the logical
dependence of elementary propositions on others in the same
space, a proposition now has sense only within the limit of
the space of its subject matter. Even if propositions still
have to picture the world in order to have meaning, and even
if the world still has some kind of a priori structure, it
is the grammatical rules of the space in which the
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proposition resides, i.e., the phenomenological rather than
logical structure of the world, that gives it meaning.
2.S

Space and Oraanar

This conception goes directly over into that of
philosophical grammar, the single most consistent feature of
all of Wittgenstein's work from 1929 on. It is within the
limits of a space that a ‘‘grammar" applies. We can begin to
approach this subject via a remark by Russell. After
speaking to Wittgenstein and reading parts of the PR, he
wrote in his response to Moore:
He uses the words 'space' and 'grammar' in peculiar
senses, which are more or less connected with each
other. He holds that if it is significant to say 'This
is red’, it cannot be significant to say 'This is
loud'. There is one 'space' of colors and another
'space’ of sounds. These 'spaces' are apparently given
a priori in the Kantian sense, or... something not so
very different. Mistakes of grammar result from
confusing 'spaces’.9
There are several themes in this comment, all related in
some way to grammar and space. Russell apparently grasped
some of the central theses of Wittgenstein's thought at this
point, but as in his introduction to the TLP, he puts things
in a way that Wittgenstein might have objected to. Sorting
the accurate observations from the sometimes misleading
expression will provide a means of getting clearer on the
relationship between grammar and space, as well as allow us
to assess one of Russell's few attempts to comment on
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.
a. In What Sanaa ara Spaeas A Priori or A Pomtmriori?
First, Russell says the spaces are "given a priori".
What he means by this is not entirely clear. It is possible
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that Wittgenstein had suggested to him that the various
realms in which propositions have sense are to be found in
the nature of language; that the number and nature of them
are independent of anyone's personal experience but are what
we might call transcendental conditions of the sense of
propositions. But more likely what Wittgenstein meant to
convey is that the grammar of a space is given a priori with
the space.
In a conversation around the same time Schlick
challenged the idea that the concept of a color system is a
logical, rather than empirical, hypothesis. Schlick used the
example of someone who spends his entire life in a red room:
"could he then say to himself: I see only red, but there
must be other colors?" (WK 66). Wittgenstein first responds
by arguing that the logical possibility of the person's
coming out of the room "is located in the syntax of space, a
priori". That is, if we say they are "in” the room, it is
taken for granted that they are in a part of physical space
and therefore that it is logically possible to be in another
part. This supports the point that if we assume physical
space at all we presuppose all of its necessary relations.
Then he points out that it is senseless to demand that
someone must have learned a certain number of color terms
before we can say they are acquainted with the color system:
"either his syntax is the same as ours: red, redder, bright
red, etc.... Or his syntax is not the same as ours. Then he
is not in general acquainted with a color in our sense" (WFC
pp.65-66). That is, either the person in Schlick's example
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understood, before coming out of the room, what it means for
there to be a color spectrum, or else we could not sensibly
say they knew what "red", or "color", means. If we help
ourselves to a single color concept we bring in the entire
system of colors. So the response amounts to saying: sure,
someone could live in a red room and have no concept of
color at all, but they cannot have the concept of one color
and not the rest of the color system. This argument is more
aligned with the idea that the grammar of the space is a
priori, than that the existence of the space itself is a
priori10.
In PR 1 the idea of color space being "a priori" is
related to its being "a grammatical representation" (PR
1,1,51-52), in this case represented by a "color octahedron"
with the "pure" colors at the corners. Again it is
essentially the phenomenological relationships expressed by
the grammar of each space that are a priori. This is even
more explicit where he says, speaking of the relationship
between visual and Euclidean space, "That which is arranged
in visual space stands in this kind of order a priori, i.e.,
in virtue of its logical nature, and geometry here is simply
grammar" (XVI,178, 217). Thus, at this point, whether or not
he believes that the spaces themselves are given a priori,
Wittgenstein is of the opinion that the relationships that
define each space and generate its particular grammar are in
some sense necessary truths.
This seems to be all that could reasonably be
maintained. A person bora blind would have no concept of
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color space, but if they were to gain their eyesight they
would presumably only be able to perceive colors with the
relationships they have for any sighted person. Some people
don't know that 7 + 5 = 12, because not everyone knows
mathematics or even how to count. But it cannot be that some
people know mathematics yet 7 + 5 does not equal 12 for
them. Nor is it a necessary truth that any perceiving beings
at all exist; there might be no perceptual space to talk
about. The most that could be held is that once the space is
presupposed all the necessary truths in that space are
presupposed.
However, all this is only one side of the matter. There
is also a clear sense in which the content of each space is
a posteriori. In SRLF Wittgenstein says that "we can only
arrive at a correct analysis by what might be called the
logical investigation of the phenomena themselves, i.e., in
a certain sense a posteriori..." (SRFL p.30). Though the
grammatical rules which define each space are
transcendental, i.e., they are preconditions of sense in
that conceptual realm, they are not known a priori in the
sense that some more comprehensive logic or rule of thought
predetermines what can be said in each space. Logical space
in the TLP was like this, and so, by necessity, was the
logic of each phenomenal space. In the post-1929 conception,
though certain laws of inference may hold in all spaces,
there is no a priori rule about what other entailments or
exclusions may exist between propositions in the same space.
This must be investigated based on the logic of the space
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itself. This investigation is a posteriori because our
epistemic access to grammar is not based on a set of
fundamental rules or principles which predetermine the
possible relations among phenomena; we can only find them
out through experience, even though what we find out is not
something contingent but the necessary relationships among
phenomena as they are captured in grammar.
b.

The Logical Structures of Spaces

The second thing we may gather from Russell's remark is
that each proposition in a particular space is
interdependent with the others in that space, but
propositions from different spaces are excluded by
grammatical rules. This is probably the point of his comment
about the exclusion of "this is loud" if "this is red" is
appropriate. The point loses quite a bit in this retelling,
though; Wittgenstein almost certainly did not put it quite
like this. In the PR he says: "Can anyone believe it makes
sense to say, 'That is not a noise, but rather a color'?"
(PR 1,8,55). The point is not that you cannot say of an
object that it is red and loud, which is obviously false in
the case of a fire engine on the way to a fire. But the
sense in which one says "this is red" is bound up with a
system of other propositions related to color perception,
and few of these will apply to "this is loud". Loudness is
not, for instance, on a continuum with redness as blue and
green are. The fact that one can say "this object is
completely red and also loud" shows that "loud" here is in a
different conceptual "space" from red; for one cannot say
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"this is completely red and also blue". Or consider the
following pairs of propositions:
la. It is only red when the lights are on.
lb. It is only loud when the siren is on.
2a. It's red but it doesn't look it.
2b. It's loud but it doesn't sound it.
In the first pair both propositions make sense, but for
completely different reasons. In the second pair 2a makes
sense in perfectly ordinary applications, but 2b would only
make sense in some special circumstance, e.g., coming from a
hearing impaired person, or in a psychoacoustic experiment.
These are examples of how color space and sound space have
different conceptual structures in spite of superficial
grammatical similarities. That is no doubt the main idea of
the remark Wittgenstein made to Russell.
e . Spatial Intrusions
The third and last theme we will address from Russell's
remark is the most important for our purposes. This is the
idea that importing the grammar of one conceptual space into
another is a potential source of confusion: "mistakes of
grammar result from confusing ’spaces'”, says Russell. This
follows from the previous idea more or less directly: if
each space has its own unique logic, or grammar, specific to
the kinds of statements made in that space, it must lead to
puzzles and paradoxes if we attempt to describe the subject
matter of one space in terms of the grammar of another. In
particular, the space of physics - of physical objects,
causal laws, ostensive reference, and verifiable hypotheses
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- tends to have a powerful pull on our phenomenological
conceptions, undermining our ability to describe these
spaces accurately (this is the meaning of the first citation
at the head of this chapter. In the discourse of
phenomenology, or mathematics, for example, the truths and
relationships of physical space are foreign and misleading.
On our reading, this was the key insight for Wittgenstein.
In this respect Russell's comment was entirely accurate, if
properly understood.
2.6

The Varieties of Space

As we have seen, in the TLP Wittgenstein had briefly
mentioned the modes of sensation (vision, sound, touch) as
spaces, as well as physical space. In one later passage he
seems to be distinguishing spaces along similar lines:
We... divide the evidence for the occurrence of a
physical event according to the various kinds of such
evidence, into the heard, seen, measured, etc., and see
that in each of these taken singly there is a formal
element of order, which we can call space. {PR
XI, 119,140)
The "heard" and "seen" are perceptual spaces and the
"measured" is presumably physical space. But the generality
of this definition goes beyond these particular spaces and
suggests that any discourse in which there is a "formal
element of order" constitutes a space. The definition
provides for an unlimited number of spaces with their own
particular logic. In the period 1929-30 he mentions several
conceptual spaces which do not directly correspond to
perceptual modalities or physical space, e.g., spaces for
mathematical sets (WK 67), pains (PR VIII,82,110; WL32 23),
67
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

motions (WA 11,224,1) and feelings (PR XX,206,257). The
contexts suggest that the "space" metaphor could be applied
whenever one needed to differentiate the rules that apply to
one set of concepts from those that apply to any other. This
confirms that he had broadened the notion of space beyond
what is mentioned in the TLP; space is now more or less
equivalent to the recognition that there are locally
necessary grammatical relationships which are part of the
underlying structure of the world.
Even the perceptual spaces that were originally
recognized in the TLP have become more complex. For example,
his reference to a "color octahedron" which gives "a rough
representation of color-space" (PR 1,1,51) suggests that
colors have their own internal logic (grammar) that is not
accounted for by the general properties of visual space.
Chapter XX of the PR is given to the discussion of
relationships in visual space, including composition,
position, orientation, object permanence, distance,
vagueness, and color; while Chapter XXI examines the grammar
of color space11. So visual space itself might be conceived
in terms of any number of spaces organized around the
various relationships in the visual field.
2.7

Objects and Spaces

An important aspect of the theoretical move from
logical space to a variety of grammatical spaces is that it
entails a corresponding move from logical objects to a
variety of objects. There was already some suggestion of
this variety in the TLP. He had said that objects have
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different logical forms depending on the facts in which they
can participate (2.0141); he says that there are "spatial"
and "temporal" objects and suggests that are others as well
(2.0121); and in the context of explicating the concept of
logical form he mentions "a spatial object", "a speck in a
visual field", "a tone" and "the object of touch",
suggesting that each is an object of a particular logical
form (2.0131). Thus he had at least entertained the
possibility that there are spatiotemporal objects and those
phenomenal ones that correspond to the modes of sensation,
each type being defined by its logical form or combinatorial
potential in atomic facts.
But while he saw that the form of the objects might
vary from one object type to another, there was still a
uniform conception of what an object might be, just as there
was a uniform logical space encompassing the others. The
thought he had expressed in an early letter to Russell, that
"there cannot be different Types of things" {NB 122;
Wittgenstein to Russell, Jan.1913), was not only retained
but was an important basis of his whole early philosophy.
Although this remark does not necessarily rule out different
kinds of objects (say, spacetime points and color patches)
what it does rule out is that fundamentally different
logical rules can apply to different classes of objects. If
logical units are defined in terms of the intrinsic
properties that allow them to be ordered by the laws of
logical space, there could be only one type, as well as only
one Russellian Type, of object. Objects were whatever
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complied with the basic tenets of logical atomism: they had
to be simple, they had to be capable of being linked to form
atomic facts, the atomic facts had to be logically
independent and map onto thoughts and propositions in a oneto-one correlation of objects to names and logical form to
logical syntax (i.e., the picture theory); and complex facts
had to be entirely reducible to concatenations of objeccs in
simple relations. These and a few other overarching theses
of logic say all that can be said about the fundamental
nature of objects. (Actually, Wittgenstein held that the
rules of logic are not assertable, so even this cannot
literally be said, but to the extent that the theory is
comprehensible they alone must determine the internal
properties of objects.)
It is clear that this position is incompatible with
allowing any logical properties of objects to be determined
by the particular relations within the logical space for
which their logical form makes them appropriate. This,
however, is just what made Wittgenstein reconsider and
eventually abandon logical atomism. Suppose, for example,
that color patches are objects. Could the color exclusion
principle describe a new logical property of all and only
those objects in color space, one that is not accounted for
by the logical principles of the TLP? That is, could the
grammar of visual perception alone logically determine the
properties of visual objects? Or, similarly, would Newton’s
laws independently determine logical properties of material
space-time points? Clearly Wittgenstein had hoped to have it
70
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the other way around, for in the TLP he tried to suggest
that a proposition that contradicts the color exclusion
principle is "impossible, indeed logically impossible"
(6.3751), just as he tried to suggest that the law of
causation was really based on a priori logical laws (6.35).
But here problems arose. His scheme required that all
logical propositions, that is, all necessary truths or
tautologies, be obtainable through inferences from
elementary propositions. But the latter were supposed to be
logically independent. If a proposition that flouts the
color exclusion principle (e.g., "Red and blue are at place
p at time t") is a logical contradiction it cannot,
therefore, be a conjunction of elementary propositions (nor
could a similar contradiction involving material rather than
phenomenal points). So in order to preserve it as a logical
contradiction propositions like "red at point p at time t"
and "blue at point p at time t" must be complex and
reducible, as he says explicitly in the NB (8 January 1917,
p.91). But Wittgenstein provided only vague hints of how the
reduction might take place. Of course, if they cannot be so
reduced, the laws excluding them - the laws of visual space
- cannot be obtained from general laws of logical space.
Then while the internal properties of objects would be given
solely by logic, the rules which describe the ordering of
objects in any specialized space would end up being
contingent propositions. But this was obviously not what
Wittgenstein wanted, for all such rules were supposed to be
tautologies at their deepest level. Thus, one might look at
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the color exclusion problem as a symptom of the fact that
within the logic of the TLP there is no way to bring the
grammar of each space into play in the description of the
essential nature of the objects in that space.
This situation is radically altered beginning in 1929.
In the first place, the old idea of objects is essentially
dropped. Nowhere in the 1929 remarks on the simplicity of
color patches does he mention the word "object". In
Wittgenstein's work from 1929-30, including the manuscripts,
typescripts, lectures and conversations, there are few
references to "objects" that do not occur in critical
contexts, usually with reference to the Fregean conceptobject form of analysis or the TLP. In SRLF, whose subject
is analysis and elementary propositions, the only reference
to objects is to "spatial and temporal objects" {SRLF 31) .
In the 1930 lectures he refers to "physical objects" {WL30
69) but not to anything like the objects of the TLP. The
short typescript "Concept and Object, Property and
Substrate" which was appended to the PG is mostly a critique
of Fregean ideas. The one called simply "Object" begins by
suggesting that "object" means "reference of a not further
definable word" {PG 1,3,208); this is followed by a number
of inconclusive comments on the relationship between color
terms and objects. The only significant reference to objects
in the Tractarian mode is found in a single remark in WK, in
which he says that he still holds firmly to the belief that
"through the analysis of propositions we must eventually
come to propositions which are an immediate connection of
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objects, without the help of logical constants..." (WK 74).
But there is no reason to assume that what he means by
"objects" here are the logically undifferentiated units he
conceived of in the TLP. In the PR he refers to "what I at
one time {seinerzeit) called 'objects’, the simple" {PR
111,36,72), as if this terminology were a thing of the past.
Finally, Moore quotes him as saying (sometime in 1930-31):
"The meaning of a word is no longer for us an object
corresponding to it"12. Clearly, the simple patches we are
talking about are not the fabled objects of the TLP.
Wittgenstein never says explicitly why he has stopped
referring to the objects of the TLP, but it follows
naturally upon the demise of the logical independence
thesis. If propositions are to be organized into logical
systems which are individuated on the basis of the
categories of experience, the objects to which they refer
will also have to be whatever experience shows to be the
basic unit(s) of reference in each sphere of discourse.
Recalling that the differentiation of spaces of discourse is
fundamentally driven by grammatical distinctions, this point
may be expressed by citing what he says in the PI some years
later: "Grammar says what kind of object something is"
(373) .
Moreover, there is some evidence that Wittgenstein
himself suggested that giving up the logical independence
thesis meant doing without Tractarian objects. Moore,
recalling Wittgenstein's criticisms of Tractarian logic in
the 1930 lectures, writes: "He said... that it was with
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regard to 'elementary' propositions and their connection
with truth-functions or 'molecular' propositions that he had
to change his opinion most; and that this subject was
connected with the use of the words 'thing* and 'name'"13.
It is plausible to assume that the first part of the
sentence refers to Wittgenstein's giving up the logical
independence thesis, since this meant abandoning the idea
that the truth-functions alone could give the logical rules
for the combination of elementary propositions into
"molecular" ones. Thus to represent color space truthfunctionally he had to eliminate the top line of the truth
table for a complex proposition placing two colors at the
same spot (see SRLF 34; WA 1,57,6 - 1,59,4), because the
propositions of which it was composed excluded one another.
In the second part of the sentence, Moore is surely
referring to the Tractarian idea that names go proxy for
objects, and that these are the sole components of
elementary propositions or atomic facts. The connection is
then fairly obvious: giving up logical independence meant
giving up the idea that one could fully account for the
meaning of the proposition in terms of the names of objects
that comprise it. For on the logical independence thesis, no
object in the fact denoted by "blue here now" can possibly
have logical properties that rule out the formation of a
molecular proposition with "red here now"; yet the
proposition as a whole does rule this out. So the demise of
logical independence also leads in a fairly straightforward
way to the admission that the objects in which he hoped to
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encapsulate all the logical properties that could give sense
to propositions were not to be found.
But this does not mean that the notion of the simple
object evaporated without a trace; at least, not this
quickly, as the remark to the Vienna Circle makes clear. As
he reconceived logic as grammar, he also initially
reconceived objects as the referents of the terms which
represent the simplest possible concepts in each particular
space. In color space, for example, the primary colors would
be the "elements of representation", and "these elements of
representation are the ’objects’" (WK 43). Similarly patches
in visual space would be the objects. This may not sound
very different from what he said in the TLP, but the
important thing is that the need to recognize the
particularity of each space has begun to undermine the
notion that the simplest elements of each space must be
thought of as logical objects, in the sense of "pure" logic,
rather than just the objects that are the necessary
constituents of the space14. The elements of representation
are in a sense the "logical" objects of each space, since
they are the grammatical basis on which meaningful
propositions can be constructed; but this basis will now be
decided by phenomenological investigation, not by general
rules of logic as in the TLP.
In physical space, the situation is somewhat different.
The corresponding units of representation here should be
space-time coordinates; and to an extent he may have
retained this Hertzian conception of them. But Wittgenstein
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is moving in the direction of recognizing that in physical
space the "objects" are just what we call "objects" in
ordinary language. This process cannot be completed while he
still hangs on to any conception of objects as the telos of
analysis, because it is tantamount to rejecting that entire
conception of analysis. By 1932 or so, after several rounds
of criticism of the Fregean concept-object theory (see
Appendix I), among other things, the process is more or less
complete; but in the period we are now discussing, 1929-30,
one finds expressions of both the earlier and later views.
In either case, his conception of physical space goes along
with the general fission of logical space into its component
parts, each of which grammatically determines what objects
are the subject-matter of that space.
In short, having abandoned the logical independence
thesis, Wittgenstein had to break up logical space into a
variety of overlapping but logically more or less autonomous
spaces - autonomous, that is, except for the obvious fact
that certain inference rules of formal logic would probably
have to be applicable to any space. Each space is
characterized by (1) a set of grammatical rules and (2)
certain basic data, or "elements of representation", which
are irreducible and conceptually necessary for that space
and could therefore be thought of as its "objects". Thus he
says, “The geometry of visual space is the syntax of
propositions which deal with the objects in visual space"
{PR XVI,178,216). Similarly for perception, which operates
in physical space: "The very expression 'I can perceive x'
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is taken from the physicalistic means of expression, and
here x ought to be a physical object - e.g., a body" (PR
VI,57,88). Analogously, he says regarding numbers:
"Arithmetic is the grammar of numbers. Kinds of number can
only be distinguished by the arithmetical rules relating to
them” (PR X,108,130). He does not, of course, think numbers
are "objects" of any sort; but the point is that grammar is
what distinguishes one kind of number from another, just as
it distinguishes one kind of object from another. Numbers
are also the basic element of representation in mathematics.
This relationship between objects and grammar is
retained even after Wittgenstein drops the "space"
terminology. Thus in 1936 he writes:
One might say that [physical] space and colour have
different properties: what is true of colour is not
true of space. But the nature of the objects in this
case is not determined by properties which we can
attribute to them truly as opposed to those which we
can't. It is determined by the grammar of the word
which denotes it. "The colour green has a different
nature from a cubic foot": this is an expression of the
fact that a different grammar applies. (LSDPE 307)
The whole difference is summed up in the statement that
"grammar is a ’theory of logical types'" (PR 1,7,54; WL30
13), or once again as in the PI, "grammar says what kind of
object something is". Objects are now relative to spaces:
ontology has been replaced by grammar, and the catalogue of
object types in the universe can only be derived from the
list of conceptual spaces in language and the rules that
apply in each one.
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2.8

Visual Space and dramatical Confusion

Some of Wittgenstein's remarks on the grammar of visual
space and related spaces demonstrate his concern with
avoiding the confusion of one space with another. We can
begin by looking at some things he says about the grammar of
color space, which clearly overlaps that of visual and
physical space in many ways:
One must remember... that each part of visual space
must have a color and that each color must occupy a
part of visual space. The forms color and visual space
interpenetrate (durchdringen) one another. (PR
XX,206,257; WA 1,12,3)
This remark is from very early in Band I and does not yet
say anything explicit about the possible confusions arising
from this overlap. But the point is not, as it might appear
at first sight, that color space and visual space are
identical. Rather, it says that according to the logic of
color, however we divide up visual space, every point in it
must be thought to have some color. In the PR this remark is
placed before others that seem to say more or less the same
thing about the relationship between color and physical
space, but which seems to be motivated by the need to avoid
a kind of confusion:
It is clear that there is no relation of "being
located" which would hold between a color and place in
which it "is located". There is no intermediary
(Zwischenglied) between color and space.15
Color and space saturate one another.
And the way in which they interpenetrate one another
makes up the visual field. (PR XX,206,257)
The point here is that when we talk about colors in physical
space we do not think of two things, a color and a spatial
position, connected together by some force or medium. What
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kind of confusion could be avoided by pointing this out?
Perhaps the idea, suggested by nearly all the major trends
in modern epistemology, that a physical object performs this
role of linking a property to a position. One can easily
read Locke, Leibniz, Hume, Berkeley, Kant, Moore and
Russell, to name just a few, as saying that a physical
object is a spatial medium for the coinstantiation of
perceptible properties. Whether it is at most, at lease, or
nothing but a medium depends on one's interpretation of each
philosopher. But what Wittgenstein says here about color
space implies a rejection of all of these pictures, as well
as a recognition of the temptation to think of color and
physical space as "linked" in this way. The temptation is
avoided by thinking of color space, visual space and
physical space as distinct but related conceptual realms
whose grammar comingles at many points.
A stronger sense of how the intermingling of different
spaces generates potential confusions comes when
Wittgenstein considers visual space in light of geometrical
relationships, using the following diagram16:
cccece.

| ; i i i i i i 1i i i i i i i i i i i i

M4AJL

i i i | i i i n i i i [i i i i i i i i i i i i i |

a

b

It is obviously possible for the lines a and b to
appear to me to be the same length and for the segments
c and d also to appear to me to be the same length
while a count shows that I have 25 c's and 24 d's. Here
we have the question: how can that be possible? Is it
correct to say here: it is just so, and we see only
that visual space does not follow the rules - for
instance - of Euclidean space? This would mean that the
question "how can that be possible?" was nonsense and
thus unjustified. (PR XX,208,258; WA 11,18,1)
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Wittgenstein does not answer his own question, and he
apparently means that the question is indeed nonsense,
indicating a tendency to confuse the rules of visual and
Euclidean space. A bit later on in the manuscript, but not
in the PR, he says in reference to the equality of intervals
in visual space, "The question of equal or unequal is thus
nonsense, or else there must be yet a third thing here" (WA
11,21,2). Here too the grammatical confusion comes in the
form of asking a meaningless question. In the PR he
continues with a remark that comes just below these in the
manuscript: "It comes, in that case, to certain
contradictions to [be] explain[ed] if we apply our ways of
reaching conclusions (SchluSweisen) in Euclidean space to
visual space" (WA 11,21,5; PR XX,210,261).
Wittgenstein refers to "visual space" when he means to
discuss the grammar of the appearances of things as
appearances, rather than as objects perceived in physical
space. In the following passage, somewhat earlier in the
manuscript but later in the PR than the last one, he
discusses potential grammatical confusions between Euclidean
space and the space of perception:
If I cannot see an exact circle then in this sense
neither can I see approximations to one. - Rather, then
the Euclidean circle - as also the Euclidean
approximated circle, is in this sense not an object of
my perception at all, but rather, for example, only
another logical construction which could be obtained
from the objects of quite another space, such as
immediate vision-space {Sehraums).
But even this way of expressing [it] is misleading,
and we must perhaps say that we see the Euclidean
circle in a different sense. (WA II,94,1-2;PR
XX,212,265)
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This passage shows that one must approach Wittgenstein's new
philosophy with the same subtlety that he himself applies to
the analysis of ordinary language. Recalling his later
remark that the space of perception is that of physical
objects, one must understand these remarks to be about a
rather particular space, that of perception of the physical
representation of a geometrical shape, in this case a
circle. This space he calls "Sehraum" rather than
"Gesichtraum", or visual space proper. To "see" the
Euclidean circle is then to construct an object in
geometrical space out of what we see in physical space; that
is, two different senses of the verb "to see”. Given this
understanding of it, the passage is a warning about our
tendency to assimilate geometrical concepts to physical
ones, the space of Euclidean geometry, where a circle is
"not an object of my perception at all", to that of the
perception of physical circles. We use geometry to
understand visual relationships in physical space, but the
space of geometry is not that of physical space17.
One of the clearest expressions of Wittgenstein's point
about the potential grammatical confusion between visual and
physical space comes in a 1931 lecture described in WL30.
Judging from the published notes, Wittgenstein made fewer
assumptions of his audience than he did when his ideas were
more developed18. In a section marked by the editor "Visual
and Physical Space" Wittgenstein apparently produced one
example after another of the differences between these two
spaces, beginning with the comment, "Visual and physical
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space are different in the sense that what you can say about
the one you cannot say about the other" {WL30 68). This
thought is repeated in a variety of ways throughout the
lecture, and the point is backed up with examples of the
differences between what we would say of a physical object
and its visual sense-data: distance varies in physical but
not visual space (WL30 68); an equilateral visual triangle
is necessarily equiangular, but not so a physical one (WL30
69); an object can "have movement in visual space without
anything changing place in physical space" (WL30 70); and so
on. In the next section of the notes Wittgenstein carries
out a somewhat briefer investigation of the differences
between auditory and physical space. Here he uses the
example of a continuous tone and asks if there is a point
"at which you can say that you both hear and remember" the
tone {WL30 71) . This, he says, is impossible: "The confusion
lies in thinking that physical sound and the sense-datum are
both continuous. The physical sound is continuous but the
sense-datum is not" (WL30 71). Again, "the confusion arises
from regarding the continuity of physical object and
auditory sense-datum as the same" (WL30 72).
Another example of confusion about continuity is given
in the PR. Picture a ruler pressed at one point against a
curved surface and then rolled (tangentially) part way
around the surface. Here the question is whether we can say
that we saw the ruler at any arbitrary position t along the
way. Wittgenstein says:
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If I want to say that the ruler must have appeared to
me to be at place t - if I am thus talking about the
place in visual space - then it doesn't in the least
follow from the premise. But if I'm talking about the
physical ruler, then naturally it is possible that the
ruler skipped over position t and nevertheless the
phenomenon in visual space was continuous. (PR
XII,134,154-5)
This theme of confusion between phenomenal spaces and
physical space is one of the central aspects of his
investigation of visual space. Recognizing that this is what
he is up to helps explain some of his less obvious
contrasts. For example, the above remarks about visual and
physical circles come in the manuscript just after a remark,
which was for some reason excluded from the PR, in which he
refers to "the dangerous alterations of sense" in the
propositions "I hear the music", "I hear the piano", and “I
hear him play the piano" (Wfl 11,93,8). Here we have at least
a perception in auditory space (hearing "the music"), and a
cognition in physical space (hearing "the piano").
Of course, there are also examples of distinctions not
involving physical space per se, such as:
The question arises what distinctions there are in
visual space. Can we learn anything about this from the
coordination, e.g., of touch space with visual space?
Say, by specifying which changes in one space do not
correspond to a change in the other? (PR XX,214,268)
One could make a very lengthy catalogue of the ways in which
Wittgenstein distinguishes spaces in this period. He is
actually at first undertaking the project of constructing a
phenomenological language, by giving an account of the
grammar of each space (see Chapters 4-5) . Even when he
abandons this project he remains interested in investigating
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the grammar of different spaces. But it is apparent that the
space of physics - of physical objects and their physical
properties - is already recognized as a potential source of
confusion for all other spaces. In fact, the whole series of
the remarks cited from the manuscript begins with one in
which he explicitly warns against using "ordinary - physical
language" to talk about the "immediately given" (WA
11,93,2). This theme will be reinforced in various other
investigations and will become an organizing principle of
his work - not the only one, but an important one that is as
much a basis of the PI as the rule-following investigations.
In general, then, at least by some time before he
compiled the PR, Wittgenstein had embarked on the
philosophical path that would lead him to the idea that
philosophical problems arise from using the grammar of one
language game where that of another belongs19. Moreover, in
various ways he had already recognized that the main problem
was to distinguish everything else from the language games
we play with physical objects, in particular from practices
like measuring, dividing into parts, setting side by side,
etc., which reflect our basic spatiotemporal orientation, as
described by Euclidean geometry and reflected in our
everyday discourse about the world around us.
2.9

Space: Mot tha Final Frontier

The idea of a conceptual domain as a "space", like some
of the other main conceptions in Wittgenstein's work
immediately after his return to philosophy in 1929, lasted
only a couple of years as an important feature of his
84
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thought. It was never explicitly dropped; for the most part
it just became superfluous. Though the term occasionally
reappears in passing until the mid-1930s, philosophical
grammar, which had never been very far from the "space"
conception, and the idea of a rule-based calculus of
language, absorbed whatever advances were made with the
notion of a "space" of propositions.
One can also think of reasons that were not just
terminological which might have encouraged Wittgenstein to
give up the use of the term "space". First, the very
considerations which led to the expansion of the "space"
conception from its Tractarian to its post-1929 usage must
have also led to its decline once the broad outlines of the
idea became clear. At some point he must have realized that
conceptual spaces are essentially constituted by the
grammatical formation rules for sentences dealing with the
concepts in a space; so not only was the notion of "space"
otiose, it was a reflection of his initial lack of clarity
about the far-reaching implications of the idea of a
philosophical grammar. Second, the same criticism that was
applied to logical atomism (see Chapter 5), the picture
theory, and other aspects of the TLP applies to conceptual
"space" too: it gives a misleading picture of the nature of
language because it is too entangled with a conception of
the physical universe. Propositions are not enclosed in a
conceptual space the way stars are in physical space, and it
is not the obvious difference between "conceptual" and
"physical" that makes the comparison problematic. More
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subtle things that are hidden in the physicalistic
conception, like the implication of clear boundaries and
law-governed relationships, are misleading when we are
talking about language or ideas. Wittgenstein increasingly
questioned the philosophical implications of nonstandard
uses of terms derived from the physical sphere; this also
led him, for example, to criticize the use of the term
’•object" in logic, especially in its Fregean form (see
Appendix I). Even though the notion of "space" was one of
the ideas that brought him to this point, it became,
dialectically, a victim of these same insights. A third
point which should have bothered Wittgenstein is that though
the idea of space was originally supposed to replace the
idea of the logical independence of propositions with the
idea that they are grouped in systems, nothing resembling
the logical independence postulate of the TLP can even be
applied to entire spaces. It is obviously not the case that
the grammar of numbers is conceptually isolated from the
space of physics, or the grammar of color or geometry from
visual space, even though one cannot determine properties of
number by experiment or say that the angles of a visual
triangle add up to 180 degrees20.
Thus, as the idea of grammar is deepened and ramified,
it replaces "space" altogether. The progression from
conceptual space to grammar, and finally to language games,
is comprehensible as a development of the basic idea that
groups of propositions function together in such a way that
the truth of one proposition may entail the truth or
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falsehood of another, and that propositions only have sense
when taken in relation to one area of discourse or another.
This perspective emerges directly from the color exclusion
problem; for that is what forced Wittgenstein to acknowledge
that the logical independence of elementary propositions,
one of the central principles of logical atomism, could not
be maintained.
The notion of ''space” plays a large role in the PR,
which was drawn from his first four notebooks; but by the
time of the Big Typescript (BT), which is drawn in part from
those same notebooks as well as from several later ones, it
is hardly in evidence except in the discussion of "visual
space". By this time the concept of a "grammatical rule" has
been expanded to the point of obviating the need for a
distinction between spaces. Here, however, another
intermediate conception, that of a "calculus" (Kalkiil) of
rules also to some extent takes over the role of "space". A
"calculus" may be thought of as a language game in which the
rules, and the way we follow or apply them, are quite
determinate, so that the grammar of the game is completely
contained in the rules21. This suggests that the term
"grammar" itself was tied, in the earlier post-1929
notebooks and typescripts, to a more mechanical conception
of linguistic usage than one finds in the PI. Thus the sense
of "grammar" undergoes a slow and subtle modification
throughout the 1930s, from being enclosed in a space and
compared to the fixed points on a scale, to a more or less
rigid and a priori "calculus", to a much less determinate
87
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body of learned uses and "techniques". The term "language
game", too, undergoes modification: it is present prior to
the Brown Book (BrB), but arguably not until then does it
have the sense than it will have in the PI.
Though it is complexto document, the basic shape of
Wittgenstein's

transitionis

fairly clear. The color

exclusion problem led him to recognize the logical
peculiarity of each conceptual realm. Thisled him totalk
about spaces, and shortly thereafter to identify each space
with a grammar. Then "space" was dropped, and grammar became
the central concept, originally conceived as a fairly
determinate calculus. But considerations about rulefollowing and indeterminacy led him to tie in the notion of
grammar with that of more or less indeterminate language
games22.
At the same time, there was a growing recognition that
in ordinary language we tend to merge distinct grammars, and
in philosophical theories we even take these naive and more
or less innocent metaphorical transfers between conceptual
spaces and squeeze them until they generate problems and
paradoxes. This train of thought is largely an outgrowth of
the separation of Tractarian spaces into phenomenological
and physical ones. Wittgenstein's initial effort to
understand the relationship between "physics" and
"phenomenology" is thus the first expression of a
distinction that will grow into an effort to ferret out
philosophical misconceptions by comparing the way we think
about the physical world to what we are trying to say about
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the rest of our conceptions. But the path to this
methodology is not absolutely straight. At first, the
physical and phenomenological descriptions of the world
stood on a par. Then the recognition set in that physical
space exerts a gravitational pull on the phenomenological,
trying to draw us into its modes of expression. Over the
next few years, Wittgenstein began to realize that not only
phenomenology but all abstract conceptions were affected by
physicalistic modes of thought. Mathematics, language,
logic, and consciousness all have a tendency to be conceived
in terms of physical models; and when we lose sight of the
fact that there is a model in play, and we follow out our
natural physicalistic prejudices, we end up with grammatical
confusion and nonsense. At this point it is no longer a
question of two views of the world, physical and
phenomenological, but of all our language games and their
relationship to the grammar of physics.
Both the idea of spaces and the phenomenology follow
directly upon the color exclusion problem: the former was
part of an effort to replace the logical independence thesis
with a constellation of propositional systems called
"spaces", and the latter was an effort to give some
substance to the notion of an elementary proposition in
these phenomenologically individuated spaces. Wittgenstein
thought this could be done by developing a "phenomenological
language", that is, a kind of grammar book that would detail
the rules for the formation and use of elementary
propositions in each space. In this chapter we have followed
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the progress of the first of these paths, and have seen some
of the ways in which it led to the later ideas about the
grammar of physics. In the next two chapters we follow the
second, tracking the rise and eventual abandonment of the
"phenomenological language” approach, and assessing its
impact on his ideas about philosophy, physics and grammar.
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notis

1. Given the importance of this principle in the discussion
of Wittgenstein's transition a few comments are necessary.
Wittgenstein took this proposition to be a tautology, its
denial to be a contradiction, and what it expresses to be a
necessary truth. This was accepted by other philosophers of
his time, and is probably still widely accepted today. Inmy
opinion it is a fallacy: the color exclusion principleis
actually a contingent proposition which depends on the
construction of our visual apparatus. See Arthur Danto's
"Foreword" to Hardin, Color For Philosophers, pp.x-xi, for a
defense of this point, and Noe, "Wittgenstein,
Phenomenology, and What It Makes Sense to Say" for an
attempt to refute it. Nevertheless, by extending Kantian
considerations about the conditions for knowledge to
relations in the visual field one can reach Wittgenstein's
point of view. If not only the forms of time and space but
all the conditions of human experience of the world are
taken as necessities, and their expressions as necessary
truths (where necessity is indexed to human cognitive
limitations) then we arrive at something like Wittgenstein’s
view. It would be reassuring if Wittgenstein had
acknowledged that on his view the color exclusion principle
is a synthetic a priori proposition; but he did not even
agree that there are such propositions (see WL30 78-80).
Thus it is a bit difficult to understand how Wittgenstein
understood the necessity of the color exclusion principle.
But it is certain that he did think it both necessary and a
posteriori, and since my object here is primarily to say how
I think Wittgenstein saw the world I will not dwell any
further on doubts about the wisdom of this view.
2. Strictly speaking parts of what I call "Band I" here were
physically written in Band I. Wittgenstein wrote first on
the recto pages of Band I, then on the recto pages of Band
II, then, starting from the beginning of the volume, on the
verso pages of Band II, and finally, again from the
beginning, on the verso pages of Band I (see WA I,xii-xiii) .
Even within this scheme there are quite a few
inconsistencies, and there are similar interpolations in
later volumes. To simplify matters, when I refer to "Band
II" I am always referring to writings that are
chronologically later than those I refer to as "Band J",
regardless of where they physically first appeared; and
similarly for later manuscripts. Moreover, references to the
manuscripts will usually be given via the Wiener Ausgabe
(WA) transcription of them. WA is referred to by volume,
page number, and remark number on the page. The first five
volumes of the WA edition consist of MSS. Band I-X, with two
of Wittgenstein's original volumes in each WA volume and
with the pages placed in chronological order of composition.
Thus we will be mainly interested in WA Band I and Band II,
containing MSS Band I-IV or MSS 105-108 in the von Wright
numbering system.
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3. See Rhees, "Editor's Note", PR p.348.
4. This has not been officially acknowledged, but is widely
rumored to be true. The translators of the Philosophical
Remarks (Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White) makes it clear
that they worked from the published version and not from the
original typescript (PR p.354). They make no reference to
their having had access to the typescript, though they
acknowledge Rhees1 assistance and publish a list of
corrections to the German edition that was provided byRhees
(apparently before the typescript was lost) . TS 209was not
included in the Cornell University microfilm series of
Wittgenstein's Nachlass. On its web site Trinity Library
lists a copy of TS 209 among its holdings but this list is
more or less a repetition of the von Wright catalogue, of
which most but not all the items are actually in the Trinity
collection.
5. Wittgenstein usually takes the Newtonian - or Hertzian account to be the standard logic of physical space. However,
since the influence of Kant and Schopenhauer, if not
Leibniz, is quite strong at this point, it could perhaps be
argued that he might have conceived of space as either a
construction or a transcendental condition of thought. In
saying, as he does in the TLP, that space is one form of the
objects, he could be taking the transcendental line, since
the forms of objects are in some sense conditions of
thought. But in neither Kant's case nor Wittgenstein’s are
these transcendental conditions subsequently constructed;
they are preconditions of the possibility of knowledge.
6. See Appendix II, The Organization of the Philosophical
Remarks.
7. The published translation renders "ilberhaupt” as "all"
(i.e., "loses all its earlier significance") rather than "in
general" but I think this suggests a slightly stronger
rejection of elementary propositions than Wittgenstein is
making.
8. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures", pp.88-9.
9. Monk, Ludwig Wi 11genstein, p .29 3 .
10. See also Waismann's Theses, where a similar response is
given to this example but in somewhat simpler terms (WK
261) .
11. See Appendix II, The Organization of the Philosophical
Remarks. Even if the chapter divisions were not indicated by
Wittgenstein, it is obvious from the text itself that there
is an end to the remarks on visual space and a beginning to
those on color. Chapter XX begins with the discussion of
simple patches, and XXI with the remark, "There appear to be
simple colors" (PR XXI,218,273).
92
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures", p.54.
13. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures", p.88.
14. In a sense, therefore, objects still exist necessarily,
as he seems to have thought of them in the TLP, so long as
the space exists. That is, in his present conception, color
space is not somehow accidentally constituted by the four
primary colors. They exist in color space necessarily in the
sense that the space would simply not be color space without
them.
15. The passage is awkward to translate. The first sentence
in the original German is: "Es is klar, daJS es keine
Relation des 'Sich Befindens' gibt, die zwischen einer Farbe
und einem Ort bestilnde, in dem sie 'sich befindet'." The
sense of the passage requires translating "Sich Befindet" as
"being located" (in the PR it is given as "being situated",
which I find too vague) but it might be best understood as
"Being [somewhere]".
A "zwischenglied" is usually a link, not an
intermediary, but it seems pretty clear that the point is
that nothing is required to link space and color because
they are already interpenetrating, not that "there is no
link" between the two spaces.
16. The diagram is given as in WA, not the PR.
17. Although Wittgenstein takes Euclidean space to be the
standard grammar of logical relationships in physical space,
the two are not the same. For example, the lengths of a, b,
c and d in the previous passage will be defined by a rule in
geometry, and by a more or less imperfect ruler in space.
But Euclidean geometry provides the principles by which we
gauge the accuracy of our spatial measurements: a and b
might measure the same in physical as well as visual space,
but geometry tells us that if they dothe ruler with which
we determined the widths of c and d had a fairly high
tolerance for error (perhaps adequate for spacing fence
pickets, but not for gear sprockets).
18. One sign of this is that he uses the term "sense data"
more or less uncritically here whereas he generally rejects
this term in his manuscripts. No doubt he wanted to express
what he was trying to say in a language that his Cambridge
students would be familiar with.
19. Regarding the progression from spaces to grammar and
language games see No6, "Wittgenstein, Phenomenology, and
What It Makes Sense to Say".
20. It is not strictly true that one cannot determine any
properties of numbers by experiment. For example, a sampling
operation on the expansion of 7t could determine the
probability of finding repeating sequences. Still, it seems
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that only certain special properties of numbers could be
determined this way.
21. Regarding the "calculus" model see Baker and Hacker,
Understanding and Meaning, pp.89-92; and Albert Newen, "Die
Entiwicklung der Wittgensteinschen Sprachphilosophie...",
pp.438-445.
22. Up to this point the basic shape of the transition as I
have described it follows pretty much the same outline as
that described by NoS ("Wittgenstein, Phenomenology...").
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CHAPTER 3
THE RISE AMD FALL OF THE
PHENOMENOLOGICAL LANGUAGE PROJECT (X)1
In all philosophical theories we find words whose sense
is well known to us from the phenomena of daily life,
used in an ultraphysical, thus false, sense. (WA II,
103,3)
3.1 Genesis of the Phenomenological Project
Wittgenstein's aim in the TLP had been to outline a
theory of logic that would, among other things, avoid selfreference paradoxes, including the one that bears Russell's
name, without any appeal to a hierarchy of logical types.
The only thing that could justify specifying different rules
for the same kinds of logical symbols (names) would be
empirical differences among the objects in their extensions.
Wittgenstein thought Russell had implictly brought in such
differences, and it was one of the key principles of
Wittgenstein’s early work that such reference was forbidden.
Hence there could be only one type of name as far as logic
was concerned, and only one logical type of object. By the
correct specification of syntactical rules that hold for all
objects, one could not only avoid the paradoxes, but also
all the other confusions inherent in natural language, like
the different uses of the word "is", and the superficial
formal differences among sentences with the same meaning and
thus the same logical form. The TLP was, in an important
sense, Wittgenstein's specification of the rules for a
"logically perfect language". Of course, it is wrong to
suggest, as Russell does (TLP pp.7-8), that the conditions
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for symbolism that Wittgenstein describes (i.e., the various
components of the picture theory) only apply to such a
language. The problem with natural language is not that it
is not meaningful, as it would not be if the picture theory
failed to contain the conditions of representation in
natural language. Rather, the problem is that it does not
wear its meaning on its sleeve. The point of the TLP was to
specify the outlines of a language in which the logical
relation between syntactical elements - the logical form is perspicuous, as it usually is not in natural language.
As we have already seen, though, the color exclusion
problem dashed the hope that one could supply a general set
of syntactical rules that would permit all and only those
combinations of logically simple terms that result in
meaningful natural language sentences. One thing such rules
could not do was account for relations of metaphysical
necessity in the same way they accounted for logical
inference. Necessary truths like the color exclusion
principle (see Chapter 2) can only be expressed as relations
between elementary propositions, or in any case between
propositions that are as elementary as one could hope to
get. This meant that the principle of logical independence
that seems to hold for logical truths, and was essential to
the atomist conception as a whole, was unacceptable as a
general semantic principle. Wittgenstein's confidence in the
possibility of avoiding this problem by further reducing
attributions of color, assignments of quantitative value, or
principles of logical relations among elements of
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experience, was eventually undermined by his inability to
come up with a feasible program for such a reduction, or
even a single convincing example. Thus he was required to
abandon the idea that elementary propositions were logically
independent of one another, and replace it with a conception
of interdependencies among the rules of semiautonomous
logical spaces. At this point, much of Tractarian logic
stood at the brink of destruction; and the only question
that remained was whether the Tractarian program for
developing a language of logically perspicuous form could be
salvaged at all.
In his 1929-30 manuscripts Wittgenstein did entertain
the notion that this project could be pursued in another
way. A purely syntactic, generalized propositional form was
not to be had? but perhaps a more specialized logic could be
developed, one that would detail the actual grammatical
relations, or rules, that stand behind the use of
propositions. Of these, phenomenological propositions would
be of the highest order of concern. The reason for this
becomes obvious as soon as we consider the fact that the
problem was originally discovered in the failure of
Tractarian logic to enlighten us about propositions
concerning "the whole manifold of spatial and temporal
objects, as color, sounds, etc., etc., with their
gradations, continuous transitions, and combinations" (SRLF
31). That is, Wittgenstein had recognized that beyond a
limited circle of language in which all logical relations
could be expressed by the traditional connectives, there
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were realms (spaces) of relations among phenomenological
propositions whose logic could only be captured by more
specialized sets of grammatical rules. Perhaps, though, the
study could offer other insights too; for example, the rules
of logical possibility and generality, mathematical
infinity, geometrical continuity, and other important
linguistic domains would have to be investigated in
conjunction with the study of visual space.
The trail would be arduous. Russell, commenting on the
PR in the light of the conversations he had had with
Wittgenstein, said:
The theories contained in this new work of Wittgenstein
are novel, very original, and indubitably important.
Whether they are true, I do not know. As a logician,
who likes simplicity, I should wish to think that they
are not...2
In another version of this remark, this last sentence reads,
"I devoutly hope not, as they make mathematics and logic
almost incredibly difficult" (WA I,x). Indeed,
Wittgenstein's new perspective means that logic is not, as
he had hoped, simpler than it was in Russell and Whitehead's
Principia, with its hierarchy of types and its allegedly
contingent axioms. Rather, it becomes far more complex, with
semi-autonomous but overlapping conceptual spaces, each
having their own sets of logical exclusions and implications
but also interpenetrating others in more or less determinate
ways. All of this follows from the recognition that the
logical independence thesis could not be maintained, and
that there were relations between elementary propositions
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that had to be accounted for in a theory of the fundamental
principles of language and thought.
Russell may have been daunted by this complexity, but
Wittgenstein was not. Instead, he set out to breathe life
into a revised version of the Tractarian project. Whereas
the method of laying out the logic of language had formerly
been to develop a purely syntactic logical language, now it
would be to develop a phenomenology. How he conceived of
this phenomenology at various points in the manuscripts from
which the PR was compiled will unfold in this chapter and
the next. But at some points, at least, he thought of it in
terms of a phenomenological language, whose structure and
logical multiplicity would be just that of the phenomena
under investigation. In SRLF, written in or around April
1929, he spoke of "the logical investigation of the
phenomena themselves" (p.30) and "the ultimate analysis of
the phenomena in question" (p.35). When this is understood
as a modification of the Tractarian project of finding a
logically perfect language, it requires only a little
reflection to see in it the idea of a phenomenologically
perfect language, or simply a "phenomenological language".
So we can say that insofar as this project represents the
underlying idea of his efforts, when he rejects the
phenomenological language approach at the opening of the PR
what he is rejecting is both his original conception of
phenomenology and the philosophical program which had guided
the composition of the TLP.
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This version of his phenomenology maintains the closest
continuity with the Tractarian project, in substituting one
language of perspicuous form for another. But later on
Wittgenstein thought of phenomenology as a grammar of our
ordinary discourse within various phenomenological spaces.
In this guise his phenomenology looks in the direction of
language games and the PI. The two conceptions are not
completely distinct until some time in the middle of his
Band III manuscript, where his rejection of the
phenomenological language program is unequivocal and final.
Wittgenstein chose to begin his phenomenology where the
Tractarian project had gone awry: with the investigation of
visual space and color. Over the next couple of years he
explored these subjects repeatedly. But he also ranged over
a much wider sphere of phenomenological topics, including
sound, pain, time, and the self; and he went on to
investigate the grammatical rules of mathematical and
logical spaces as well, in the same spirit of trying to
ferret out the necessary propositions in each of these
spaces. Though in hindsight this may all be a prelude to his
later ideas about language games and rule-following, it was
at the time an enterprise in its own right, resulting in a
rough and incomplete phenomenology.
We will now proceed, in the remainder of this chapter
and in the next, to unravel the development of the central
feature of Wittgenstein's 1929-30 philosophy, the
phenomenological language project. Our interpretation will
conincide at one point or another with those of the
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Hintikkas, Stem, and Noe3, but we will show that many of
the critical developments are either missed or not
sufficiently emphasized in previous efforts. In contrast to
the usual procedure of patching together a version of
Wittgenstein's phenomenology from quotes taken from
different parts of his manuscripts and lectures, we will
proceed more or less chronologically, noting the changing
content of his conceptions at various stages of his work
between February 1929 and March 1930. By this method we will
reveal that virtually all of Wittgenstein's basic
conceptions underwent fundamental changes between the
beginning of his work and the creation of the PR. We will
also demonstrate, contrary to received wisdom, that
Wittgenstein had mixed feelings about the concept of a
"phenomenological language" from the very first time he used
this term, and that he never adopted it without reservation.
In broad outline, our view of his project consists of
four phases. (Please see Appendix III for a schematic
diagram of the phases, including dates and manuscript
materials involved.) In the first, from February 1929
through some time in the summer of that year, Wittgenstein
developed a number of ideas in which the concept of a
phenomenological language is implicit. This phase is
represented by Wittgenstein's Band I notebook (the first of
the four volumes from which the PR was drawn) and most of
Band II. The second phase, which lasts only a few weeks,
begins when he first uses the term "phenomenological
language"; at this time he apparently rejects the whole idea
101
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in short order. This phase, in which he emerges from a brief
philosophical crisis in or around July 1929, takes place at
the end of Band II. In the third phase, which comprises the
first half of his Band III notebook, he suddenly takes up
the project again, encounters problems, and tries to work
them out. This ends, and the fourth phases begins, in
October 1929, with a second philosophical crisis from which
he recovers only by finally rejecting most of his earlier
ideas, including the phenomenological language conception.
The spark for his recovery, and the key move in the
transition to his later philosophy, is the realization that
a physicalistic grammar cannot be used to express
phenomenological truths. This phase begins midway through
Band III and continues until the middle of Band IV, when he
compiles the PR; though most of the transformation has taken
place by January 193 0, well before the end of Band III. The
PR, which dates from April-May 193 0, really belongs to a
fifth, constructive phase, where Wittgenstein tries to put
together a phenomenology, in the sense of a grammatical
investigation of phenomena rather than an analytical
phenomenological language, out of the remarks he had written
over the past 16 months4. It is intended to reflect his
views as they had emerged by March 1930, after many changes
had taken place; but the attempt to recontextualize his
earlier remarks in light of his later ideas is not
altogether successful, and this accounts for much of the
difficulty of the work, and its apparent inconsistencies. We
will not be able to give this interpretation of the PR a
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full exposition here, but will limit ourselves to a few
examples as the occasion arises.
PHAS1 Zt WITTGENSTEIN'S EARLY 1929 PHILOSOPHY
3.2 Initial Zdaaa about Grammar, Physica and Phano— nology
Within a few days of beginning his 1929 manuscripts
Wittgenstein reveals the most important feature of his new
project, the distinction between phenomenology and physics
(WA 1,4,6ff) . Such a distinction may be inferred from the
later parts of the TLP, e.g., from the distinction between
empirical propositions and all others; but it is not an
organizing principle of that work as it is in these later
manuscripts. Here it is clear from the outset that it is a
central feature of what he is thinking about - as one might
expect from the fact that the impetus for starting the
notebooks was at least in part a misgiving about the
treatment of the phenomenology of color in the TLP.
He also introduces the term "grammar" almost
immediately, in a way that sounds much like his use of it
throughout his later work. But he treats it here as
identical with "phenomenology" (WA 1,4,7), and this should
signal to us that he is thinking about it quite differently
than he will in his later work. He says phenomenology is
[3.1] the grammar of the description of those facts out
of which physics constructs its theories.5 (WA 1,5,1)
Thus he actually started out with the belief that a grammar
of phenomenological spaces would provide an adequate account
of the necessary relations between propositions that the
formal logic of the TLP had failed to capture. Nevertheless,
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one should not jump to any hasty conclusion from these brief
remarks about the grammar of phenomenological spaces, i.e.,
by reading into them the meanings that these terms developed
over the next few years. From the little he says here the
notions of ''grammar", "phenomenology" and "physics" could go
in any number of directions.
In fact, there is good reason to suppose that what he
means by "grammar" in [3.1] does not have much to do with
ordinary language, for he does not seem to be claiming that
it is ordinary language or its grammatical principles out of
which physics builds its "theories". Nor is "physics" used
here in the sense in which he later holds that ordinary
language is based on the grammar of "physics", but rather in
the usual sense of a scientific discipline. This is apparent
not only from his use of the word "theories", but from the
fact that he says, "physics strives for truth, that is,
correct predictions of events" (P/A 1,4,6), and "physics
differentiates itself from phenomenology in that it wants to
establish laws" (P/A 1,4,10). From this we can also see that
"theories" does not have the sense of his later term
"hypotheses", which he used to describe ordinary
propositions which presuppose the existence of a physical
world beyond the senses; it has rather the technical sense
of a body of descriptive and predictive scientific laws.
Most likely, these first few remarks in the manuscript
constitute a development of what he had said in TLP 6.3ff,
where he deals with scientific propositions. References here
and in that section of the TLP to the advantages of the
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"simplicity" of physics (TLP 6.342; ViA 1,4,6), and
discussions of physics as a mode of representation (TLP
6.341; VIA 1,4,4-6) tend to confirm this interpretation. So
does the fact that it is in that section of the TLP that the
color exclusion problem appears (6.3751), and this problem
was apparently the impetus for beginning this notebook. Thus
the terminology here is more backward-looking than it seems
from the introduction of "grammar" and "physics".
As we know, the term "physics" eventually develops a
much wider sense than it has here. The long-term resting
place of this term in Wittgenstein’s usage is as a
description for the grammar of ordinary language per se. But
even before it reaches this stage it comes to signify
statements which presuppose the existence of a physical
world, i.e., statements in which physical objects and
temporal relations are mentioned without being couched in
terms of appearances. Since even this usage is not really
apparent until the early phenomenological system begins to
break down we will say no more about it here. The term
"grammar" takes even longer to acquire its later sense. The
PR opens with a remark which gives a fairly clear indication
of his later ideas: "That proposition is completely
logically analyzed whose grammar is completely clearly laid
out" (PR 1,1,51; WA 11,220,2). This remark is from Band IV,
written 23 February 1930, just about a month before the last
remarks which went into the PR.
As for "phenomenology", in these initial remarks there
is no explicit talk of a "phenomenological language", though
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in hindsight one could infer something like this from the
idea of phenomenology as a set of grammatical rules for
physics. This would appear to align Wittgenstein with Mach's
conception of science at this point. But even if this is how
we should read this remark - and there is not enough here to
be sure that it is - it is still quite far from his own
conception even a short time later, because he increasingly
takes phenomenology and physics to be two different
languages which describe different “worlds" or “systems”.
This view, however, turned out to be quite problematic, and
a year or so later he arrives at a very similar view to that
of [3.1], which guides the construction of the PR: i.e.,
that phenomenology is just the grammar of our descriptions
of phenomena. By this time, though, the view incorporates
the prior recognition that the grammar of phenomena must be
derived from ordinary language, and that the latter has an
inherent physicalistic bias.
So in spite of appearances, none of the terms he
introduces in these first few remarks - grammar, physics, or
phenomenology - are used in the way he will eventually use
them. By the time any of these terms has acquired its mature
sense Wittgenstein's philosophy had been largely overhauled.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to observe how small an
effort it would require to make any of these remarks appear
to reflect his later ideas: if one simply established, with
a few well-chosen passages, the later meanings of these
terms, it would be hard to tell that these remarks reflect,
at most, very primitive versions of those ideas, if not an
106
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

altogether earlier line of thought. This is exactly what he
does with some of these remarks in the first few passages of
the PR (1,1,51): much later expressions of his ideas about
phenomenology establish a context, and the earlier remarks
are then added. Wittgenstein uses this technique often in
the PR, in the hope of avoiding inconsistency while
excavating as much as he can from the earlier manuscripts in
the service of constructing a grammar of phenomena.
3.3

Phenomenology Defined

Wittgenstein's first comment about phenomenology and
physics in his manuscripts is the statement:
[3.2] It seems that much speaks for the representation
(Abbildung) of visual space through physics actually
being the simplest. (WA 1,4,6)
Roughly three months later, in Band II, he adds that
[3.3] the description of phenomena by means of the
hypothesis of a physical world (KQrperwelt) is
unavoidable due to its simplicity compared with the
incomprehensibly complicated phenomenological
description. (WA 1,126,1)
In these comments Wittgenstein suggests that physicalistic
language is a kind of shorthand for what would be a language
of experience. This should give us a sense of what the task
of a phenomenology would be: to recover those modes of
expression that avoid the simplifying assumptions of
physics. Several months after [3.3], at the end of Band II,
Wittgenstein makes the famous remark which appears in the
first section of the PR, in which he speaks as if he had all
along had in mind some sort of “phenomenological language".
To the extent that he did, these remarks on the simplifying
hypotheses of physicalistic description provide a hint of
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what such a language was supposed to be. It would be one
that could capture the complex necessary truths of
phenomenology in logically perspicuous form, more or less as
Wittgenstein's formula for the "general form of the
proposition" in the TLP was supposed to perspicuously mirror
the logic of all language, without introducing reductive
assumptions about the causes of phenomena. In this sense, at
least, something like a "phenomenological language" was part
of his original conception.
An early remark in Band I, which opens Chapter XXI of
the PR (the chapter which contains remarks on the grammar of
color) begins with the following:
There appear to be simple colors. Simple as
psychological phenomena. What I need is a psychological
or rather phenomenological color theory, not a physical
and just as little a physiological one.
Furthermore, it must be a pure phenomenological color
theory in which only the actually perceptible is spoken
of and no hypothetical objects - waves, cells, etc.
etc. - occur. (PR XXI,218,273; WA I,24,2)6
This gives a further indication of the nature of the project
as Wittgenstein conceived it at the beginning. The pure
phenomenological description of the world is to be
contrasted with the description in terms of "hypothetical",
i.e. physical, objects. Much of the material in Band I is an
extention of this idea: in particular, he tries to develop a
purely phenomenological description of the nature of visual
space, with the expectation that this will lead to a way of
avoiding the color exclusion problem. That is why having a
"phenomenological color theory" was so important to him. If
the quickly abandoned ideas of SRLF tell us anything it is
108
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that he initially saw his immediate goal as an examination
of "visual space and other things" towards the longer-term
project of offering a phenomenological substitute for the
Tractarian system. Phenomenology would then consist of
natural language reports of conscious experience, expressed
in a grammatically perspicuous form; while physics would
express hypotheses, meaning more or less that its language
would presuppose external, physical causes of that
experience ("waves, cells, etc.”).
3.4

Phenomenology, Sense-Date end the Two Worlds

One of the central ideas of Wittgenstein's early 1929
remarks is that there is, in a sense to be discussed, a
"world of physics" and a "world of data", i.e., sense-data.
Discussions of Wittgenstein's phenomenological period
usually collapse this into his other phenomenological
conceptions, but for reasons that will become clear as we
proceed it is best viewed as a distinct thesis. The basic
idea is that there are two distinct worlds, or "systems", as
he often calls them, one of which is composed of sense-data
and the other of physical objects. There is a further
thesis, which is almost always merged with the former in the
scholarly literature on this period, to the effect that
these systems or worlds are so ordered that the "world of
data" is the "primary world", or real world, or at least the
known world in something like the sense that Russell sees
“knowledge by acquaintance" as the only direct knowledge we
can have of the world. The "secondary world" of physics is
then an inference from sense-data.
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The purpose of the distinction between two "worlds"
seems to be primarily epistemological at first, coinciding
with that between phenomenology and physics, and thus with
many other philosophical systems in which sense-impressions
are considered epistemologically distinct from physical
objects. One might therefore assume that Wittgenstein meant
to be neutral about its ontological commitments. This is
also suggested by the fact that he frequently refers to a
"system", which sounds less ontologically loaded than a
"world". This is hardly decisive, though, since one could
speak of a system of bodies as well, and Russell, for one,
does not even hesitate to speak of systems of sense-data
("biographies") as belonging ontologically to the physical
world. When Wittgenstein begins the TLP with the assertion
that "the world is the totality of facts, not things" (1.1)
this can be read as an effort to move "the world" out of the
realm of metaphysics. "Things" suggests ontology while
"facts" suggests either something epistemic or perhaps a
purely logical construction, though it is certainly possible
to construe a Tractarian "fact" as an entity composed of
objects in a particular configuration. Wittgenstein's
initial response to the color exclusion problem after the
TLP was that propositions are not logically independent but
hang together in "systems". This suggests that the term
"system" is essentially a linguistic or epistemological
term, not a metaphysical one, and this lends some support to
the idea that "world" was also initially thought of as an
epistemic term.
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But in the PI, in a passage that is quite clearly
directed at the TLP, he says that "if the words 'language',
'experience', 'world', have a use, it must be as humble a
one as that of the words 'table', 'lamp', 'door'" {PI 97).
This suggests that the "world" here is just what we
ordinarily mean by it, which would not be an epistemological
category, though it would not strictly speaking be an
ontological one either. The decisive factor, in my view, is
that the terms in which he later rejects the idea of "two
worlds", and the fact that he nevertheless retains the
physics vs. phenomenology distinction after this point,
suggests that he himself thought he had slipped into
thinking of the distinction metaphysically. Thus the
following middle view emerges: although the notion of "two
worlds" originally signified nothing more than two distinct
modes of representation, Wittgenstein had begun to think of
them as metaphysically separate, such that a
phenomenological language would refer to facts in one world
and a physical language to facts in another. He then caught
himself in this fallacy and rejected the "two worlds" idea
altogether. This reversal belongs to the opening foray in
his attack on his original conception of phenomenology, and
so to a later part of our discussion.
The "two worlds" idea is first expressed some forty
pages into the Band I manuscript, where Wittgenstein begins
to speak of a "first" and "second" system {WA 1,23,2-6) of
which the former is the "world of data" {WA 1,25,4). The
notion of two worlds or systems seems to be connected with
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various references he makes to the "primary" beginning in
his Band II notebook: primary "time" and "life" (WA 1,45,13), primary "propositions" (WA 1,83,7) and primary and
secondary "number series" (WA 1,96,1). What ties these
references together is the distinction between physics and
phenomenology, which is already taking on a much broader
sense than we find in the opening remarks. Primary "time"
will be that of phenomenological experience, primary
"propositions" express this experience; both are
distinguished from physical time or language. Wittgenstein
compares the two systems to the images on a filmstrip (the
physical) and what they project on the screen (phenomena,
the "primary") (WA 1,23,3-5; PR V,51,83). It is significant,
though, that he does not refer to the physical as
"secondary" until quite a bit later in the manuscript.
Though characterizing phenomenological propostions as
"primary" seems to imply this, we shall see that he began
with a conception of the two realms as equal, and only
later, and very briefly, began to think of physicalistic
language as in some sense subordinate to the
phenomenological.
Wittgenstein does not start dating his manuscripts
until 6 October 1929, well into his Band III manuscript, so
the dates of most developments between 2 February and 6
October have to be estimated7. The distinction between the
two "worlds" informs his first remarks about verification
and phenomenological language, which must have been written
some time in the summer. Phenomenological language is
112
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constituted by those propositions about the "primary world"
that are verifiable (WA 1,190,2). Wittgenstein had started
out by speaking of phenomenology and physics as two modes of
representation, rather than two distinct languages; but as
we pointed out, a long journey separates this statement,
which is placed right at the beginning of the PR (1,1,51),
and the later recognition that the distinction between
phenomenology and physics is found in the grammar of
ordinary language. Shortly after he began he started
thinking of the "grammar" of phenomenology and the
"theories" of physics as two different languages. The "two
languages" outlook is simultaneously reflected in a "two
worlds" epistemology.
We may call the idea of that there are separate worlds
of sense-data and physical objects the "two worlds"
hypothesis and the idea that knowledge of the latter is
based on the former the "epistemological priority thesis".
It will be useful to formulate the two theses separately so
as to keep them distinct in what follows. The "two worlds"
conception may be described thus:
TW: There are two distinct worlds, or systems, the
first of which is composed of sense-data, and the
second of which is composed of physical objects.
The thesis of epistemic priority, then, is:
IP: The first world of TW is primary in relation to the
second, in the sense that they are so ordered that
knowledge of the second is obtained only through
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inferences from knowledge of the first, while knowledge
of the first is direct, infallible, and unmediated.
Both of these ideas may be further distinguished from the
following conception in which what are distinguished are
modes of representation of the world:
MR: There are two different modes of representation
used to depict reality, one of which is used for the
representation of immediate experience and the other
for representing the physical world.
It should be readily apparent that MR must be attributed to
Wittgenstein throughout the period we are discussing, even
when he seems to hold TW and BP as well. A later version of
this thesis, though, equates ordinary language with the
physicalistic mode of representation:
MR': Ordinary language is the mode of representation
primarily used to depict reality as consisting mainly
of physical objects, whereas the representation of
immediate experience is done by other means, including
uncharacteristic uses of ordinary language itself.
The "other means" here might include various metaphors
derived from ordinary language, pictorial or geometrical
representations, or a phenomenological language. MR* belongs
to Wittgenstein's mature conception of his project; it is
anticipated in the summer of 1929, but its full importance
is not appreciated until at least October.
MR is more or less implied right from the beginning of
Band I. But it is initially stated in terms of the
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continuity of space, and hence cloaked in mathematical
language:
If I can represent {abbilden) space with rational
numbers then I can also represent it with irrational
numbers. And if the one representation is given,
therewith so is the other mode of representation (Art
der Abbildung) thereby also already given.
Now the question is: is there a privileged, for
instance particularly immediate, mode of
representation? I believe not!
Each mode of representation is equally justified
[gleichberechtigt) . (WA I,4,2-4)
Since Wittgenstein’s first mention of physics and
phenomenology immediately follows this passage, and does not
seem to suggest a change in point of view, it appears that
far from endorsing ZF here, he was quite opposed to it.
Indeed, if any priority is suggested at the beginning of his
notebooks it is quite the reverse of that in IF. We have
already cited his statement that "much speaks for the
representation of visual space through physics actually
being the simplest", to which he adds: "That is, that
physics were thetrue phenomenology" [WA 1,4,6).

He

immediately moves to restrict this idea, but not in a way
that suggests that phenomenology is "primary":
But there is something to object against that: namely,
physics strives for truth, that is, correct predictions
of events, while phenomenology does not do that, it
strives for sense not truth. [WA 1,4,6)
But one can say: physics has a languageand it states
propositions in this language. These propositions can
be true or false. These propositions constitute
[bilden) physics and grammar constitutes phenomenology
(or however one wants to call it). (WA 1,4,7)
Physics distinguishes itself from phenomenology in that
it wants to establish laws. Phenomenology only
establishes possibilities. (WA 1,4,10; PR 1,1,51)
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The next remark is [3.1] (above, p.100). This opening foray
into phenomenology begins with the idea of a certain primacy
of the physical, at least in terms of simplicity. It then
strikes a kind of functional balance between the two, as
different modes of representation. Wittgenstein gives no
indication that he is thinking of a contrast between this
and the above remark that all modes of representation are
"equally justified". The reasonable conclusion is that
physics and phenomenology also stand on a par at this point.
In other early remarks Wittgenstein refers to the
"first" and "second" systems. Since he refers to the first
system as "primary" it is hard to understand why he avoids
calling the second one "secondary". The analogy in the
following passage, near the end of Band I, can be taken in
two ways, one of which suggests the primacy of the physical
world, the other the reverse:
Then is there time at all in the first system? Can one
say of an event or rather of a fact in the system of
data, 'it was’?
If I compare the facts of the first system with the
pictures on the screen and the facts in the second
system with the pictures on the filmstrip then there is
a present picture on the filmstrip, past and future
pictures; but on the screen there is only the present.
(WA 1,23,2-3; #3 is Pi? V,51,83)
On the one hand, this film analogy suggests something quite
the reverse of his later expressions, since the phenomena
are derived from the physical facts. For it is clear that
the images on the screen are in fact "mere" images, and the
physical film is the source of them. However, Wittgenstein
probably means to describe our epistemic position as being
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similar to that of the audience; in this case he would be
saying that the images are all we can observe and the film
can only be inferred by hypothesizing some physical and
geometrical method of projection8. Thus, he had begun to
move toward a position, which seems more natural the more
one takes phenomenology as a basis for an epistemological
foundationalism, in which the “first" world is also
"primary” and the physical world is "secondary".
Nevertheless, no explicit expression of BP can be found
until the middle of Band II. The few passing references to
the "primary" before the middle of Band II do not show that
he had altered his position before this point. The following
is the earliest overt contrast between "primary" and
"physical":
What we conceive in physical space is not the primary
that we can only know more or less; rather, what we can
know of physical space shows us how far the primary
goes and how we have to interpret physical space. (WA
1,141,1; PR XII,147,168)
This is found a little more than halfway through Band II.
This means that IP, as a concsciously held position, dates
from roughly midyear 1929. This gives it a life of only
about six months, quite a bit less than what one might
suppose from reading the PR. For several months after the
above remark, written perhaps in the late spring or early
slimmer of 1929, there appear a number of more explicit
expressions of BP. There is little question Wittgenstein
held BP for at least a few months. Beginning in October
1929, with his reconsideration of other philosophical
positions, it becomes increasingly problematic to continue
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holding KF, and by the end January 1930 it had been finally
and decisively rejected.
NR' is first stated explicitly towards the end of Band
II {WA 1,190,2), and thus belongs to the second phase of
Wittgenstein’s 1929-30 philosophy, to be examined below. TW
develops gradually during the first phase. We have seen that
he refers to a "world of data" early in Band I and to "the
hypothesis of a physical world" near the middle of Band II.
His other references to the primary or secondary world, or
system, prior to the beginning of a general re-examination
of his position in mid-1929, occur mainly in the context of
considerations about the infinite divisibility of space,
where he wishes to distinguish the logically infinite
possibility of spatial division in the "primary" world from
physically possible divisibility in the "secondary” world
{WA 1,144,3; 1,146,2). Once again "world” and "system" are
used interchangeably, and shortly after he leaves off this
topic we find a revealing series of remarks on worlds and
systems:
[3.4a] A system is, so to speak, a world.
[3.4b] Or: each higher system is a world of more
dimensions than the lower.
[3.4c] Thus one can't search for a system. But indeed
for the expression for a system that is given to me in
unwritten symbols. {WA 1,173,7-9)
All but [3.4b] were included in the PR (XIII,152,178). This
remark seems to suggest IF, a stronger thesis than TW, and
since both of these were rejected along with the rest of his
early ideas well before the PR was put together it is not
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surprising that it was omitted. Moreover, [3.4b] looks very
much like a phenomenological theory of types; yet only a few
remarks later Wittgenstein is concerned to deny that such a
proposal is necessary (WA 1,174,4; PR XIII,152,179). On the
other hand, to the extent that it catapults the physicsphenomenology distinction into proposal for a plurality of
worlds, one can see in it a kind of predecessor to the
notion of language games. Indeed the three remarks taken
together form a kind of nexus of the ideas that led from the
TLP, to the phenomenological system, and finally to the
later philosophy. The notion of a "world" as a system of
propositions clearly has its place in the TLP. But the color
exclusion problem led to an emphasis on the multiplicity and
semi-autonomy of such systems, in particular systems of
phenomenologically related propositions, in order to account
for metaphysically necessary relations like those that
characterize the color spectrum. Rule-following is
represented in [3.4c] by "searching", which one can do only
within a system, or game. What this passage shows, then, is
that TW, though it was rejected in fairly short order, was
an integral part of the conjuncture of intellectual threads
that led from the TLP to the PI.
Over the course of his first two notebooks, the
reification and epistemological ordering of the two worlds
or systems began to replace the initial proposal NR that
simply distinguishes two ways of talking about the world.
Wittgenstein began to think of the two systems as discrete
worlds that were so ordered that the physical one was known
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only by inference from the phenomenal. Though he is never
moved to explicitly characterize them as ontologically
distinct, once he has taken the position that the existence
of one (the "primary") is known with certainty, while the
other is a "hypothesis" or inference from sense-data, it is
difficult to avoid talking about them as if they were indeed
different worlds9. At any rate, Wittgenstein seems to have
been concerned about this implication after a certain point,
for as he starts to reconsider his initial positions he
forcefully reminds himself that both ways of talking refer
to the same world.
The progression to the dualist position coincided with
his deepening commitment to phenomenological investigation.
One has the sense that during this period Wittgenstein was
slowly tying himself in phenomenological knots, more or less
forcing on himself the thesis that there was a
phenomenological "basis language" (to use the Hintikkas'
term) with which one could speak of "a world of pure
experience" (to use James's term) and avoid committing
oneself to the "simplifying hypothesis" of a world of pure
matter. This is the kind of phenomenology Wittgenstein had
started to pursue, but it led him in directions he did not
care to follow. The phenomenology that is represented in the
PR, though, is not this, but the grammatical conception.
Despite the inclusion of some of his earlier remarks there,
the PR was not supposed to defend either TW or IP but only
the two versions of MR. As we shall see, the two-worlds
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conception will be rejected along with the phenomenological
language conception, for the two went hand in hand.
3.5 A Few Remarks on Sense-Data
Before we move on we must say a word about "sensedata" . I have attributed to Wittgenstein an acceptance of
this term, and even suggested that it forms a basis of his
phenomenology. But in fact, up to the end of the period we
are now considering (Phase I) he uses only the terms "Datum"
and "Data", and that mainly in a few remarks towards the
beginning of Band I, where he refers several times to a
"system of data" or "world of data" (WA 1,23,2; 1,23,5;
1,25,4). Here the "world of data" is contrasted with the
"world of physics" (WA 1,23,5), so it is pretty much beyond
doubt that he is referring to sense-data, not "data" in any
other sense of the term, i.e., to phenomena as opposed to
physics. Moreover this gives us a reasonable basis to assume
that when he speaks of the "primary" world or system he
means a world composed of sense-data.
However, when he actually starts using the word
"Sinnesdaten" in Band III he is usually critical of it. This
in itself suggests that he had consciously adopted it, since
this is largely a period of criticism of his own earlier
ideas. Given its association with the early work of Russell
and Moore it is somewhat surprising that Wittgenstein ever
did adopt it, even in his abbreviated form. It is true that
before 1929 Russell had published The Analysis of Mind, the
neutral monist work in which he gives up the idea that
sensations are data10. But though Wittgenstein read this
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work at some point (most likely in 1930, which is when his
remarks first turn towards some issues raised in Russell's
book) there is no reason to think he adopts the "sense-data"
terminology merely because Russell dropped the idea. More
likely the explanation is that Wittgenstein picked it up as
a convenient expression with which to talk about
phenomenological experience, and simply left aside any
psychological or ontological baggage that Russell, Moore or
others might have wished to attach to the term. As we have
seen, he was not much concerned with questions of
experimental psychology, and ostensibly even less with
metaphysics, so he would have had little interest in the
matter of what sense-data were, where and how they were
cognized, etc. In the NB he had struggled to understand the
ontological nature of "objects", but by the time he wrote
the TLP he gave up trying to say what they were and focused
instead on their logical properties (how they combine to
form facts, etc.). In undertaking his phenomenological
investigations he avoids the ontological issue of what
sense-data are altogether. A "world of data" was at first
thought of as a construction or representation of senseexperience; the rest was a conceptual investigation of the
necessary properties of visual space and other spaces. Later
on, when he began to doubt that such a construction from
pure experience could exist or that such a representation
was, strictly speaking, possible, he also began to question
the usefulness of the notion of "sense-data".
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3.6 Wittgenstein'ft Original Conception of Hypotheses
We have already seen a number of instances of
Wittgenstein's use of the terms "hypothesis" and
"hypothetical". At the very beginning of the manuscripts
Wittgenstein spoke of the language of physics as
"hypotheses" and said he wanted a color theory without
"hypothetical objects", i.e., the physical apparatus of the
eye or the physical medium of light. He speaks of the
"description of phenomena by means of the hypothesis of a
physical world". These references suggest that by
"hypothesis" he initially meant any statement that
presupposes a physical cause behind an appearance. The
"world of physics" is thus described by means of hypotheses.
Another indication of this occurs well into Band II.
Wittgenstein asks, "how can we construe an infinite
hypothesis, for example the infinitely many fixed stars?" He
says of such a hypothesis, "it is clear to us that no
experience corresponds to it. It exists only in the 'second
system', thus in language..." {WA 1,146,2). Again, the
hypothetical seems to be equated with the physical in
general, which is distinct from experience and is expressed
in the language of physics.
As we can see from Wittgenstein's statement about the
kind of color theory he was after, hypotheses are at this
point in his philosophy regarded with a certain amount of
suspicion. Hypothetical propositions are not now thought of
as perspicuous representations of the world; on the
contrary, they are precisely what a phenomenological
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language, or something along those lines, would provide an
analysis of. Thus, at least by the end of Phase I, they do
not stand on a par with phenomenological propositions; the
latter are immediately known, while hypotheses are known by
inference from sense-data.
This is about as much as we can learn of "hypotheses”
prior to the transformation of Wittgenstein's overall
philosophical outlook. There is nothing at this point
indicative of the later view on which "hypotheses" are
contrasted with the verifiable nature of phenomenological
claims (VIA 11,5,1); that development occurs only at the
beginning of the series of changes that altered his original
views, and it quickly gives way to another view in which
hypotheses are not verified but "confirmed". Note, however,
that it is already used in a wider way than the word
"theories" was in his reference to the "theories of physics"
at the beginning of Band I. There he seems to have meant by
"theories" more or less what we would mean by that phrase in
ordinary language, i.e., a technical model used in
/

scientific explanation of the physical world. A
"physicalistic hypothesis", however, was a way of talking
about the world as a world of physical objects. A hypothesis
of physics is the same thing as what he has in mind in the
BIB when he says of propositions about the material world,
"I am not thinking in particular of the laws of the natural
sciences, but of any such proposition as 'the tulips in our
garden are in full bloom', or 'Smith will come in any
moment’" (BIB 46; see Chapter 1). The term "hypothesis" does
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not, however, lead directly into this conception, but is
rather refined out of existence in the subsequent
manuscripts. By the BT (p.440) he is already using the word
in its ordinary sense.
PHASE ZZ: CRITIQUE OF THX EARLY SYSTEM
3.7 The Chimera of a Phenomenological Language
We have so far given a general overview of the nature
of Wittgenstein's philosophy through roughly mid-summer
1929. In that period he began using the terms grammar,
physics, phenomenology, hypothesis, datum, and primary world
(or "the primary"), and if only in virtue of his vocabulary
he sounded like he was already in possession of most of the
ideas that went into the PR, and even some of his later
philosophy. But this is not the case, for the use of these
terms at this point is not what it will be only a short time
later. The earlier conception will be largely jettisoned,
and it is this self-criticism that will lead to the PR and
eventually to his later philosophy.
One reason to suspect that the main story has not yet
begun is that up to this point Wittgenstein has not even
introduced the terms "phenomenological language" or "primary
language"; nor has he used the terms "verification" or "mode
of expression" in any way that suggests their later
significance. But it is just when he begins using these
terms that the original conception starts to break down.
These expressions (except the last) were initially thought
to capture the essence of the project; but no sooner does he
formulate them than he begins to notice difficulties that
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eventually prove fatal to the project as originally
conceived. In a prolonged rectification which begins at the
end of Band II, reaches a kind of climax in October 1929,
and continues at least through January 1930, Wittgenstein
burst out of the straightjacket he had made for himself and
emerged with ideas that would evolve into what we now know
as the "later Wittgenstein".
In a well-known remark on the first page of the PR
Wittgenstein gives a negative characterization of his point
of view in May 1930: it involves the rejection of the notion
of a "phenomenological language, or ’primary language' as I
called it" (WA 11,118,6; PR 1,1,51). This has led many
readers to think that this notion was the foundation of some
substantial previous body of work. We have rejected (Chapter
1) the suggestion that the TLP or its precursors were based
on such a notion. When the PR was composed Wittgenstein’s
entire post-Tractarian opus consisted of SRLF and his four
notebooks Band I-IV, of which Band I was rather brief and
the fourth only about a quarter filled. It was not until
just before the end of his second (Band II) notebook that he
began to use the term "phenomenological language” (WA
1,190,2). His first use of the term "primary language”
occurs almost immediately after this (WA 1,191,8), in spite
of the above remark11. The remark at the opening of the PR
in which he rejects these ideas is found on p.205 of Band
III, written 25 Novemeber 1929. This chronology yields two
sobering facts:
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1. His rejection of the "phenomenological language"
project was a break with ideas he had developed for no
more than 10 months, i.e., beginning at the earliest in
February 1929.
2. The project he rejects nevertheless occupies some
part of Band I - Band III, the very sources from which
a great deal of the PR itself is drawn.
The second point largely explains why the PR is so difficult
to follow and appears inconsistent at many points. We will
discuss this as the need arises in what follows.
The first point, however, requires some immediate
comment. In fact, it may be stated in even stronger terms;
that is, the expressions "phenomenological language" and
"primary language" are associated with the first steps in
the decay of Wittgenstein's first phenomenological system. I
have argued above that he had something like the notion of a
"phenomenological language" in mind from the beginning. It
is nevertheless quite interesting that this phrase itself
does not occur as a self-conscious characterization of his
project until he begins to question it. In this sense, the
notion of a "phenomenological language" is the beginning of
a process of decline of that project. That process lasted
from roughly July 1929 until January 1930, with some of the
most significant changes occuring in October 1929.12
3.8

First Intellectual Crisis and Critique of Dualism

Wittgenstein's use of the phrase "the hypothesis of a
physical world" must have stuck in his mind like an
intellectual prickle, perhaps made even more uncomfortable
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by his references to a “world of data" in the early parts of
his manuscript. For it should not be taken as a matter of
course that a desire to find a perspicuous representation of
the exclusion of one color by another should lead anyone to
speak of the existence of an external world as a
"hypothesis"! One might speak of two "worlds"
pleonastically, in order to distinguish epistemological
vantage points, but once the notion becomes reified it is
unlikely to have a clarificatory effect overall. Recognition
of this difficulty seems to be the basis of the first step
in what would become, beginning some time in mid-1929, a
revolution in Wittgenstein's perspective. Notably, as with
later stages in this turnaround, it occurs after a period of
intellectual stagnation. He writes:
For 14 days I have not worked. Now we will see whether
it will still go on. I have not yet found the road. And
my thoughts flutter around the object. {WA 1,190,1)
His next remark is the one in which he first uses the term
"phenomenological language":
[3.5] A phenomenological language describes exactly the
same thing as an ordinary, physical [language]. Only it
must limit itself to what is verifiable.
Is that even possible? (WA 1,190,2-3)
This would have been written roughly in summer 1929, perhaps
six months and more than 400 manuscript pages into his work.
Two fundamental assumptionsare questioned here. First, TW
(the two-worlds hypothesis) is practically cast aside; if
the two languages describe "exactly the same thing" there
can be only one world. Second, the possibility of a language
of immediate experience is put in doubt. There are other
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important developments here too. This is the first time he
mentions verificationism in a way that connects it with his
phenomenology. It is also the first time he equates ordinary
language with physicalistic language, setting the stage for
the idea that philosophy must work with ordinary language
but be cognizant of its physicalistic bias.
But what transpires in [3.5] is an extremely important
step in Wittgenstein's transition even without these
concurrent developments. For from what he says in the remark
just before this we can infer that he wanted to put an end
to whatever was blocking him from working, and that [3.5]
goes right to the heart of the difficulty. Thus he first
coins the phrase "phenomenological language" as a kind of
summation of all of his assumptions up to now, and then
immediately questions his direction by asking if the goal it
aims at is even possible. It is a sign of the fact that a
crisis is upon him that Wittgenstein does not begin with
less formidable questions, such as whether a
phenomenological language would actually solve problems like
color exclusion or anything else, or whether it might not
realistically be too complex to specify. Instead, he goes
directly to the question of whether such a language is even
possible.
These doubts about the possibility of a
phenomenological language are no passing tremor; they
continue in various forms for ten manuscript pages, to the
end of Band II. In fact the whole idea of a phenomenological
language appears to be decisively rejected in these pages.
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Although he does not explicitly answer his own question of
whether it is possible until the next manuscript (Band III),
a negative answer is strongly suggested in these last 10
pages of Band I, as we will see. Historically, though, this
is not the final word; for at the beginning of Band III he
suddenly seems bent on reviving the project which he seems
to abandon here. Nevertheless, it stands in stark contrast
to much that has been written about Wittgenstein's
phenomenology that no sooner had he given expression to the
idea of a "phenomenological language" than he raised
fundamental doubts about it. As we shall see, the revival of
it in Band III similarly plunges into doubt in very short
order, although (for reasons we will explore) it takes much
longer this time before he decides that these doubts are
fatal to the project. But he does finally reach that
conclusion, and it is the end of a process of critical selfexamination that begins with [3.5].
In his next remarks Wittgenstein continues questioning
his previous assumptions:
[3.6] Let us not forget that physicalistic language
also only describes the primary world again, and not
e.g. a hypothetical world. A hypothesis is only an
assumption about the practical/ correct/ mode of
representation.
Now is this hypothetical essential [for] every
representation of the world? (WA 1,190,4-5)
This confirms the rejection of TW, and with it at least the
original form of IP, i.e., the epistemological priority of
the phenomenological world over the physical world. Having
spoken of primary and secondary "worlds" to the point of
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talking as if they were ontologically distinct, he now
withdraws from this implication and returns to the idea with
which he began his manuscripts, that physics and
phenomenology are two modes of representation of one world.
This is an about-face from the direction of his remarks up
to this point; it is the critical step in his transition, on
our reading, and hails the onset of a new system of ideas
and the end of his pursuit of phenomenology as traditionally
conceived. At this point the idea of a grammatical
distinction between two ways of talking regains the ground
it had partially ceded to the two-worlds view. The
grammatical philosophy is now visible on the horizon, and
the phenomenological language project will eventually be
folded into it as an examination of the grammar of
phenomena.
Wittgenstein also puts a new spin on the term
"hypothesis" in [3.6], one which further undermines TW. To
say that ordinary language contains hypotheses is not
necessarily to doubt the existence of an external world. But
this is what his use of the term had seemed to imply up to
now, leading him to characterize the physical world as
"secondary". Now he says that the use of a hypothesis only
implies that our present purposes are best suited by the
assumption that physical objects exist. This is why the
adjectives "practical" and "correct” occur as alternatives
in his manuscript: the "correct" mode of representation is
the "practical" one in the sense that it is dictated by
considerations about what the discourse is to achieve. Since
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it is usually practical to represent the world through the
consolidation of the data of experience into a few basic
relations between ourselves and physical objects, the
hypothetical mode is also in this case the "correct" one.
The idea that the practical superiority of a mode of
representation makes it "correct" raises a question, since
it seems to suggest that the previous motivations for a
phenomenological language, i.e., its foundational
relationship to ordinary language, are trumped by purely
prudential considerations. This sounds unusual given the
views Wittgenstein has been propounding until now; in fact,
it seems that unless he has dropped a lot more of his
perspective than he lets on, he is still committed to some
form of SP, with the ontological implications removed.
Wittgenstein clearly wants to hang on to the term
"hypothesis"; thus he continues to recognize the contingent
and uncertain nature of propositions which presuppose a
physical world13. He also seems to still believe that
phenomenological observation is our only means of direct
access to reality, and that the grammatical rules for the
expression of phenomenological experience are necessary
truths. Together these suggest that the data of immediate
experience is a better guide to knowledge of the world than
physical hypotheses, and that practical purposes are no
guide at all. Thus he may be implicitly committed to some
form of IP, and this should make practical considerations a
secondary if not altogether superficial matter.

132
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Two answers to this question can be formulated based on
what Wittgenstein says, though he does not spell out either
of them. First, let us say, as he now seems to hold, that
our interaction with the world requires more than one mode
of representation (this does not beg the question, since
these modes could still be hierarchically ordered). Second,
one of the modes we require is the physicalistic one; this
is argued in some form in remarks we will examine below.
Third, we might maintain that the hypothetical nature of
physicalistic expressions is itself part of what sometimes
makes the mode of representation through physics necessary
to our purposes. Wittgenstein does not say this even
implicitly, so far as I can see, but it seems to be correct.
For example, to describe the world we often need to
represent errors of perception, possible outcomes of an
action, theoretical or fictional entities. These require a
mode of representation in which the objects we represent may
not exist, which is not possible in phenomenology. Thus in
practice our epistemic priorities can be the reverse of IP:
it may be essential that some entities be "hypothetical",
that they not be reducible to necessary truths of immediate
awareness. This alleviates the pressure of supposing that a
contingent mode of representation must be epistemically
dependent on a noncontingent one, and hence of supposing
that in using the term "hypothesis" Wittgenstein still must
have been committed to IP. In this case practical purposes
could make the difference in one’s choice of a mode of
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representation, and the putative advantages of a
phenomenological language would disappear.
The second answer depends on recovering the perspective
which Wittgenstein started with at the beginning of Band I
(see above, 3.2 and 3.3) . He had said that conventions of
representation are "equally justified" (WA 1,4,4), by which
he seems to mean that one has no inherent advantage over
another in representing the world. Wittgenstein's remarks
about Newtonian mechanics and causality in the TLP (6.341,
6.35) display a similar equanimity about modes of
representation. But he also offers in both places a
justification for choosing one over another, i.e., that one
convention may be simpler than the next (TLP 6.342), and in
particular that physics may be simpler than phenomenology
(WA 1,4,6). This simplicity provides another sense in which
one's choice of a mode of representation might be based on
practical considerations; simplicity is a rationale for
choosing physicalistic conventions in particular instances.
But if conventions are otherwise equally capable of
representing the world then considerations of purpose may be
the strongest argument for a particular convention. This is
the main rationale that Frege provides for his
Begriffschrift: "Its first purpose... is to provide us with
the most reliable test of the validity of a chain of
inferences and to point out every presupposition that tries
to sneak in unnoticed, so that its origin can be
investigated"14. In a 1933 lecture Wittgenstein says, "One
symbolism is just as good as the next. The word 'I' is one
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symbol among others having a practical use, and could be
discarded when not necessary for practical speech" (WL32
p.63). Aside from a practical justification one might point
to aesthetic preferences or other subjective criteria; but
there is not going to be a deeper kind of justification, and
from an epistemic point of view every practical purpose
stands on the same level. Thus if the choice of a
physicalistic convention is dictated by pragmatic
constraints, this does not mean it is a second-rate
description of the world, or that what we represent this way
is a "secondary" world or system. Thus once again we can
avoid the idea that a commitment to the term "hypothesis"
entails a commitment to EP.

As mentioned above, the question of the possibility of
a phenomenological language is answered only indirectly,
though perhaps no less decisively, in the present series of
remarks. In a variety of ways Wittgenstein calls into
question the possibility that a language of pure experience
could find an adequate means of expression. It is not hard
to see in this a hint of doubt about private languages, for
a phenomenological language would be a solipsistic one and
the concern is that we cannot conceive of an actual language
that would give adequate expression to experience, which is
in constant flux. We will pursue this train of thought
further in Chapter 4. But the question of whether a
phenomenological language is possible is intimately related
to the question raised in [3.6] as to whether physicalistic
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hypotheses are essential to the description of the world. If
the physical description is essential, then it follows that
a phenomenological language will at best be an incomplete
description, i.e., that no single mode of representation
will be adequate to all our purposes.
Wittgenstein's critical examination of these two
questions continues in the form of a critique of the idea
that one can give a complete description of an object by
means of sense impressions. He calls such a description a
"biography" [WA 1,190,6), after Russell’s usage15, and he
rejects it due to considerations about the temporality of
language itself. These remarks about language are the ones
that the Hintikkas take to be the fundamental point in
Wittgenstein's alleged move from a phenomenological to a
physicalistic "basis language". We will see later on just
what is wrong with their view; but one thing is already
apparent. Wittgenstein has already taken the most important
step in rejecting the phenomenological language view: he has
has seen that TW and IP are false, and he has at least
suggested an argument for this conclusion, centering on the
idea that modes of representation are conventional and
pragmatically selected. Wittgenstein could hardly have
believed anymore that a phenomenological language could play
the role of a "basis language" for any other mode of
representation if they are two "equally justified" ways of
representing the same world and the choice of one over the
other depends mainly on one's purposes. It follows that
nothing he says after [3.5] and [3.6] can be the fundamental
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reason for rejecting the idea of a phenomenological basis
language. He is already convinced that phenomenology cannot
provide an analysis of physicalistic grammar; at most they
could stand on a par, and he has begun to question even
that, i.e., whether an immediate description of experience
is even possible. So the Hintikkas can at most say that the
remarks about the physicalistic nature of language itself,
which follow these other remarks, lend support to a position
he has already adopted. As we shall see, though, their
interpretation is incorrect on other grounds as well.
Wittgenstein asks of his "biography" of sensations,
"Why shouldn’t I be able to leave everything hypothetical
out of this description?" (WA 1,190,6) The answer to this,
he suggests, has to do with the fact that physical time
necessarily enters into the use of a language. Let's assume,
per impossible, that one could write as fast as one’s memory
records sense-impressions. Still there is a problem:
But let’s assume I then read this description through isn't it now still hypothetical? And why not? (WA
1,190,8)
A phenomenological language was supposed to be a descritpion
of immediate experience; but to do this it would have to be
an immediate (i.e., unmediated) description of experience,
or else it is not even a private language, for it is not
even solipsistically adequate to its subject. Thus we are
supposing that our speedwriting subject can actually record
sense-impressions immediately in such a language. But what
is so immediate about this language when we read this
description back - even for the subject who wrote it? For
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now the experience, which we assume was captured with
absolute precision, is mediated by a language which can only
be used in ordinary physical time; there is no such thing as
reading immediately, i.e., in the time of phenomena. This
cannot be solved by matching our speedwriting subject with a
speedreading subject; once it is written down the expression
of the experience is already in physical time; it cannot be
immediate again.
Indeed, we can make the example even sharper. Imagine
now a speedta2king subject - someone who represents their
experience orally, as it occurs, to an audience fluent in
the language of phenomena. The audience can experience the
immediacy of the subject’s monologue at most once - it is
gone as soon as it is past, for then it is in "the time of
the filmstrip", as Wittgenstein puts it, not that of the
screen, and thus in mediated time. In fact, to be precise,
it could not be experienced even once - for it takes time
for sound to travel, time to recognize words and form
thoughts, time for words to combine into meaningful phrases.
A phenomenological language, if it were actually a language,
would be a lead balloon: the very material of which it is
made (be it oral or visual) and the temporal medium of its
use would undermine its intended purpose.
At this point Wittgenstein has all but demonstrated
that a phenomenological language is not possible, and that
the hypothetical cannot be eliminated from our description
of the world. He does not stop here, though, but produces a
thought experiment to demonstrate that the most immediate
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description possible would not eliminate the physical mode
of representation:
[3.7] Let's imagine a representation: The bodies that I
appear to see are moved by a mechanism such that they
must give the visual images to be represented to two
eyes which are fixed at a determinate place in the
model. Out of the position of the eyes in the model and
out of the position of [sic; "and"] movement of bodies
the described visual image is then determined.
One could imagine, e.g., the mechanism to be
driven by turning a crank, and the description "read
off" from this (herunterzulesen) .
Isn’t it clear that that would be the most
immediate description one could think of? That is, that
anything that would be more immediate yet would cease
to be a description? (WA 1,191,1-2)
This model is to be compared to a phenomenological language.
We are to see the model as a representation of the positions
of bodies we "appear to see", i.e., of our visual field, as
described to someone whose point of view is that of the
fixed eyes. Our visual field is given to the observer
(reader) simultaneously with our experience of it. The
objects in the model, like linguistic signs, are
representations in physical space of the movements and
positions of bodies we perceive in phenomenological space.
The observer can then "read off" the description of visual
space from the physical objects, as one would read a
phenomenological language.
The force of this physical model is that it appears to
eliminate the mediation of language to the greatest extent
imaginable. Thus the representation is by hypothesis
synchronized with our perceptions, eliminating even the
minimal temporal intervention required by our speedwriter.
Moreover, the observer seems to be able to "read off" what
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the model signifies directly, without first recognizing and
then interpreting signs. The question is, are there still
hypothetical elements that cannot be eliminated from this
model? We have to allow that the model is temporally
synchronized with our perceptions, as we granted
speedwriting capabilities to our previous subject. We may
suppose that the observer "reads off'* what is represented in
the model by interpreting it in a "thin" sense, such that
interpreting happens automatically and does not pose any new
problems. But what of the idea that the observer "reads off"
the description directly? This cannot be allowed: the whole
point of the quest for an immediate means of representation
is that we cannot observe the physical world without the
intervention of "hypotheses", that it cannot be described
directly. But the crank-driven mechanical model we are
discussing is necessarily part of the physical world; that
is the very reason it can represent anything at all of our
experience to an observer. Then even this model, so much
closer to immediate representation than a language, cannot
represent immediate experience immediately.
The point is, we cannot get to the point of immediately
perceiving a representation as a representation. The
representation itself is part of the physical world, just as
a phenomenological language would have to be a real language
with practical application. If we could immediately perceive
the physical signs there would be no need for a distinctly
phenomenological language at all; the whole idea is that we
perceive physical objects only mediately. There is another
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difficulty, too, though it requires going deeper into
Wittgenstein’s thought experiment than he might have
intended us to do. Even if we could somehow get around the
physicality of the model and perceive it directly, we would
not be perceiving the physical objects in the model as
representations. To perceive them as representations we must
understand them as such, and this requires that we take the
perception of the objects in the model to be distinct from
what they refer to. This brings the temporal element back
into the picture; it brings temporal thought processes back
in, as we attempt to distinguish our perception of the
objects from our understanding of them as signs.
Wittgenstein's mechanical analogue of a language
demystifies the idea of a phenomenological language, and in
doing so shows its incoherence. Previously Wittgenstein had
not thought of such a language as something that actually
had any pragmatic constraints; it would simply represent
experience, in a manner that was never specified, without
permitting any "presupposition... to sneak in unnoticed" (in
Frege’s words). The problem is that too much is packed into
"representing" in this conception of language. How will the
language represent the experience of a subject to someone
else or even to oneself at a later time? A language must
first of all be recorded and second of all be read, i.e.,
used as a sign. Ordinarily this is just what we would expect
to do with any representation or model, linguistic or not.
But it becomes a problem when the intention is to represent
what is immediate as immediate, for representation is
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mediation: it requires that transactions take place in which
something is made a sign for something else, and someone
else interprets the sign. Even on our "thin" notion of
interpretation, where interpreting is just reading (perhaps
the language would be made of pictograms or something like
that), the immediacy of the experience to be represented is
lost because it is represented in a physical medium which is
used in ordinary time and space.
In addition to answering in the negative the question
of whether a phenomenological language is possible, the
thought experiment gives a positive answer to Wittgenstein's
question about whether the "hypothetical” (i.e., physical)
is an ineliminable mode of representation. For the
mechanical model provides the closest possible proximity
between the signs and the sensations themselves, and yet it
is very much a spatiotemporal model and has to be understood
as such. The problems with the immediacy of representation
in the model spring directly from the fact that it is a
physical medium and as such cannot be construed, on the
understanding of physics as an indirect mode of
representation, as representing anything to an observer
immediately. But language is also in this sense a physical
medium, and we can no more eliminate this from language than
we can from the physical model. But note that if the
hypothetical cannot be eliminated, the whole
phenomenological language project cannot be motivated by the
uncertainty of ordinary language. A phenomenological
language, no matter how perfect, would not be a
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philosophically favored substitute for physics, for the same
commitments would eventually show up: the need to mediate
between the phenomena and the audience that is supposed to
receive the description.
The example of the visual model reinforces the
conclusion of the previous thought experiment which involves
reading back a phenomenological language. Together they
suggest that the notion of a phenomenological language is
essentially incoherent, for it contains the false assumption
that phenomena can be represented in it in such a way that
the representation can somehow be used without ever entering
the realm of the hypothetical. This is false because a
language, whatever it represents, can only be applied in the
ordinary way. "Language itself belongs to the second
system", says Wittgenstein:
[3.8a] If I describe language, I essentially describe
something physical. But how can a physical language
describe a phenomenon?/... (WA 1,191,4)
[3.8b] What we understand by the word "language" goes
on in homogenous physical time. (As will be perfectly
clear through the comparison with a mechanism). (WA
1,191,7)
These two remarks sum up the lessons of the examples we have
just studied. The comparison of language with a mechanical
model that reproduces sensations shows that representation
is by nature mediate, and thus takes place in the physical
world.
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There is another remark immediately after [3.8b] that
requires some comment, because along with other remarks of a
similar nature it has led to some misunderstandings:
[3.8c] Primary language could only be what this
mechanism corresponds to in the primary world. (WA
1,191,8)
The reference to a "mechanism" suggests that a
phenomenological language would be a phenomenological
version of the model we have just been discussing, clearly a
ludicrous notion and one Wittgenstein means to write off as
absurd. Nevertheless, this is the first of several remarks
in which Wittgenstein refers to a "primary" or
"phenomenological" language after expressing his initial
doubts about the possibility of such a language. Remarks
like this one have sometimes been taken to show that
Wittgenstein still held on to this idea as a live
possibility. But this is wrong: he uses these terms in the
context of a critique of the concept they are meant to
express, for he has no other term to refer to
phenomenological language. The context of [3.8], as we have
just seen, is an extended argument against a cluster of
ideas: that an object can be completely described by
describing sensations, that a language of immediate
experience is possible, that the physical mode of
representation is eliminable. Passage [3.8c] supplements the
argument by introducing a false analogy in which the error
can instantly be seen from what he has already said. The
language of the physical world has been compared to a
physical mechanism, so the language of the phenomenal world
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must analogously be a phenomenal "mechanism". But the model
in [3.7] shows that the latter is inconceivable: for such a
"mechanism" could not be a description of anything unles it
operated in physical time and space, which would be a
contradiction in terms; and in any case the notion of a
phenomenological counterpart to a "mechanism" looks prima
facie nonsensical. For instance, would its parts move and
cohere on some principle of psychological causation? So the
point of the statement about "primary language" in [3.8c] is
to emphasize that there can be no language which is itself
phenomenological, even if what it is supposed to represent
is phenomena.
It is hardly likely that Wittgenstein has just turned
around and suggested that there really is a phenomenological
analogue of physical language after all. Pursuing such a
line of thought could lead only to deeper confusion about
the notion of a phenomenological language and what it is or
represents. Wittgenstein is well aware of this; consequently
he says next16:
It is as if with phenomenological language I entered an
enchanted swamp where everything ascertainable
disappears. (WA 1,92,1)
This is both a comment on the idea that phenomenological
language would represent a world of ghostly phenomena, and
an expression of frustration at the whole project. A few
remarks past this one he refers to his "preoccupation" with
the idea of a "description of the present phenomenon" as
"frankly childish" and says, "I got involved in a dead end"
(WA 1,192,4)17. The only reasonable conclusion is that at
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this point Wittgenstein thought the phenomenological
language project and its concommitant assumptions about
worlds and sense-data were a failed philosophical program.

Now that we have seen what transpires in this critical
section of the manuscript, let us examine what the Hintikkas
say about it, and how they think it leads to the change from
a phenomenological to a physical "basis language". First of
all, they cite some remarks from a later manuscript (Band
III) to the effect that "you must be able to fit the
proposition on to reality" {WA 11,89,7; I retain the
Hintikkas' translation). On this basis they argue that
Wittgenstein holds "that an actual comparison of a sentence
with reality must be performed by the language user"18. This
is a rather tendentious reading; the remarks they cite seem
to be no more than an expression of the Tractarian point
that the logical form of language must duplicate that of
facts. If this is the case then Wittgenstein was aware of
the "direct comparison" requirement from the beginning and
there is no reason to think it leads to dropping the
phenomenological language project (indeed, on the Hintikkas'
interpretation the TLP is the phenomenological language
project). But the Hintikkas seem to have something else in
mind with their idea of an "actual comparison". What such a
comparison might be other than a matter of logical form they
don't exactly say19; but if their interpretation is correct,
then their use of these later remarks to ground their
interpretation of [3.8a] is anachronistic. There is nothing
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in the manuscript up to this point that suggests the idea of
"an actual comparison of a sentence with reality" in any new
sense. In any case, based on this reading, they argue as
follows:
It is not hard to see how the requirement of direct
comparability leads Wittgenstein to the thesis that
only a physicalistic language is possible. Wittgenstein
needed a supplementary assumption, however, in order to
draw his conclusion. This extra premise was the idea
that language itself is part of the physical world.20
Thereupon they reproduce [3.8a] to show that the extra
premise had now been added. Then they deduce, on
Wittgenstein's behalf, the conclusion that "if language
itself belongs to the realm of physical objects, its
sentences can be compared in the intended strong sense only
with what is also physical"21.
In spite of its considerable ingenuity, this argument
cannot be right, even apart from the tendentious reading of
the remarks about laying propositions up against reality.
For one thing, Wittgenstein has already recognized that
ordinary language is the physicalistic language in question
here. If the Hintikkas are right, this is what he thought
could only be laid up against physical reality. Then he must
have thought at this point that ordinary language would be
incapable of expressing anything non-physicalistic, since
the latter is an almost trivial consequence of the position
attributed to him22. This consequence is actually developed
in some of the Hintikkas' readings of other passages in the
manuscripts, though they offer no explicit general defense
of this interpretation.23 But there is no evidence that
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Wittgenstein thought nonphysicalistic concepts were
inexpressible. He sought to untangle our confused means of
expressing such propositions in ordinary language, not to
paint them as being beyond expression altogether. Moreover,
given the very strong correlation he maintained between
language and thought, had he held the thesis the Hintikkas
ascribe to him he would have had to hold something like the
absurd thesis that we have no cognitive access at all to
phenomenological, mathematical, or abstract concepts. But
the Hintikkas offer no reason to believe that Wittgenstein
meant to deny that we have such concepts, and it would be
highly uncharitable to attribute it to him without evidence.
Another reason to doubt the Hintikkas' interpretation
is that they seem to lay the wrong emphasis on
Wittgenstein's question in [3.8a], "how can a physical
language describe a phenomenon?". The question is not
entirely rhetorical. He is expressing in a different way the
doubts he has just raised about a phenomenological language:
what it cannot do is describe a phenomenon immediately, and
that is because it must be, in the end, a language that is
used in ordinary time and space. He is not saying that
ordinary (physical) language can't describe phenomena at
all. Of course, a language that is by hypothesis a language
of physical objects, as he had conceived it at first, is by
definition incapable of describing a phenomenon. But there
would be no point in stating this definitional truth in this
context, especially as a rhetorical question. As was
mentioned above, he has just equated physicalistic language
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with ordinary language, and he may have thought it a valid
question how ordinary language represents phenomena. But he
was certainly not saying it cannot represent them, only that
because it is physical it cannot represent them as a
phenomenological language was supposed to, i.e.,
immediately.
The Hintikkas* account misses this completely.
Moreover, their inability to follow Wittgenstein's actual
argument leads them to temporarily abandon the premise that
the demise of the phenomenological lanaguage project led to
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, which is their most
valuable contribution to Wittgenstein studies. Instead, they
say that "the crucial question in Wittgenstein's thinking...
did not concern the contrast between the phenomenological
and the physical as much as the problem of language-world
relations"24. By means of this trap door they are able to
lead into their contention that Wittgenstein required a
"direct comparison" between language and the world. But this
only shows that in spite of grasping some of the essential
aspects of his transition and correctly locating many of the
crucial passages, they were unable to follow the argument
Wittgenstein was making for rejecting the phenomenological
language idea. They therefore had to patch together an
explanation of his transition out of heterogeneous remarks
from different parts of his manuscripts.
But Wittgenstein's procedure is quite coherent, even if
it is not explicitly stated. He first grasped that physics
and phenomenology are two modes of representation of the
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same world. Then he saw that phenomenology could not be an
immediate way of representing immediate experience, because
there is no such way. He then concluded that the idea of a
phenomenological language is incoherent, and furthermore
that ordinary language, operating in the time and space of
the physical universe with its physicalistic bias and all,
is coherent, and is the only language we can work with in
philosophy.

One last comment is in order before we move on.
Virtually none of the self-critical remarks we have seen
above appear in the PR. Other remarks in this section of the
manuscript, dealing with time, visual space, and related
topics, all of which constitute further exploration and
deepening of his self-criticisms, are printed in Chapter
VII, without being framed by the self-examination which
constitutes their original context. Yet it is that context
that makes these some of the most important remarks in his
career. They herald the beginning of a crossover from a
phenomenological project that could not have succeeded to
the new system of ideas that emerged when he conceived of
language in terms of different modes of expression. This
crossover begins in earnest at this point in the manuscript.
Given the already entrenched doubts about a logically
perfect language on the Tractarian model, once the hope of a
phenomenological language was removed the most sensible
choice was to focus on the grammar of ordinary language.

150
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3.9 Th« Physiealistie Mod* of Sxprosaion
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the above
rejection of phenomenological language is the coda. After
saying he got involved in a "dead end", Wittgenstein adds:
"And yet it is a significant dead end, for all are tempted
to go down it; as if to find the final solution to
philosophical problems" (WA 1,192,4). The notion of
linguistic confusions as philosophical temptations is one of
the roots of the later Wittgenstein, and it makes its first
explicit appearance in this context. Thus his critique of
the phenomenological language idea led directly to a
conception of philosophy that is central to his later
perspective. He immediately follows this by introducing a
pair of new terms that will remain a part of his
philosophical vocabulary throughout his career, often to be
associated with this conception of how philosophical errors
arise. The terms are "Ausdrucksweise", or "mode of
expression", and "Ausdrucksform", or "form of expression",
which he had not used in any significant context in the
course of some 420 manuscript pages prior to this:
[3.9] On the other hand it is clear that we need a mode
of expression {Ausdrucksweise) in which we can
represent the phenomena of visual space - e.g. isolated as such.
"I see a lamp standing on the table" says, as it
must be understood in our ordinary language, more than
the description of visual space. A correct description
would surely be: "It seems to me as if I see a lamp
standing on the table". But this form of expression
{Ausdrucksform) is misleading because it makes it
appear as if nothing real were being described, but
rather something whose essence was not clear. (WA
1,192,5)
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Wittgenstein evinces a distinct discomfort here with the
simplistic form of phenomenology he had formerly envisioned.
The term "mode of expression” is a step towards replacing
this conception, as it captures his new way of distingishing
the physical from the phenomenological. That is, each
logically distinct kind of space will have its own
Ausdrucksweise, its own way of speaking, to which a
particular form of expression, or "Ausdrucksform", will
belong25.
The terms "Ausdruckweise" and "Ausdrucksform" may be
seen as precursors of "Sprachspiel" ("language game"),
although their usage at this point is limited to the
distinction between the physical and phenomenological
language games in general rather than the more specialized
games he discusses in the Brown Book and the PI. But they
also survive the introduction of "Sprachspiel" and reappear
frequently throughout his later work, where their use is
often closely connected with the notion of grammatical
mistakes and linguistic temptations, as it is here in its
original context26.
The importance of his introduction of the term
Ausdrucksweise here has not generally been appreciated. The
Hintikkas, for example, reproduce the following passage,
which is the next but one after [3.9], as an example of the
idea of phenomenological language being "repeatedly
mentioned as a realistic possibility"27:
[3.10] From the above it is seen - as is otherwise
obvious - that a phenomenological language represents
the same as our ordinary physical mode of expression
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(Ausdrucksweise) and has only the advantage that many
things can be said [ausdrilcken; "expressed"] in it more
concisely (kilrzer) and with less danger of
misunderstanding. (WA 1,193,2; I retain the Hintikkas'
translation)
We have seen that a few manuscript pages before this
Wittgenstein says "physicalistic language... describes the
primary world again" (see [3.6]). Everything since that
point has put the notion of a special language of immediate
experience into question; and now he is repeating the
previous point in slightly different terms. This suggests
that the term "phenomenological language" is not used here
as a live option, but only because he lacks a new term for
the mode of expression particular to phenomenology.
Wittgenstein is saying that the purpose of a
phenomenological language would be to offer a more precise
way of describing what we describe roughly with our ordinary
mode of expression; his interest is in the function that it
was supposed to serve, not in the project as originally
conceived. Indeed, every expression of the idea that a
phenomenological language must describe the same world as
physicalistic language must be taken as a contribution to
the refutation of the phenomenological program as originally
conceived, because it was already clear to Wittgenstein that
the kind of language he originally had in mind was logically
incapable of representing anything but an independent
phenomenological reality. The kind of "phenomenological
language" he refers to here could only be a particular mode
of expression of ordinary language, not a continuation of
the Tractarian program.28
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No6 also makes use of [3.10], and though his ultimate
conclusion is in agreement with the view of Wittgenstein’s
development presented here29, his argument from this passage
is incorrect. This points up a difference between his
criticisms of the Hintikkas' position and mine. NoS says
that the Hintikkas' thesis that Wittgenstein gave up
phenomenological language because it cannot be compared with
the physical world "would seem to imply that they regard a
Wittgensteinian phenomenological language as designed to
represent that which cannot be represented in ordinary
physical language, specifically the phenomenological (as
opposed to the physical)"30. No§ points to the present
remark [3.10], and to the even later remark that "our
ordinary language is also phenomenological" (WA 11,4,2), to
show that Wittgenstein held no such belief, and concludes
that a different explanation of Wittgenstein’s transition
must be sought. His point gains some force from the
Hintikkas' own suggestion that in [3.10] the original
phenomenological language project was still a live option.
But from what we have said it is clear that [3.10] is part
of Wittgenstein’s argument for giving up the
phenomenological language project altogether. The problem is
that No§ does not seem to realize that Wittgenstein's
original conception of phenomenological language did involve
embracing the two-worlds, two-languages view, and that
[3.10] is part of the effort to abandon this idea and the
phenomenological language project with it. Thus [3.10] does
not show that Wittgenstein did not formerly hold that a
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phenomenological language could only represent a phenomenal
world, nor therefore that giving up this idea was not the
main reason for the change in his philosophy. The second
remark NoS cites is taken completely out of context; in the
manuscript it is preceded by the words, "Or is it thus:..."
(WA 11,4,2), and in fact Wittgenstein never actually adopts
the position it expresses (see Chapter 4). Hence it does not
demonstrate his point either.
The main problem with the Hintikkas' view is not their
conception of what a phenomenological language was for
Wittgenstein, but their conception of what a physicalistic
language would be. Their belief that it was a new "basis
language" is not just a poor choice of terms; it is an
indication that they do not grasp the essence of the change
taking place. Nog’s thesis, on the other hand, is somewhat
closer to our own. He says that Wittgenstein's transition
consists in recognizing that "we only need to get clear
about how [ordinary language] symbolizes"31, which suggests
a need for "careful examination and comparison of different
methods of representation”31, and in particular a
recognition that "it is not essential to what is described
that it be characterized in the language of physical
objects”33. This is a step closer to the truth; it actually
captures the main points that come to the fore in the part
of the manuscripts we are now discussing, the end of Band
II. But we will see in the next chapter that it still does
not quite hit the target. The pivot point of Wittgenstein’s
philosophy was the simultaneous recognition that we must do
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philosophy without "basis languages", and that our ordinary
language is riddled with physicalistic traps. A
phenomenology that comes out of this language must therefore
take as its starting point the recognition and avoidance of
those traps34.
There are still a couple of important lines of thought
in [3.10] that we have not yet mentioned. One is that the
function of a phenomenological language would be to serve as
a method of clarification, or help avoid the "danger of
misunderstanding", rather than to represent a distinct
"world of data". At this point Wittgenstein is still tearing
himself away from the two-worlds view, which had naturally
entailed a two-languages view. The idea of a method of
clarification was one way of moving in the direction of
linguistic monism, and thus towards recognition that
phenomenology, like everything else, must be done in
ordinary language. At the same time it suggests that
ordinary language contains pitfalls, which a phenomenology
will help one recognize and avoid.
Another idea in [3.10], and one which no doubt led to
this remark in the first place, can be seen in relation to
the immediately prior remark: "The verification of language
- thus the act through which it gets its sense - happens
only in the present" (WA 1,193,1). The sense of a
proposition of ordinary language derives (according to
Wittgenstein) from some relationship it has to immediate
experience. This "verification", however, is not temporal:
"the phenomenon (spacious [sic] present) contains time, but
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is not in time" (WA 1,191,5; PR VII, 69 ,98 )35. Verification
thus takes place in the "present", not in time. The idea of
a phenomenological language was to represent these acts of
verification, and thus the sense of ordinary propositions.
Presumably ordinary propositions are also supposed to
express their sense. This showsthat what he now

callsthe

two "modes of expression" must be different ways of
representing the same thing.
These various readings of the content of the above
passage are all compatible: the

function ofa

phenomenological language would

be to serveas a method of

clarification of physical language, and must therefore
represent the same thing as physical language through a
different, perhaps more perspicuous, mode of expression. The
idea that the distinguishing features of phenomenology and
physics are their "modes of expression" contrasts with the
foundational role for epistemology that phenomenology was
previously assumed to have, as well as with the metaphysical
talk about a physical world as opposed to a "world of data".
As Stern has put it, "he soon came to see that the
distinctions between phenomenal and physical, and primary
and secondary, were only an overblown misinterpretation of
two different ways of talking."36

This perspective has further highly significant
consequences that appear almost immediately in the
manuscripts. Wittgenstein realizes that if the two modes of
expression describe the same world, then visual space, and
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phenomenological space in general, cannot contain private
objects! It must be a public space, like that of physical
objects. Thus he comes to the conclusion: "Visual space
essentially has no owner" (WA 1,193,4; PR VII,71,100);
again, "The essential thing is that the respresentation of
visual space represents an object and contains no hint of a
subject" (WA 1,193,7; PR VII,71,100). This is not a return
to the 5.6's of the TLP ("what the solipsist means is
entirely correct", 5.62); indeed it is quite the opposite.
Rather than the idea that "the world is my world" the
perceived world is now conceived of as a public space. The
subject is no longer the owner of visual space, operating
from its limit or outside the world, any more than the
subject can have a place in the space of physics. There are
two spaces, one world, and no subject. This is the initial
step in a critique of Cartesian dualism that will reach its
most explicit expression in the Blue Book and its most
sophisticated form in the private language argument. As we
shall see in the next chapter, that argument begins in the
PR, in a direct development of the present line of thought.
The remainder of Band II is an exploration and defense
of this view of visual space. From this point on visual
space can only be distinguished from physical space in
virtue of the different grammatical rules that apply to it;
it is not opposed to the space of physical objects as a
private space is to a public one. This would suggest that
phenomenological language is already, so to speak, a dead
language. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein appears to be making
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another implicit reference to it near the beginning of this
series of remarks on visual space:
[3.11] In the - secondary - language of "objective physical - space" visual space is called subjective, or
that is called subjective which in this language
immediately corresponds to visual space. (WA 1,193,5;
PR VII,71,100)
The dashes, though, may suggest some reticence about using
the term "secondary language"; and the content of the
remark, like the ones that precede and follow it, reinforce
this impression. The remark is part of an effort to
consolidate the idea that visual space does not contain
private objects. Wittgenstein realizes that one must still
explain the apparent subjectivity of the visual field.
Rather than do this by saying it is a realm of private
phenomenological objects, he says that it is simply "called
subjective" in a language whose function is to designate
publicly available physical objects37. Like the last
reference we examined, this is an unlikely context in which
to resubscribe to the idea of a phenomenological language.
The reasons for questioning the pursuit of that project in
the first place were that it seemed quite impossible to
conceive of phenomenology as a description of an
epistemically favored world, which led directly to the
present doubts about conceiving of it as a description of a
private world. Why would he now slip this idea back in
without withdrawing his point, but rather in the midst of
deepening it? The term "secondary - language" is probably
only used here to identify the mode of expression in terms
of his former distinction of "primary" and "secondary". It
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cannot be taken to signify that he now once again thinks of
physical language as derivative of, or founded on,
phenomenological language.
Remark [3.11] comes from a passage that begins with the
example of two people seeing an object from different
perspectives, and it says that when we think of reality this
way visual space is “interpreted as subjective; and an
objective space is opposed to it, which is, however, only a
construction with visual space as its basis" (WA 1,193,5; PR
VII,71,100). This must be a reference to Russell, who
employed just this perspectival notion of objects from 1914
through the 1920’s. He called objects "constructions" out of
various "aspects" or "perspectives", also referring to them
as "hypothetical" and to an actually perceived perspective
as a "private world"38. Now, Wittgenstein is thinking of
this whole system as a representation on a piece of paper
which shows the observers as well as the aspects39. That, he
says in the next remark, is "only one mode of
representation"; rather than representing the two
perspectives as emerging from two different pairs of eyes
(i.e., as two private objects),
it is just as well if the part of the object that is
"seen" is indicated by shading40. Naturally one can
always determine the position of the two eyes from the
boundaries of this shading but that only corresponds to
the translation of one mode of expression
(Ausdrucksweise) into another. (WA 1,193,6; PR
VII,71,100).
From this it is clear that the idea of a "mode of
expression" has taken hold. The mode of representation that
includes the two eyes represents the same thing as the one
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that excludes them and uses "shading", only the former is
clearly meant to emphasize the subjective points of view,
while the latter emphasizes the unity of the object. The
latter corresponds to the physicalistic mode of expression,
and to deduce the former from it (to determine the position
of the eyes) is to translate this into the phenomenological
mode of expression. There is absolutely no need of a
phenomenological language here, unless that expression is
now to have a completely different content, i.e., to be
equivalent to the mode of expression of phenomenological
propositions, or a way of characterizing a certain function
of ordinary language rather than a separate or more perfect
language.
3.10 Conclusion
Roughly six months after he started his new series of
notebooks Wittgenstein came to the conclusion that the
phenomenological project as he had originally conceived it
was flawed. He had hoped to continue on the Tractarian model
but substitute a language of immediate experience for a
language of perspicuous logical form. He was no longer as
concerned with Russell's paradox as he had been; he no
longer entertained the idea of a logical theory that would
mirror the whole of language and avoid self-reference
paradoxes. His concern now was with necessary, metaphysical
truths about the structure of experience, beginning with the
nature of visual space and color perception. He was dimly
aware from the start that in order to express such truths he
would need a kind of phenomenological grammar; so he thought
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that he had to end up with something roughly along the lines
of a set of grammatical rules for a phenomenological
language. But no sooner had this conception crystallized in
the explicit notion of such a language than he realized the
idea was fraught with problems.
One problem is that phenomenology was supposed to
provide an analysis of physics. It was to be "the grammar of
the description of those facts out of which physics
constructs its theories" (see [3.1]), i.e., a set of rules
for constructing propositions about immediate experience.
These propositions then form the basis for judgements about
the physical world. But the phenomena that a
phenomenological language was supposed to describe

seemedto

comprise a world that is not the physical world at

all.This

simply will not work: phenomenology must describe the same
world as physics, or the whole conception is incoherent.
Moreover, if phenomenological language unfolds in physical
time it cannot be an immediate representation of experience,
even if it could keep pace with the flux of phenomena; but
if it goes on in phenomenological time it cannot be
expressed at all in any language we could use.
The upshot of this is that the idea of a
"phenomenological language" per se, as originally conceived,
is incoherent. But perhaps it could be thought of in a
different way: as a manner of speaking about the world (the
one world) "with less danger of misunderstanding", i.e.,
without making all the assumptions that physicalistic
language makes. It would then not be an "analysis" at all,
162
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

much less a "language" strictly speaking, but might still be
useful in philosophy, which seeks maximum precision in the
description of reality. What it would be is a "mode of
expression", a way of using language to avoid hypotheses.
Under this title a phenomenological project makes sense; and
it takes only a small amount of imagination to see that it
must be an investigation rather than a construction project.
This is how, in the course of time, Wittgenstein's
grammatical philosophy is born.
Where does this leave "ordinary, physicalistic
language"? Is there just a language of physical objects, and
no other? The answer is "yes and no": we have only one
language to express all that we want to say, but it is no
longer the case that it is simply a "physicalistic
language". Rather, because it is primarily used for the
purpose of referring to the physical world, it encourages a
physicalistic way of talking, or mode of expression, about
the world, and this places obstacles in the path of the
expression of our immediate experience of the world. This
difference is key to understanding Wittgenstein's transition
from his "middle" period, which from this perspective lasts
only a year or so, to the later philosophy. Instead of a
distinction between physical world/language and
phenomenological world/language, the new idea is that we
have to sort out the physicalistic mode of expression from
all others.
To say that ordinary language describes the world of
physical objects is just to say that in common discourse we
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normally make assumptions about the existence of an external
world. That is, to use Wittgenstein's own example (see [3.9]
above), if I say "I see a lamp standing on the table" my
meaning is not further elucidated by using a
phenomenological qualifier to eliminate all assumptions, as
in, "It appears to me as if I see a lamp standing on a
table"; it is elucidated by making the realist assumption
that I perceive an external world in which there are two
physical objects, a lamp and a table, and one is resting on
the other. But sometimes we do talk about how we experience
things or about the contents of our own minds or those of
others. We ascribe intentions to others; we speak about
selves, souls, time, events, processes, properties,
appearances, etc. Even this sort of talk has some tangible
connection to bodies in space, at least prior to being
filtered through some philosophical theory. But we also
speak of abstract relationships in mathematics and logic, of
concepts and theories, infinity and probability. Yet we have
only a single language in which to carry on our discourse
about slabs and apples as well as about visual impressions
and infinity; and presumably this language is structured
primarily to permit us to express practical facts about the
world in which we live, not abstract concepts that emerge
from reflecting on thought or language itself.
This leads to difficulties: we tend to use the
physicalistic means of expression to talk about everything
else. Earlier, it had seemed to Wittgenstein that there was
an epistemological gap separating phenomenological language
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from the physical world. Now that it is recognized that
there is only one world that gap is closed; but another
appears in its place. If ordinary language is doing just
what it was designed to do then propositions about the
physical world must be quite unproblematic; whereas our
ability to get away from physicalistic language to express
our direct experience of the world is now recognized as a
challenge. To meet this challenge first of all requires
training oneself to recognize how ordinary ways of talking
presuppose a physicalistic orientation to the world. Thus if
I say, "The car is parked around the corner" I presuppose
that it did not dematerialize after I walked away. Secondly,
the challenge is to see that in many philosophical
situations we are tempted to use relations among physical
entities as a conceptual model, even though the model leads
to confusion. If I say, "I can recognize my car because a
visual image of it is stored in my brain" this does not
presuppose that someone can find the image if they know
where (or how) to look for it in my brain, as the previous
statement implied that someone would find the car if they
looked around the corner. However, it sometimes seems that
something like that is implied. Thus, distinguishing the
grammar of physics from the grammar of those activities in
which we speak about phenomenological concepts, and more
generally, intangible things, would become the goal of the
project. But this means Wittgenstein still sees his work as
being at least in part a grammar of experience, or
phenomenology. So whatever the earlier work contributed
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toward this goal is still useful to the extent that it can
be separated from the idea of a phenomenological language.
This is the spirit that guided the creation of the PR.
His insights about the problems with a phenomenological
language led Wittgenstein to question and eventually reject
all of the assumptions about language, logic and
representation that had been tied to the atomistic logic of
his, Frege's, and Russell's earlier work. As No# has so
aptly put it,
Wittgenstein's rejection of the need for a
phenomenological language has to be taken as the
rejection of the entire philosophical project which
Frege and the Wittgenstein of the TLP had launched,
that namely of creating the logically perspicuous
representation of that which is only confusedly
expressed in our ordinary language.41
By the time he reached the end of his self-criticism the
Tractarian program would be buried once and for all, and
Wittgenstein would be well on his way towards his later
philosophy. But we are not quite at that point yet. For
though his stance seems firm and his arguments against the
original conception cogent, Wittgenstein has difficulty
pulling himself away from it. Recall all the references to
"simplicity" in the TLP and the manuscripts: the analytic
ideal that was at the heart of the Fregean program, Russell
And Whitehead's Principia Mathematica, Russell's theory of
descriptions, and Wittgenstein's own TLP had at least the
virtue of simplicity in its basic understanding of the tasks
of philosophy, and a certain elegance in its method of
carrying them out. Wittgenstein was extremely sympathetic to
the elegance and simplicity of this ideal, even if the
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phenomenological version was not quite as simple and elegant
as a "general form of the proposition" or the well-defined
rules and axioms of formal logic. This must explain his
reluctance to part with it, even on the basis of the wellconsidered concerns we have discussed. In the next chapter,
we will follow Wittgenstein through his reconsideration of
this program, and then to the ultimate demise of the
phenomenological language project. In so doing we will find,
in even more remarkable ways than we have done so far, that
much of what we now call the later Wittgenstein arose from
his critique of the possibility of a phenomenological
language.
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KOTOS
1. In Chapters 3 and 4 I touch on material in the
manuscripts that has been addressed by other Wittgenstein
scholars, including the Hintikkas, Investigating
Wittgenstein (especially Chs.6-7, 10); David Stern,
Wittgenstein on Mind and Language (especially Chs.4-5) ; and
Robert Alva No6, "Wittgenstein, Phenomenology, and What It
Makes Sense to Say". There is a large and constantly growing
literature on Wittgenstein's transitional period, but I will
have little to say about most of it since it is not based on
the manuscripts. For reasons that should become clear in
what follows, I do not think it is possible to obtain an
accurate view of his transition from published works, though
some specific insights can be achieved. For example, Dale
Jacquette, in "Wittgenstein and the Color Incompatibility
Problem" (1990) and his recent book Wittgenstein In
Transition (which really covers the entire scope of
Wittgenstein's work) touches on points about the role and
impact of the color exclusion problem that I would also make
if I had the space to discuss it in more depth. But his
understanding of the transition is entirely based on SRLF,
which is quite an inadequate source in my view.
The Hintikkas' work helped establish the idea that the
difference between the language of physics and phenomenology
was the key to Wittgenstein's transition, and pinpointed his
philosophical crisis in October 1929. On these points I
follow their lead; but as I have already indicated (Chapter
1) I head in a different direction when it comes to filling
in the meaning of these developments. In its expostion of
the main outlines of Wittgenstein's transition, NoS's
article is a good elucidation of some of the views presented
here. There are, however, some points of difference as well:
I think NoS misses the importance of Wittgenstein's
introduction of the term "Ausdrucksweise", and of his
suggestion in January 1930 that hypotheses are confirmed,
rather than verified. His use of the passages in which
Wittgenstein suggests we are misled by physicalistic
language is quite different from mine, though not
incompatible with it. Other differences will be addressed in
the text. Stern's book is a seminal contribution to the
understanding of this period; I think our views are in the
main complementary, but I address one or two important
differences in the text below. Anticipations of certain
aspects of the view put forward here can also be found in
Hacker, Insight and Illusion, Ch.4. and in Garth Hallett,
"The Genesis of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy in His
Failure as a Phenomenologist" (1991), an earlier article
with a point of view more or less similar to Nog's.
Aside from Hallett and Nog, perhaps a dozen or more
major articles on Wittgenstein's phenomenology have appeared
since Herbert Spiegelberg's pathbreaking essay, "The Puzzle
of Ludwig Wittgenstein's PhMnomenologie (1929-?)", published
in 1968. Virtually none of them are based on the
manuscripts. The subject of Wittgenstein's transition was
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also dealt with in reviews of the PR and the PG when they
were first published: see e.g., Norman Malcolm,
"Wittgenstein’s Philosophische Bemerkungen" (1967), and
Richard W. Miller, "Wittgenstein in Transition: A Review of
the Philosophical Grammar" (1977) . Most books which attempt
to offer comprehensive overviews of Wittgenstein's
philosophy have something to say about this subject, usually
derived more or less exclusively from SRLF, the PR, and WWK.
For more recent contributions to this literature see Michael
Wrigley, "The Origins of Wittgenstein's Verificationism"
(1989); Mathieu Marion, "Wittgenstein et son oeuvre
posthume" (a review of the first two volumes of WA) (1996) ,
*
and Albert Newen, "Die Entwicklung der VJittgensteinschen
Sprachphilosophie von 1929-1932" (1997).
2. Malcolm, A Memoir, p.l2nl5.
3. See note 1 above.
4. See Appendix II, The Organization of the Philosophical
Remarks.
5. In this chapter and the next I assign numbers in square
brackets to some of the remarks in order to facilitate later
references to them in the text. The numbers consist of the
chapter number followed by a sequential number.
6. In the manuscript Wittgenstein wrote "psychological"
before ’’color theory” in the second paragraph; this must
have been changed to "phenomenological" in the typescript,
as this is what is printed in the PR. The German edition of
the PR, however, has "Wellen, Zellen etc. etc." as in the
manuscript, not "waves, rods, cones and all that" as the
translators render it.
7. The recorded conversations with the Vienna Circle begin
on 18 December 1929, after the dating began, so comparison
with them does not help us date the manuscript material. The
lectures WL30 begin on 20 January 1930. Unlike his early
letters to Russell, Wittgenstein's extant letters from 1929
contain little of philosophical interest. The only help is
provided by the fact that SRLF was published in April, which
permits us to give a rough date to the section of the
manuscript which contains remarks that form the basis of
some of the material in the article. Otherwise, dating the
1929 remarks must be based on the assumption of equal daily
production between 2 February and 6 October, a very rough
guide at best. Between 2 February and 6 October Wittgenstein
wrote some 300 pages in about 250 days, i.e., about 1.2
pages per day, or .83 days per page. I do not attempt to
apply this formula in any rigorous way in what follows, but
it can serve as a guide for the reader to judge whether my
dating of later developments is credible.
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8. Compare Karl Pearson's analogy of the subject of
sensations as someone sitting at a telephone switchboard
receiving messages from the imperceptible beyond (The
Grammar of Science, pp.56-8). Pearson correctly concludes
that given this view of things, there is really no
compelling reason to posit a thing-in-itself, or, in
Wittgenstein’s case, a film, since nothing in the received
data demands that one do so. Pearson goes on to illustrate
his point by reproducing Mach's drawing of his visual field
partially obscured by the bridge of his nose (The Grammar of
Science, p.59), to which Wittgenstein often refers in these
manuscripts.
9. It is hard to think of a coherent alternative to this
given the assumptions Wittgenstein makes. For instance,
suppose we say that though world A is known with certainty,
and world B is only an inference or hypothesis based on
experience, if it turns out that B exists it is (or may be)
the same world as A. Then if the existence of A is known,
the existence of B is already known, only it is just not
known that it happens to be the world referred to by "B".
But since B is by definition the "world of physics" this
would mean that a world of physics exists and turns out to
be just the phenomenological world, which we did not realize
was the world we happened to be referring to when we spoke
of a "world of physics". This would not be as innocent as
saying, for instance, that the reference of "Morning Star"
just turns out to be the same as that of "Evening Star"; it
is rather like saying that the hypothetical object "Morning
Star", which is by definition the referent of Morning-startalk, might just turn out to be that which is by definition
the referent of Evening- Star-talk. That is to say, not that
we may falsely believe that two terms refer to different
objects, but that we may falsely believe that they have
different senses. But this seems tantamount to saying that
we don't know what we mean, which seems like nonsense. At
any rate, once we posit a difference in the epistemological
status of the objects, it would be much more natural to
account for this by making an ontological distinction
between them than than by reducing the epistemic difference
to an inability to know what we mean.
10. See Russell, The Analysis of Mind, p. 141: "It might seem
natural to regard a sensation as a cognition, and until
lately I did so regard it...". It is not entirely obvious
from the text that Russell means to give up "sense-data"
here, but this is how he later characterizes his position
(see My Philosophical Development, p.245) . The reason he
offers for doubting this now is that "the subject... appears
to be a logical fiction" (p. 141), a position that no doubt
owes as much to Wittgenstein as it does to James and the New
Realists. I think it is arguable that the passage commits
him to giving up "knowledge by acquaintance" rather theua
“sense-data", for not every conception of what sense-data
are, including his own earlier view that they are part of
170
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the physical world, requires that a sense-datum in itself be
"a cognition".
11. The mistaken impression that Wittgenstein had originally
used the term "primary language" for what he now calls
"phenomenological language" is exaccerbated in the English
edition by one of the numerous misleading translations found
there: the rendering of "wie ich sie nannte" as "as I used
to call it”. There are always several technically correct
ways to translate the German imperfect indicative into
English; only contextual considerations can provide an
argument for one or the other. The translators may not have
known that Wittgenstein had not used the term "primary
language" prior to the expression "phenomenological
language", but why they chose a translation that suggests
that he did, rather than a neutral one, is hard to
understand. In fact, when he says "as I called it" in his
Band III notebook he can only be referring to the instance
just cited at the end of Band II (which comes immediately
after his first use of "phenomenological language"), since
it is the only other instance in which he used this term in
his post-1929 manuscripts (Band I-X).
12. Though we have been quite critical of the Hintikkas'
interpretation of Wittgenstein's transition, their
recognition that a fundamental change in his views took
place in October 1929, and their pinpointing the manuscript
remarks in which it occurs, was at the time a great advance
in Wittgenstein studies. This, more than anything else they
say, accounts for the historical significance of
Investigating Wittgenstein.
13. Remember that for Wittgenstein this means practically
all propositions: "Someone is playing the piano in the next
room", "Bring me a flower", "Julius Caesar crossed the
Rubicon", etc. It would be imprudent to say here,
"propositions that refer to a physical world". For one
thing, it is not clear whether Wittgenstein at this point
would say that the above propositions do "refer" directly to
the objects they mention, since he still thinks our only
direct experience of the world is through phenomena. For
another, it is not clear what he would think at this point
about propositions like, "The physical world exists", or,
"The world is made of physical objects"; but these are the
only ones that literally "refer to a physical world".
14. Frege, Begriffschrift, p.4.
15. See e.g., "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter", p.141;
The Analysis of Mind, pp. 124-9.
16. The remark immediately following those in [3.8] is an
incomplete comment on extensional number theories and
identity. I suspect it was meant to illustrate the idea that
a complete description of an object by means of sense171
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impressions is absurd. The reasoning would run along
something like the following lines: if you describe an
object by means of an expression such as " ' x = a v x = b v x
= c' etc" (WA 1,191,9), i.e., a disjunction of its
properties, you cannot at the same time introduce the same
object by means of an identity function. That is, you cannot
describe an object phenomenologically and then, describing
it physicalistically, say "and this is the same object as
that other (phenomenological) one". Unfortunately this
remark was not completed, so the point was not drawn out,
giving it the appearance of an irrelevant interpolation on
the philosophy of mathematics. Consequently the remark which
follows this one in the manuscript seems like a return to
the discussion rather than a continuation of it. The
incomplete remark was left of the PR for obvious reasons.
17. For an alternative translation of this and the previous
passage see Stem, Wittgenstein on Mind... p.148-9. The
Hintikkas cite these passages from roughly July-August, but
they think that Wittgenstein was not "hit by the full force
of the idea that language belongs to the physical world"
until October (p.165). But it seems to me that this thesis
is primarily a reinforcement of what he has already
realized: that phenomenology and physics describe the same
world. I do think the full impact of this idea is not felt
until October (see Chapter 4).
18. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p.164.
19. The closest they come to explaining this idea is the
following statement:
Wittgenstein's 'deduction' thus ran as follows: the
basic sentences of our language must be compared
directly (virtually, superimposed on) the facts they
represent. (Investigating Wittgenstein, p.166)
What this is supposed to mean, if not a mapping of logical
form as in the TLP, is anybody's guess.
20. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p. 165.
21. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, pp. 165-66.
22. To avoid a misunderstanding later on, it is important to
distinguish the doubt I am introducing about this
interpretation from a doubt introduced by Nog
("Wittgenstein, Phenomenology...), which I dispute below.
Nog thinks the Hintikkas must attribute to Wittgenstein the
position that a phenomenological language could not
represent what is physical, exactly the reverse of the
thesis I am disputing here. I disagree with Nog on this
because the concept of a phenomenological language in
Wittgenstein is entirely intertwined with the two-worlds
view and so it is true that one language cannot represent
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the other world; whereas the concept of physical language as
ordinary language does not entail that language cannot
represent the phenomenological.
23. See e.g., Investigating Wittgenstein, pp.169-170, where
they interpret certain passages as evidence that
"Wittgenstein in effect rejects phenomenological objects in
favor of physicalistic ones" (p.170); but they are forced to
admit that "he fails to follow up on this result" (p.170).
But there was no such result; phenomenological objects are
the proper objects of the phenomenological mode of
expression. Wittgenstein does at one point refer to color
patches and tones as “uneigentlichen Gegenstanden" (WA
11,9,1; PR XI,115,136), which literally means "improper
objects", but he is using it in the sense of "figurative" or
"nonliteral" objects. Of course Wittgenstein does not mean
to say that ordinary language cannot talk about
phenomenological experience at all. See Appendix II and for
a translation of these and other passages in the manuscripts
relating to the use of the word "object".
24. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p.164.
25. In the PI and RFM Anscombe translates "Ausdrucksweise"
and "Ausdrucksform" interchangeably. Probably very little is
lost by this since the two are very closely related, but on
my reading the former is the general term and the latter the
particular. See the references in the footnote below. The
importance of Wittgenstein’s introduction of these terms may
be obscured by the fact that they are ordinary enough German
compounds that do not quite have the sense of novelty that
"Lebensform” or "Sprachspiel" have. The word
"Ausdrucksweise" even appears several times in the TLP
(4.015, 5.21, 5.526). But nothing suggests that it is a
technical term there (whereas, on the other hand, the word
”Ausdruck" is a technical term there: see 3.31-3.314). There
seems little doubt, given their persistent use from this
point forward in his writings to express the same sort of
concept, that the two compounds with "Ausdruck" and cognate
terms play a technical role for Wittgenstein.
26. For some of the many examples of Wittgenstein's use of
these terms see BT p.438; PI 90, 91, 94, 111, 112, 356, 398,
402, 426; CE (1937) p.400; PPP I 163, 551, 1102; RFM
11,46,138. Other cognate terms used in related ways are
"Redeweise" (RPP I, 1101) and "Sprachformen" (PI 91) .
27. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p.161-2.
28. Unfortunately, describing phenomenology as offering a
"more concise" mode of expression conflicts with most of his
other statements about it; normally he takes physics as the
simpler language and immediate experience as extremely
complex. But this is an incidental point, perhaps a symptom
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of some confusion that accompanied the important transition
his thought was undergoing at this time.
29. See above, Chapter 1, Section 1.6, below in the present
section, and the Conclusion of this chapter for expressions
of Nog’s point of view.
30. No6, "Wittgenstein, Phenomenology...", p.16. As pointed
out in a footnote above, this is not the criticism I made of
the Hintikkas, though the form looks similar. I said they
were wrong to imply that Wittgenstein held that ordinary
language could not represent the phenomenological. Nog is
saying that they are wrong to imply that prior to his
transition Wittgenstein thought that a phenomenological
language could not represent the physical. I am replying
that on this count Nog is incorrect.
31.

Nog,"Wittgenstein, Phenomenology...", p.19.

32.

Nog,"Wittgenstein, Phenomenology...", p.19.

33.

Nog,"Wittgenstein, Phenomenology...", p.19.

34. Cf. BT Section 90: "Philosophy. The Clarification of the
Use of Language. Traps (Fallen) of Language" (ST 422; PO
183). In this section we find the following remark:
"Language has the same traps for everyone; the immense
network of well-maintained... false paths (Jrrwege)" (BT
423; PO 185). Cf. also LCA 1: "There is constant surprise at
the new tricks language plays on us when we get into a new
field". Some "new fields" he describes in the previous
remark are personal experience, numbers, quantification,
personal identity, and valuation. In saying there are "new
tricks" in each field he is not denying that they are mostly
based on physicalistic thinking; in one case we may take
impressions to be located in physical space, in another we
treat explanations as if they were mechanical causes, in
another we take private sensations to have public criteria
of identification, in another we Platonize "Beauty", etc.
35. The reference is to the "specious present", William
James's term for the time of immediate perception. James
actually believed this interval was temporal: he says "it is
only as entering into the living and moving organization of
a much wider tract of time that the strict present is
apprehended at all" and quotes Clay, the inventor of the
expression, to the effect that "The present to which the
datum refers is really a part of the past..." (Principles of
Psychology I, pp.608-9) . Indeed, the "specious present"
lasts from 6 to 12 seconds, according to James (Principles
of Psychology I, p.613) . But the term was later used by
Russell and others in a way that suggested it was not
temporal, and this is no doubt the usage that Wittgenstein
picked up. In Russell's use, if I understand it correctly,
the "specious present" refers to a schematic series of
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stages of the decay of sensations into memories (see The
Analysis of Mind, p. 174); it does not make essential
reference to time. Some kind of temporality may be implicit
in this decay, but it could be a logical progression rather
than a temporal one. When Wittgenstein says a "phenomenon"
is not in time and yet "contains” it, he seems to be using
"specious present" as the time of phenomenological
experience, and this time is itself thought of as
phenomenological (like the conception of phenomenological
language that he criticizes). James seems to hold that we
experience phenomena in what Wittgenstein would call
physical time, but the Peircian psychology behind the stream
of experience makes it anything but a straightforward
sequence of temporal images. I cannot go into this any
further here.
James obtained the term "specious present" from E.R.
Clay, who wrote about it in a publication called "The
Alternative" (p.167). Clay's use seems to have been as a
stepping stone to a proof of the unreality of time. It
appears that Clay, James, Russell and Wittgenstein each had
slightly different purposes in using the term and gave it
slightly different meanings.
36. Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind... p.146.
37. The interpretation of this passage given by John W. Cook
is superficially similar to mine, but has as its point that
"'objective' (or 'physical') space is a construct - a
logical fiction" (Wittgenstein's Metaphysics, p.74).
Although there is a line right before the one I cite that
could lead to this conclusion, I think Wittgenstein is
saying that the notion of physical space as a "construction"
is part of the subjective point of view. Cook seems to be
defending the view that for Wittgenstein phenomenological
space is a public space, while physical space doesn't exist
at all; but I take Wittgenstein's point to be that
phenomenological space construed as private doesn't exist at
all.
38. See Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) p.93ff;
"On Scientific Method in Philosophy" (1914) p.117; "The
Ultimate Constituents of Matter" (1915), pp.128,139-42; and
The Analysis of Mind (1921) .
39. No doubt he also has in mind here Mach's famous drawing
of his room, partially obscured by the bridge of his own
nose; this drawing is referred to many times in these
manuscripts, though not always explicitly. See Mach, The
Analysis of Sensations, p. 19. Aside from the present example
{PR VII,71,100) see the explicit reference at PR XX,213,267,
as well as PR XX,216,271.
40. Though I can find no support in the dictionary for
translating the word "Anstrich" as "shading", as it is
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rendered in the PR, none of the alternatives (“painting"
"tinge", "upstroke", etc.) seem to work here.
41. No6, "Wittgenstein, Phenomenology...", p.17.
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CHAPTER 4
THE RISK AND FALL OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL LANGUAGE
PROJECT (XX)t PATHS TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVSSTIOATIONS
"The world is not composed of sense-data and physical
objects. The relation between them is one in language a necessary relation." (WL30 81)
"Here it is like the relation: physical object and
sense-impressions. We have here two language-games, and
their relation to one another is of a complicated sort.
-If you try to put their relations into a simple
formula you go wrong." (PI p.180)
PHASE XXX: PHENOMENOLOGICAL LANGUAGE RESTORED?
4.1

Wittgenstein Reconsiders

Our previous chapter brought us to the end of
Wittgenstein's Band II manuscript, probably some time in the
summer of 1929. At the beginning of Band III Wittgenstein
suddenly turns back to the notion of a phenomenological
language, and there is no doubt at this point that he means
to reconsider his recent rejection of the project. Unlike in
the previous cases, he offers some definite arguments in
favor of it. Nevertheless, the scope of this reconsideration
is very restricted. Wittgenstein runs into significant
problems almost the moment he reopens the discussion and
after a lengthy attempt to come up with some mathematical
logic that could ground the idea he gives it up once and for
all.
Wittgenstein begins Band III with the remark:
It is not necessary to make eliminative (ausschaltende)
experiments (e.g., thought experiments). Visual space
has its own independent reality.
It contains no subject in itself. It is autonomous.
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It can be immediately described (but we are far removed
from knowing a mode of expression to describe it).
Ordinary physicalistic language relates to it in a very
complicated and instinctively known way. (WA 11,3,3)
The first thing these ruminations confirm is the idea that
the representation of experience requires no Cartesian
subject, a thought that would remain in place right through
the PI: "That which has no owner is the ’visual room'" (PI
398). The second thing they suggest is that there is some as
yet undetermined mode of expression for the description of
immediate experience, a throwback to the last paragraph of
SRLF which already suggests that he is reconsidering the
Tractarian project once again. But then, in what at first
appears to be a leap into his later ideas about meaning, he
says:
The decisive factor (Moment) for a language is its use.
The thought with its support (Hilfe) . (WA 11,3,3)
This may show us something about where the idea of meaning
as use originated, but it is not that concept. It is
actually a reference to a phenomenological language, as
becomes clear when he pursues the notion of a "support".
Noting that the idea of a solipsism of the present moment
"leads into a pit" (WA 11,3,4) he says:
The error must be that we attempt to grasp the fleeting
present with scientific methods. That must be as if we
wanted to detach the firmness of a beam in order to
grasp it. In order, so to speak, to distill it [the
firmness] out of it... (WA 11,3,4;)
From the impossibility of attempting this we must
retain the insight (Erkenntnis) that we speak nonsense
when we attempt to employ our language in this
undertaking. (WA II,3,5)
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The "fleeting present" would be phenomenological experience,
and the attempt to grasp it using the language of physics
removes the essence of what we are trying to study. If we
can't employ "our language" in this enterprise, and the
enterprise itself is coherent, then presumably a
phenomenological language is called for. In the PI this kind
of reasoning will be characterized as trying to "repair a
torn spider's web with our fingers" (PI 106), reflecting the
frustration he encountered trying to carry out this program.
But here he sees the idea of a phenomenological language as
a support for ordinary language, just as he sees
phenomenological propositions as verifications of ordinary
ones.
Yet there are serious misgivings already:
But if one says: But the philosopher must yet climb
down into this pit and grasp the pure reality itself
and pull it to daylight, then the answer is that he
thereby must leave language behind and will come up
from there without having achieved anything. (WA
11,3,8)
Wittgenstein does not make this route (rather like an
inverted version of Plato's cave analogy) sound like a
promising one for philosophy. Having just stated that visual
space “can be immediately described" he already seems to be
doubting that that is possible. Even the next comment, his
most hopeful yet, suggests some doubts about the program:
And yet there can be a phenomenological language.
(Where must this end (Halt machen)?) (WA 11,3,9)
But now he goes on to give an actual argument for it:
When we want to imagine this language it is
characteristic that at the very beginning we imagine
the world to ourselves simply as it is. But this does
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not speak against, but rather for, the possibility of
this language, for we go a definite way around to get
to it. (WA 11,4,1)
This last phrase is a reference to the desire to "begin
before the beginning", which he had mentioned inconnection
with the idea that we can begin philosophy with an
"inarticulate noise", such as the cogito-like "I have,
knowing of my knowledge, consciousness of something" (WA
I,191,3; PR VII,67,98). The same idea is later expressed in
a comment on Russell's theory of descriptions: it shows that
one "cannot sneak into a knowledge of things from behind"
(WA 11,84,9; PR XIV,166,200-1). So Wittgenstein is here
expressing optimism about the ability to grasp immediate
experience that he did not have only a shorttime before

and

will lose again before the year is out.
This ambivalence is characterisitic of the whole series
of the remarks in the first few pages in Band III. The rest
of this discussion shows Wittgenstein still groping for a
way to retain the "support" of a phenomenological foundation
for ordinary physical language. He suggests that perhaps
"our ordinary language is also phenomenological", that it
just fails to separate the various modes of sensory
experience (WA 11,4,2). He suggests that even the complexity
of immediate experience shows that "the description is
possible in principle" and that it is easy enough to "think
of events in this space simple enough to be described" (WA
II,4,3).
But after these somewhat hopeful remarks he comes once
again on a difficulty that beset him earlier, and helped
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convince him to abandon the project: the temporality of
language.
If now phenomenological language isolates visual space
and what happens in it from everything else, what does
it do with time? Is the time of the "visual" phenomenon
the time of our ordinary physicalistic mode of
expression? (WA 11,4,5; PR VII,75,103)
Note that the idea that ordinary language is itself
phenomenological, suggested on the previous page of the
manuscript, has already been dismissed1. To deal with the
problem of temporality Wittgenstein turns to analogies of
physical time with a metronome (WA 11,4,6) and a filmstrip
(WA 11,5,2) and the phenomenal world with the projected
images. But these are no more than ways of representing the
problem; the difficulty is not eliminated.
Let us take stock of what has happened thus far. Near
the end of Band II Wittgenstein questioned the possibility
of a phenomenological language in the very act of coining
the term, and he offered a considered rejection of the idea
shortly afterward. But at the beginning of Band III, he has
apparently turned back to it. Within few months, though, it
would be abandoned once and for all. How then are we to
assess his reconsideration of this program? The first thing
to notice is that everything in Band III that has been
described so far, including the discussion of experience and
time, takes place within the space of six manuscript pages.
At Wittgenstein's rate of production in this period that
could mean as little as a single day or as much as a week;
on a reasonable estimate the remarks were penned within the
space of a few days. As is clear from the discussion above,
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this material contains only one or two unequivocally
optimistic remarks about the project, and some that are
downright skeptical. Shall we say, then, that he had taken
up the phenomenological point of view again, or merely that
he wanted to be sure the idea was not viable before fully
committing himself to the skepticism he had expressed about
it in Band II?
The course of his development in this notebook suggests
the latter. Towards the end of the material we have been
citing Wittgenstein makes the following comment which pivots
the focus of the discussion: "It can even appear that the
certainty of mathematics or logic also undermines the
observation of the bare present" (WA 11,5,5). Thereupon he
turns briefly to the philosophy of mathematics. This is
hardly a return to phenomenology; he recognizes that the
problems have not been worked out, and he is going to see if
they can be. The mathematical discussion leads him to
considerations about Frege’s theory, in which context he
makes one of several studies of subject-predicate sentences
and the Fregean-Russellian analysis of them (see WA 1,63-66;
WA 11,8,2 - 11,9,5; WA 11,202,1). Here he reiterates what he
said in SRLF, i.e., that such an analysis covers up more of
the grammatical form than it reveals. The study focuses on
the use of the word "object” and the grammatical differences
between various kinds of "objects", and strongly suggests
that a confusion with the grammar of physics is implied by
the Fregean analysis (see Appendix I for translations of
this and other related passages). This too looks to be more
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a part of his later ideas than the phenomenological
approach; indeed, it is an important component of what will
develop into his critique of the notion of logical form as
it appears in the PI. At this point there is no reason to
think he has recommitted himself to the construction of a
phenomenological language.
The discussion of topics in the philosophy of
mathematics continues for another 125 manuscript pages
without any mention of phenomenological language. At one
point the mathematical discussions turn more directly to
considerations about visual space; much of Chapter XX of the
PR comes from this material (WA 11,17,7 - 11,23,l)2. This,
and the fact that the whole mathematical episode is both
preceded and followed by considerations about
phenomenological language suggest that he was in some way
trying to work out problems which had developed when he
reconsidered his rejection of this program. The lengthy,
uninterrupted stretch of remarks on mathematics is concerned
directly with the notions of numerical series and rulefollowing: the real and prime number series, the development
of Jt and other irrational numbers, proof by induction,
limits and sums, and similar topics. Recall that Band I
began with remarks about the real number series, and that
these seem to have been directly tied in with his study of
the nature of continuous phenomena, which emerged from the
color exclusion problem. It is possible that in these later
studies Wittgenstein was considering in part how the timeseries of experiential phenomena can be related to that of
183
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

language. In any case, in these remarks rule-governed series
are often opposed to apparently (but misleadingly) analogous
series in the physical world (see Chapter 1). Thus they also
constitute a further development of his idea that the nature
of continuous phenomena (i.e., those where analysis ends
with infinitesimal points or degrees rather than discrete,
finite objects) is expressed by rules about the space rather
than by terms which denote infinite classes of objects; that
is, they are intensional rather than extensional. Where the
phenomenological project contrasts the modes of expression
used for continuous phenomena to the ordinary physical mode,
the mathematical investigations contrast the mathematical
epression of continuity with set-theoretic models whose
extensions are classes of objects. Thus one can say that he
is trying to solve the problem he has come upon in reviving
the idea of a phenomenological language, that of comparing
the time-series for visual phenomena and for language itself
with time in physics, and at the same time working on the
insight that has been developing from the beginning, the
difference in the grammatical rules for phenomenology and
physics.
The result of this survey of Wittgenstein’s work up to
this point is that there is no straightforward answer to the
historical question of whether Wittgenstein was ever
explicitly guided by the notion of a phenomenological
language. We already know it had been implicit in his
earliest work in 1929, as a response to the demise of the
logic of the TLP. Yet as soon as he explicitly formulated it
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he questioned its possibility, and very soon thereafter he
rejected it outright. Much of the impression that he ever
actually believed in it comes from the remarks in the first
few pages of Band III in which he reconsiders the idea. But
now we have seen that upon doing so he encounters problems,
and all we have to go on from this point until he quite
definitely rejects the program as "absurd" is a long stretch
of mathematical philosophy in which he increasingly pursues
ideas about rule-following and makes no explicit statements
one way or another about the possibility or necessity of a
phenomenological language. All we can really say in answer
to the question is that in Band III he briefly expressed
renewed interest in the possibility of a phenomenological
language, ran into difficulties right away, and tried to
work these out using analogous concepts in the philosophy of
mathematics. Though this is merely a way of saying that the
question cannot be answered directly, it is an important
corrective to the standard view. Virtually every exposition
of Wittgenstein's 1929 philosophy makes the assumption that
at some point during this period, if not before, he had
explicitly adopted and worked on the idea of a
phenomenological language. This is understandable, since the
terms in which he rejects it at the beginning of the PR ("a
phenomenological language... I do not now have in mind as a
goal; I no longer consider it necessary"; PR 1,1,51)
strongly suggest this. But whatever Wittgenstein had in mind
as his goal, the written evidence shows that from the time
he coined the term "phenomenological language" to the end of
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the mathematical investigations he was in various degrees of
doubt about it and spent much of his time developing ideas
that would lead well beyond it without ever lending it any
direct support.
FHASK XVt SECOND INTELLECTUAL CRISIS AND TBS DEMISE
OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL LANOUAOI PROJECT
4.2

Crisis and Insight

It is now early in October 1929, still only nine months
into Wittgenstein's work. The mathematical investigation
begins to give way to phenomenological interests once again
with the following comment:
What the immediate datum is to a proposition of
ordinary language that it verifies, that is the
observed (gesehene) arithmetical relationship of the
structure to the equation that it verifies. (WA
11,84,3)
That is, as sense data verify ordinary language proposition,
or give them sense, an impression of the structural
relationships within an equation gives sense to the
equation, or to the proof it represents. This leads to
thoughts on verification and proof; these remarks comprise
part of Chapter XIV of the PR (#166-167). What occurs at
this point is difficult to follow. We come to a place in the
mansucript where for several pages nearly every remark is no
more than a single short sentence, as if each thought led to
a dead end (WA II pp.88-9). The remarks range over a variety
of topics without fixing on or really developing any of
them. The last of them seem to be efforts to reintroduce the
picture theory in the context of his phenomenological
research, e.g.:
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The observed (angeschaute) reality takes the place of
the picture. (WA 11,89,8)
"Blue and white lie next to each other", that is
apparently a proposition, apparently also a picture.
(WA 11,89,11)
This might appear to be a productive line of thought, but
Wittgenstein is actually, on my reading, already in the
midst of an intellectual crisis which will put an end to the
phenomenological language project once and for all.
On 6 October 1929, for the first time since the first
few pages of Band I, he begins dating his remarks - perhaps
a sign of his recognition that an important crossroads has
been reached. His first dated comment begins: "Incapable of
thinking. Thoughts like an anxiety-dream, going around in
circles (Gedanken fiebertraumartig, reitirierend)" (WA
11,90,1). This was written in his personal code, but the
rest of the remark was not. It concerns a dream he had which
he interprets as a representation of his fear that he will
never really be understood by others. In his next remark,
again in code, he describes himself as being in
"Gedankenmatt", i.e., "thought-mate" (like checkmate), and
complains bitterly of his inability to work and his feelings
of worthlessness as a result of this (WA 11,90,2). Very
little of philosophical interest takes place for several
more days. His last remark of 10 October (in code) reads:
"Today I feel a particular poverty of problems around me; a
sure sign that before me lie the most difficult and hardest
problems" (WA 11,92,6). In another coded remark the same day
he describes himself as a "bad person" and complains of
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being under pressure. At this point he had written little of
any interest for more than a week.
It may be of some relevance that at this time
Wittgenstein was working under a grant from Cambridge, with
no guarantee that it would be renewed; he had not received
his doctorate yet, had no teaching assignment, and in spite
of his fame as the author of the TLP was completely beholden
to the good offices of Russell, Moore, Ramsey and Keynes.
This may have contributed to his sense of gloom; he even
complains of feeling "alien (fremd)" (VJA 11,90,2).
Nevertheless, the main source of the pressure was clearly
intellectual: his mathematical explorations, though they are
in hindsight an essential step in the development of his
ideas on rule-following, had produced nothing that could
support the concept of a phenomenological language. What he
had complained of at the beginning of the notebook - that
there was no obvious way of capturing the flux of experience
by means of some special manipulation of a language that
necessarily unfolded in time - remained every bit as much
the case as it was before.
How does Wittgenstein emerge from this crisis? By
finally putting in explicit terms a key insight that had
been underlying his ideas all along, but that had been
obscured by the chimerical pursuit of a linguistic system to
replace the failed Tractarian project. Thus on 11 October,
immediately after the last of his self-critical remarks, the
conception that on our interpretation is central to the
later Wittgenstein emerges with the force of a revelation:
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

[4.1] The worst philosophical errors always arise when
we want to use our ordinary - physical - language in
the area of the immediately given.
If one asks, for example, "Does the box still exist
when I am not looking at it, then the only correct
answer is, "Certainly, if no one has dragged it away or
destroyed it". Naturally a philosopher would be not
satisfied with this answer but it would quite rightly
reduce his way of questioning ad absurdum. {WA 11,93,2;
PR VI,57,88)
All our forms of speech {Redeformen) are derived from
normal physical language and are not used in
epistemology or phenomenology without casting a
distorting light on the object. {WA 11,93,3; PR
VI,57,88)
The very form of speech (Redensart) "I perceive x" is
already derived from the physicalistic (world) mode of
expression and here x should be a physical object e.g. a body. It is already false to use this mode of
speech (Redeweise) in phenomenology, where x must then
mean a datum. For now "I" and "perceive" do not have
the same sense as above. {WA 11,93,4; PR VI,57,88)
In these passages, Wittgenstein forcefully states the
view that will eventually lead him from his phenomenology to
the later philosophy. Though he does not exploit the full
power of these ideas until the BlB he already has the main
concepts. When we speak in ordinary conversational or
written language we take the existence of the physical
world, and the reference of words to physical objects, as
given, or unproblematic. When we say "I see a tree" we do
not mean "I have a visual sense-datum that corresponds to
what should be the physical presence of a tree"; we mean
simply "There's a tree". The former is not an analysis of
the latter but a new idea that replaces it in philosophical
discourse. Wittgenstein suggests that we have all kinds of
expressions in ordinary language that presuppose our ability
to refer immediately to physical objects; it is what gives
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ordinary language its particular use-value for us. But when
we do philosophy, in this instance phenomenology, we posit
different kinds of objects - sense-data, or whatever - and
proceed to apply our normal physical mode of expression - "I
perceive..." to this new entity. This is the idea that
stands at the crossroads between what has become known as
the "middle" Wittgenstein and his later philosophy.
Wittgenstein actually gives us examples of two kinds of
errors: doubting that a tree exists when I'm not looking at
it is like applying the language of phenomenology in the
area of physics; whereas saying "I perceive x" where x is a
sense-datum is the reverse. In either case, the point
remains that we cannot cross grammatical realms and take the
resulting propositions literally. He does not, however, say
precisely what difficulties we encounter as a result of
doing so. But they are not hard to come up with. For
instance, if our ordinary talk about perceiving a tree
should be interpreted as meaning we are perceiving sensedata, why stop there? How do we perceive sense-data directly
if we can't perceive trees directly (especially if, as
Russell believed, sense-data are part of the physical
world)? It does not help to say that sense-data are "by
hypothesis" things we perceive directly; we are talking
about an empirical theory of perception, not a logical
analysis, so we can't just posit perceptual entities willynilly. This forces us to say that when we talk about
perceiving sense-data, we must really be saying we perceive
ultra-sense-data which mediate between the sense-data and
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our senses! This clearly leads to an infinite regress. The
point is, the philosophical method in which we are supposed
to be able to analyze reality in terms of immediately
perceived phenomenal objects is not going to work. It is
already difficult to accept the implication of such a
program, namely, that we are making a huge mistake when we
say we "perceive" physical objects - though this was not
enough to dissuade its early 20th-century adherents. But if
it turns out to be incoherent to say that what we really
perceive are sense-data or phenomena, a whole philosophical
program is ready to become history.
It is important to see that the fundamental insight in
the above passages is not limited to the particular
difficulty regarding sense-data. It is the idea that "all
our forms of speech are derived from normal physical
language", and that as soon as we apply these constructions
to philosophical theory we "throw a distorting light" on
what we are trying to talk about. Though the point is
applied here to "phenomenology or epistemology", the
generality of the statement about physical forms of speech
suggests that one goal of philosophy (not just
phenomenology) will be to avoid being misled by the
intrusion of physicalistic modes of expression into our
theoretical language. Note that this is just the reverse of
the problem that figures so prominently in the Hintikkas'
thesis, i.e., that Wittgenstein's change of mind about the
phenomenological language project was due to the inability
of such a language to express physicalistic truths. It was
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the awkwardness of using physicalistic language to express
phenomenological truths that played the crucial role.
Indeed, this insight engenders much of Wittgenstein’s
later conception of philosophy, as expressed in the
metaphors of showing the fly the way out of the fly-bottle,
understanding the picture that holds us captive, avoiding
linguistic temptations, etc. All of these expressions
originate from the idea that we generally lead ourselves
into philosophical difficulties by failing to see the traps
that language sets for us; and the most important of these
occur when we invent metaphysical entities, processes or
relations and apply our usual spatial and temporal concepts
to them - our metaphors of inner and outer, or finitude and
infinitude, or temporal continuity, or creation and
destruction. Again and again in Wittgenstein's later work he
returns to the simple idea expressed here, that ordinary
language has a spatiotemporal bias that leads to confusion
and paradox when it is unwittingly reflected in
philosophical theories.
In Wittgenstein's use of these remarks in the PR it is
already apparent how this insight may be applied to problems
that go well beyond strictly phenomenological matters. Their
function in the PR is to bolster a point that ties in with
the issue of sense-data, but is wider in its implications,
i.e., the claim that a Cartesian subject is not necessary
for the representation of experience. Recall that this point
was developed at the end of Band II and the beginning of
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Band III. He begins Chapter VI of the PR with a slightly
later expression of the same idea:
[4.2] One of the most
representation of our
"I", especially where
represented by it, as

misleading modes of
language is the use of the word
immediate experience is
in "I see a red patch".

It would be instructive to replace this mode of
expression with another in which immediate experience
would be represented without the help of the personal
pronoun, because one could thus see that that
representation of facts is not essential.3 (PR
VI,57,88; WA 11,135,4-5)
In the manuscript these remarks are followed by others which
develop the same line of thought. These are also printed in
the PR (WA 11,136,1; PR VI,58,88) but first remarks from
[4.1] are interjected. They are clearly intended to support
the point that the use of "I" as a subject of experience is
a "misleading mode of representation". The idea of a
Cartesian soul, as we saw in Chapter 1, can be seen as the
kind of metaphor Wittgenstein is alluding to in saying that
we make "the worst philosophical errors" by applying the
discourse of physics in the realm of phenomenology. Taking
literally the idea of the soul as a kind of ethereal
substance inside the head, a metaphysical abstraction is
extended to the point where philosophical problems fall like
rain, e.g., in the form of paradoxes about the interaction
of mind and body. So by May 1930 he has already taken this
insight of October 1929 and made it serve as a pedestal on
which to question fundamental assumptions in modem
epistemology.
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4.3

Digressions A Path to the Private Language Argumnt
Even more interesting things emerge if we ask why the

epiphany of self-clarification that transformed his ideas in
the manuscripts seemed most appropriate in the PR at this
point. If one understands the basic ideas it is easy enough
to see that [4.1] lends some support to remarks like [4.2];
but why should such crucial remarks as [4.1] be reserved for
this particular context in the typescript? The intriguing
answer, I suggest, is that they precede, and provide a
foundation for, the earliest version of Wittgenstein's
"private language argument"4.
The argument which continues Chapter VI depends, as
does [4.2], on the idea with which he had begun his
manuscripts: that there is no privileged mode of
representation. Consider claims about being in pain: if
these are to be represented phenomenologically there will be
a certain claim that "J" (L.W.) am in pain that is
immediately known; and all claims of the form "A has
toothache" can be stated: "A is behaving as L.W. does when
he has toothache" {WA 11,136,1; PR VI,58,89). As
Wittgenstein points out, "this language can have anyone at
all at its center" {WA II,136,1; PR VI,58,89). That is, it
makes no logical difference whether or not the "I” who
serves as a paradigm of pain-behavior is the "I" that I
experience as the subject of sensations. However, the
solipsism in phenomenology comes out in that "among all the
languages which have different people at the center, the one
which has me at the center has a special position
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(Sonderstellung)" [WA 11,136,1; PR VI,58,89). At least, that
is how it is typically conceived: I am supposed to be able
to recognize my pain immediately, while that of others is
known by inference from behavior (which is again known to me
only phenomenologically). This alleged egocentric language
is precisely a private language in which I can ostensibly
point to a particular pain-sensation.
Wittgenstein does not dwell here on our inability to
reidentify a particular pain-sensation ("the sensation S")
as he does in the PI (258ff). The question is whether I can
identify a pain as mine; but this is quite comparable, for
in both cases, the answer turns on whether I can come up
with reasonable criteria to justify the identification of
something by private ostensive reference. It is presupposed
by any theory of names for physical objects that there is
ultimately some method like pointing and using demonstrative
pronouns that makes reference to these objects publicly
accessible. The warning about confusing physical and
phenomenological means of expression applies just here: it
suggests that what happens with the notion of privately
identifiable sensations is that a subtle conceptual transfer
has been made from the practice of naming physical objects.
The faulty assumption is that ostension in a public space
has a sufficiently comparable analogue in private space to
justify private ostensive references.
Wittgenstein refutes this idea here with a move that is
indicative of the originality of his later thought. He asks,
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regarding the putative "privileged status" of the selfcentered language:
[4.3] How can I express that? That is, how can I
correctly represent its special position
(Sonders tellung) in words? That is not possible. For if
I do it in the language which has me at the center,
then the privileged position (Ausnahmestellung) of the
description of this language in its own terms is no
wonder, and in the mode of expression of another
language my language takes no special position at all.
(WA 11,136,1; PR VI,58,89)
In short, there is no language in which I can say that my
sensations are the paradigm for all sensations, and thus
phenomenolejically distinguish my pain; for in a private
language the proposition fails to say anything, and in a
public one it fails to distinguish itself from the logically
equivalent public proposition "there is pain". Note that
Wittgenstein is not defending the absurd thesis that an
individual cannot recognize when she is in pain. He is
arguing against the idea that a phenomenological language
can be a private language, by trying to show that in a
phenomenological language it would be logically impossible
to express the proposition that the pain I experience is my
pain. The correct inference is not that I cannot know if I
am in pain but that there is no privileged phenomenological
position from which to assert the primacy of certain
phenomena (one's own); we cannot "begin before the
beginning" (PR VII,67,98; WA 1,191,3), as he puts it. Of
course, Wittgenstein would also deny that one "knows" or
"recognizes" one is in pain in the same sense that we say we
know or recognize empirical truths about the world; we do
not, for instance, "learn" that we are in pain as we learn
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what we usually know or recognize. But for the same reason
Wittgenstein would consider it absurd to say we do not
know we are in pain. My point is that his remarks are
misinterpreted if they are taken as a defense of this absurd
thesis.
The argument depends in part on two points already
established in his manuscripts: his intitial observation in
Band I that all modes of representation are "equally
justified", and his realization at the end of Band II that
phenomenology and physics both describe the same world, and
are simply different "modes of expression".5 Together these
suggest that there is no way to establish a priority of the
phenomenological or physical modes of representing the
world6. Adding to these the ideas in [4.1] and [4.2] we come
up with the position that philosophical confusions will
arise when we give preference to one mode of representation
over another; and that precisely such a confusion arises
from privileging the phenomenological standpoint in firstperson experiential reports. Finally, in [4.3] Wittgenstein
gives a definite argument to prove this point: a
phenomenological language that privileged its own standpoint
would be incoherent, for it could not represent an
experience as mine to me, since the solipsistic point of
view does not recognize a mine/thine dichotomy; and to
anyone else the representation of my experience (i.e., an
expression in my solipsistic language) is just the
representation of an experience, the same as anyone else's.
Hence the phenomenological mode of expression must be
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public, not private, and what it represents must be just as
publicly accessible as anything represented
physicalistically.
At one point during the private language argument in
the PI Wittgenstein says that "in the end when one is doing
philosophy one gets to the point where one would like to
emit an inarticulate sound" {PI 261). The remark is rather
obscure in this context, but it is a development of a remark
we mentioned above, which is found in the PR towards the
beginning of the next chapter (Chapter VII). It comes from
the section at the end of the Band II manuscript where he
discusses the model in which objects are moved about so that
their positions correspond to the subject's visual field.
There, as in the present remarks from Band III, he was
developing arguments against the phenomenological language
program. The mechanical model, he says, would be "the most
immediate description one could think of" (WA 1,191,2; PR
VII,67-8,97; see section 3.8). If one tried to give a more
immediate description than this (i.e., to express something
in a strictly non-hypothetical phenomenological language)
"instead of a description what would come is that
inarticulate noise with which many authors would like to
begin philosophy" (WA 1,191,3; PR VII,68,97-8). Not only is
the sense of the remark clearer in its original context, but
here he explicitly confirms the anti-Cartesian intent which
is often ascribed to the private language argument of the
PI. In the Band II manuscript and the PR he provides in
quotes an example of such an "inarticulate noise": "I have,
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knowing of my knowledge, consciousness of something" (WA
1,191,3; PR VII,68,98).
Wittgenstein also observes, in this early private
language argument, that "only their application really
differentiates languages" and that "all these languages only
represent one single, incomparable thing and cannot
represent anything else" (WA 11,136,1; PR VI,58,89). The
various solipsistic language are thus pragmatically
undifferentiated, and therefore can only be taken in sum as
a single, public language. Continuing in the same mode, he
begins the next paragraph in the PR with the statement, "It
is not possible to believe something for which one cannot
think of a verification" (WA 11,116,2). This remark is
pertinent if we follow the line of reasoning that the
inability to identify pains by private ostensive definition
is due to the absence of any "application" which could
distinguish my private language from all others. This means
that there is no possible way in which the distinction can
be verified. The present series of remarks in the PR makes
the relationship between his early conception of
verification and his later use of "criteria" plainly
visible. On most interpretations of the private language
argument in the PI, the problem of reidentifying "the
sensation S" turns, at least in part, on the unavailability
of publicly accessible criteria for such a procedure (PI
253, 258, 269, 288, 290), hence the inability to provide a
"justification* (PX 261, 265, 289). Here too, the confusion
of physical and phenomenological discourse is behind the
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difficulty: our conceptions of verification, confirmation,
and criteria are all based on the possibility of public
exchange of information, but failing to notice this we are
misled into thinking that we can privately (or
solipsistically) verify, confirm, or produce criteria for
mental facts just as we do publicly for empirical facts. In
the PI he compares this tosomeone purchasing "several
copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it
said was true" (PI 265)

or to "my right hand giv[ing] my

left hand money" (PI 268) .7 He suggests over and over in the
PR that propositions that are in principle unverifiable have
no meaning, just as he argues later that a language without
criteria is not a language.
There are many remarks in this section of the PI that
could have been used in the earlier discussion as well.8 But
the remarks which open the discussion of the famous "beetle
box" example seem to refer as much to the earlier version as
the later:
If I say of myself that it is only from my own case
that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say
the same of other people too? And how can I generalize
the one case so irresponsibly? (PI 293)
This is essentially the same problem first dealt with in the
PR: all private phenomenological languages are equivalent,
so how can I assign paradigmatic status to my experience? I
can try to do so, but then what I point to mentally cannot
be a public object, and if it is a private object I can say
nothing more about it than can anyone else in their private
language. The "beetle box” example illustrates this dilemma.
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Each person in the example has privileged epistemic access
to their "beetle", just as Wittgenstein's earlier
phenomenologists had to their "toothache". In the earlier
version he says that the ownership of the "toothache" cannot
be expressed; here he claims that the "beetle" itself
"cancels out" (PI 293). As before, he considers the question
of finding a use for the private object: if the word
"beetle" has an application "it would not be used as the
name of a thing" (PI 293); "not even as a something" (PI
293), and "not a nothing either" (PI 304). Here we encounter
one of the myriad later expressions of the insight of
October 1929: conceiving the private entity as a "thing" is
using a physicalistic model for the grammar of mental
content. "Consider what makes it possible in the case of
physical objects to speak of 'two exactly the same'..." (PI
253), he asks. That is the essence of the problem, early and
late: grammatical mistakes made by assuming that we can talk
of abstract entities in the same way we talk of physical
objects.
All in all, an understanding of these early remarks
leads to the conclusion that in his 1929 manuscripts, and
even moreso in the PR the following year, Wittgenstein had
already begun to formulate what would eventually become the
"private language argument". If our discussion has captured
the dynamic of his thought at this time, it should
furthermore be clear that the idea that we transfer
expressions and practices from the sphere of physics to that
of phenomenology played a crucial role in facilitating that
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argument. Moreover, it was his critique of the notion of a
phenomenological language, with its odd combination of
Ptolemaic egocentrism and Newtonian avoidance of hypotheses,
that led directly to his realization that the notion of a
private language was incoherent. The recognition that a
phenomenological language would not hold a privileged
position over a physical one, and simultaneously that it
would have to have a different grammar, led to the
formulation of the private language argument even as it
began to dig the grave of the phenomenological language
project.
4.4

The Demise of Phenomenological Language (Continued)

Wittgenstein's use of [4.1] in the PR as a means of
undermining the possibility of a phenomenological language,
conceived of as a language of private experience, lends
support to the above interpretation of the 125 pages of
remarks on mathematics which separate these remarks from the
concerns at the start of the manuscript. It suggests that
they were an unsuccessful attempt to find a solution to the
philosophical problems he had started with, and [4.1]
represents a return to the earlier line of thought and an
acknowledgement that his doubts about phenomenological
language were justified. They could not be removed by
further investigation of the continuum, the time-series, or
the infinite in general. At this point, the original project
was dead for all intents and purposes. What supplied
Wittgenstein with a way out of his crisis was the idea that
ordinary language tempts us to carry over the physicalistic
202
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mode of expression into the phenomenological; and this, as
we have described it here, is not only the end of an
intellectual crisis which stemmed from a problematic
conception of the distinction between phenomenology and
physics, but the first really explicit expression of the
idea that will now guide his work right through the PI.
A few days later Wittgenstein once again voices doubts
about his work; but this time he ends them much more quickly
than before, with this comment:
[4.4] The assumption that a phenomenological language
would be possible and that it would actually say what
we must express in philosophy is - I believe - absurd.
We must manage with our ordinary language and just
understand it correctly. That is, we should not let it
tempt us to speak nonsense. (WA 11,102,5; 22 October
1929)
It would not be too much to call this passage the birth of
the later Wittgenstein, in spite of the fact that it occurs
in 1929, even before his recorded discussions with the
Vienna Circle and near the beginning of what is usually
considered his "middle period". What he rejects here is a
worldview, which includes not just his own idea of a
phenomenological language but a program for epistemological
foundationalism and a conception of the tasks of philosophy.
He rejects the idea that philosophers can construct a
foundation for knowledge, or for scientific thought, out of
necessary perceptual truths expressed in a formalized
language. Though it was perhaps only Wittgenstein himself
who had subscribed to this entire program per se, it is not
hard to see that elements of it had guided the work of a
wide range of philosophers, from Mach, Russell, Frege,
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Moore, Husserl, Carnap, and James, to representatives of
schools such as New Realism (Edwin Holt, for instance) and
neo-Kantianism (e.g., Karl Pearson). The rejection of a
phenomenological language has a ripple effect. It challenges
the notion that formalized languages can help us formulate
all valid inferences, such that any inference can be reduced
to logical components and compared with systematic rules:
that is, the program of Frege, Russell, Whitehead and
Carnap. It throws into question the notion of sense-data or
"the given", which rocks the boat of the entire Cammbridge
school from the early Russell and Moore through C.D. Broad,
and many other philosophers sympathetic to this program
(H.H. Price, for instance)9. The Kantian idea (if such it
is) of a "thing-in-itself" standing behind the object is
also upset; even such apparently intuitive notions as fixing
a reference through "ostensive definition" can be found
tilting if one begins to doubt the possibility of
determinate identification by phenomenological criteria.
The evidence that all this and more is being opened up
follows in fairly short order. Wittgenstein soon begins to
see the idea of sense-data as an error of grammar, to
question the notion of logical analysis through a further
critique of the concept-object idea, and to raise doubts
about naming and pointing. True, he holds on to a form of
verificationism for awhile; but by January 1930 this would
be transformed into a notion of confirmation, which (as we
have seen) eventually leads to his later ideas of
justification, symptoms and criteria. He does not yet fully
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appreciate the significance of his discovery of
philosophical grammar; and of course, the ideas of "family
resemblance" and "language games" are not yet present.
Nevertheless, these later concepts will gradually emerge out
of the insight that is here well understood: that ordinary
"physical" language is what we have to work with in
philosophy as well as everyday life, and that the task is to
isolate the ways in which it tempts us to speak in
physicalistic metaphors when we try to talk about immediate
experience (and much else, as he will discover over the
years). Moreover, one path to the private language argument
is already discernible. The space of objects of perception
is a public space; so it is going to be misleading to use
the grammar of perception to refer to anything like an
"inner sensation" that is by hypothesis not in a public
space. From this point on there is no backsliding on
phenomenological language, only a deepening of the arguments
for rejecting it.
Thus he abandons the idea of a phenomenological
language, and with it the notion that physics rests on
phenomenology as an inferential language on a direct one. He
had already come to the conclusion that there are not two
epistemically distinct worlds but merely two ways of
representing the world. Now he also realizes that the two
modes of representation are not distinct linguistic systems,
but different grammatical features of ordinary language.
Even the idea that we can construct a metalanguage of
apodictically certain phenomenological propositions is
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tossed aside. Having previously recognized the failure of
Tractarian logic, he now sees that he cannot salvage the
program of developing a syntactically pure "basis language"
that mirrors the necessary truths that frame our discourse
about the world.
At this point Wittgenstein could conceivably have
chosen to give up philosophy a second time. Instead, he saw
that in spite of the magnitiude of his initial failures the
essence of the task he had embraced from the start lay open
before him for the first time. The whole problem had been
that the sense of a sentence in ordinary language was not
clear from its superficial form. The role of philosophy,
largely defined for him by Frege’s Begriffschrift and
Russell’s theory of descriptions, was supposed to be to
address this problem. This conception remained intact
throughout his life (as is shown, for example, by his
appreciation of the importance of Moore's paradox - "It's
raining and I don’t believe it’’10). But why did the problem
have to be addressed by developing alternate languages? Why
not confront it head on, by sorting out the different uses
of words and compiling, so to speak, a super-grammar of
contextual linguistic usage? One obstacle was the aesthetic
appeal of a logically perfect language; but this he now
recognized as a chimera. Another was the tediousness of the
procedure. But he had already gone deeply into the grammar
of visual space, and explored the grammar of infinity in a
way that was supposed to be propadeutic to our concepts of
time, space, number, and geometry. Why not continue the
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project and explore all the important psychological spaces?
A little later on, in Band IV, he would say, "The words
'color', 'tone', 'number', etc. could appear as the chapter
headings of our grammar" (WA 11,225,3). He could already
have added the words "self" and "time". Before the end of
Band IV "expectation" and "recognition", or more generally
"intention", and "pain" would become topics of comparable
importance. And as is already clear, one of the central
tasks for each of these spaces, indeed what gets many of
these discussions off the ground, is to reveal the
misconceptions that arise from assuming that their grammar
follows the model of physical space11.
4.5

Wittgenstein's Alleged Ambivalences

In rejecting the two-worlds approach and the
phenomenological language project Wittgenstein embarks on
the course that would lead him to the PI. This process had
begun with the series of remarks cited in Chapter 3, in
which he starts to doubt the possibility of a
"phenomenological language", and resumes a few months later
with [4.4] above. On 21 November, probably less than six
months after he first coined this phrase, he makes the wellknown remark which constitutes (with one alteration) the
second remark in the PR:
[4.5] A phenomenological language or 'primary
language', as I called it, I do not now have in mind as
a goal; I no longer consider it possible. All that is
possible and necessary is to separate what is essential
in our language from the inessential. {WA 11,118,6; PR
1,1,51)

v
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This signals not only a final step in disengaging from the
phenomenological language approach, but a major step towards
the philosophy of the PI, in which investigation of the
linguistic and epistemic structures of "our language", i.e.,
"ordinary" language, are the only path to philosophical
understanding.
In the PR (1,1,51) Wittgenstein changes the word
"possible" in the first sentence of [4.5] to "necessary".
This is one of only a handful of changes he made to the
manuscript remarks which were included in the PR, and since
this is both a crucial remark in his own development and
occupies a prominent a position in the PR the change has
drawn the attention of most commentators who address
Wittgenstein's phenomenology12. It is generally recognized
that it cannot signify that in the PR Wittgenstein thinks a
phenomenological language, in the sense we have examined it,
is possible; for in the very next sentence in [4.5] he
suggests that it is not possible. Why, then, did he change
the initial claim?
In this case the explanation given by the Hintikkas
seems essentially correct. According to them, the change
"reflects a genuine hesitation on his part, not concerning
what he believed, but concerning what he thought he could
prove".13 It is reasonable to suppose that Wittgenstein did
not want to start the typescript on a note that might set up
the expectation that he was going to demonstratate the
impossibility of a phenomenological language; for although
there is a kind of proof in Chapter VI, as we have seen,
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that was not the goal of the work. It should be added,
though, that the whole book, properly understood,
demonstrates by example that such a language is not
necessary. That is because it is a grammatical investigation
which, as he says in a remark that follows shortly, "amounts
to the construction of a phenomenological language" (PR
1,1,51). So modifying this initial claim has the beneficial
effects of avoiding undue emphasis on the proof in Chapter
VI, and setting up expectations of what actually does follow
- the construction of a phenomenology without a
phenomenological language.
Stern may have something like this later, grammatical
project in mind when he suggests that Wittgenstein uses the
term "phenomenological language" in two different senses:
the formal sense we have alluded to several times, and "a
looser sense, meaning by it any way of talking about the
content of experience". According to Stern, "in this sense
of the term, he holds that a phenomenological language is
possible, but not necessary"14. The problem with this way of
putting it is that if there were a second sense of the
phrase, it could only be that of a "grammatical
investigation", or the closely-related notion of a
phenomenological Ausdruckweise. Yet this would not be a
"looser" sense of the term, but one that even at this point
is more developed theui the notion of a "phenomenologically
perfect language", which was never fleshed out in more
detail than the programmatic pronouncements of SRLF.
Moreover, it seems very doubtful that Wittgenstein would
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have expected the reader to be able to differentiate even
these two senses of the phrase. There are only a few
occurences of the phrase "phenomenological language", and a
few instances of "primary language", in all of
Wittgenstein's manuscripts. Many of these are not even
included in the PR; but even in the manuscripts it is quite
difficult to make out more than one sense of either phrase,
i.e., that of a replacement language for the Tractarian
project. This suggests that he never did intend two
different senses of the term "phenomenological language".
One could at most make out a difference between the intended
goal of the project and the actual content of the term: for
although it was supposed to be a kind of formal or
analytical language, it never had much more in the way of
content than the collective sense of Wittgenstein's remarks
on the grammar of visual space and other spaces. In any
case, the fact that Wittgenstein denies the possibility of
such a language (albeit circuitously) in the next sentence
makes Stern's interpretation unlikely; for Wittgenstein
would have to have switched to the alleged second sense of
the phrase in the blink of an eye, without notice.
But we might say that what Stem wants to say is quite
correct: Wittgenstein at least moved to deemphasize the
point that a phenomenological language is not "possible"
because he wanted to leave room for the idea that a
grammatical investigation of ordinary language was
essentially a phenomenology. If someone insisted on calling
the result a "phenomenological language" they would be
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saying something misleading, in virtue of the way
Wittgenstein actually used the term, but not entirely wrong
in spirit. As we shall see, by the time he put the PR
together Wittgenstein had also written some other remarks,
which are included in the PR, and give a kind of sense to
the notion of a "primary language", though a different sense
from the way he had used it at first (i.e., as a synonym for
a formal phenomenological language). Thus by weakening
"not... possible" to "not... necessary", in addition to
avoiding the emphasis on a proof, Wittgenstein avoids the
appearance of self-contradiction when he suggests that a
kind of "primary language" is indeed possible.
Yet another interpretation of [4.5] and the remarks
that immediately follow it is offered by John W. Cook, who
is not concerned with the issue of whether a
phenomenological language is impossible or only unnecessary
but with the apparently ambivalent claims that Wittgenstein
has given up trying to construct such a language and that,
"a recognition of what is essential and what inessential in
our language if it is to represent... amounts to
constructing a phenomenological language"15. Like Stem,
Cook resorts to the idea that "the term ‘phenomenological
language' is used here in two senses"16. He claims that what
Wittgenstein rejects is “an explicit phenomenological
language, i.e., one that would contain names of sensible
qualities but not words such as 'table', 'chair', and 'Mr.
Smith’". But in saying that it can be constructed,
Wittgenstein "has something else in mind, namely, that our
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ordinary language is a phenomenological language despite the
fact that it contains words such as 'table' and 'chair'"17.
However, Cook does not share our view that Wittgenstein
thinks ordinary language permits different modes of
expression; rather, his interpretation is that "ordinary
language is a phenomenological language... in the sense that
the propositions of ordinary language do not... refer to
entities that transcend sense-data"18. Cook's goal here is
to retain his interpretation of Wittgenstein as a lifelong
phenomenalist in the face of the damaging remark that
Wittgenstein has given up on the idea of a phenomenological
language. Is Cook's reading plausible? Due to Wittgenstein's
allusive and dialectical style there are many expressions of
his views from which one can squeeze out a phenomenological
reading, but Cook's dexterity in utilizing this kind of
opening cannot get around every remark. For example, in a
remark in the BIB (part of which was cited in Chapter 1),
Wittgenstein writes:
There are propositions of which we may say that they
describe facts in the material world (external world).
Roughly speaking, they treat of physical objects:
bodies, fluids, etc. I am not thinking in particular of
the laws of the natural sciences, but of any such
proposition as "the tulips in our garden are in full
bloom", or "Smith will come in any moment". There are
on the other hand propositions describing personal
experiences, as when the subject in a psychological
experiment describes his sense-experiences; say his
visual experience, independent of what bodies are
actually before his eyes, and n.b., independent also of
any processes which might be observed to take place in
his retina, his nerves, his brain, and other parts of
his body. (That is, independent of both physical and
physiological facts.) (BIB 46-7)
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To maintain that someone who writes a passage like this
believes that "the propositions of ordinary language do
not... refer to entities that transcend sense-data" flies in
the face of reason. As we will see later on in this chapter,
before the current transformation of his philosophy is over
Wittgenstein will have decided that the very idea of "sensedata" is based on mistakenly reifying the appearances of
things. This is all we need to say here about Cook's
interpretation of Wittgenstein, though much energy could be
devoted to hacking away the thickets of misreadings that are
required to support the phenomenological interpretation of
Wittgenstein's philosophy after this point.
4.6

Ideal Languages and the Varieties of Representation

Moving away from the conception that philosophy should
be concerned with "logically perfect" or "basis” languages
of any sort was the fundamental step that marks the
difference between the later Wittgenstein and all his
earlier ideas. This step is memorialized in several passages
in the PI where he contrasts his later view with the former
ideas. Thus he notes that attempting to ferret out fine
distinctions in language “can make it appear as if we saw it
as our task to reform language" {PI 132); this, he says, can
be done for practical purposes, but these are not relevant
to his investigation. Again, considering the question "How
does the sentence do [something] such that it [can]
represent?", he says that one merely has to look, for
"nothing is concealed" (PI 435) . But what if one objects
that "it all goes by so quickly" (PI 435)?
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Here it is easy to get into that dead-end in philosophy
where one believes that the difficulty of the task lies
in that we should describe phenomena (Erscheinungen)
that are hard to get hold of, the present experience
that slips quickly by, or something similar. Where
ordinary language seems to us too rough—
(PX 436)
This is exactly the dead end that he escaped when he gave up
looking for a phenomenological language.
After [4.5] Wittgenstein continues, in both the
manuscripts and the PR, as follows:
[4.6] That is, when one has, so to speak, described
the class of languages that fulfill their purpose then
one has thereby shown the essential in them and thereby
immediately represented immediate experience.
Each time I say that one could also present such and
such a representation through this other one, we take a
step farther toward the goal of grasping the essence of
what is represented. (WA 11,118,6; PR 1,1,51)
The argument here for abandoning the phenomenological
language project is inseparable from the recognition of the
varieties of modes of representation in language. The "class
of languages" he refers to is another precursor of the
notion of "language games"; for physical and
phenomenological language are the first two such games that
he distinguishes. By recognizing these as different modes of
representation of the same world we grasp more fundamentally
the nature of what we are describing. Thus, recognition of
the varieties of language, and a refusal to sweep all the
nuances of one mode of representation under the rug of
another, constitute the basic change of mind which prompts
him to move from the phenomenological language conception to
the idea of a grammatical investigation.
This idea of a variety of representations is the very
point he drives home through much of the first part of the
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PJ. He suggests that the fundamental flaw in the philosophy
of language tradition that he inherited from Frege and
Russell was to conceive of all language on one pattern:
basically that of the model suggested by the passage from
Augustine in PJ 1, i.e., naming and pointing to physical
objects19. This constitutes a "narrowly circumscribed
region" of language, "not... the whole of what you were
claiming to describe" (PJ 3). In the above passage in the PR
the emphasis is on the different possibilities of
representation, whereas in the PJ the argument focuses on
different games we use for different activities. But this
contrast is not as important as it might appear. First of
all, a language game is a "mode of representation" (PJ 50).
By noting the different language games we use to describe
the world and act in it, as opposed to assimilating
everything to one model, we are noting the different ways of
representing it. Secondly, it is hard to find any basis for
the appeal in [4.6] to languages that "fulfill their
purpose" unless it is already a grasp of the idea that a
mode of representation functions in the context of a
particular kind of activity. For accomplishing a practical
task we use the model of physics; for conducting a
conceptual investigation we use others.
Consequently, in PJ 2-5 (on the Augustininan
conception), 10-14 (on referring), 23 (on naming), and the
series of remarks on ostensive definition beginning with
#27, Wittgenstein begins to carry out the program first
proposed in these mansucript remarks and the PR: "that one
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could also present such and such a representation through
this other one". Hence: "you seem to be thinking of board
games, but there are others" (PI 3); "how we group words
into types will depend on the purpose of the classification"
(PI 17); "think of how many different kinds of things are
called 'description'" (PI 24); "as if there were only one
thing called 'talking about a thing'" (PI 27); "the word
name is used to characterize many different kinds of use of
a word" (PI 38); etc. The PI is the ultimate realization of
the conception of philosophy that Wittgenstein first hit
upon when he abandoned the goal of a phenomenological
language.
The momentum of the change in his views gathers steam
the following month. In a remark of 21 December (still in
Band III) he speaks of the fact that we sometimes take the
appearance of something to be opposed to the reality of it,
as in optical illusions. However, he says, "if appearance
were ordinarily more important in life than the result of
measuring then language would also show a different attitude
to these phenomena" (WA 11,145,5; PR V,53,84). This adds
emphasis to the point we just made to the effect that he was
already well aware of the relationship between our canons of
representation and our practical activities. Moreover, it
does more than suggest skepticism about the primacy of the
phenomenological; it gives a definite argument for doubting
it. The argument is that it is unreasonable to suppose that
ordinary language would assume a topsy-turvy order in which
what is "primary" in practice becomes "secondary" in
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language. He had already noticed in October the hegemonic
tendencies of the grammar of physical objects; now he
suggests that this cannot be an accident, but that grammar
reflects the pragmatic constraints of our interaction with
the physical world.
Wittgenstein's next comment, which sounds ambivalent
when taken out of its original context, as it is in the PR,
is really a deepening of previous insights:
[4.7] There is not - as I believed earlier - a primary
language in contrast to our ordinary "secondary" one.
But one could speak of a primary language in contrast
to our language insofar as no preference for certain
phenomena over others could be expressed in it; it must
be, so to speak, absolutely objective (sachlich). (WA
11,145,6; PR V,53,84)
When he says that a primary language would be "objective" he
means that it would elide all expressions that reveal a
preference for the physicalistic mode of expression; i.e.,
that is, it would eliminate the subjective bias that comes
out of our need to use language to manipulate the external
world. Objectivity in this sense is simply a suppression of
the operational constraints on our use of language. Thus two
earlier points - that ordinary language prioritizes the
physical, and that this does not reverse the order of
reality but reflects our practical relation to it - are now
harmonized with a third and very forward-looking one: that
by isolating the pragmatic preference that is built into
language we could see each grammatical space in its own
right as a way of representing a part of reality. Thus
Wittgenstein gives a new sense to the notion of a "primary
language", and this may have in part deterred him from
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proclaiming the impossibility of a phenomenological
language.
One direction in which this leads is to the many
thought experiments in Wittgenstein's later work where he
asks us to imagine what we would say in unusual
circumstances - whether we would be inclined to make the
same assumptions about how language works20. This is used,
for instance, in the electric-shock example PI 409 to drive
home the point he had already made in the PR, in a quite
different way, about the use of "I" and the relation between
identity and pain-sensations. Another such experiment is
used in PI 420 in an attempt to undermine philosophical
prejudices about what our linguistic preferences might be
with regard to the relationship between mind and body.
Again, the duck-rabbit example of PI II,xi, which begins
with the words, "Two uses of the word 'see'" (p.193), is
meant in part to help remove prejudices about the use of
this word that we acquire from more typical instances of
visual perception. More generally, the point that a "primary
language" would be "objective" insofar as it removed our
pragmatic prejudices is another way of expressing what we
have taken to be the underlying thought of his later work.
Language has a physicalistic bias, because our most
primitive language games are oriented towards practical
needs in a world of physical objects; and we have to
eliminate that bias if we want to be able to play language
games with concepts, experiences, sensations, and the like.

218
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Remark [4.7] was written on 21 December 1929. The next
day Wittgenstein addressed a meeting of the Vienna Circle
with the following speech:
Earlier I believed that there is a colloquial
language in which we all ordinarily speak and a primary
language which expresses what we actually know, that
is, the phenomenon. I have also spoken of a first
system and a second system. I would now like to explain
why I no longer hold this view.
I believe that in essence we have only one language
and that is ordinary language. We don't need to first
find a new language or to construct a symbolism;
rather, colloquial language is already the language
presupposed, which we must rid of the unclarities that
are hidden in it. (WK 45)
The phenomenological language program and the notion of a
primary and secondary realm were abandoned together, and the
whole transformation quite clearly constitutes the final end
of the original Tractarian program. He has completely given
up the search for an ideal language, or a philosophical
"basis language". “We don't need to first find a new
language or to construct a symbolism": this is not because a
"basis language" stood ready at hand awaiting philosophical
employment, as the Hintikkas think, but because the whole
program that had provided the foundation of analytic
philosophy up to that point involved a false notion of
clarification. Thus, in suggesting that the task of
philosophy is to examine the "unclarities" in everyday
language he is not introducing yet another version of the
Russellian program; he is saying that philosophers need to
be aware of the permeation of ordinary language by
misleading implications and metaphors.
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In fact, later the same day he discusses a number of
examples of misleading physicalistic presuppositions we make
in the philosophy of mind, of which the most explicit is
this:
One represents (bezeichnet) memory as a picture. I can
compare a picture with the original, but not a memory.
The experience of the past is not like the objects in
the next room: now I don't see them at all, but I can
walk over to them. But can I go into the past? (W3C
p.48)
Several other examples of confusing the grammar of physics
with that of phenomenology, including the notion of objects
disappearing when not perceived ("a free-spinning wheel"21),
or feeling someone else's toothache, are presented in the
same discussion. This is all very far from suggesting
anything like a theory of descriptions or a concept-script.
Instead, it is entirely grounded by the idea that philosophy
must offer a method of leaving out of a description of
immediate experience all the linguistic assumptions that
grow out of our ordinary discourse about physical objects,
processes and relations.
We have already demonstrated that the idea that
Wittgenstein was ambivalent about phenomenology in the PR is
a mistake; he was quite clear, by this point, what his goal
was, and what remains of his phenomenology in the PR is a
grammatical program that does not differ in principle,
though it does in emphasis and terminology, from the
underlying philosophy of the PI. We can now also add that
when he began to attend meetings of the Vienna Circle in
December 1929 he was in fact already beyond the naive phase
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of his phenomenological approach. It is true that he
embraced verificationism for a time, and this led him to
speak of physical propositions as "hypotheses" and
phenomenolgical ones as "verifications" of these. It is
possible that there was some underlying inconsistency in
holding onto this while abandoning the "epistemological
priority" and "two worlds" theses (see Chapter 3). This
depends on one’s interpretation of Wittgenstein's
verificationism. We cannot examine this in detail here, but
two points need to be emphasized.
The first is that whatever the nature of his
verificationism, there is no question that he had already
rejected, explicitly and in no uncertain terms, his earlier
conceptions of the two systems, of the epistemological
primacy of phenomena, and of phenomenological language. His
verificationiam must therefore be interpreted as either
inconsistent with his other views, or as independent of
them, in a way that would require some explanation. Second,
the verificationist phase was even shorter than these other
brief expeditions: already in January 1930 he is suggesting
that verification is "not definitive" (WA 11,174,8).
Moreover, he proposes replacing "verification" with
"confirmations (BestStigungen)" (WA 11,175,12), and says
that "a hypothesis has a different formal relation to
reality than that of verification" (WA 11,177,10); again, "a
hypothesis is in a so to speak looser relationship with
reality than that of verifiction (WA 11,177,1; PR
XXII,227,284) . Thus many comments after January 1930 that
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may appear to express strict verificationism, and thus to
suggest a relationship of primary and secondary between
phenomenology and physics, are actually expressions of a
much weaker confirmationist view that requires a similarly
weakened ordering of the object and its appearances. In
fact, as we have already pointed out, Wittgenstein's notion
of confirmation and hypothesis leads directly to his later
ideas of justification, criterion and symptom (the term
"symptom” is already used frequently in these manuscripts,
with changing emphases) and this view is clearly intended to
bring out relations within language games and does not
depend on an hierarchical ordering of physics and
phenomeno1ogy.
Even though Wittgenstein had by this point essentially
abandoned the original idea of a "primary language", in his
manuscripts he occasionally falls back on the use of the
terms "primary" and "secondary" for a while afterward. He
suggests that "recognition" is "the primary" and identity
"the secondary" (WA 11,171,6),* this remark is included in
the PR (11,19,61), but the others are not. For example, a
little later on he says that he is "mixing up" the "1st and
2nd systems" (WA 11,174,1); like many of the remarks that
betray his doubts about earlier conceptions, this one is
excluded from the PR. In the last such remark in these
manuscripts we can see him at last dragging himself away
from the dualism of his earlier conception. In the context
of a discussion about the relationship between expectation
and occurence (remarks that were mostly incorporated into
222
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Chapter III of the PR), just 11 months after beginning his
manuscripts, he writes:
With all my thoughts on these things (Gegenstand) I am
still in a terrible confusion between the first and
second systems of expression. The most that I would now
like to say of them one need not and cannot say at all.
[WA 11,183,8; 29 January 1930)
With this comment he more or less drops this terminology
from active use, though in later manuscripts he sometimes
refers to or quotes his earlier uses22.
4.7

Oth«r Tranaformations of Wittgenstein's Philosophy

We have focused, in this chapter, on the demise of the
phenomenological language project. The undoing of the "two
worlds" conception went hand in hand with this. We have also
mentioned some other developments following the crisis of
October 1929: phenomenological solipsism is soundly refuted;
ordinary language is recognized as the only viable
philosophical language and as a source of physicalistic
misunderstandings; the verificationist phase is kicked off
but the strict view of it goes quickly by the wayside. But
these are far from comprising the totality of the
transformation in Wittgenstein's views in this period. In
what follows we will return to some of the concepts we
examined in Chapter 3 and see the modifications that
virtually made over his philosophy prior to the creation of
the PR. It will then be even more apparent that we must read
the PR quite differently than one would imagine from looking
at the ideas in his first two notebooks, and even from
looking at the PR itself without realizing what his path had
been over the past 16 months. It was stated above that
223
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Wittgenstein intended for the PR to express his ideas as
they had emerged after the period of self-criticism that
began in the summer of 1929 and lasted at least through
January 1930. From the following it should become obvious
that this makes the PR a very different work than it appears
at first sight.
4.8

S«ns«-Data Rejected

In Chapter 3 we saw that Wittgenstein had helped
himself to the idea of "sense-data” in his earliest 1929
work, calling phenomenological reality the "world of data”.
But his sympathy for this term does not last long. Though
the term is used in several remarks that were included in
the PJ? (VI, 60, 90; VI, 61, 91; XIV, 166, 200; XX, 216, 270), all of
these remarks are in one way or another critical of the
Russellian idea of sense-data and all but one suggest that
the notion is incoherent.
One series of remarks, written on 30 November, found
its way into the PR with a critical comment removed. In the
manuscript he writes:
In the sense of the the word sense-data in which it is
unthinkable to say that the other [personl has it, on
just this ground one also cannot say that the other
[person] does not have it. And on just this ground it
is senseless to say that X, as opposed to the other
[person], have it. {WA 11,125,2; PJ? VI,60,90)
This indicates simply that something is not in order
with the concept of sense-data. {WA 11,125,3)
Only the first remark is printed in the PR, the critical
content of which is not obvious by itself unless one
appreciates, based on a prior understanding of
Wittgenstein's views, that it is a ground for saying the
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term "sense-data" is "not in order". But the reason the
second remark was left out is just that the first comment
supports the main point of Chapter VI - the fact that
phenomenological space contains no subject - and the second
does not. But he had come to the conclusion that the concept
of sense-data was "not in order" many months before the PR;
and indeed, a correct interpretation of the first remark
shows well enough what is "not in order" about sense-data: I
cannot say a sense-datum is yours, since it is by hypothesis
impossible to know someone else's sense-data; consequently I
cannot say it is not yours either; consequently I cannot say
it is mine, insofar as that implies it is not yours, which
we just said is nonsense. Something is indeed out of whack
with the concept of a private object that cannot logically
be attributed to anyone.
Later in the PR Wittgenstein says, "It is now the time
to criticize the word 'sense-datum'" {PR XX,216,270; WA
11,155,1). The alleged critique, however, is pretty hard to
follow; as we will see, it is easier to understand in the
light of later, clearer expressions of it. Wittgenstein
first says that "a sense-datum is the appearance of the
tree" {PR XX,216,271). Then he adds:
[4.8] the form of expression "the appearance of this
tree" specifically contains the view that there exists
a necessary relation between what we call this
appearance and "the existence of a tree", and in fact
either through a true cognition or an error... But this
relation does not obtain. {WA II,155,1; PR XX,216,271)
Now Wittgenstein's point here is mainly to deny that the
allegation that language "represents the secondary as
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primary and the primary as secondary", for "ordinary
language contains no decision between primary and secondary"
(WA 11,155,1; PR XX,216,271). What he apparently wants to
deny is that language itself transfers the grammar of
physical objects onto the phenomenalistic mode of
expression, but he suggests that in talking of "sense-data"
we do so tranpose it. For the term "sense-datum" is supposed
to refer to something that exists regardless of whether the
tree is really there (hence "through a true cognition or an
error"); but that is just to take appearances on the
physicalistic model. What we are justified in saying is that
we cannot make an error about our sensations, but not that
the appearance of a tree is somehow analogous to the tree,
only in the "world of data". So we establish the necessary
relation between appearance and existence; ordinary
language, however, contains no thesis in this regard.
Wittgenstein's critique of the term "sense-data"
occupies an important place among the paths that lead to his
ideas about the grammar of physics. The critique is perhaps
best expressed in the following passage from his 1936
lectures:
The word "sense datum" really means the same as
"appearance". But the term introduces a particular way
of looking at appearance. We might call it
"objectification". If "personification" means, e.g.,
using the word "time" as though it were the name of a
person, then objectification is talking of it as though
it were a thing...
Suppose I say, "If this coat appeared grey, then
something must have been grey". This is
objectification. We assimilate the grammar of
appearance to the grammar of physical objects. (LSDPE
312) .
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Wittgenstein goes on to connect the objectification of
sense-data with the idea of the privacy of sense-data, and
the notion that our thoughts are private pictures that we
see, and finally the idea that "the picture is the only
thing which is real, nothing else exists" (LSDPE 314). One
might add, in the spirit in which we began our study, that
perhaps the soul is the little man within who views these
pictures. In any case, the critique of the concept of sensedata, like that of phenomenological language, is a path from
his earlier ideas to the private language argument.
Inconveniently for our study, Wittgenstein is cited
several times in his 1931-2 lectures (i.e., more than a year
after the remarks in the PR) using the term "sense-data" in
a way that would appear to be not only uncritical but more
enthusiastic than even in his early 1929 manuscripts. For
instance, he reportedly says,
A proposition is a judgement about sense-data, a
reading of one's sense-data; for example, 'This is
red’. No further verification is needed; it is a
priori. (WL30 p.66)
Again, he says, "there is no fact that this is a physical
object over and above the qualities and judgements of sensedata about it" (WL30 p.81). Another series of comments from
the same lecture series includes the following:
[4.9] Sense-data are the source of our concepts; they
are not caused by our concepts...
All propositions about causation are learned from
sense-data. Therefore no proposition can be about the
cause of sense-data. (WL30 p.81)
It is nevertheless extremely unlikely that Wittgenstein went
back to his earlier view of sense-data after the PR,
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especially since critical remarks along the same lines as
[4.8] appear again in Band IV as soon as 12 June 1930 (ViA
11,266,3), just a month or so after the composition of the
PR, and in the BT (p.488), which was composed within two
years of these lectures. But the difficulty presented by
[4.9] and similar remarks is not so much that Wittgenstein
might have been inconsistent in his attitude towards the
term "sense-data". Given that these quotes are from
lectures, indeed among the first lectures he ever gave, that
could be explained any number of ways: perhaps he judged
that he could present his ideas more easily if he utilized
some concepts that were widely known, whatever reservations
he may have had about them; or perhaps he thought he would
lose his audience if he subjected them to an immediate
critique of such commonplace ideas. What is more troubling
is the possibility that his use of this term shows that he
was not consistent about his rejection of the two-worlds
position (TW) or his critique of the subjectivity of
phenomena.
This concern is exaccerbated by another remark included
in these lecture notes:
[4.10] The world we live in is the world of sense-data,
but the world we talk about is the world of physical
objects. (WL30 p.82)
This remark, moreover, appears to suggest a return to the
epistemological priority thesis (IP), i.e., to some kind of
phenomenalism. It is taken that way, for instance, by John
W. Cook, who says it suggests that "the world of physical
objects is in some sense a product of our language"23, in
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contrast to the "real" world of sense-data. J. Hintikka uses
it as evidence in support of a similar point:
The change in Wittgenstein's concept of language was
precisely and only that: a change of language. It did
not change Wittgenstein's conception of reality, which
remained for him a phenomenological reality.24
In fact, though, neither TW nor IP nor phenomenalism in
general is expressed by [4.10]. In a series of remarks just
before this Wittgenstein tells his students:
There is a tendency to make the relation between
physical objects and sense-data a contingent relation.
Hence such phrases as "caused by", "beyond", "outside".
But the world is not composed of sense-data and
physical objects. The relation between them is one in
language - a necessary relation. If there were a
relation of causation, you could ask whether anyone has
ever seen a physical object causing sense-data. We can
talk about the same object in terms either of sensedata or hypothesis. (WL30 p.81)
There is, admittedly, a bit of inconsistency between this
and [4.8], in that Wittgenstein seems to be acknowledging
here that a "necessary relation" between object and sensedatum exists in language. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein was
quite clearly using the term "sense-data" in expounding his
thesis of the equality of modes of representation (NR),
indeed of the later version of this in which ordinary
language is the language of physical objects (MR1); he is
not returning to IP or TW at all. Remark [4.10] expresses
neither dualism nor phenomenalism, but Wittgenstein's later
linguistic monism in which different modes of expression or
representation are acknowledged. The two "worlds" in this
remark are nothing but different uses of language. To
imagine, as the Hintikkas and Cook do, that he is saying
that the "world we live in" is the real world, and that we
229
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mistakenly refer to this world as if it were physical, is to
completely misread not only this remark but the whole
direction of his intellectual development. Wittgenstein's
point is that our lives consist of our experience of the
world, our sensations of it, but our language is not
oriented towards expressing this, but rather towards
reducing our experience, for the sake of practical
simplicty, to our causal interaction with physical objects.
4.9

The Confirmation of Hypotheses

We mentioned in the previous chapter that
Wittgenstein’s use of the term "hypothesis" undergoes
modification along with the rest of his philosophy. In its
original use it referred to any proposition which made or
presupposed a material claim, i.e., anything that would not
be permissible in a phenomenological language. At that point
this necessarily meant that hypotheses were in some sense a
confused or inaccurate mode of speech which could only be
perspicuously represented (analyzed) by phenomenological
statements. The demise of the possibility of such a language
spelled the end for the original notion of "hypotheses".
Thus when he says, after his first period of crisis, that "a
hypothesis is only an assumption about the practical/
correct/ mode of representation", adding that physicalistic
language does not describe a "hypothetical world" (WA
1,190,2-4; see Chapter 3) he is giving up the idea that
"hypotheses" are in themselves misleading or require
analysis. The philosopher's job is to be clear about when we
are using physicalistic language and what its limitations
230
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are, not to reduce physics to phenomenology, as Mach does.
There is no "hypothetical world" to be validated by
phenomenology; but it remains the case that the language of
physics has sense only if it maintains some contact with
experience. In this sense, hypotheses must still be verified
by experience.
At some points Wittgenstein contrasts hypotheses with
what he simply calls "statements" ("Aussage"; WK p.99) or
"propositions" (WA 11,128,2-6; WL30 pp.50,66). No6 says that
Wittgenstein makes this distinction as of "at least March of
1930 "2S. In fact, it takes place in January of that year,
but his usage is not consistent, either at that point or any
other time. In a Lecture of 28 April 1930 Wittgenstein seems
to be offering this contrast, but then says that a
hypothesis "enables us to construct propositions which say
what will occur and which can be verified or falsified"
(WL30 p.16). But no predictive proposition can be a
phenomenological one. Again, in a lecture of 2 February 1931
he uses "proposition" in a perfectly ordinary sense and then
distinguishes this from "propositions in the strict sense.
'There seems to be a man here' is a proposition. 'There is a
mein here' is a hypothesis" (WL30 p.50) . The remarks included
in the PR do not recognize this distincition consistently
either. Thus "Julius Caesar crossed the Alps" is referred to
as a "proposition" (PR V,56,86; WA 11,134,2), and is
certainly not (for us) a proposition of immediate
experience. At the opening of Chapter XXII he says:
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The proposition, hypothesis, is coupled with reality
and more or less loose. In the extreme case there no
longer exists a connection, reality can do what it
wants without coming into conlict with the proposition:
then the proposition, hypothesis, is senseless! {WA
11,113,6; PR XX,225,282)
Obviously "proposition" is not distinguished from
"hypothesis" here. Yet later in the same chapter he includes
a remark from a later part of the manuscript in which he
says, "A hypothesis is a law for the construction (Bildung)
of propositions" {WA 11,193,4; PR XXII,228,285). There are
many other statements in this chapter, in LWVK, and in WL30
that make it seem as if Wittgenstein either had no clear
conception of a hypothesis or that his conception changed so
rapidly as to make it impossible to reconstruct.
Yet there is an explanation for these varying uses. The
critical point is to understand Wittgenstein's rejection of
his original notion of the relationship between verification
and hypotheses, and his adoption of a confirmationist view.
Originally he had assumed that physicalistic propositions
had sense if they could be verified by being reduced to
concatenations of phenomenological ones. This was a part of
the post-Tractarian program of a phenomenological language.
But in January 1930, after tossing the idea around for
awhile, he decides, as we have seen, that they have "a
different formal relation to reality than that of
verification". What, then, is this "formal relation to
reality" that a hypothesis has? Wittgenstein holds that "the
essence of a hypothesis is... that it sets up an
expectation, in that it permits a future confirmation
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(BestMtigung) (PR XXII,228,285; WA 11,177,8). This was
written 22 January 1930. The relationship of confirmation is
not that of verification, but rather a more modest standard
of correspondence. Thus:
All that is necessary for our propositions (about
reality) to have sense is that our experiences in some
sense or other either more agrees or more disagrees
with them. That is, immediate experience must prove
[well-founded] (bewahrheiten) only something in them,
some one facet. (PR XXII,225,282; WA ??)
In the sense that it is a picture of an expectation, "a
hypothesis is a law for the construction (Bildung) of
propositions" (PR XXII,228,285; WA 11,193,4), i.e., those
which tend to confirm or disconfirm the expectation. Here
the use of "proposition" is close to that which Nog
suggests.
The notion of a hypothesis as a "law" is related to
another metaphor he uses to show the many-to-one relation of
"propositions" to a hypothesis. He says that "a proposition
is, so to speak, a cut through a hypothesis in a definite
place" (PR XXII,228,286). That is, it is one of the crosssections of reality that we would expect as confirmation of
certain hypotheses:
The hypotheses of physics are so constructed that a
great many experiences of different kinds are set in
relation to one another. This connectedness
(Verbindende) is the hypothesis. (WK 160-1)
These passages should be enough to emphasize the fact
that Wittgenstein's sense of both "hypothesis" and of
"verification" had been totally altered by January 1930. The
impression that Wittgenstein remained a verificationist in a
stronger sense than this is due partly to what he says about
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synonymy, which, however, actually depends on this weaker,
confirmational, view:
The two hypotheses, that others have pain, and that
they have none and only behave as I do when I have
[pain], must have identical senses if every possible
experience that confirms the one also confirms the
other. (PR VI, 65, 94-5)26
According to my principle, two assumptions must have
identical senses if every possible experience that
confirms one also confirms the other. Thus, if no
decision between the two is conceivable through
experience. (PR XXII,225,282)
Here he is speaking of "possible" or "conceivable"
confirmation, and this links up nicely with his later
conception of phenomenology. Since that is a grammatical
system which determines the possible propositions of
experience, two hypotheses or propositions have the same
meaning if the necessary grammatical relations are such that
no phenomenological statement can confirm one but disconfirm
the other. In a remark written just two weeks before he
began to put the PR together he develops a further
refinement: a proposition becomes a "postulate" if no
phenomenological statement can disconfirm it (PR
XXII,231,288; WA 11,230,2).
Wittgenstein gives a nice example of the different ways
of confirming a hypothesis in response to a challenge by
Schlick, who suggested that in physics it is not "a"
proposition that is verified by different methods, but
different propositions which conform to a natural law.
Wittgenstein's response shows that he actually agrees with
the general point; it also provides an illustration of how
propositions are like cross-sections of hypotheses:
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[4.11] Wait a minute I That happens not only in science,
but rather also in daily life. I hear, e.g., pianoplaying in the next room and say: "My brother is in
there". If someone now asks me how I know that, I can
answer: "He told me that around this time he would be
in the next room." Or: "I hear piano-playing and
recognize his style." Or: "I have just heard a step
which was just like his", etc. Now it seems that the
same proposition has been verified in several different
ways. But it is not so. What I have verified are
different "symptoms" for something else... The pianoplaying, the step, etc., are symptoms for the presence
of my brother." {WK 158-9; 4 January 1931)
This passage really shows what kind of a "verificationist"
Wittgenstein was at this point. He took the meaning of a
hypothesis, a statement of physics, to be tied to the
different phenomenological propositions that could be taken
to confirm it; and what those propositions actually verify
is a particular slice of reality as given in experience;
"what we can verify is always just one such cut" (WFf 159) .
Here we can see one source of the confusion in
terminology that abounds in the PR. Wittgenstein sometimes
speaks of "verifying" a "cut" of a hypothesis, and of such a
procedure as "verification", even though the point of view
it expresses is quite different from traditional
verificationism. He does not seem to believe that his
original concept of verification, on which statements of
physics are verified by phenomenological claims, has any
application at all; but he does believe that aspects or
facets of them are verified, and that they only have sense
if some such verification is possible. This perspective he
generally refers to, after January 1930, as confirmation;
but once again not consistently. Thus, in the PR, he seems
to have felt free to use "verificationist" terminology to
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express the new view; since "cuts" are still verified,
hypotheses themselves might still, in a sense, be said to be
"verified" too. Moreover, on Wittgenstein's later view, one
can still appeal to a method of verification, or to an
attempt to verify a proposition, in the sense that such a
method or attempt is necessarily also a method of
confirmation. All of this makes for very confusing reading
in the PR; little wonder that for a long time it was thought
to represent nothing but a confused "transitional" stage for
Wittgenstein. In fact, the transition had already happened;
but it had not yet found a clear expression.
Nevertheless, the confirmationist view is well
represented in the PR, especially in Chapter XXII, but also
throughout the typescript in various places. Wittgenstein's
first supposedly "verificationist" statement in the PR is
found near the end of the first chapter: "One cannot exceed
the possibility of evidence with language" (PR 1,7,55). This
was written on 5 April 1930, less than three weeks before he
started to compile the PR. It is quite clearly an expression
of the confirmationist view, not the verificationism that is
usually attributed to him; for "the possibility of evidence"
is what gives sense to a proposition on the confirmationist
view, whereas verificationism demands the possibility of
proof. Thus, the impression that some sort of robust
verificationist view is represented in the PR, though surely
understandable given the text, is misleading unless one
understands that his whole view of verificationism underwent
a radical change in January 1930.
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Finally, let us take a closer look at the end of
[4.11]: "What I have verified are different 'symptoms' for
something else... The piano-playing, the step, etc., are
symptoms for the presence of my brother." Here the various
experiential statements which confirm the hypothesis are
said to denote "symptoms". This term is used quite a bit in
the manuscripts too. This suggests that in its distinction
between the hypothesis and its various "cuts",
Wittgenstein's notion of confirmation leads to his later
distinction of "symptoms" and "criteria". It is tempting to
think that this too is anticipated in the 1929-30
manuscripts. Little would be left of his later philosophy
that was not already suggested here in one form or another:
perhaps only the notions of "family resemblances" and
"Lebensformen" ("forms of life”, in the usual translation).
Only further study of his later mansucripts could confirm
the extent to which this is true. In any case, we have seen
enough to be able to assert with confidence that the roots
of the later Wittgenstein were already deep in the ground by
the time he composed the PR. It is the later philosophy, not
the naive phenomenalism of early 1929, that is represented
there.
4.10

Conclusion

The idea of a phenomenological or primary language,
system, or world had run its course well before the PR was
compiled. The remarks in the PR which seem to suggest some
support for these conceptions acquire that implication only
out of their original context, and only in the cases where
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the new context he tries to give them in the PR fails to
adequately express his intent to reject such conceptions.
Given an understanding of his intentions, it is possible to
read these remarks without taking literally the idea that he
really thought a phenomenological or primary language in his
original sense was possible, necessary, or desirable.
Instead, they should be read as recommendations for his new
grammatical approach. In giving up the phenomenological
language project, Wittgenstein did not give up, for
instance, his investigation of visual space; in fact, he
enlarged it to other phenomenal areas, like that of bodily
sensation. So he could talk of a “phenomenological language"
insofar as phenomenology continued to interest him, as
grammar, without really placing any emphasis on it as the
background for physics. He could still speak of a "primary
language" in the sense of an objective mode of expression
that would show no preference for the physical or the
phenomenological. But the original project was past history
before the end of 1929, less than a year after it had begun;
and before May 1930, when the PR was finished, he had
changed his whole philosophical outlook.
Wittgenstein’s early view of "primary" and "secondary"
worlds bore an obvious similarity to Russell's early
epistemology, with its distinction of "knowledge by
description" and "knowledge by acquaintance". His later view
of the world as alternatively phenomenological or physical
also has a Russellian counterpart: the "neutral monism" of
The Analysis of Mind, which was largely drawn from the "new
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realism" of William James and his followers. The basic idea
of those schools is that there is a single ontological
"stuff" of reality (thus the "monism") which when taken in
different aspects appears as either physical or mental
material. For William James, for instance, the "stuff" was
"pure experience"27, thus a phenomenological conception in
some ways similar to what Wittgenstein was thinking at some
points. By proposing a single type of constituent of reality
these monistic philosophies (not to be confused with
Hegelian monism) hoped to do away with Cartesian dualism,
another goal that Wittgenstein apparently embraced. They
could then, like Wittgenstein, characterize the physical and
phenomenological points of view as different modes of
representation, the choice of which would be motivated by
our pragmatic purposes.
But in spite of the similarity with neutral monism,
Wittgenstein's thought by 193 0 really has very little to do
with it28. The unity of physics and phenomenology is in our
having only one language to work with, not in having one
substance to work with. Similarly, the difference between
phenomenology and physics is grammatical, not ontological:
we have two different modes of expression, not two different
worlds or substances. In some of our claims and observations
we are speaking ex officio, so to speak, describing the
world as we actually experience it; in others we make the
assumption that we move about in a world of physical
entities that we can refer to unproblematically. This
grammatical dichotomy does not depend on there being a stuff
239
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or material taken in different aspects. As we saw in Chapter
1, Wittgenstein regards neutral monism as an error of
grammar just as much as dualism. In rejecting metaphysical
dualism he is not adopting metaphysical monism; he is trying
to see how far we can say whatever we need to say without
using metaphysics at all.
Wittgenstein's rejection of phenomenological languages
turns on his recognition that the real goal is to
distinguish the grammar of physics from that of
phenomenology; that the grammar of ordinary language is
laden with physicalistic biases, and that we tend to import
these into our epistemology. This thought leads along any
number of interrelated paths to the later philosophy that
finally finds adequate expression in the PI. Moreover, in
recognizing that phenomenology must describe the same world
as physics, Wittgenstein realized that phenomenological
space cannot be private, or make essential reference to a
subject. The argument for this is a vital step in the
direction of the private language argument. Finally, in
recognizing that a purely formal language of experience was
not really possible, Wittgenstein was for the first time in
a position to question the original basis of analytic
philosophy - the Fregean, Russellian, Tractarian program for
the formal expression of all necessary relations among
propositions. Thus he began to formulate the critique of
this program that would eventually appear in the PI. What
all of this shows is that for all its brevity, the critique
of the phenomenological language project was the key turning
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point in Wittgenstein's thought. If our discussion has
demonstrated this then it has opened a new window on our
understanding of Wittgenstein.
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NOTIS
1. Thus my statement in the previous chapter that Nog cannot
legitimately use this remark to refute the Hintikkas'
position, for there is no evidence that this view ever held
sway with Wittgenstein.
2. See Appendix II, The Organization of the Philosophical
Remarks.
3. David Pears has written to me with the following comment:
"The influence of James is much more extensive than the
acknowledgements. E.g., W's treatment of "I" in Phil Remarks
c.VI owes a lot to James..." (PC 9 May 1992) I think a
correct interpretation of James's "Memorial Hall" example in
"A World of Pure Experience", and of other things he says in
the Essays in Radical Empiricism, supports the idea that he
and Wittgenstein would have agreed on the public character
of objects of perception. However, I can find no evidence
that Wittgenstein had read these essays, and I doubt that
the knowledge he would have obtained about James's radical
empiricism from Russell's works (Theory of Knowledge and The
Analysis of Mind, primarily) would have been enough to count
James as an important influence here.
4. Anticipations of some aspects of the private language
argument may be found, on my reading, as early as the NL
(p.107). David Pears has pointed to ideas common to the
passages on solipsism in the TLP and the private language
argument (The False Prison, I, p.58; Pears went into more
detail on this in a lecture at the CUNY Graduate Center in
1999). I believe the discussion that follows bears out his
view. But in spirit and language this passage in the PR is
much closer to the argument in the PI than any of the hints
of it in his early works.
5. The Hintikkas were the first to draw the conclusion that
Wittgenstein's acknowledgement of the public character of
phenomenological language "is in effect a rejection of
private languages, and as such the germ of his... 'private
language argument..." (Investigating Wittgenstein, p.172).
However, their astute observation is undermined by two false
beliefs: that Wittgenstein’s sole ground for rejecting
phenomenological languages was that they could not be
directly compared with the physical world (p.241); and that
Wittgenstein remained a phenomenalist even after the private
language argument (pp.247, 251) . Hence they think that in
1929 and throughout his "early middle period" he "did not
yet have available to him conceptual tools for proving" the
impossibility of a phenomenological language (p.241). On
their reading that tool was the concept of language games
(Chapter 10), which allowed him to show how we could "speak
of [sense-data] in... the language of physical objects"
(p.251). Consequently they completely overlook the present
argument, which shows that already in 1930 Wittgenstein had
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an ingenious argument against private languages, one which
does not depend on language games or the physical character
of language itself.
6. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the idea of the variety and
equality of modes of representation is given much prominence
by No6 ("Wittgenstein, Phenomenology..."). We are in
complete agreement on this point in itself; the only
difference is that I do not take it to be the central
feature of Wittgenstein's transition. But see below, where
this point is not only given due emphasis but tied in with
one of the main thoughts in the PI.
7. The analogies are quite complex and bear some study. One
way of looking at them is that in each one a relationship
between two physical objects is falsely assumed to acquire a
social component (the empirical confirmation of a fact, or
the exchange of value) by the addition of an act of pure
thought. Or, to put it differently, the comparison or
interchange between two physical objects (the two
newspapers, or the left and right hand) is made in a way
that seems to ignore the phenomenology of the type-token
distinction (in the case of the papers) or the value
relation. One way emphasizes the substitution of mental acts
for public criteria; the other suggests that we can also
mistakenly rely on phenomenological relations that fail in
physicalistic discourse. The reason Wittgenstein usually has
the first in mind rather than the second is that they are
the kinds of mistakes he thinks philosophers (and others)
actually make. The second scenario is possible too, but
since our training in ordinary language normally emphasizes
the acquisition of such techniques as the ability to
distinguish (in ordinary circumstances) between types and
tokens, or between human individuals, mistakes like these
are much less frequent and are more easily corrected when
they occur.
8. In the PI version there are a number of other remarks
which could be echoes of the earlier point that we could not
express or verify the privileged position of a self-centered
language. For example, he says that if someone invented a
name for a sensation when there were no outward criteria for
being in pain "he couldn’t make himself understood when he
used the word" (PX 257) . Some other comments reminiscent of
parts of the earlier argument include: "a note has a
function, and this 'S' so far has none" (PI 260); "if a
person speaks when no one else is present, does that mean he
is speaking to himself?" (PI 260); "The essential thing
about private experience is really not that each person
possesses his own exemplar, but rather, that nobody knows
whether the other (person] also has this or something else"
(PI 272); etc. But Wittgenstein did not necessarily take
these points directly from his earlier discussion; these
just happen to be some of the original ideas that remained
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intact through the lengthy process of development and
editing that resulted in the PI.
9. See for instance Moore's "Some Judgements of Perception"
or "Visual Sense-Data"; Chapter 1 of H.H. Price's
Perception, entitled "The Given"; or Chapters 7-13 of C.D.
Broad’s Scientific Thought.
10. See Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, p.56; and
LRKM p.177 (M.42, Wittgenstein to Moore October 1944).
11. In fact physical time figures in many of his discussions
as centrally, or moreso, than physical space per se, but if
what we said in Chapter 2 is correct, time, like space, is
one aspect of the conceptual space of "physics". It would be
interesting, but beyond the scope of relevance here, to
consider whether this implies more similarities or
differences between Wittgenstein and Kant.
12. See Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p.140; Stern,
Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, pp.136-7; No§,
"Wittgenstein, Phenomenology...", p.4.
13. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, p.140.
14. Stem, Wittgenstein on Mind..., p.137. It seems clear
from Stern's text that he does think Wittgenstein intended
the two different senses. What he says exactly is:
Wittgenstein sometimes uses the term "phenomenological
language" in a restricted sense, to mean a canonical
analysis of the experience of the present moment. In
this sense, he consistently maintained after 1929 that
such a primary language was indeed impossible.
(Wittgenstein on Mind... p.137)
and,
But he also spoke of "phenomenological language" in a
looser sense, meaning by it any way of talking about
the content of experience, and, in this sense of the
term, he holds that a phenomenolgical language is
possible but not necessary. (Wittgenstein on Mind...
p.137)
This appears to attribute to Wittgenstein an awareness of
the distinct senses.
15. Cited in Cook, Wittgenstein's Metaphysics, p. 103. I
retain Cook's translation here, which differs slightly from
the PR (1,1,51) .
16. Cook, Wittgenstein's Metaphysics, p.103.
17. Cook, Wittgenstein's Metaphysics, p.103.
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18. Cook, Wittgenstein's Metaphysics, p. 104.
19. As noted in Chapter 1, many commentators have recognized
this as an important theme. See e.g., Baker and Hacker,
Understanding and Meaning, p.33ff. More recently this point
has been emphasized at great length by Dale Jacquette in
Wittgenstein in Transition (Chapter 7, "Naming", and the
chapters after this). Jacquette takes the new conception of
naming to be the central change in Wittgenstein's
philosophy. I think he overemphasizes it, but there is
certainly something very central to Wittgenstein's later
philosophy about overthrowing the concept that all language
functions on the model of name and object.
20. It seems to me obvious that Wittgenstein uses what we
call "thought experiments" all the time, in spite of his
criticism of that phrase in the 1929-30 manuscripts. The
first remark in Band III is: "It is not necessary to make
determinative (ausschaltende) experiments, e.g., thought
experiments. Visual space such as it is has its own
independent reality." (WA 11,3,1). This remark was not
included in the PR; but another one from the end of this
manuscript was: “What Mach calls a thought experiment is of
course not an experiment at all. At bottom it is a
reflection on grammar (eine grammatische Betrachtung) " (WA
11,194,6; PH 1,1,52). It seems to me that Wittgenstein's
problem with the notion of a thought experiment was not with
the use of imaginary examples, but with the possibility that
one would mistake the nature and result of a thought
experiment with that of a scientific experiment - i.e., once
again a qualm about mixing up the grammar of physics with
that of a conceptual investigation. No new empirical
knowledge can come out of a thought experiment; it is only a
way of understanding how we use language. (One could also
say, pace Wittgenstein, that that is empirical knowledge, in
which case a thought experiment would be an experiment in
the ordinary sense of the term.)
21. The term "leerlaufendes Rad" is usually translated by
Anscombe, in the PI, as "wheel turning idly". This
translation hooks up with the notion that "language is
idling" when we say nonsense that sounds as though we were
saying something meaningful. When Wittgenstein uses the term
"leerlaufendes Rad" he is probably thinking of a mechanical
part called a "freewheel" in English. Such a part is not a
wheel that is completely useless, which is what the term
"idle" or "idling" implies (to me, anyway). A freewheel
serves a function, such as to make a chain or a belt run
smoothly, prevent it from sagging, etc. The problem seems to
occur when we think it is doing more than it is, when we
think it is "part of the mechanism" in a different sense:
e.g., that it is pulling the belt that it is merely
supporting, or that it is an essential part of a power
train. I don't know how far to pursue this point. It
suggests to me that if the analogy was carefully chosen, a
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phrase that was compared to a "leerlaufendes Rad" would not
be complete nonsense; but in another analogy in the same
passage Wittgenstein says that the phrase "I cannot feel his
toothache" is "pure nonsense" (WK p.49). It is not clear
that he saw a difference between this and the statement,
"the stove disappears when I'm not looking at it".
22. The manuscripts which comprise Band IX and Band X are
largely reworkings of some of the remarks from early
volumes; see WA 5.
23. Cook, Wittgenstein's Metaphysics, p. 144.
24. J. Hintikka, "Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Immediate
Experience", p.158. See also Investigating Wittgenstein,
pp.141,247.
25. NoS, "Wittgenstein, Phenomenology...", p.12.
26. In composing this remark Wittgenstein took the unusual
measure of splicing together parts of two remarks from
different parts of the manuscript. See WA 11,186,4 and
11,195,1.
27. See James, "Does Consciousness Exist?", in James (1967)
p.4.
28. For an alternate view see John W. Cook, Wittgenstein's
Metaphysics. I do not think the argument in the book has
much to recommend it. Moreover, Cook doesn't really seem to
understand what neutral monism was, either for Russell or
the New Realists, for he equates it with a kind of
phenomenalism reminiscent of Berkeley, but possibly even
more radical. This is the view he attributes to
Wittgenstein, which he calls "neutral monism".
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CHAPTER 5
THE CRITIQUE OF LOGICAL ATOMISM:
ANALYSIS AMD THE METHOD OF PHYSICS
"I might say: the old logic contains much more
convention and physics than anyone has realized. If a
substantive is the name of a body, a verb e.g.
signifies a movement, and an adjective serves as the
property of a body, then one can well see how full of
assumptions this logic is, and one can hypothesize that
these original assumptions also go deeper in the use of
words, and reach into the logic of propositions." (PG,
Part I, Appendix 2, p.204)1
5.1

Logic and Physics

In his pze-Tractatus manuscripts, the Notebooks 191416, Wittgenstein struggles mightily with the conceptual
obstacles to the fundamental ideas of logical analysis: that
ordinary propositions can be reduced to elementary ones
which represent atomic facts, and that the atomic facts are
concatenations of irreducible objects. In spite of the
sometimes intractable difficulties it posed, this logical
atomist conception was a cornerstone of his early conception
of philosophy, and he would not relinquish it, come what
may. Ideas about objects, pictures, elementary propositions,
and the like would have to bend to accommodate the basic
intuition that there must be an ultimate, determinate
conclusion to the analysis of any meaningful proposition. It
is a testament to Wittgenstein's tenacity in his lifelong
effort to understand the nature of language that he zeroed
in on this very conception that he had been so reluctant to
part with, and subjected it to a torrent of criticism in his
later work. The criticisms begin early in his 1929
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manuscripts and continue through the PI; indeed as late as
OC we still find him attacking elements of the earlier
conception. Though the feeling remains that some deep
underlying continuity connects the Wittgenstein of the TLP
with his later incarnation, and though one can point to a
few elements of the Tractarian philosophy that seem to have
been retained in one form or another, there is hardly a
section of the TLP that is not directly or indirectly
implicated in critical remarks over the course of his later
career.
We shall restrict our examination of these criticisms
to those which bear on our primary subject, the grammar of
physics. More specifically, we will show that many of the
critcisms Wittgenstein directed against "logical atomism"
were based on the idea that the Physics2 metaphor captured
in that description had not been as innocent of
physicalistic presuppositions as he had apparently thought.
On his post-1929 view, a physicalistic grammar, appropriate
to physical objects and the material world but not to the
purely logical theory at which he and Russell had been
aiming, had infected the whole conception. This line of
criticism does not, of course, constitute the whole of his
criticism of the TLP; for instance, it does not say much
about his dissatisfaction with the treatment of color
exclusion, or the reason he gave up the idea that atomic
propositions are logically independent. But as we shall see,
it strikes at the early work on level that is much deeper
than it first appears; and in many ways it is the criticism
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that most clearly exemplifies important characteristics of
his later work. Moreover, this type of criticism was touched
on almost immediately after he returned to philosophy in
1929, and continues well into the later work.
The kind of self-critical remarks to which I am
referring are exemplified by the quotation above. On one
level, what he is saying in this passage is that one problem
with the analytic conception was the ready transference into
logic of conceptions that are more appropriate to the
physical world; and thus to Physics, since Physics is the
fundamental science of the physical world as logic was
supposed to have been the basic science of language. But
there is more to it than that. What Wittgenstein is
describing here is a conception of the analysis of language:
"the old logic" not only harbors a conception of language as
an arrangement of the names of physical objects, movements,
and properties, but makes the "assumption" that as Physics
peels away the phenomenal garb of the material world and
shows us the laws that operate beneath the surface, so logic
was supposed to give us an "analysis" of language that went
beneath the grammatical phenomena.
When he says there is "convention" in this logic he
means we apply to the grammar we find in language a priori
norms that are based on our conception of the physical
world. In an earlier passage, which deals with the analysis
of sentences into argument-function form, he says, "in that
case that we now have nothing to do with objects and
concepts, as the result of an analysis, but rather with
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norms into which we have squeezed the proposition" (WA II, 9,
3). The same thing is suggested by the projection metaphor
in SRLF: where language presents "ever so many different
logical forms" (SRLF p.31) we apply a template based on
conceptions we bring with us to the analysis. It is the same
with our habit of expressing things in terms of the objects,
processes, laws, and events of the physical world: tempted
by a facile conception of how language works we apply the
same template wherever we find a problem.
As we shall see presently, the passage we began with is
far from being an isolated application of this criticism,
and if one's initial reaction is that it is an example of
Wittgenstein's rich imagination rather than his considered
critique of the TLP, we will see that this view cannot hold
up. But before we proceed to unfold this criticism as
Wittgenstein explicitly expressed it in other remarks, let
us consider for a moment what might have led him to believe
that the language of Physics had somehow intruded itself
into formal logic.
Consider, then, not only the terminology of the NB and
the TLP, but of Russell's Philosophy of Logical Atomism and
the other essays in which he defended the atomist viewpoint.
These writings displayed a preoccupation with terms from
Physics, and one must at least occasionally wonder, why
these? For instance: atoms, elements, and molecules are
prominent descriptions of the particulars under
investigation; complexes, analysis, substance, structure,
and space are used to describe their phenomenological form
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or that of the medium in which they subsist. It is true, of
course, that most of these terms have a philosophical
history as well as a place in Physics? but by the time
logical atomism came into the picture there was really no
question that they had a distinctly scientific ring. In any
case, the way they are applied (the notion, for example,
that there are "molecular" propositions which consist of
"atomic" or "elementary" ones), the central position of
several of these terms in one body of philosophical theory,
the keen interest of both Wittgenstein and Russell in the
Physics of their time, and the occasional use of terms that
could not but come from Physics or chemistry (like
"molecular"), suggest that it is not Democritus, Aristotle,
or Descartes who provide the main background here. It was
Wittgenstein himself who authorized the translation of
"Sachverhalt" as "atomic fact". Since this is in no way a
literal translation, it is a safe assumption that he was
quite intent on introducing an analogy from Physics here.
The list can be expanded to less obvious terms as well.
The notion of a method of projection sounds like an
application of either geometrical optics or mechanical
drawing; I will also suggest a connection with Hertz's view
of scientific models, below. Even if no conscious borrowing
took place here, the idea at least derived some support from
physical theories that had become part of the intellectual
background. Mathematics supplies an additional stock of
terms like logical product, logical sum; and the whole idea
of logical "space" first appears in the NB as a kind of
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Cartesian coordinate system (MB 31). This suggests that
Physics, or some quasi-physical conception, was operating on
some level, whatever intentions there were to the contrary.
Moreover, it is telling that in pursuit of this atomist
metaphor, everything which might have led to a selfcorrection had been pushed aside. The fact that no examples
of simple objects were available was rationalized by
thinking of the logician as someone who need not be bothered
with obtaining empirical evidence for the existence of his
theoretical entities, just as a theoretical physicist can
leave these questions to the experimentalist to sort out.3
If simple objects need not be found neither do "atomic”
propositions; even if those which should have turned out to
be elementary were deprived of that status by the color
exclusion problem (TLP 6.3751) . Hints in the MB and the TLP
about the vagueness of language, the indeterminacy of
meaning, problems with intentionality, etc., were all set to
one side with quick theoretical moves, leaving only the
"crystaline purity" of logic and logical form. On the one
hand Wittgenstein saw a need to distinguish logical analysis
as being of "a totally different kind than any other
science" (MB 120); on the other there was the temptation to
wear the mantle of the heroic scientist unveiling a
theoretically pristine model of the essence of nature. The
analytical conception of philosophy thrived on the latter as
much as the former.
Though the critique of this conception really begins
almost immediately in the post-1929 work it will be more
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conducive to understanding the point if we look first at
some clearer statements of the self-critical stance. One
such example occurs in one of the 1932 lectures, in a
passage which is explicitly concerned with criticizing the
notion of an "atomic proposition". Wittgenstein says:
Russell and I both expected to find the first elements,
or "individuals", and thus the possible atomic
propositions, by logical analysis. Russell thought that
subject-predicate propositions, and 2-termed relations,
for example, would be the result of a final analysis.
This exhibits a wrong idea of logical analysis: logical
analysis is taken as being like chemical analysis".
(WL32, p.II)4
This is very much in the spirit of the citation at the head
of this chapter, and not far removed from it in time. The
remark is more directly targeted at the concept of analysis,
though. In the previous passage Wittgenstein was saying that
the logical template through which we view the proposition
makes it look like it consists of parts of a physical
system; the lesson about logical analysis had to be
inferred. Here he is confronting it directly. In chemistry
we begin with some complex substance - say, some organic
compound - and by applying various tests to it we discover a
hidden structure. This might on a first approximation be a
certain configuration of molecules, arranged in some
definite pattern (which we depict as a geometrical
structure). Then we apply further tests and discover that
each such structure consists of a definite arrangement of
carbon, hydrogen and oxygen atoms. This will be our
analysis. Logic is supposed to do something very similar:
start with the complex proposition, keep breaking it down
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until we reach atomic propositions composed of "objects".
But as Wittgenstein now realized, this conception really
does not work at all - in some sense, is not even coherent when dealing with concepts. One cannot make much progress by
thinking of ordinary propositions as concatenations of
irreducibly simple ones, nor of thoughts as concatenations
of logically simple parts.
This point, that the notion of logical analysis
incorporated a subtle, but real and highly misleading,
transference from the notion of physical analysis, will be
the main theme of this chapter. Our immediate concern will
be to address the issue of how to properly interpret remarks
of this type - that is, to get clear on the sense of
Wittgenstein's critical remarks. Following that, we will
examine a number of applications of this kind of criticism.
The net result, I hope, will be to see the relationship
between Wittgenstein's critique of the original concept of
analysis and the development of his idea that philosophical
confusions arise from the misuse of physicalistic metaphors.
5.2

The Sense of Wittgenstein's Critique of "Physics"

The kind of self-criticism I am emphasizing in this
chapter is quite at odds with the usual way of approaching
the transformation of Wittgenstein's philosophy; so much so
that one might take the lack of attention to such remarks in
the Wittgenstein literature to indicate that it is not
considered appropriate to attribute much significance to
them. That sort of misgiving will, I hope, be sufficiently
relieved in the following section. But assuming, for the
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moment, that the self-criticisms are intended quite
seriously, it is important to have an idea of the spirit in
which they are made. Although one can find evidence pointing
in different directions, I will maintain that one particular
reading is the correct one. In what follows I will consider
three possible ways of reading these remarks, and suggest
that one of them (the last) is the most plausible.
The first possible reading, though I believe it is
mistaken, is perhaps the most straightforward and obvious
interpretation. On this reading Wittgenstein is saying that
he and Russell had developed and defended the logical
atomist viewpoint under the influence of the view that
philosophy should emulate the natural sciences. On this
view, the early Wittgenstein felt that by following this
scientific paradigm philosophy could achieve explanatory and
practical successes similar to those of the physical
sciences. What this paradigm might have been is hard to say
explicitly, but it would have involved some notion of a
scientific method that could be abstracted from scientific
practice and applied to philosophy. This interpretation
gains a certain plausibility from the historical fact that
the quasi-scientific conception of philosophy has surfaced
again and again in modern philosophy, from Descartes to the
present. It could not be seriously maintained that Russell
did not have such a conception of philosophy, whether or not
Wittgenstein ever did. So it is worth exploring the evidence
for and against this reading.
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We might therefore consider the fact that the whole
picture conception, and much else in the TLP, was influenced
by Hertz's Principles of Mechanics, which suggests a largescale transfer of methodology from physical theory to
philosophical atomism. Indeed, the degree of Hertz's
influence is deep enough that it requires a separate
discussion; we will therefore put the main discussion of
this point off until later. However, what can be said about
it in general is that although the influence of Hertz runs
very deep, it is not so much the scientific method as found
in Hertz that attracted Wittgenstein. Aside from its quasideductive style, what impressed him were Hertz’s
philosophical ideas and the reliance on models and a method
of projection. These are the aspects which give Hertz's
Principles of Mechanics its distinctive character and
appeal. The influence of Hertz is indeed implicated in
Wittgenstein’s later criticisms; but it is primarily what is
misleadingly physicalistic in Hertz's philosophical
framework, rather than what is scientific in itself, that
forms the target of the criticism. The Hertz connection does
not, therefore, establish that Wittgenstein had capitulated
to scientism.
Wittgenstein's criticisms of atomism are often
explicitly applied to Russell as well as himself. Russell
maintained at least as much interest in contemporary Physics
as Wittgenstein did. Sometimes he appeared to be suggesting
a philosophical method for the sciences rather than the
reverse. This is evident, for example, in the antirealist
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account of the theoretical entities of atomic Physics he
offers in "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter": "The
persistent particles of mathematical physics I regard as
logical constructions, symbolic fictions enabling us to
express compendiously very complicated assemblages of
facts..."5. But in "On Scientific Method in Philosophy" he
explicitly said that it is "from science, rather than from
ethics and religion, that philosophy should draw its
inspiration"6. It is the "method" rather than the "results"
of science that should serve as a model7. What he takes that
method to be emerges from the suggestion that the correct
method in philosophy, which he now explicitly calls "logical
atomism"8, consists in applying a "piecemeal and tentative"
approach to the resolution of philosophical problems9. The
conception of philosophy as "analysis, not synthesis"10 has
its roots, for Russell at least, in the belief that
philosophy should emulate science.
But what did Wittgenstein think of this perspective?
Explicitly, he opposed it. In May 1915 he says of Russell’s
essay of the previous year, "Russell's method in his
'Scientific Method in Philosophy* is actually a step
backwards (Riickschritt) from the method of physics" (MB
44)11. This naturally leads one to doubt that Wittgenstein
had taken the same position as Russell, and hence to doubt
that his later criticisms were meant to suggest that he
himself had had a scientistic view. Nevertheless, there is
some difficulty in leaving it at that; for there is very
little that Wittgenstein could have reasonably objected to
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in the essay. Certainly he did not object to the analytic
approach or the notion of "logical atomism". Was there some
other perspective put forward here that might have provoked
Wittgenstein's ire?
Russell begins by explaining that the problem with
other philosophical (especially Hegelian) systems is that
they start from ethics, which is anthropocentric, and that
philosophy should set out from a more objective perspective
Even if Wittgenstein could conceivably have had a problem
with this, it would be senseless to call this "a step
backwards from the method of physics". Russell next
establishes that philosophy cannot rest on the basis of the
unity of experience nor of the generality of scientific law
Again, it is hard to imagine Wittgenstein objecting. When
Russell offers details as to how his "scientific method in
philosophy" is distinguished from scientific method in
general, the essay actually starts sounding like an
anticipation of the TLP. Philosophical propositions must
first of all be "general"; secondly "they must be a priori"
Russell adds: "A philosophical proposition must be such as
can be neither proved nor disproved by empirical
evidence”12. This amounts to saying that "philosophy is the
science of the possible"; hence "philosophy becomes
indistinguishable from logic"13. It is moreover "concerned
with the analysis and enumeration of logical forms, i.e.
with the kinds of propositions that may occur, with the
various types of facts, and with the classification of the
constituents of facts"14.
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Thus, in spite of Wittgenstein's comment, one might
well wonder whether he did not end up finding some
inspiration in this essay. There is, however, one remaining
matter of substance in the essay, i.e., what follows from
the above-mentioned "piecemeal and tentative" approach that
Russell recommends. Of his scientific philosophy Russell
says,
above all, it will be able to invent hypotheses which,
even if they are not wholly true, will yet remain
fruitful after the necessary corrections have been
made. This possibility of successive approximations to
the truth is... the source of the triumphs of science,
and to transfer this possibility to philosophy is to
ensure a progress in method whose importance it would
be almost impossible to exaggerate."15
This does have the feeling of a quasi-scientific battle cry
with which Wittgenstein could wholeheartedly disagree. With
this, one can see how Wittgenstein might have reacted to the
essay as a whole: where Russell differentiates scientific
and philosophical method, Wittgenstein would have found a
perspective that he would later carry to great lengths;
where he identifies scientific method with philosophy,
Wittgenstein would have detected a spirit alien to his own
intuitions. This also sheds some light on what Wittgenstein
means by "a step backwards from the method of physics", at
least if (as seems plausible) he had Hertz in mind as an
example of that method. Hertz treats the fundamental laws of
Physics as having a role like the axioms of a logical model;
he says that a "principle of mechanics" is such that "the
whole of mechanics can be developed from it by purely
deductive reasoning without any further appeal to
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experience"16. What Wittgenstein says in TLP 6.3ff, and
related earlier remarks in the NB, leaves little doubt that
he had full confidence in this Hertzian program. Compared
with this, Russell's "piecemeal and tentative" method must
have seemed a step backwards indeed17; and his explicit
denial that Newton's famous dictum about hypotheses applies
even in science, much less philosophy, would likely have
raised Wittgenstein’s hackles even more18.
This provides us with more reason to doubt the first
interpretation, for there is at least a basis for saying
that his objection to Russell's essay rested on serious
misgivings about the application of scientific method (as
Russell conceived it) in philosophy. Finally, Wittgenstein's
early system prohbits any direct association between
philosophical and scientific methods. In spite of some
ambiguous comments19, there are remarks which all but put an
end to the plausibility of the first interpretation. For
instance, he says in the TLP:
Philosophy is not a natural science.
(The word "philosophy" must mean something which
stands above or below, but not next to, the natural
sciences.) (4.111)
Almost equally forceful are the statements that "psychology
is no nearer related to philosophy them any other natural
science" (4.1121) and that evolutionary theory does not have
any more philosophical content than "any other hypothesis of
natural science" (4.1122). Now, these pronouncements about
natural science may not be directly aimed at the conscious
conception of philosophy as a quasi-scientific enterprise.
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On the view of Wittgenstein's early philosophy presented in
previous chapters, the fundamental aim of his work was to
have a theory of logic that could do without a theory of
types, and the reason he sought such a theory is that he
thought logic had to be free of any empirical content
whatsoever. Russell had tried to protect logic from selfcontradiction by introducing into its foundations quasiempirical propositions about the nature of the objects in
the world. Wittgenstein may be countering here, as he does
in numerous other ways in the TLP, with the argument that
once that road is taken there is no reason to call the
solution philosophical, or indeed logical, at all. Be that
as it may, his opposition to all quasi-scientific
philosophizing is clear, and these remarks leave no doubt
that a quite conscious principle of his early work was the
inadmissibility of any appeal to the methods of natural
science.
Aside from this, it is one of the main thoughts in the
TLP that philosophical truths, to the extent that they can
be called "truths" (as he does call them in the "Preface"),
are arrived at by a priori reasoning from logical premises,
not by inductive reasoning from empirical facts. Moreover,
in 6.3ff he extends this idea even to higher-order
scientific truths. The correct method in science was that of
logic, not the other way around. Therefore, unless he
himself misrepresents his earlier view, Wittgenstein’s later
view cannot be that he had indulged pseudo-scientific
conceptions at this level in the TLP; i.e., that he had in
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some way depended on the notion that principles, methods,
results, or theories taken from empirical science would
provide the ground for philosophical truths.
The first interpretation, therefore, must be dropped.
In fact, it probably does not have a legitimate target in
Russell either. It is doubtful that even he had confused
philosophical investigation with scientific practice, even
if he claimed to find a model in scientific method. In The
Philosophy of Logical Atomism Russell seems quite clear on
the distinction between logical and Physical atomism20, and
as in the earlier essay, he relates philosophical atomism,
by contrast, to Hegelian monism21, rather than to Physics.
Wittgenstein could of course have been mistaken about
Russell and blown his scientism out of proportion. But as we
shall see later, his criticism of both himself and Russell,
including the idealization of the "method of science",
places the error at a different level than the naive
confusion that this interpretation suggests.
If he had not intended his atomist language to be read
as quasi-scientific theorizing, it is tempting to say that
for Wittgenstein at least, the scientific language of
logical atomism was largely a matter of convenience, and had
no real scientific commitments. On this deflationary view, a
second possible reading of his later remarks suggests
itself. On this reading, Wittgenstein was offering a
reductio of the model that is implied by the use of terms
like "atoms" and "elements". That is, he was hoping to
undercut the analytic conception by taking literally the
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features of its vocabulary that express structural relations
among its terms and showing they lead to absuridties. Though
these features - the language of Physics - would be
contingent in the sense that they were not directly
dependent on the theory from which the terms were drawn, and
could presumably have been replaced by terms not derived
from the physical sciences at all, the point of attacking
them would be to bring out disanalogies in the linguistic
model that might betray confusions in the underlying
assumptions that led to it. So, for example, if atomic
structures always have emergent chemical properties at the
molecular level, one might expect molecular propositions to
always have emergent meanings; and one might try to show
that this, and other such inferences, are false,
inconsistent or counterintuitive. Thus he might have hoped
to push the implications of the model to the point where he
uncovered consequences that are valid for the analysis of
matter but are clearly unacceptable in the analysis of
language and thought. By forcing atomists to acknowledge
that the model breaks down one forces them to adopt
strategies which are to one degree or another unattractive:
they must either find another model that incorporates the
same assumptions but avoids the disanalogies, or admit that
they cannot come up with a model that brings out the main
features of the subject in an intuitive way, or (what the
critical strategy really aims at) acknowledge that the
underlying assumptions captured in the use of this model are
incorrect.
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The last point here is, I think, close to the correct
reading of what Wittgenstein is trying to achieve with his
self-criticisms. He is in part trying to undermine the model
of Physics by showing that the analogy contains false
presuppositions. But first, the method he is using is not
properly described by saying that he is primarily attacking
the model itself. Rather, the point of pushing the Physics
metaphor into the open is to challenge its presuppositions
directly. It is not by way of ridicule, so to speak, that he
compares "logical analysis" with "chemical analysis"; it is
to confront a

general tendencytowards the assimilation of

the conceptual to the physical. Second, it is not in
Physics, the science, but in physics, the various forms of
description of the material world, that Wittgenstein locates
the threat; utilizing the language of Physics, though it is
not without some implications, is not the underlying
problem. Third, the strategy of repudiating a theory by
deconstructing the analogies on which it is based is just
too subtle to

have much chanceof success. If one did not

entirely miss

the point of thecriticisms, it might just

seem that the critic had failed to exercise even the most
minimal degree of charity. Further, one could always counter
that the basic ideas of the theory are correct even if the
analogy is poorly chosen.
In order to develop a tenable interpretation of
Wittgenstein’s self-criticisms we have to account for his
borrowing from the language of Physics in a way that does
not presuppose any intent to associate his early theory with
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scientific strategies per se but does open his work to the
self-criticisms which suggest that there is some physics in
it anyway. The first thing to note is that the atomic model,
as a mode of representation, had achieved great success in
explaining the surface phenomena of the physical world in
terms of a hidden structure. This was just what Russell and
Wittgenstein had hoped to do for language; so Physics seemed
to provide a perfect model for the analysis of language in
terms of underlying logical structures, more or less along
the lines of Russell's theory of descriptions. But,
secondly, this would be the case irrespective of whether any
other aspect of Physical theory or method was to be adopted.
It was just because what he and Russell had in mind was a
method of analysis that they thought it quite innocent to
speak of atoms, molecules, elements, and the like. For
analysis seemed to be a concept that was abstract enough to
owe nothing to empirical science, and it was quite plausible
to think that analytical reasoning in the sciences, be it
mereological or some more complex structural relation, would
be something that physics owed to logic, rather than viceversa22. So the adoption of a metaphor from Physics could
hardly do any damage to the "crystaline purity" of logic.
Moreover, one can imagine several apparent advantages that
might have been considered. One is just that of being able
to state one's theory in the terms of an already well-known
and widely accepted model. Another is that the model was not
only successful but well-ramified, so that new relationships
between logical "atoms" or "elements" could be expressed by
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means of concepts already established by science23. My point
here is not that these benefits were actually consciously
considered (though I think what we see in the next section
will suggest that they were present at some level) but that
the use of the model could be justified independently of any
appeal to scientific method in philosophy, or any real
dependence on the methods, results, or empirical facts of
Physics.
But the whole force of Wittgenstein's later criticisms
is to suggest that in spite of this, the use of this model
was not as innocent as they believed. Their error, however,
was not consequent on the adoption of a specific language
from modern Physics; it was a conceptual error, which was
already expressed in their confidence that the model could
serve their purposes and was further deepened by exactly
that easy inference from one expression to another that was
offered by the use of an established model. The essence of
the error was the implicit assumption that the logical
concepts could be entirely separated from their normal
applications. Specifically, so long as "analysis" in logic
and language was conceived of in either a baldly
mereological sense, or even in the more sophisticated
structural sense that would capture the spirit of early
20th-c. atomic theory, the model could not but tend to
mislead those who adopt it. To see this, consider the fact
that even something as apparently mereological as a
mathematical set does not "have" parts in anything like the
same way that a house “has" parts; nor does it "consist" of
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its elements in the way a carbon atom "consists” of protons,
neutrons and electrons. Moreover, when we consider such
"entities" as events, experiences, propositions, numbers,
etc. the notion of analysis, if it is useful at all, must
have a completely different meaning from its application to
the material world. That this distinction was not
sufficiently appreciated is clearly seen in Wittgenstein’s
early meditations on watches (see NB 60-70). Distinguishing
philosophy from science in general was not sufficient for
distinguishing logical analysis from scientific analysis in
particular.
The adoption of the language of atomic Physics did,
therefore, betray a physics that lay at the basis of the
early conception of philosophical analysis. It betrayed a
false idea of the way in which "complex" thoughts or
propositions were complex, and an unworkable program for
achieving simplicity (and thereby a degree of certainty
analogous to that of science) through the "reduction” of
these complexes to "atomic" propositions. The whole
constellation of terms relating to "analysis" - complex,
composite, reduction, simple, atomic, etc. - were an
expression of the erroneous belief that one could innocently
adopt a model which worked for the analysis of matter and
transfer its logical structure to philosophy. The logic of
the model was specific to the subject matter, and could not
be transferred without promoting confusion24.
One can speak of the "analysis" of a poem, meaning
(more or less) the explanation of intended semantic
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relationships among the words, ideas, and symbols used in
it. A similar kind of operation might be carried out on the
"meaning" of a sentence or a thought, and there is, so far,
nothing inherently physicalistic about such a procedure. One
can even analyze physical entities without being
"physicalistic", e.g., in terms of their function within a
system, or their historical evolution. But the conception of
analysis that was employed in formal logic, being so closely
tied to notions of reference, extension, object, thing,
subject, set, etc. (even the notion of "sense" had a
referential function for Frege) was not a purely logical
conception. It was useful for the categorization of entities
- not as tables and stars and elephants but as entities that
could be clearly individuated, reidentified, etc. by
looking, testing, experimenting, and other physical
procedures - and for the description of entailments among
propositions about those entities. But this commitment, far
from being acknowledged, was explictly denied by Frege and
Russell, who thought it was a matter of indifference whether
the variables of logical functions represented bricks,
numbers, mental images, or events. Having generalized a
particular conception of "analysis" in this way, it would
appear that one could solve difficulties that arise in the
analysis of a thought or proposition by proceeding as if
thoughts and propositions involved parts and wholes,
substructures and superstructures, fundamental and emergent
properties, or combinatorial possibilities. In other words,
having adopted the model, one now tends to make easy
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transitions to solutions that would apply to relationships
among material entities, and go on as if philosophical
"entities" were just like that.
The underlying problem with this program is suggested
in a remark that expresses a central feature of our
interpretation of Wittgenstein's transition. He says: "We
need new concepts and again and again we take those of
physical language" (WA 2,95,1; PR XX,213,266). Though its
scope is much broader than the present problem, this remark
sums up in a few words the entire difficulty with the
analytic program. For the foundation of the analytic
enterprise was the effort to use late-19th c. developments
in formal logic to reestablish the leading role of
philosophy in the pursuit of conceptual truths in general.
In order to do this one had to get at the structure of
reality in a way that was not available through either the
prevailing Hegelian trends or a simple return to empiricism.
But one cannot approach any such effort with a totally new
stock of concepts, or the relationship to our existing body
of knowledge would be very tenuous. Instead, the natural
tendency is to turn to existing concepts and apply them in
new ways. But this, of course, already contains the seeds of
error; for one does not, in the pursuit of a new level of
certainty, turn to already abstract or fuzzy concepts, but
to those apparently solid geometrical relations that
characterize the world of spatial entities. This is the
essence of Wittgenstein's remark.
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We were looking for a way of characterizing
Wittgenstein's comments on the "physics" of his earlier
philosophy that would justify these criticisms without
suggesting that he thought he had somehow endorsed the
scientistic program that Russell and others had tried to
follow. We have now achieved such an interpretation.
Wittgenstein's early philosophy had rested on a notion of
analysis of which atomic physics had been the paradigmatic
example. It was not anything peculiarly scientific about
that model, but rather its logical structure that had been
admired. But that logical structure itself had its roots in
the concepts we use to understand relationships between
physical entities. On the superficial level the vocabulary
of Physics was adopted; beneath that, there was not (in
Wittgenstein's case, at least) a direct emulation of Physics
or scientific method but rather an adaptation of the physics
in our ordinary language and concepts, that which is
captured in a notion of analysis as involving parts and
structures, and which underlay not only Physics but physics.
This is the solution to the puzzle of how Wittgenstein could
have explicitly denied the applicability of scientific
method to philosophy while retaining concepts that
essentially brought in physics through a back door.
5.3

The Physics of Analysis

It follows from what has been said above that overt
references to physical theory in atomist writings, though
they are not hard to find, are not even the main point of
the problem Wittgenstein was addressing in his later work.
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Rather, what illustrates the root of the problem that
Wittgenstein is talking about, are statements like these:
The nature of philosophic analysis... can now be stated
in general terms. We start from a body of common
knowledge, which constitutes our data. On examination,
the data are found to be complex, rather vague, and
largely interdependent logically. By analysis we reduce
them to propositions which are as nearly as possible
simple and precise... (Russell, in Our Knowledge fo the
External World, 1914 )2S
I confess it seems obvious to me (as it did to Leibniz)
that what is complex must be composed of simples...
(Russell, in "Logical Atomism", 1924)26
Every statement about apparent complexes can be
resolved into the logical sum of a statement about the
constituents and a statement about the proposition
which describes the complex completely. (Wittgenstein,
NL p.101)
It seems that the idea of the Simple is already
contained in the idea of the complex and in the idea of
analysis... and we realize the existence of the simple
object - a priori - as a logical necessity.
(Wittgenstein, NB 60)
It is in these claims that we find, on my reading, the
confusions to which Wittgenstein is pointing. We have
already seen, in our study of the NB, that this analytic
conception is fraught with difficulties even when applied to
the simplest problems. What, then, accounts for its appeal?
Perhaps we begin with the conception of the physical world
as a tremendously complicated structure of interconnected
parts, and we see the progress made by science in the ever
deeper analysis of those parts and their relations. Why
should the same thing not hold in logic? Isn't language,
like the physical world, a highly complex amalgam of
grammatical parts with endlessly varying relations between
them? Doesn't it seem obvious that our "complex" ideas
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cannot be sui generis but must be "composed" of simple ones?
Only through logical analysis, then, can we arrive at the
simple propositions which constitute the complex one. This
train of thought presses so hard on our intuitions that one
is almost inclined to deny that the analogy with Physics is
necessary at all. What further justification do we need,
really, for "analyzing" propositions, experiences, or
thoughts?
But if Wittgenstein is right, this already betrays
philosophical confusions born of the tendency to borrow
physical concepts - spatial, causal, mereological - to map
the new conceptual terrain.

Therefore, even Wittgenstein's

early criticism of Russell's "On Scientific Method" does not
show that he himself did not succumb to the same temptation.
He hints at this point in the BIB:
Our craving for generality has another main source: our
preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the
method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena
to the smallest possible number of primitive natural
laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of
different topics by using a generalization.
Philosophers constantly see the method of science
before their eyes, and are irresistably tempted to ask
and answer questions in the way science does. (BIB 18)
The reduction to "primitive... laws" and the demand for a
"unifying... generalization" was as much a paradigm for his
own early work as for anyone who overtly emulated the
"method of science". David Pears has suggested that the
above passage also ties in with Wittgenstein's later
criticisms of theorizing in philosophy, and that these
criticisms are meant to be applied to his own earlier method
as well. As Pears observes, "the point would not be worth
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making if nobody had ever supposed that philosophy did
operate in that way"; so he proposes to consider "whose
philosophical theories would have struck Wittgenstein as
examples of this error":
One obvious example was his own earlier work,
especially the dogmatic presentation of it in the
Tractatus, where he claimed to have discovered the
structure of all factual language: it had to be a
truth-functional development of elementary sentences,
each of which had to be produced by putting together
the names of simple objects. This structure was not our
invention but something imposed on us by the nature of
things. So the familiar phenomena - in this case our
own language and thought - could be explained only if
we went beneath them and discovered their underlying
structure and its basis in reality.27
Pears' point is similar to mine: it is the very idea of
analysis - of going "beneath" some complex phenomenon to
find the "underlying structure" of relations of simple
objects - that constitutes the point of entry of the
conception of physics. My point is also that Wittgenstein's
criticism of the borrowing from Physics is part of a larger
criticism of a tendency to adopt physicalistic conceptions
when faced with philosophical problems. But this is
compatible with Pears' emphasis on Wittgenstein's rejection
of theorizing and of scientific method in general.
But my basic explanation of the difficulty differs
somewhat from the analysis Pears provides:
These claims were evidently inspired by the
achievements of science. If the kinetic theory of gases
could explain such a wide range of physical phenomena
by moving to a deeper level, why should not philosophy
do the same for all language and thought? The point to
notice here is not just that logical atomism is modeled
on physical atomism. It is that this whole way of doing
philosophy is modeled on the methods of science, even
if its results are firmly distinguished from scientific
results, as they were in the Tractatus.38
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I have not denied that at some level the Tractarian program
was "inspired by the achievements of science", as Pears puts
it; but I have sought to avoid the implication that
Wittgenstein, in his early work, had subscribed to Russell's
program of following the "methods of science", or that he
had in his later work believed that he had formerly adopted
this program. Wittgenstein saw the program of Hertz and
others as proof that a program of logical atomism could be
carried out for that limited domain of statements which
constitutes the true claims about the physical world.29 But
it remains true that "this whole way of doing philosophy is
modeled on the methods of science" insofar as these are the
paradigmatic methods for the analysis of matter; for it was
a particular method of analysis, not some more general
conception of the "method of science", on which the work was
modeled. It would have been no more than a fortunate
coincidence if this methodology were to have proved
successful in the pursuit of conceptual truths.
I will return to Pears’ interpretation below. My point
is that when Wittgenstein says that philosophers seems to
always have scientific models in mind, the central issue is
not whether they consciously try to emulate theoretical
physicists but that they think of philosophical analysis as
"like chemical analysis" in that it is supposed to permit
inferences similar to those we make when we discover the
"underlying structure" of matter. Moreover, this is one
facet of a yet broader point Wittgenstein is making. The
transference of physicalistic concepts into the language of
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metaphysics or epistemology not only emerges from adherence
to a scientific paradigm but from the very nature of
language. We need words to express new concepts, and the
temptation is to fall back on the modes of expression we are
most familiar with - those that describe the external world.
There seems to be a vocabulary and a grammar all prepared
for our use.
Indeed, the passage Pears and I have cited from the BIB
is but the last of a list of "tendencies connected with
particular philosophical confusions", all of which are
characterized by the error of assuming that a "general idea"
can somehow be seen as roughly analogous to a material
entity of one sort or another. It is worth looking at this
passage for a moment, for it establishes the point that the
target of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of is not fundamentally
scientism but a more generic tendency to transfer the logic
of physicalistic relationships into all areas of thought.
The first source of confusion is, more or less, an implicit
essentialism that Wittgenstein contrasts with his notion of
family resemblances. Of this confusion he says, “It is
comparable to the idea that properties are ingredients of
things which have the properties; e.g., that beauty is an
ingredient of all beautiful things as alcohol is of beer and
wine..." (BIB 17). It is a small step from here to the idea
that in order to find the essences of general terms what we
need is an analysis that is comparable to chemical analysis.
The next source of confusion is
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a tendency, rooted in our usual forms of expression, to
think that the man who has learnt to understand a
general term, say, the term 'leaf1, has thereby come to
possess a kind of general picture of a leaf, as opposed
to pictures of particular leaves... [W]e are inclined
to think that the general idea of a leaf is something
like a visual image... (Galtonian composite
photograph.) This again is connected with the idea that
the meaning of a word is an image, or a thing
correlated with a word" (BIB 17-18).
Here instead of reified properties we have reified meanings,
condensed into images that can serve as the reference of
words. The third source of confusion, just before passage
cited above, is "the confusion between a mental state,
meaning a state of a hypothetical mental mechanism, and a
mental state meaning a state of consciousness" (BIB 18). The
word "mechanism" is meant to be taken literally here; it is
what corresponds in this passage to the Galtonian photograph
and the alcoholic drink. These are all examples, not only of
our "craving for generality", but of our craving to cash out
properties, meanings and relations in physical terms. This
is how the admiration for the “method of science" gains a
foothold; for all its pretension to objectivity and rigor,
it is really based on a yearning for simple answers, based
on the combinatorial or mechanical logic of material
entities, in the face of complexity, vagueness, and other
difficulties which accompany more ethereal concepts.
A later expression of Wittgenstein's view comes in some
famous remarks in the PI. He says, "'The essence is hidden
from us' r this is the form our problem now assumes" (PX 92).
Hidden essences were to be revealed by distilling the pure
meanings out of sentences too coarse to be studied in their
276
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

natural state. This is the promise of the theory of
descriptions, of the Begriffschrift, of logical atomism:
meanings are hidden by the superficial form of sentences,
forcing us to conceive the investigation of meaning as
something conceptually similar to investigating the
subatomic structure of matter. The metaphor of the logical
analysis as pseudo-chemistry is used again in the following
remark:
Compare 'logically possible' with 'chemically
possible' . One might perhaps call a combination
•chemically possible' if a formula with the right
valencies existed (e.g. H-O-O-O-H). Of course such a
combination need not exist; but even the formula H02
cannot have less than no combination corresponding to
it in reality. (PI 521)
This is a direct reference to the picture theory: a state of
affairs was supposed to be logically possible if the objects
had the right "valencies", or combinatorial possibilities.
The proposition could be false, but it was not nonsense, it
could not have "less than no combination corresponding to it
in reality", so long as the names represented atoms of the
right sort. There is no suggestion here that this chemical
analogy is exactly what Wittgenstein was thinking when he
developed the picture theory; the immediate considerations
could be explained within the realm of logic. But there is
certainly a suggestion that “a picture held us captive"; it
was the picture of an actual physics that lay at the bottom
of the pseudo-Physics of logical atomism.
This picture, and the problems with it, were already
understood by Wittgenstein in 1929. This is apparent from a
passage from his second (Band II) notebook in which he
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discusses the successor relation. To fully appreciate the
point, we must set out the context of the remark.
Wittgenstein has been discussing the concept of infinity for
much of this notebook. Over the last several pages he has
been at pains to clarify the distinction between the
infinite possibility of values that satisfy a rule, and the
possibility of an infinitude of things30. In a similar
spirit he explains that the expression "the highest point of
a curve" does not denote some particular point among several
but rather a determinate outcome of the function which
produces the curve (WA 1,163,6). In these remarks the
fundamental point is to distinguish the intensional object
as determined by a rule from the material object that
satisfies a description. This is apparent, for example, in
Wittgenstein’s concern with distinguishing the grammar of
the word "can" in the expression "infinitely many things can
lie in this direction" from that in "a book can lie on this
table" (WA 1,136,5). It is even more apparent in the section
of the PR in which some of this material is placed. He
begins this section with a remark from a few pages later in
the manuscript, in which he says that the notion that there
could be "infinitely many things" in space comes from "our
confusing the things of physics with the elements of
knowledge" (PR XII, 147,168; WA II, 140, 6)31 Thus, the general
concern of these early rule-following explorations is
essentially the same as that which led him to find in the
TLP "a wrong idea of logical analysis": we think we are
still talking about purely logical relations whereas in fact
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we have already slipped into thinking about extensions and
the physical world.
This is the context that has been establsihed when he
begins to look at the the successor relation. He describes
this relation as follows: "Each thing has one and only one
predecessor {Vorgdnger); a has no descendents. All things
other than a have one and only one descendent" (WA 1,139,1;
see PR XII,147,169). "These propositions", he says, "appear
to describe an infinite series", but then he goes on to say:
Can't one take the above propositions as
propositions of physics, which represent a scientific
hypothesis? Then they would be incontestable. As it
would be if physiology found a species of animal in
which each individual appeared to come from one earlier
one, and that was expressed as a hypothesis.
Are we misled here by the appearance that the
pieces of matter - thus here for example the
individuals of the species - are simple objects?
That is, isn't that which one can imagine
multiplied to infinity the combination of things in
their infinite possibility but not the things
themselves? (WA 1,139,3-5)
The point here is essentially the same as that which he has
been making in the previous passages. In the propositions
Wittgenstein has used to express the successor relation, it
looks as if the rule could be taken extensionally. In this
case they would be "propositions of physics", and would
therefore express an empirical claim, or in other words (in
the terminology of these manuscripts) a "hypothesis". This
leads to the idea that units of succession, rather than
being the merely logically possible outcome of a rule, are
the actual extension of the series, or "simple objects". The
example has recourse to biological succession since that is
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the most natural example of a series of physical objects
that "follow" from one another. But the point is
fundamentally the same as the examples in which elementary
physical particles serve as simple objects. The target of
both is the idea that the analysis of a proposition must be
like the analysis of matter, that it must arrive at "simple
objects". A tendency of the mind, based on or reflected in
something built into the structure of language,

leads usto

make misleading analogies between the simple terms that
might serve as the ultimate constituents of a proposition
and bits of matter that constitute the ultimate constituents
of physical reality.

The corrective to this is to

understand that what is represented is "the combination of
things in their infinite possibility but not the things
themselves".
Another expression of this critique appears in
Wittgenstein's "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough". He says:
To drive out or slay death; but on the other hand
it is representedasa skeleton, as itself dead in a
certain sense. "As dead as death." "Nothing is as dead
as death; nothingisas beautiful as beauty itself."
The picture in terms of which one conceives of reality
here is such that beauty, death, etc. are
the pure
(concentrated) substances, while they arepresent in a
beautiful object as an admixture. - And do I not
recognize here my own observations about 'object' and
'complex'? (PO p.135)
In the absence of any other interpretive cues it is quite
difficult to see what similarity Wittgenstein finds between
"death" or "beauty" in these aphorisms and his Tractarian
ideas of "object" and "complex". But the passage is
immediately comprehensible as a comparison of the Tractarian
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terms with the misplaced, and reified, notion of death and
beauty as "pure (concentrated) substances" and their
presence in an object as an "admixture".
The point should be sufficiently clear now. The
critique of the TLP, in particular the critique of the
notion of analysis and of the related ideas of simple
objects, elementary propositions, and complexes, is
thoroughly bound up with the idea that a host of concepts
which had seemed quite promising in the analysis of the
material world were applied, with misleading results, to
philosophical analysis. This critique began as early as 1929
and continued through the PI. The struggle against this kind
of metaphor became an organizing principle of Wittgenstein's
work. The same struggle is expressed in the phrase "the
crystalline purity of logic". Having taken off the tinted
glasses, Wittgenstein realized that "a picture held us
captive" {PI nll5). It was the picture of logical analysis,
conceived on a model that could not possibly lend clarity to
a conceptual investigation.
Propositions do not share the logical form of physical
structures; the scientific theories which model such
structures are meant to range over the whole of nature (or
at least, as Hertz says, of inanimate nature), but they do
not extend to the representational structure of language.
The latter, in any case, probably cannot be modeled in one
way, and for this reason the proper and productive tendency
of science to look for universal laws becomes a positively
harmful "craving for generality" in the logical analysis of
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language. From one sphere of discourse to another the
representation may vary in form; and the apparent forms,
like those of subject-predicate and relational propositions,
do more to disguise the variety of structures than to reveal
their inner nature.
5.4

The Mechanics o£ the Tractatua

Consideration of the influence of Hertz appears to lend
some credence to the idea that a preoccupation with models
adopted from Physics led Wittgenstein down the path of
scientism in the TLP. However, as was argued above, it was
primarily the philosophical content of Hertz's system and
method that interested Wittgenstein; rather than attempting
to emulate the "method of physics”, in borrowing from Hertz
Wittgenstein was primarily acknowledging the strength of
Hertz's assimilation of the method of philosophy. Yet in
spite of this, the final coup here belongs to science. For
what lies at the bottom of the whole Hertzian system is a
scheme for modeling the relationships between material
systems. By applying this scheme to psychological modeling
as well, Hertz achieves an elegantly simplified
representational system in which theoretical models, mental
pictures, and physical systems are all conceived as
projective models of one another32. But the point, after
all, was to account for the systems which are the subject of
Physics, so it is no surprise that projective relations are
conceived along lines that are most intuitive for the
mapping of systems in space. The result, for both Hertz and
the early Wittgenstein, is a view of meaning and its
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"objects" that takes this relationship to be almost exactly
parallel to the way models of material systems correspond to
their objects.
Hertz's influence on the picture theory is too well
known to require arguing here.33 The statement at TLP 2.1,
"Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen" (more or less
literally, "We make pictures of facts for ourselves") and
the whole unfolding of the picture theory that follows seems
to be heavily indebted to the conception that Hertz offers
in the first paragraph of his introduction: "We form for
ourselves images or symbols of external objects; and the
form which we give them is such that the necessary
consequents of the images in thought are always the images
of the necessary consequents in nature of the things
pictured."34 Though this passage has been cited innumerable
times it is worth noting that it not only contains an
anticipation of the picture theory but of the idea of
inference as an unfolding of the "necessary consequents" of
the model; this is as important to the conception of the TLP
as the picture theory itself. But there is much more of the
TLP than this broad anticipation of the picture theory in
Hertz's Principles. A clear example is the conception of
science expressed in 6.3ff, including the "net" analogy. The
notion of mechanics as a deductive system based on Newton's
laws or other basic principles was not peculiar to Hertz
(Helmholtz and others had similarly conceptions), but
Wittgenstein's appropriation of this model was primarily
based on Hertz35.
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But even more interesting connections turn up when we
examine Wittgenstein's explicit references to Hertz. For
example, at TLP 4.04 he says:
In the proposition there must be exactly as many
things distinguishable as there are in the state of
affairs which it represents.
They must both possess the same logical
(mathematical) multiplicity (cf. Hertz's Mechanics, on
Dynamic Models).
What Hertz says about "dynamic models" is of considerable
interest for much more than the notion of multiplicity. If
"a material system" is a dynamic model of another "the
connections of the first can be expressed by such
coordinates" that "the number of coordinates of the first
system is equal to the number of the second", and therefore
any equation that describes a displacement in one system
describes it in the other as well36. Hertz's first comment
on this definition is that, "Any two of the coordinates so
related to one another in the two systems are called
corresponding coordinates"37. Mow, the remark at 4.04, which
is clearly related to this, is one of a series (4.01, 4.02,
etc.) in which Wittgenstein comments on the idea of sense in
TLP 4: "The thought is the proposition with sense." So the
following picture emerges from Hertz's "dynamic models":
there are simple objects in the world, and names in
propositions, and simple ideas in thought, and each is a
model of the other insofar as all the elements are in oneto-one correspondence with one another. That is quite a
central doctrine of the TLP; it also ties in neatly to the
idea of a "method of projection" discussed in TLP 3.11-3.13.
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Here we have a real scaffolding that was apparently
influenced by Hertz's scientific models; and if Hertz’s aim
was to map the freedom of movement of a "material system", a
mechanical conception of the mind cannot be more than a
whisper away when this is transposed into the philosophy of
psychology.
In another comment on dynamic models Hertz says: "In
order to determine beforehand the course of the natural
motion of a material system, it is sufficient to have a
model of that system.1,38 Here we have something like the
notion of logical possibility, the idea that the connections
of objects in "logical space" are determined by the nature
of the objects. Quite a bit of the TLP - the whole thing,
really - rides on the idea that the logical possibilities of
objects predetermine the possible propositions with sense.
Debts to a mechanical model in this regard suggest a
conceptual congruence between the logically possible
movements of a mechanical system and the possible relations
of logical atoms, but such a congruence seems prima facie
very limited. No wonder Wittgenstein's later work is
peppered with examples of wheels turning idly, and machines
that break down: it is again a matter of the kind of
thinking that was behind the Tractarian model in spite of
the generally anti-scientistic stance.
Yet another of Hertz's observations on dynamic models
that bears on the TLP is this: "it is impossible to carry
our knowledge of the connections of natural systems further
than is involved in specifying models of the actual
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systems"39. This approaches the idea of the limits of
language, or of "silence": you cannot get outside the model
to say something about it. The passage also seems to
anticipate the idea that one cannot say anything other than
"the propositions of natural science" (6.53), since these
are the specifications of Hertz’s model. The thing to notice
here is that the model has a totally different impact when
applied to language than it does for physics. It is an
absolutely essential feature of scientific inquiry that we
not claim to know anything beyond what established theory
predicts. That is partly because it logically undermines the
whole enterprise to do so; but speaking practically as well,
theories often prove more robust than apparent pieces of
knowledge which seem to contradict them. But it is quite
counterintuitive to suggest, as the Tractarian picture does,
that language or thought are limited a priori by the
possibilities inherent in the objects and facts that
constitute the elements of the model. We expect language to
be productive and the mind to be able to entertain new
conceptions. The logical possibilities of language are
supposed to be the limits of our knowledge according to the
TLP. Language determines a priori what we can and cannot
say, or think, about the world (cf 5.5571). Of course, there
is evidence that Wittgenstein himself was not entirely
convinced of this; for instance, he says, "It is essential
to propositions that they can communicate a new sense to us"
(4.027) and "A proposition must communicate a new sense with
old expressions" (4.03). It is pretty clear that he thought
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language is productive in a way that does not easily square
with the a priori conception elsewhere visible in the TLP.
But on his later view the conception of language in the TLP
was misleading in that it suggested this mechanical picture,
whether or not Wittgenstein himself was misled in this way.
His allegation that the language of the TLP had a quasiscientific bias generally amounts to saying that it promoted
this kind of potentially misleading picture, rather than
that anything was done under the banner of a scientific
paradigm. The picture suggested in his later work - the
interplay of language games, the anti-essentialism of family
resemblances, the rejection of determinate rule-giving - is
more likely to conjure up the image of language as a highly
fluid medium in which new ideas or types of knowledge can
always be represented.40
Hertz concludes the discussion of dynamic models with
the following observation, which demonstrates not only the
inseparable link between Hertz's physics and the Tractarian
conception, but exactly what Wittgenstein later opposed
about this conception:
The relation of a dynamical model to the system of
which it is regarded as the model, is precisely the
same as the relation of the images which our mind forms
of things to the things themselves. For if we regard
the condition of the model as the representation of the
condition of the system, then the consequents of this
representation, which according to the laws of this
representation must appear, are also the representation
of the consequents which must proceed from the original
object according to the laws of this original object.
The agreement between mind and nature may therefore be
likened to the agreement between two systems which are
models of one another, and we can even account for this
agreement by assuming that the mind is capable of
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making actual dynamical models of things, and of
working with them.41
Clearly Hertz was doing philosophy of mind here as surely as
he was setting out a program of theoretical physics. But
consider what is assumed or implied in this passage: (1)
that psychological inference can be adequately understood on
the model of causal interaction between two material
systems? (2) that a mental state ("condition") is very much
like the state of a physical system; and (3) (as a
consequence of these) that a mental image behaves very much
like an object. Nothing could be more characteristic of
Wittgenstein's later work than the effort to undermine these
three ideas, and they are all expressed with the utmost
clarity in this passage. Moreover, the problem with all
three ideas can be traced to a single, fundamental
conceptual difficulty: mental phenomena (inferences,
beliefs, or memories, for example) cannot really be very
much like the objects of the physical world, in the sense of
being subject to physical causes or material states.
Another example of the way Hertz1s underlying
materialism finds a home in the TLP has to do with his
definition of the concept of "mass" in terms of infinitely
small "material particles"42. These are in turn defined, in
the First Book of the Principles, as a relation between
space-time points43. The material particles are said to be
"invariable and indestructible"44. In the TLP Wittgenstein
says objects are "the fixed, the existent (Bestehende45);
the configuration is the changing, the variable" (2.0271).
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Thus Tractarian objects are conceived in much the same terms
as Hertz's "material particles" or "points"46, the units of
matter. This was not the only, or even the main
consideration that went into them. But it is one
consideration, and the following passages from the NB
emphasize the importance of this factor: "the division of
the body into material points, as we have it in physics, is
nothing more than the analysis into simple components" (NB
67) . The next day he adds: "It always appears as if there
were complex objects which function as simples, and then
also actual simples, like the material points of physics,
etc." (NB 21 June 1915, p.69). From this it appears likely
that ideas derived directly from Hertz's physics were among
the factors that influenced Wittgenstein’s conception of the
nature of objects. He calls Hertz’s material points "actual
simples" and says in the TLP, "The object is simple" (2.02).
What we have just said illuminates a puzzling comment
on Hertz that occurs only in the NB. The ancestor of the
"net analogy" passage is followed by the same remark as in
the TLP: "Mechanics is an attempt to construct, according to
a single plan, all true propositions which we need for the
description of world" (6.343)47. But the NB version is
followed by the comment, "(The invisible masses of Hertz)"
and then: "The invisible masses of Hertz are admittedly
pseudo-objects (Scheingegenst&nde)" (NB 36). The question
is, what does Wittgenstein mean by "pseudo-objects"?
Hertz does not actually refer to "invisible" masses;
Wittgenstein is no doubt thinking of Hertz's "hypothetical"
289
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bodies, "which we can neither handle, move, nor place in the
balance [i.e., weigh]..." About the latter, Hertz says, "The
mass of such bodies can only be determined by hypothesis"48.
The "material points", then, which are explicitly defined as
objects with a definite mass, and (in the Second Book) a
definite weight, are the "real" objects, i.e., correspond to
the objects Wittgenstein thought of as the ultimate bearers
of meaning. The hypothetical masses are the "pseudo
objects"? and the reason, apparently, is that they are known
only in virtue of their criteria. This suggests that "real"
objects cannot be known only by description. Strictly
speaking, for Russell, material objects were also known only
by description? but perhaps Wittgenstein is ignoring that
and thinking that in order to fulfill their function as
objects of reference logical objects cannot be
hypothetical49.
Now, even after he had decided that the existence of
objects is a necessary outcome of logical considerations (NB
50) Wittgenstein remained convinced that they could somehow
be identified. But now it appears that their being
identified by description would not suffice. So his thinking
at this point, and perhaps in the TLP as well, contains the
assumption that the identities of objects would at some
point have to be verified. But this does not cohere well
with the rest of his ideas. Objects were supposed to provide
the basis for a strictly a priori description of the logical
possibilities of reality; how could he have assumed that
some as yet undiscovered but verifiable type of entity had
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to have the strictly logical properties that are required to
contain all the possible propositions with sense?
One possible rationale for this assumption would be
that in physics one can postulate as yet undiscovered
entities that are known by description to have certain
physical characteristics. The postulate may be wrong
(phlogiston) but it is standard scientific procedure: e.g.,
Yukawa’s hypothesis about the Tt-meson, or the postulate of
the "dark matter" that is supposed to prevent the permanent
expansion of the universe. At first glance the idea of
transferring this license into philosophy looks like a
solidly positivist move. But on closer inspection it turns
out to be more characteristic of rationalism. The
rationalist begins with an urge to provide a single a priori
explanation of all our knowledge of the material world, and
then posits the existence of

entities which have the

requisite logical properties: Spinoza's God, DesCartes's
substance, Leibniz's monads, and (negatively) Kant's Dingan-sich. Whatever metaphysical status these entities are
supposed to have it is clear that they cannot be nothing:
the rationalist epistemologist can only deliver on the
promise of a unifying theory by becoming a realist
metaphysician (often malgrS lui, as in Kant's case). The
objects of the TLP were just

such metaphysically real

entities ("das Bestehende");moreover, they were not just

a

logician's metaphysical baggage, they were conceived as
logical descriptions of Hertz's "material points".
Wittgenstein’s later concerns with there being a physics in
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"the old logic" are nowhere more justified than in his
earlier preoccupation with Hertzian objects.
5.5

Theories end Things

Our final task in this chapter is to take account of
David Pears's treatment of the transition in Wittgenstein's
philosophy, which bears some similarity to ours. Pears, as
we have seen, places much emphasis on Wittgenstein's
rejection of theorizing in philosophy.50 He begins with the
observation:
His [Wittgenstein's] early system had been
constructed under the guidance of the old idea, that
philosophy penetrates phenomena and reveals their
underlying structure. Its results were, therefore
theories.51
Pears points out that in the TLP Wittgenstein had adopted,
implicitly or explicitly, the following positions: (1)
philosophical theories are not like scientific theories
(therefore not subject to empirical verification); (2) all
philosophical theories are "unsinnig" ("nonsense")52; (3)
the TLP is just such a nonsensical theory (or contains
several such theories). He says that this "was not a stable
position"53,* for if philosophical theories are neither
empirically verifiable nor grammatically sensible, the
question is whether there is any sense in talking about
"theories" at all in philosophy. The logical conclusion
would be to look for some way of doing philosophy other than
attemtping to ferret out the underlying structure of
reality.
Pears offers as an example of the new view
Wittgenstein's well-known dictum in the PI that "we may not
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advance any kind of theory... We must do away with all
explanation, and description alone must take its place" (PI
109) . He comments: "Part of his meaning is that philosophers
must not try to explain things in the same way as
scientists"54; and Pears charitably observes that "the point
would not be worth making if nobody had ever supposed that
philosophy did operate in that way”55. As we have seen
above, Pears holds that one example of such a philosophical
spirit was the TLP.
Two points may be added to his observations. First,
though in the TLP Wittgenstein never uses the word "theory"
to describe the TLP or anything in it, he used this word
repeatedly in his earlier writings to refer to his own work;
and he continued to refer to various "theories" of his own
through his first five post-1929 notebooks.56 It is
therefore quite plausible to attribute to him a kind of
theorizing in the TLP. Second, though the relationship
between philosophy and natural science goes back as far as
philosophy itself, the idea of a scientific method as basis
for philosophy is a more modern one, and receives several
impulses which can plausibly be seen as targets of
Wittgenstein's attack, even if his own early work is not
among these. The initial impulse was the effort of Descartes
and Locke to bind the theory of knowledge to the perception
of mathematically measurable properties of matter. The
positivism of Saint-Simon and Comte was explicitly based on
the emulation of scientific method. The theory of evolution
had a decisive impact in a number of areas. C.S. Peirce, a
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scientist himself whose philosophy was avowedly indebted to
Darwin, says quite plainly that "philosophy ought to imitate
the successful sciences in its methods..."57 Russell's
admiration for the methods of contemporary physics has
already been mentioned, and we have also referred
(obliquely) to the similar views of another nemesis of
Wittgenstein's, Karl Popper. There is plenty of substance to
Wittgenstein’s point that "philosophers constantly see the
method of science before their eyes". Perhaps it is even
fair to say that it would take more than the sincere but
isolated epigrams directed against scientific theorizing in
the TLP to really pitch this entire tradition overboard.
That sort of revolution can be found in the PI, but not in
the early Wittgenstein.
It should be apparent that to this extent Pears' thesis
is compatible with, and complimetary to, the one presented
here. For if Wittgenstein criticized the TLP for being
infected with a kind of pseudo-physics of language and
thought, it is surely plausible that he also criticized the
methodology of this presentation as an implicit confusion
with scientific theorizing. Pears' interpretation of the
transition therefore adds an important dimension to what has
been said above. But what Pears has said differs with the
present interpretation in that if the present view is
correct, he is too cautious about the broad picture and too
sweeping in his appeal to Wittgenstein’s qualms about
theorizing. Pears calls "the idea that philosophy neither
is, nor is like, a science" the later Wittgenstein's
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"leading idea"SB. He recognizes that this theme is only
occasionally mentioned in the PI but says that "the gap
between philosophy and science is, for the most part, taken
for granted" there, and that "attention is focused on
consequential developments"59. These are strong claims for
the anti-scientism theme; they suggest that what he is doing
in the PI is a development of this theme. But this view does
not appear to explain the content of the PI as well as the
view that what he is working out are the consequences of all
types of metaphorical transposition from the grammar of
physical objects to that of concepts. The opening remarks,
the language game of the "builders", the private language
argument, the objections to logical atomism, the injunctions
about causal explanation, as well as the objections to
pseudoscientific theories, can all be seen as developments
of the idea that philosophical mistakes stem from
applications of the grammar of physical objects to the
grammar of all objects. At least, this is the contention
being defended here, and if it is valid then something akin
to scientific methodology, namely inference to the simplest
and most comprehensive reasonable explanation, bids us view
it as the preferable one.
Thus, on our view, Wittgenstein's point about
pseudoscientific theorizing is understood as being part of a
larger project of getting us to stop dealing with the
conceptual world as if it is like a mystical shadow of the
physical one; or stop thinking there is a conceptual "world"
(a shadow-world) at all. The qualms about theorizing are not
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the root of the problem. The difference comes out in Pears'
discussion of some points which figure in our argument too.
Pears suggests two levels of impact of the theorizing in the
TLP. One is that atomism is supposed to be established a
priori, but an assumption is nevertheless made that it will
someday be verified (e.g., when the nature of objects is
"discovered").60 This is clear enough, but at another level
Pears identifies two other consequences of Wittgenstein's
alleged scientism by more subtle argumentation. One has to
do with the idea that the application of a word is fixed by
a theory of meaning61. The other is the promotion of a kind
of folk psychology into a "theory" of the mind: "the easy
generalization that the mind is a private place"62, or "our
natural tendency to model the inner world on the outer
one"63. Wittgenstein's well-known attacks on these
conceptions are clearly critiques of certain kinds of
theories, but they are only with difficulty seen as
primarily following from a critique of philosophical
theorizing in general. On the other hand, the criticisms of
both the "belief box" picture of the mind and the notion of
inner mental objects that follow causal laws are quite
easily seen as developments of the idea that misapplications
of physicalistic grammar result in misrepresentations of the
nature of the mind. This is the fundamental problem; the
problem of theorizing runs parallel with the others.
It is also worth pointing out that the manuscript
material and lecture notes from 1929 on contain an enormous
number of remarks following the theme emphasized here, and
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very few that are concerned with philosophical theorizing
per se. But that does not detract from the importance of
what Pears draws attention to; the idea of philosophy as a
purely descriptive enterprise is an important feature of
Wittgenstein's later work. However strongly it is emphasized
it tends to lend support to the present interpretation, so
long as it is not made the ground on which the later work
rests. Another consideration that tends to work against the
weight Pears puts on the anti-theorizing principle is that
Wittgenstein's concerns about quasi-scientific theorizing go
as far back as his early remark to Russell that philosophy
"must be of a totally different kind than any other
science". That is, they do not begin with the TLP or even
the NB. Whatever transgressions he may have made against
this principle in the TLP were not a kind of moral weakness
that was overcome by a more concerted effort in the later
work. If he did not recognize the problem in the TLP there
was something more fundamentally wrong; it is this that he
tries to understand, beginning in 1929, by examining the
grammatical preconceptions of the Tractarian system.
Not to belabor the difference with Pears, which is
mainly one of emphasis, but it is worth noting a particular
practical difference in interpretation which emerges from
how the emphasis is placed. Pears cites two passages from
the PI in which Wittgenstein talks about the origin of
philosophical problems64, and perceptively notes an
interesting dichotomy (which is not immediately obvious):
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one suggests that philosophy solves grammatical
difficulties, the other that it creates them. Pears remarks:
The two passages... are not irreconcilable. We could
take him to mean that the problems of philosophy become
intractable when a misunderstanding intervenes, and
that, though language goes on holiday as soon as we
step back from our use of it and ask how it works, the
holiday does not have to start as an intellectual
Saturnalia. We certainly do not want to saddle him with
the thesis that someone who asks, 'What is a number?'
must already be confusing the abstract with the
concrete. True, he does think that certain
philosophical problems arise only because a mistaken
assumption has been made; for example, that a child who
asks his mother how she knows that her visual
impressions of red are not like his of blue, is
assuming, mistakenly, that visual impressions are like
objects. But it is obvious that this kind of aetiology
cannot be extended to all philosophical problems.65
Towards the end of this passage Pears correctly identifies
the thesis that is here being attributed to Wittgenstein:
that mistakes of the general form "visual impressions are
like objects" are indeed the root of at least all
metaphysical "problems" (or we might say, are what is
actually happenning when we think we are faced with a
metaphysical problem). Pears says that according to
Wittgenstein this error is made by "a child who asks his
mother" the question about impressions, but not by the
person who asks, "What is a number?". But the error that the
child makes is not philosophically significant in the same
way as when someone who already knows the use of the word
"number" asks, "What is a number?". For the child, assuming
she has not yet assimilated the grammar of visual space very
well, does not know what sort of answer to expect and
therefore does not really make any philosophically
interesting error at all66. Whereas any linguistically
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competent adult who asks what a number is does not have in
mind an answer like, "It is what you use to count with", but
an answer that gives something like the metaphysical
equivalent of a response to the question, "What is
lightning?". This person is "already... confusing the
abstract with the concrete" in asking the question; and this
is also why philosophy is sometimes the cause of grammatical
confusions and sometimes the cure for them.
Therefore, while it is of course prudent to avoid
attributing to Wittgenstein wildly general theories about
the nature of philosophical errors, it is not necessary to
abandon our thesis that his later work is fundamentally
concerned with sorting out the distinction between the
grammar of physical objects and that of abstract (especially
mental and linguistic) concepts. Pears' own example shows
that the application of this distinction is very general
indeed.
5.6

Conclusion

In this chapter we have explored Wittgenstein's
critique of the TLP from a particular angle: the
infiltration of a physicalistic conception of analysis and
meaning into the core logic of the work. It was
Wittgenstein's considered opinion, in remarks made over a
period of at least 15 years, that a grammar of physics, or a
constellation of mental and linguistic habits tied to our
understanding of the material world, underlay the appeal of
Physics and the model of logical atomism. This intrusion of
physics occurred in spite of a conscious effort to
299
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distinguish philosophy from science, and to eliminate
everything empirical from philosophy and logic.
Several factors worked against this effort, including
the reliance on Hertz's notion of models and the adoption of
numerous terms from the language of Physics. But the most
fundamental problem was the assumption that the mereological
or structural relations that apply to the analysis of
spatiotemporal entities could work for the analysis of
language. The urge to understand leads to a conservative
inclination of the mind in matters of representation, and a
concommitant linguistic conservatism suggests the extension
of a metaphor rather than the invention of new language
games. These tendencies lead us to fall back on
relationships that hold for our interactions with the
physical world. Thus, we reason, if language can be
analyzed, perhaps a reasonable paradigm for this analysis is
the identification, individuation, and combination of simple
physical parts into a complex whole67. This primitive
physical conception seemed as if it would serve very well;
perhaps with a nod toward "das Mystische" to cover what lies
beyond the limits of such a conception.
But Wittgenstein's early difficulties in identifying
simple objects were more portentous than he realized. His
assumption, upon failing in that effort, was that they would
be identified in due time; what he didn't realize was how
much was at risk if it turned out that his inability to
provide the details was not a mere misfortune but a sign
that the notion of a simple object was not as coherent as it
300
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seemed. This attitude - that one can run the theory anyway
and leave the details to providence - is criticized as late
as OC. He says of his own suggestion that "any empirical
proposition can be transformed into a postulate":
But I am suspicisous even of this. The sentence is too
general. One almost wants to say "any empirical
proposition can, theoretically, be transformed...", but
what does "theoretically" mean here? It all sounds too
close to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. (OC 321)
Using a model derived from Physics was a risky move in the
first place in a treatise concerned with eliminating
everything empirical from logic. Trusting to some future
investigation to detect the theoretical entities it needed
to succeed made the whole thing look like an empirical
theory awaiting verification

by experiment. It was as if

the objects must be found, and this "must" had the ambiguous
status of being a logical demand for something that could
only be conceived of as an ultimately simple material body.
Another problem, identitied in the passage with which
we began this chapter, was a conception of the nature of the
proposition that divided up the parts of speech into words
which identify objects, properties, and processes. This
emerges from the Fregean tradition in the philosophy of
language, which we have only touched on above; it is
examined in more detail in Appendix I in the context of
Wittgenstein’s later comments on subject-predicate form.
Wittgenstein's critique of the TLP has many dimensions
which have not been explored here. Among them are his
rejection of his earlier solution of color exlclusion. This
led him down another path, in which he explored the various
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"spaces" in which propositions have sense (see Chapter 2).
His criticism of the "picture" metaphor is another aspect of
his critique of his early work. The end result of all of
these paths was that he knew the logic of the TLP could not
be sustained. His attempts to move beyond it all followed
the general formula: distinguish the grammar of physical
objects from that of all other objects. One aspect of that
was distinguishing the models we use in scientific or
empirical descriptions of the world from those we need in
philosophy. The notions of "rule", "grammar", and "languagegame" answered to the latter need.
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n o ti s

1. The manuscript source for this remark is near the
beginning of Wittgenstein's Band V (VIA Band 111,12, 1; 17
August 1930). The remark was included in a short typescript
consisting of three essays (von Wright TS 214); von Wright
dates the typescript "probably 1933" (Wittgenstein, p.47).
Anthony Kenny, editor of the PG, writes that Wittgenstein
had clipped these essays together "with what intention we do
not know" (PG p.489). I would suggest that the intention was
a work or part of a work that would be a critique of the
central concepts of the TLP. The titles of the essays,
"Complex and Fact", "Concept and Object", and "Object"
suggest this.
2. To avoid confusion as much as possible, I will write
"Physics" (capitalized) when I am referring to the science
of physics and "physics” when I am referring to general
discourse about physical objects (which might, therefore,
include for instance biological facts, spatial relations,
etc.). Note, though, that neither of these domains
completely excludes the other; whether the sense is
exclusive in any particular proposition must be determined
from the context. E.g., in the present sentence, it should
be clear that "physics" includes Physics.
3. A famous example in modern physics is the description of
the properties of a particle of formerly unknown type
(eventually named the K-meson) by Hideki Yukawa, in the mid1930's. The existence of the particle was later (1947)
confirmed experimentally. See Feynman, Lectures I, 2-8.
Malcolm reports having asked Wittgenstein whether he had
"decided upon anything as an example of a simple object"
when he wrote the TLP, and that Wittgenstein replied that
"at that time his thought had been that he was a logician,
and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try to
decide whether this thing or that was a simple thing or a
complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter"
(Malcolm, A Memoir, p.70) . If that was indeed Wittgenstein’s
attitude it increases the sense that he thought of a
logician as being something like a theoretical physicist who
could leave the matter of verification to the
experimentalist. If Wittgenstein's remark is an accurate
representation of his view when writing the TLP, it
represents a definite change from his stance when he wrote
the NB, for there he made strenuous intellectual efforts to
determine what might or might not be a simple or complex
thing.
4. Essentially the same remark is applied to himself alone
in a typescript of about the same time in which he
criticizes the notion of an "elementary proposition"; see PG
p.210. See also VJL30 pp.34-5, where, in a slightly different
context, he had already criticized the idea that philosophy
is analysis in the sense that chemistry is.
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5. "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter",

p.128.

6. "On Scientific Method in Philosophy", p.98.
7. "On Scientific Method in Philosophy", p.98.
8. "On Scientific Method in Philosophy", p.111.
9. "On Scientific Method in Philosophy", p.113. The idea is
comparable with Karl Popper's later theory of "scientific
discovery"; see, e.g.. The Logic of Scientific Discovery,
pp.32-3.
10. "On Scientific Method in Philosophy", p.113.
11. Anscombe's translation of this phrase as "simply a
retrogression" does not quite capture the critical tone of
this comment. Her translation makes the remark into a
description of Russell's method; Russell wishes to derive
his philosophical method from that of physics. But
Wittgenstein is here casting aspersions on such emulations.
Moreover, her translation makes it appear that Wittgenstein
is endorsing Russell's claim to have abstracted a
methodology from the sciences, whereas the tone of the
remark suggests quite the reverse.
12.

"On Scientific Method in Philosophy", p.111.

13.

"On Scientific Method in Philosophy", p.111.

14. "On Scientific Method in Philosophy", p.112.
15. "On Scientific Method in Philosophy", p.113.
16. Hertz, Principles of Mechanics, p.4.
17. Cf. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p.9.
18. Later on he enunciates this explicitly: “There is no
[such thing as a] logical hypothesis” (WA 1,137,3).
Russell's endorsement of hypotheses also seems to contradict
his own statement that philosophical propositions must be a
priori. Are some (or all) of them to be a priori hypotheses?
The idea seems quite incoherent.
19. The ambiguity comes from his sometimes identifying
philosophy with science, while at the same time suggesting
that they are utterly different. For example, in his first
known letter to Russell he says that "logic must turn out to
be a totally different kind than any other science" (JNB 120;
Wittgenstein to Russell, 22 June 1912). The ambiguity is
also captured in the famous passage near the end of the TLP:
"the right method in philosophy" would be "to say nothing
except... the propositions of natural science, i.e.,
something that has nothing to do with philosophy" (6.53). If
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the first passage seems to count philosophy as a science of
a unique kind, the second suggests that scientific
propositions (presumably meaning the kinds of very general
propositions he discusses in the remarks which precede this
one) are both the only content available to philosophy and
the limit at which philosophical discourse turns into its
opposite. Even so, the main impact of both statements is to
suggest a distinction between philosophy and science, even
if it is not altogether clear what this distinction amounts
to.
20. The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, p.27.
21. The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, p.36.
22. Much of the dispute between Russell and Moore, on the
one hand, and the British Hegelian tradition, on the other,
took place over the question of relations, which was closely
related to that of part-whole conceptions. The first chapter
of Moore's Principia Ethica is partly devoted to this
debate. For a discussion of the relationship between
mereological questions and logical atomism see Peter Hylton,
Russell, Idealism... , p.113 and Chapter 4.
23. I will offer some more specific examples of these
ramifications, and what we might call "inferences by
analogy", below.
24. Cf WL30 p.35: "When we analyse in science we describe
some further event. In chemistry we analyse water and find
that its composition is H20; we find out something new about
it. Analysing here means finding something new. But this is
not what we mean by analysis in philosophy. In philosophy we
already know all that we want to know; philosophical
analysis does not give us any new facts. It is not the
results of science which are of interest to philosophy but
its methods. Philosophical analysis does not tell us
anything new about thoughts (and if it did it would not
interest us)." The penultimate sentence is more or less a
quote from Russell, and one which Wittgenstein criticizes in
other contexts. It may be that the notes used by Lee did not
correctly convey the spirit in which Wittgenstein repeated
this aphorism.
25. Our Knowledge of the External World, p.229.
26. The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, p. 173.
27. David Pears, The False Prison, V.2, p.203.
28. David Pears, The False Prison, V.2, p.203.
29. Wittgenstein
himself suggests that this iswhatPhysics
(or "mechanics") tries to achieve; see TLP 6.343 (cf 4.11).
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30. For instance, he says: "An infinite number series is
only an infinite possibility of finite number series. It is
senseless to speak of the whole (ganzen) infinite number
series, as if it were also an extension" (WA J, 137,5).
31. Although the distinction here involves the so-called
"primary" or phenomenological versus the "secondary" or
physical mode of speech, it still demonstrates that in the
PR he consciously placed these manuscript remarks in the
context of a distinction between physicalistic and nonphysicalistic ways of thinking.
32. The word Bild, as Hertz uses it, it usually translated
as "model". Since nothing in my discussion depends on
whether we call Hertz's Bilden "pictures" or "models" I will
stick to the standard rendering. It is obvious that
Wittgenstein's "pictures" might also be called "models" but
I will not be depending on this either. I assume only the
general fact that the "picture theory" involves modeling
reality through thoughts and propositions.
33. The literature on this topic is extensive. See for
instance Janik and Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna, pp.13946, 179-91; Hacker, Insight and Illusion, Chapter 1; Barker,
"Hertz and Wittgenstein"; and Wilson, "Hertz, Boltzmann and
Wittgenstein Reconsidered". This literature approaches the
influence of Hertz in pursuit of a constructive
interpretation of the picture theory; my discussion below,
which is concerned with his later critique of the picture
theory, overlaps these sources at a few points but generally
puts the influence of Hertz in a new perspective based on my
interpretation of the later criticisms. Wilson's article is
largely concerned with demonstrating that Wittgenstein was
probably influenced by Boltzmann prior to reading Hertz. I
do not think it would alter much in my discussion if some of
the ideas that I believe the later Wittgenstein saw as
problematic in the Hertzian conception were originally
obtained from Boltzmann.
34. Hertz, Principles of Mechanics, p.l.
35. But see again Wilson, "Hertz, Boltzmann and Wittgenstein
Reconsidered". Also, see Brockhaus, Pulling Up the Ladder,
pp.224-250, for an interesting discussion of what
Wittgenstein may have been rejecting in Hertz's philosophy
of science.
36. Hertz, Principles of Mechanics, #418, p.175.
37. Hertz, Principles of Mechanics, #418, p.175.
38. Hertz, Principles of Mechanics, #425, p.176.
39. Hertz, Principles of Mechanics, #427, p.177.
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40. It is not clear that he ever entirely gave up the idea
that our concept of the world is somehow limited by
language. But if this is true of the later work it has to be
understood in a very different way than is suggested by the
a priori limitations of the TLP.
41. Hertz, Principles of Mechanics, #428, p.177.
42. Hertz, Principles, #4, p.46, and #300, p.140.
43. Hertz, Principles, #3, pp.45-6. Note that these points
are actual spatiotemporal entities, not, for instance,
merely the specification of coordinates on a 4-dimensional
graph.
44. Hertz, Principles, #3, p.46, and #300, p.140.
45. This word is translated as "existent" by Ogden,
"subsistent" by Pears/McGuinness, and "persistent" by
Stenius. Nothing in what I say here rides on any particular
translation.
46. See Gerd Grafihoff, "Hertzian Objects in Wittgenstein's
Tractatus", and Peter Barker, "Hertz and Wittgenstein", on
this subject.
47. The words "an" and "single" are italicized in the NB.
48. Hertz, Principles of Mechanics, #301, p.141.
49. This of course does not answer the obvious question of
why Wittgenstein mentions these hypothetical masses in the
context of his description of mechanics as a template for
the production of "true propositions". I believe this has to
do with the emphasis in the "net" passages on the idea of
constructing the world according to "a single plan", or
"with these and only these stones" (NB 35). That is, if the
discoverable objects do not suffice for grounding all the
true propositions you must simply posit whatever else is
needed to maintain the unity of the plan. Similarly, the
totality of objects is just whatever is needed to duplicate
the multiplicity of language.
I have not been able to discover if Hertz had a
specific scientific problem in mind that required his
"hypothetical masses"; perhaps it was some difficulty
regarding the properties of the ether. In any case, there
does not seem to be any good explanation for them except
that hypothetical entities could account for verified
propositions of physics that apparently contradicted
Newton’s laws.
50. See The False Prison, V.2, Chapter 1.
51. Pears, The False Prision, V.2, p.199.
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52. Pears is correct to translate this as "nonsense", though
the Ogden/Wittgenstein translation has it as "senseless".
53. Pears, The

False Prision, V.2, p.199.

54. Pears, The

False Prision, V.2, p.202.

55. Pears, The

False Prision, V.2, p.203.

56. Here are several examples from the early work:
"In my theory p has the same meaning as not-p but
opposite sense. The meaning is the fact. The proper
theory of judgement must make it impossible to judge
nonsense." (A7L p.95)
"Characteristic example for my theory of the meaning of
physicalistic descriptions of nature..." (NB 37)
"For my theory does not really bring out that the
proposition must have two poles." (NB 53)
"This theory deals exclusively with propositions..."
(NB 55)
"I am very sorry to hear that my objection to your
theory of judgment paralyzes you. I think it can only
be removed by a correct theory of propositions." (LRKM,
R13, p.24)
The following examples from the post-1929 notebooks
demonstrate his continuing belief in philosophical
theorizing through about 1930:
"Wie verhSlt sich diese Theorie [of numbers] zu der
Freges und Russells?... Diese Grundklasse ware in
meiner Theorie die Klasse der Substantiva..." (WA
1,8,4)
"My theory [of intentions] is completely expressed in
the fact that the state of affairs satisfying the
expectation of p is represented by the proposition p."
(PR p.66)
"Das hat eine Bedeutung in der Theorie der Grammatik."
(WA 111,12,3)
"Meine Theorie kommt darauf hinaus, daS man die Sprache
in gewisser Beziehung nicht erkiaren kann." (WA
111,69,31)
57. C.S. Peirce, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities",
p.29.
58. Pears, The False Prison, V.2, pp.220.
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59. Pears, The False Prison, V.2, pp.221.
60. See Pears, The False Prison, V.2, pp.204-7.
61. Pears, The False Prison, V.2,

pp.207-211.

62. Pears, The False Prison, V.2,

p.211.

63. Pears, The False Prison, V.2,

p.213.

64. PI 109, 38; cited in Pears, The False Prison, V.2,
pp.216-217.
65. Pears, The False Prison, V.2, pp.217-218.
66. Admittedly a child who can even formulate the question
Pears puts in her mouth has a certain amount of linguisitic
sophistication; but I assume, since this sort of question
could easily be posed by an adult, the point of putting it
in the mouth of a child was to suggest some degree of
linguistic naivete. I do not know if Pears is closely
paraphrasing Wittgenstein here, since I have not found the
source of this question. But whether it is Wittgenstein's
example or not, it seems to be inconsistent with
Wittgenstein’s later views in general to attribute errors of
this sort to subjects who are not yet linguistically
competent. For the person who asks "What is a number?" or
"Does my red look like your blue?" and does not yet
understand the use of number or color terms is not asking a
philosophical question but wants to know the use of the
word. Therefore they must surely be making a different kind
of mistake from someone who knows the use and nevertheless
demands an answer. For remarks relevant to this question,
and which I chink support my view (though not without some
interpretation), see Bouwsma, Wittgenstein; Conversations
1949-1951, p.27.
67. When I am using a word processor, and I want to change
the wording of a passage, it always seems to me that I am
saving something by not "erasing" the parts I can use in the
new wording - recycling them, as it were. Even if it costs
more time to modify rather than retype I often retain what I
can of the old passage. This strikes me as a modern example
of the automatic tendency of the mind to assimilate whatever
we can to physicalistic conceptions; for it is difficult, in
spite of my knowledge of computers and how they work, to
shake the idea that the letters in front of me exist and are
destroyed when they are erased.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: WITTOSNST1ZN AND PHILOSOPHY
6.1

Wittgenstein•s Insight

Our discussion has primarily been an effort to make a
case for a certain reading of the transition in
Wittgenstein’s philosophy. This transition began in 1929. It
had no definite end, for Wittgenstein continued to expand
and deepen his studies into the nature of language and
thought throughout his career. But on our reading, some of
the most critical steps had been taken within a year. Our
central idea is that many important aspects of
Wittgenstein's later work may be explained as the unfolding
of a particular insight: that ordinary language is oriented
toward the description of physical objects and their
spatiotemporal relations. When we naively apply ordinary
language to philosophical problems we transfer, in more or
less subtle ways, the grammar of these objects and relations
to abstract or conceptual realms of discourse, and as a
result we end up with philosophical problems, if not pure
nonsense. Wittgenstein thought this explained a lot about
philosophical puzzlement and applied it very widely. Thus,
Frege’s idea that all subject-predicate sentences can be
analyzed into the logical components of concept and object,
Russell's theory that direct knowledge consists in
acquaintance with sense-data, and Wittgenstein's own earlier
idea of logical analysis, are all seen as confusions based
on the misapplication of a grammar that is really only
suited to discourse about the material world. Calling every
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grammatical substantive an "object" gives us the opposite of
an analysis: it submerges distinctions between sentences of
different grammatical form, and thus leads to confusions.
Thinking of sensations as packets of exotic matter (sensedata) emitted by physical objects, or of meanings as simple
parts (Tractarian objects) like the sticks and brushes of
brooms, are two examples of this kind of confusion.
We have seen many examples of how Wittgenstein
expresses in his own words the idea on which we are
focusing, but perhaps one more very clear one will be
appropriate, if only to let Wittgenstein have his say in
this concluding essay:
We are tempted to use the grammar which we use for a
word designating a physical object - we are tempted to
use this grammar for words that designate impressions.
In our primitive language most substantives relate to
some physical object or other. When we begin to talk of
impressions, we have a temptation to use the same kind
of grammar. This produces a puzzle which doesn't look
as though it were a grammatical puzzle. (LSDPE 356)
The passage is from lecture notes taken by Rush Rhees, dated
23 May 1936, six years after the end of the manuscripts on
which we have focused. Wittgenstein held on to his idea for
a long time, following it over many paths to the
philosophical contents of the PI: the private language
argument, the critique of logical atomism, the pluralistic
view of language games, and the conception of philosophy as
guidance for the grammatically perplexed. Though we have not
entered into a detailed discussion of the PI, we have shown
that many of its most important discussions can be traced to
ideas which were first expounded in his 1929-30 manuscripts.
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In the PI these ideas are finally synthesized into a wideraging but coherent philosophy.
In addition to arguing for the importance of his idea
that ordinary language is oriented towards the grammar of
physics, we have suggested that this insight emerged from
Wittgenstein's critique of his own "phenomenological
language" project. The recognition that phenomenology must
describe the same world as physics - for otherwise how could
it provide the analysis that Wittgenstein was looking for? led to the realization that a language of private experience
was incoherent. How then to distinguish these two different
ways of describing the world? One way is to think of them as
different modes of expression within a single language. But
ordinary language, he had assumed, is not precise enough for
philosophical use, for it depends on the assumption that
there are physical causes behind experience, and betrays
this way of thinking at every turn. How could a
physicalistic language be the same one we use in
phenomenology? The answer is that it must serve this
purpose, but the strain is apparent: as we grope for ways of
expressing our phenomenological experience or mental life,
"we need new concepts and we continually resort to those of
physicalistic language". Through this line of reasoning, or
something very close to it, Wittgenstein simultaneously gave
up the project that had consumed analytic philosophy since
Frege, the chimera of an analytical language of perspicuous
form, and arrived at his ideas about the grammar of physics.
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6.2

Xa Ordinary Language Defective?

We are left with two possible readings of
Wittgenstein’s fundamental idea, each of which seems to have
some textual support. One is that ordinary language, as he
had said as long ago as the TLP, is "logically completely in
order” (TLP 5.5563); the other, as he had also said there,
is that "from it it is humanly impossible to gather
immediately the logic of language" (TLP 4.002). In the
present context, one view has it that language itself is
neutral in its ordinary use, favoring neither the physical
nor any other vantage point, yet in philosophy it is misused
in the service of metaphysical or epistemological theories
and its physical mode of expression is adopted
(intentionally or not) as a general form for all discourse.
The other view is that language itself is hopelessly biased
towards the physical, and therefore not well equipped to
express those truths of phenomenology or psychology that we
nonetheless need to express to describe the world
accurately. On the first view, the problem lies in the
philosophical extension of language; on the second, ordinary
language itself is built on a grammatical structure that is
only really useful for helping us manipulate the material
world.
The impression of an antinomy here, as so often in
philosophy, is exaggerated. Both views express partial
glimpses of Wittgenstein's insight. He might have said that
language is not logically defective, precisely because it is
perfectly in order for the expression of that which it was
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designed to express. This includes both our interaction with
the physical world and our phenomenological experience. But
what kind of phenomenology do we need in practice? Suppose I
say, "What a lovely pink flower", and someone else replies,
"It's not really pink, but the setting sun makes it look
pink". I stand corrected; what more needs to be said? I see
a puddle of water on the road, swerve to avoid it, and then
realize it was not really there. Is there really any
question about what the "it" is that was not really there?
This pedestrian sort of phenomenology is far from misleading
in the grammar of ordinary language. Now, suppose I am
riding with a philosopher, who suggests: "But what was there
(somewhere) was your perception of a puddle". Perhaps she is
trying to soothe my feelings at nearly having caused an
accident; more likely, she is worried that my words would be
meaningless without a reference, and that reference must be
to some metaphysically respectable entity. I might frown a
bit and say, "Well, that's not how we usually talk about it,
but if you insistl". The average speaker is not ordinarily
confused, prior to the attempt to explain or theorize.
On the other hand, the average speaker can be easily
misled by such attempts, and this points to a different way
of looking at the problem. For there must surely be
something about language that permits this to happen. One
might of course suppose that philosophers are just
exceedingly boorish people who lack the common social skills
that others have and hence use language in peculiar ways;
though tempting, this is probably too rich an empirical
314
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assumption to have much force. Surely one reason that the
philosophical use of language leads us awry is that here it
is normal to talk of experiences and mental faculties and
abstract concepts as the subjects of sentences; and it is
just in their being the subjects of sentences that we tend
to take them on the analogy of ordinary nouns which denote
physical objects. But that temptation may be said to be in
language itself; or at least in our standard conception of
the grammar of language - and isn't that our primitive
understanding of how language works? We are ever attentive
to the structures of sentences as a function of their
grammatical parts, and the rules are conceived to be
independent of the content of the parts. That is how we
ordinarily learn grammar: nouns can stand in this postion,
verbs and modifiers in that, etc. Wittgenstein says of
Augustine's conception of language acquisition: "If you
describe the learning of language this way you are, I
believe, thinking primarily of nouns like 'table', 'chair',
'bread', and of people’s names, and only secondarily of the
names of certain actions and properties; and of the
remaining kinds of words as something that will take care of
itself" (PI 1). But Augustine's view is not supposed to
represent the end result of a sophisticated philosophical
theory; it is a first shot, an attempt to say how we
ordinarily think of language. Thus there are facts about
language itself that tempt philosophers.
One philosophical move that is naturally likely to
mislead is when we posit new entities to explain the way we
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talk about mental things; as if this were helpful in the
same way that a physicist might posit a new particle to
explain anomalies in cloud chamber observations. This is
Plato's move, and perhaps that of Descartes, Leibniz,
Russell, Husserl, Meinong, and many others too; it is the
move of the above fictional philosopher who found a
perception in the middle of the road. But that is only the
end of the story; it has much more plebian beginnings.
Consider for instance the language of Judeo-Christian
religion; first the power of self-movement is explained as a
union of dead matter with a soul; then the soul itself is
given a location, and described as the recipient of
blessings, the possessor of virtues, or an agent "lost”,
"saved", and finally "judged". Is this any less determined
by analogy with the physical than philosophical theories of
sense-data?
If religion is too close to philosophy to be considered
pretheoretical, there are many other discourses that offer
the same lesson. Wittgenstein often discussed the grammar of
the word "can", suggesting that we tend to think of logical
possibility as if it were physical possibility. In ordinary
language the word "can" is connected with ability: "You
can't outrun a cheetah" means that people are physically
incapable of performing this act; there are causal
constraints. But what about, "You can't count to infinity"?
It sounds like the same kind of constraint is in question.
Language makes no distinction here between logical and
causal possibility. Thus Wittgenstein writes: "There is a
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constant temptation to picture an enormous extension when we
find the remainder in a division equal to the dividend...
And it looks as if some superhuman being might survey the
infinite extension even though we cannot"1 (WL32 p.189).
This seems to be a prephilosophical conceptual error, though
it may come to be magnified in philosophical discussion. For
other examples, consider how we talk about electronically
reproduced images, or fictional characters, or the
information in a computer: it is normal to describe or
discuss them as if they were entities with spatial and
temporal continuity and other quasi-physical properties. We
know that nothing is "on the TV" except perhaps last night's
coffeecup, that data does not flow like a river (you can't
step into it even once), and that Pogo, Popeye and Pinnochio
are not entities but fictional names used in stories of a
certain type (aided, of course, by readily identifiable
types of drawings). But even in these common uses, language
prompts us to fall back on physicalistic expressions.
But this does not mean language is defective. It does
not normally prevent us from saying things in a non
misleading way. If one is inclined to attend to the nuances,
and one finds an audience similarly inclined, phenomenology,
psychology, and the more abstract branches of philosophy can
be discussed without provoking confusion. There would be
little point to Wittgenstein's constant warnings about the
"danger" of this expression or that if he thought the
situation was hopeless. Even the minimal precaution of
noting the limits of application of the model one is using
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can sometimes have the desired effect. However, this does
not mean that philosophical concepts can be expressed
without recourse to physicalistic language at all; for that
is too pervasive, and even reaches into such expressions as
"grasping a concept” or "having a thought in mind".
Many years after Wittgenstein developed his ideas about
the grammar of physics, Georgre Lakoff and Mark Johnson
wrote in an influential book on metaphor:
Our experience of physical objects and substances
provides a... basis for understanding... Understanding
our experiences in terms of objects and substances
allows us to pick out parts of our experience and treat
them as discrete entities or substances of a uniform
kind. Once we can identify our experiences as entities
or substances, we can refer to them, categorize them and, by this means, reason about them...
Just as the basic experiences of human spatial
orientation give rise to orientational metaphors, so
our experiences with physical objects... provide the
basis for an extraordinarily wide variety of
ontological metaphors, that is, ways of viewing events,
activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and
substances.2
Lakoff and Johnson were not much influenced by Wittgenstein
in this part of their theory3, but their ideas might in one
respect serve as an elucidation of his view. As they make
clear in both the content of their book and the title
Metaphors We Live By, we cannot get along without metaphors
that relate our more abstract concepts to common
spatiotemporal relations. Wittgenstein would have agreed,
and no more than them would he have called this a "defect"
of language. Neither is it an accidental feature of language
that it expresses things first and foremost in terms of what
Kant called our a priori forms of outer and inner intuition,
space and time. But perhaps signaling a difference with the
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Kantian conception, Wittgenstein is not saying that we
cannot but think in terms of inner and outer, only that we
cannot but be drawn to this way of thinking, i.e., tempted
by it.
Thus, to summarize, Wittgenstein did not think language
was in any way defective. He did think language was
naturally oriented towards the expression of everything in
spatiotemporal terms. He thought this was a problem in
philosophy because this is precisely where we don't want to
express everything this way; yet the more we try to explain,
the more we get caught in the web of our ordinary
conceptions and expressions. The first line of defense
against temptation is to recognize it as a temptation.
Perhaps this makes Wittgenstein sound a little like a
latter-day Augustine. That is probably an apt analogy,
though we should be cautious about extending it too far.
6.3

Whither Phenomenology?

Wittgenstein was almost never a phenomenologist*. For a
brief period he entertained the idea that there was a "world
of phenomena”, distinct from the physical world; or at least
that this was a useful way to talk about reality. Each world
had a language which described it: ordinary language
presupposed and normally referred to the physical world,
while phenomenological language referred directly to the
data of perception. Physics, in Wittgenstein's broad use of
the term, was a way of saying what we need to say in order
to pragmatically interact with the world, and this could
include hypotheses which collapse "the incomprehensibly
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complicated phenomenological description" of the world into
a more manageable set of relations among physical objects.
But this world of physical objects was, if not a fiction,
then at best a construction. Phenomenology would be a way of
expressing the logically incontestable truths of experience
out of which this physical world was constructed. But it
would not simply be a more accurate way of depicting
reality; it would be an analysis of the language we use to
talk about reality. It would be a language of immediate
experience which would show us the underlying form of the
language of physics, or in short, a phenomenological
language.
Wittgenstein's interest in this project stemmed
initially from the color exclusion problem. But he may also
have imagined that this type of solution to the problems
with the TLP would be even wider in its appeal than the TLP
itself. It would, for instance, create a quasi-formal basis
for Mach’s program in The Analysis of Sensations (a program
he had once unequivocally rejected5). This program had been
widely influential; even Einstein was sympathetic to it at
one point, and V.I. Lenin devoted his only philosophical
work to refuting it6. William James, in his widely read
Essays in Radical Empiricism, as well as Russell and the New
Realists, who had responded to James's approach, all had
some sympathy for Mach's ideas; together they developed
positions which Russell collectively characterized as
"neutral monism". Their basic idea was that the distinction
between the material world and and perceptions of it - that
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is, between the world of physics and that of phenomenology was a pragmatic or perspectival difference rather than one
of substance. They hoped thereby to avoid both metaphysical
dualism of the Cartesian variety and epistemological monism
of the Hegelian type. Wittgenstein's phenomenological system
answered to the same needs. Though his two-worlds view could
hardly be called either neutral or monist, we have said of
this phase that he had temporarily veered off course; he
actually started with a quite neutral conception of the
relationship between physics and phenomenology and returned
to it after a short while. So his phenomenological language
idea might also have represented a formalized version of
neutral monism, something to which in fact some of the New
Realists themselves aspired1.
In 1928, just as Wittgenstein began to think about
philosophy again, Husserl’s Ideen zu einer reinen
PhSnomenologie und phcLnomenologischen Philosophie was
reissued and his lectures on time-consciousnes (Vorlesungen
zur PhSnomenologie des inneren Zeitbesustseins) were
published for the first time. Wittgenstein discussed Husserl
with the Vienna Circle, and though he argued that
phenomenological expressions are not synthetic a priori
judgements8 (WK 67-8;78-9), he may well have thought
initially that Husserl’s fundamental approach was correct.
The most obvious source of sypathy for his program, though,
was no doubt within the Vienna Circle itself. Carnap's Die
logische Aufbau der Welt was also published in 1928; in his
Preface to the second edition he says: "In this book I was
321
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

concerned with the... thesis... that it is in principle
possible to reduce all concepts to the immediately given"9.
Other members of the circle had some degree of sympathy for
the phenomenological program. In short, the phenomenological
approach was an extremely popular philosophical thrust of
the time.
What Wittgenstein hoped to contribute to this trend was
of course not just another phenomenological system, but
something fundamental. The result of his research was not to
be just a categorial analysis of experience by means of the
various modes of sensation, nor an encyclopoedic catalogue
of the empirical foundations for knowledge, but a calculus
of possible experience by means of a language that would
express the necessary truths upon which all higher-order
propositions would be based. Thus all synthetic expressions
would be reducible to some concatenation of
phenomenologically verifiable sentences. In this way,
Wittgenstein could have something analogous to his
Tractarian program and provide a leading idea for the
phenomenologists too.
Within six months or less he came to the conclusion
that the whole idea was incoherent. The phenomenological
world was supposed to be built up out of a consciousness
that was necessarily private. But how could it then provide
an analysis of physicalistic propositions, whose very
essence was to express something objective that all
observers could equally well perceive? Then perhaps the
phenomenological language simply referred once again to the
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world of physics, he thought. But this would not make sense
either; why would we need another language to refer to that
which we can already talk about in a way that was entirely
adequate to its purpose? Besides, if our goal was to capture
the flux of experience, this had to take place either in a
public, and therefore physical language, or else in a
private one. But how could a physical language, which goes
on in the time of physics, hope to keep pace with the
complex, continuous, and ever-deepening stream of
experience? On the other hand, how could a private language
ever express the primacy of experience over physics? For in
the world of public objects this language has no claim to
primacy, but in its private world its claim to primacy
"cannot be said", i.e., it is merely tautological. So the
idea of an analytical language of experience was seen to be
deeply incoherent, and the analytical program was dropped.
In any historical sense of the word, Wittgenstein was no
longer a phenomenologist at this point; he was no longer
under the impression that you could provide a foundation for
something else, something confused or vague or synthetic, by
means of statements of pure experience.
But in a different sense Wittgenstein did not drop
phenomenology; it continued to serve as a stepping stone to
his later ideas. Only now thepoint was not to analyze
anything, but to document therules that are actually put
into practice in talking about experience; "the question is
not one of explaining a language-game by means of our
experiences, but of noting a language-game" (PI 655). But
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why would anyone be interested in this kind of project? Why
should a philosopher spend time describing experience,
especially when poets and novelists do it so much better?
Wittgenstein's deflationary remarks about philosophical
theory and explanation are apt to be misleading unless their
context is understood. The work of describing our languagegames is not simple; much of it consists in saying why
certain assumptions cannot be made, why certain analogies
fail, and also why they fail to be noticed, when we play
games with experiences, as well as with concepts,
intentions, numbers, and events. This is why the project can
go on; indeed, why it can evolve into the central ideas of
his later work. Phenomenology, psychology, the philosophy of
mathematics, and much else, are reformulated as efforts to
untangle their particular grammar - what it makes sense to
say about these things - from the grammar of physics.
Phenomenological language turns out to be just a way of
using ordinary language without indulging the sirens of
physicalistic thinking.
It might be thought pertinent to consider what
Wittgenstein believed phenomena actually were, once he had
dropped his idea of a phenomenological language. The term
"sense-data", we have seen, he takes to be a kind of
category error, suggested by the idea that our impression of
a tree is an object like a phantom tree. Then what do we
sense, when we sense what we do? Unfortunately, it is not
clear to me that there is any good answer to this question.
Wittgenstein's whole later philosophy concerns the use of
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words. There seems to be no reason to believe that in 1930,
any more than in 1945, he had so much as an opinion on
"what” a sensation was. The very use of "what" here suggests
that we are looking yet again for an analogy with an object
or substance of some kind, whereas the whole idea is that
such endeavors are chimerical. ”1 know my method is right",
he once said; but his method was to investigate the grammar
of concepts, not to offer theories about the nature of
entities.
Above all, we should avoid the kind of endless debate
that has developed over "what" objects were in the TLP. In
that case, Wittgenstein said just enough about objects to
make it seem respectable to develop hypotheses about what he
had in mind. But whatever he had in mind, he did not commit
himself to a particular ontology of objects in the TLP; in
fact, he says that "one cannot e.g. say 'There are objects’"
(4.1272), and one ought to infer that "Objects are
universals" or some such thing would equally be nonsense.
Compare this to the later statement that we have cited
before: "Grammar says what kind of object something is". One
can no more step outside a particular language-game to
define what its objects are than one could temporarily exit
the logic of objects in the TLP to say "there are objects".
A sensation, a phenomenon, an experience, or anything else,
is just whatever our ordinary talk of such things amounts
to. Though this may not satisfy every philosopher, we must
avoid the temptation to say that, after all, Wittgenstein
must have thought sensations were something•.
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6.4

Witt9«nst«in and Philosophy

In Chapter 5 we examined Wittgenstein's critique of
logical atomism, in particular the idea that philosophy must
discover the underlying structure of language in a way that
resembled, even when it did not intentionally mimic, the
methods of science. This critique followed from the demise
of the phenomenological language project. After attempting a
logical analysis of language on purely syntactic lines, and
then a phenomenological analysis by means of direct
experience, and finding both of these enterprises to be
ultimately incoherent, Wittgenstein came to the conclusion
that something was wrong with the whole approach.
Phenomenology was not to be replaced by a third formulation
of the analytic project. But what does that leave as the
task of philosophy? And in particular, how could
Wittgenstein have gone on to fill up thousands of additional
notebook pages for another twenty years after these
disappointments?
Indeed, philosophy as originally conceived in the
analytic tradition must come to an end at this point. This
conclusion is expressed in many ways in Wittgenstein's later
work. His injunctures against theorizing, explaining, and
analyzing all lead to this conclusion; as does the idea that
all we can do is correct the damage that is done by confused
metaphysical theories and false epistemological foundations.
"Philosophy shows the misleading analogies in the use of
language'*, runs the title of Section 87 of the BigTypescript; and if one is tempted to think that this cannot
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really be the sum total of what philosophers are supposed to
do on Wittgenstein’s account, that impression may be
corrected by any number of passages in his later work,
including this one that occurs just a few remarks below this
title:
If I rectify a philosophical error and say that it has
always been conceived (vorgestellt) this way, but it is
not so, I always point to an analogy //I must always
point to...// that was followed, and that this analogy
was not correct //... I must always point to an analogy
by which one had been thinking, but which one did not
recognize as an analogy. (BT 408-9; PO 163)
This is the program for philosophy, and it is directly
opposed to metaphysics: "We lead words back from their
metaphysical to their correct use in language... And this is
what the solution of all philosophical difficulties looks
like" (ST 412; PO 167).
From this we should be able to understand the
*

relationship between Wittgenstein's discoveries in the
critique of his phenomenological language program and his
later philosophical method. We said that his fundamental
idea was that ordinary language is overrun with
physicalistic metaphors. But we have also said that this is
(as proprietors of computer software are wont to say) not a
defect but a feature. It is the strong connection between
language and practice, and the need to ground our abstract
concepts in ways that we can grasp visually and tactually,
that accounts for this feature of language. But these
metaphors tempt philosophers; they lead beyond themselves,
and philosophers follow willingly in search of analyses on
the model of scientific understanding. Philosophy, in
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Wittgenstein's later thought, convinces us to "abandon a
certain combination of words as senseless" (BT 406; PO 161) .
In several remarks in the "Philosophy" section of the Big
Typescript Wittgenstein compares his method to that of
psychoanalysis: "resistances of the will must be overcome"
(title of Section 86), he says, and the subject must be led
to acknowledge the errors that lead to one's present verbal
behavior: "what the other [person] acknowledges is the
analogy that I propose to him as the source of his thinking"
(BT 410; PO 165). Philosophy leads us away, not from defects
of language, for there are no such things, but from
following the analogies that language sets before us but
which we must not extend for philosophical purposes beyond
their natural use.
Some of the resistance to Wittgenstein's philosophy in
modern times may be attributed to the belief that if
Wittgenstein is right there must be an end to philosophy
itself. This impression is encouraged by other facets of his
later philosophy. If many of our cherished philosophical
concepts are "family resemblance" concepts it does not make
any sense to develop theories which try to specify the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the instantiation of
such concepts. If a human being following a rule is not much
like a computer carrying out a series of coded instructions
or a particle following a trajectory described in advance by
mathematical equations, then the "laws" of thought and
action are not going to be much like the laws around which
scientific theories are built. One might think, then, that
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in denying that philosophers may invent theories of
anything, Wittgenstein is really counseling us to give up
philosophy altogether. Like Marx, who is thought to have
said that we should stop interpreting the world and
concentrate on changing it10, Wittgenstein is imagined as
having deposited us at the door of ordinary language and
told us to get over our puerile obsession with philosophical
theorizing.
But Marx was probably well aware that one cannot change
the world in any meaningful way without first interpreting
it, and Wittgenstein too must have known that one cannot
offer grammatical advice without having some theoretical
conception of the nature of language. Wittgenstein's
injunctions against theorizing in philosophy are thus
misinterpreted if they are taken to mean that we should stop
thinking and talking about the nature of language and
concepts altogether; or that we should lie in wait only to
pounce on the first unsuspecting philosopher who offers an
idea about anything. We are not to construct analytical
theories on the model of science, of course. But
Wittgenstein’s own later work consists largely of what we
would ordinarily call "theories"; only the theories he
offers only purport to describe the phenomena of language
without attempting to penetrate to a hidden essence. Thus,
the idea that in many cases the meaning of a word is "its
use in the language" {PI 43), or that many concepts consist
in instances linked by "a network of similarities
overlapping and criss-crossing" {PI 32) rather than one
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essential feature, qualify as theories; only not in the
sense of finding a substructure. Instead, they are theories
that might be introduced by the preamble: "The following is
a helpful way of describing features of language that anyone
can see:... etc.” Propositions like this could be tested and
contested in certain ways, if not verified or falsified.
These “theories" could be compared to propositions about
Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit (PJ II,xi). For example, the
following theory would be helpful:
1. You can see this as a picture of a rabbit.
2. If you look at it this way you can see the long
narrow feature on the left as the ears.
This would be analogous to a "helpful" theory; it is
enlightening, but what it says could be verified by anyone
with average visual competence. But "theories" of this type
could also be rejected on various grounds: "The feature on
the left is the trunk of an elephant" would not work at all;
while a claim like, "The aspectual change represents the
artist's suppressed rage at his alcoholic mother" would be
comparable to the rejected conception of theory as a search
for hidden meanings.
Thus, in addition to the arguments offerd in Chapter 1,
we now have further reason to be reassured that we can
follow Wittgenstein without abandoning philosophy. We may be
forced to abandon some traditional philosphical enterprises:
the pursuit of a hidden order of meaning, the search for
necessary and sufficient conditions to define a concept, or
the attempt to solve problems by developing ontological
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classifications of objects. This requires a philosophical
housecleaning of the kind that occurs from time to time
anyway. This happened, for instance, in the 17th century
when many aspects of Aristotelian scholasticism were
rejected by Descartes, Hobbes, and others, or at the end of
the 19th century when associationist psychology, Hegelian
monism, and some aspects of Kancianism were rejected by
philosophers in the pragmatist and analytic schools. Such
events serve rather to keep philosophy healthy than to
initiate its demise. In fact, philosophers seem to have
adapted to much of Wittgenstein’s perspective already. It is
commonplace, for instance, to build a certain amount of
indeterminacy into one's theories to account for family
resemblances. Philosophers are more concerned today to make
their theories work for paradigm cases and to tell an
interesting story about the rest, than to engage in
comprehensive conceptual analyses. They are more likely than
before to avoid the assumption that a "law of thought" is
like a law of science, though some of what goes by the name
of "folk psychology" might persuade us otherwise. In
general, it is quite common nowadays to find even explicitly
anti-Wittgensteinian philosophers acknowledging some of the
constraints that Wittgenstein’s arguments have put on
traditional philosophical theorizing, while continuing to
construct theories in light of these constraints.
There are even a few philosophers who have recognized
to one degree or another the ideas we have focused on here.
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For instance, in an article on the philosophy of
mathematics, Arthur W. Collins writes:
The model of physical objects is very powerful. But
numbers, of course, do not exist in the manner in which
physical objects do, they do not take up space and do
not have mass, and they cannot move around. They cannot
cease to exist or lose their features. This means that
we are not to think of the existence of numbers on this
pattern. Although it is still right to say that they
exist, it is not right to think that you might look for
them and find them. This is a comment on what we mean
when we speak of the existence of numbers. It does not
mean that numbers are strange things. It just means 'Do
not look for them'.11
Or as Collins says in The Nature of Mental Things,
We readily imagine retained beliefs as stored entities
like the several contents of files where old records
are kept... In philosophy... these imaginative aids do
not function as innocent heuristic devices to which we
attach no literal significance. On the contrary, we are
very much tempted to think that the constituents of our
mental lives must be realities like the things we
imagine...12
E.D. Hirsch also demonstrated an awareness of the problem,
after comparing what he calls the "verbal meaning" of a text
(i.e., the speaker's intended public meaning) with an
iceberg (the implications of the text being the submerged
part):
Physical analogies are dangerous, but in this case the
analogy holds. The self-identity of a verbal meaning
depends on a coherence that is at least partly
analogous to physical continuity.13
But such insights into the temptations and dangers of
physicalistic analogies may well be limited to philosophers
who have been directly influenced by Wittgenstein.14 It
cannot be said that Wittgenstein's views about the
temptations of the grammar of physics and the grammatical
errors this leads to have penetrated very far. In fact it is
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difficult to imagine what philosophy would be like today if
they had. Some of his insights have found their way into
every field from aesthetics to the philosophy of science to
international law, but if our interpretation is correct,
recognition of one of his central doctrines remains rare.
Philosophers hardly ever worry about the possibility that
their views are clouded by misplaced physicalistic
analogies, or undermined by linguistic models that they may
have unconsciously adopted. Why is this?
Partly this is because this aspect of Wittgenstein’s
work has not received the emphasis that others have.
Perhaps, too, this line of thought, though fundamentally
simple, is more difficult to understand than a clearcut
conception like that of family resemblances, or the idea
that "every course of action can be made out to accord with
[a] rule" (PJ 201). But it is also conceivable that at least
a few philosophers have understood Wittgenstein’s point, and
rejected it; though if so, there is virtually nothing in the
literature that constitutes an argument against it. Let us
consider, though, some reasons why it might not have
persuaded those who have understood it.
One thing is that not only does it lack the intrinsic
appeal of more glamorous philosophical ideas; from the point
of view of philosophers who may have devoted much of their
lives to developing metaphysical or epistemological
theories, it may seem downright provocative. It sounds like
the idea is that philosophers are a rather dim lot, who
cannot tell when a metaphor has gone overboard, or who
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actually introduce confusions that were not present before.
One reading of Wittgenstein's remarks makes it seem that
philosophy as traditionally practised not only does not
solve philosophical problems but creates them where
everything was perfectly in order before. This suggests that
the most interesting philosophical debates have no real
solutions, and this is a result that would make most
philosophers feel that they have been wasting their breath.
We might read him differently. Perhaps he is only
saying that philosophy cannot solve the confusions that
arise when we look at ordinary language analytically,
because philosophers have not understood that the problems
only occur when the wrong linguistic models are applied to a
particular area. Every kind of discourse, from ordinary
conversation to judicial decisions and scientific theory,
employs rational methods of argument; but rational methods
often apparently lead to contradictions which then require
resolution. In philosophy these contradictions usually occur
in our analysis of concepts: e.g., the concept of a soul, of
causality, infinity, meaning, justice, or art. But
philosophers lose their way because they don't see the real
origins of the problems, which are, according to
Wittgenstein, in the nature of our language and our need to
extend it to meet new needs. Where a specialized grammar is
already being stretched they tend to stretch it more, not
realizing that each model works best when applied only to a
specific field of discourse. It is alright to think of a
belief or expectation as a mental "state"; we will find we
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need some physical metaphor or other to describe it
eventually. But philosophers pursue the analogy and end up
with something like the idea of "thought as a gaseous
medium".
Unfortunately, though it somewhat ameliorates the sense
of gloom about the pursuit of solutions to philosophical
problems, this perspective leads to another uncomfortable
conclusion: that the only correct method of doing philosophy
is to do it exactly as Wittgenstein did. Most philosophers
believe their own theories are correct and that everyone
should believe them; but no one has ever before suggested
that everyone else must use their method. It is as if
accepting the validity of Wittgenstein's method would mean
that all efforts at originality were useless. This might
explain why there is more sympathy for some of his
conclusions than for his grammatical method. Nevertheless,
even if his method is correct it is an invalid conclusion
that one could not adopt it without becoming a kind of
philosophical clone. This would be comparable to the idea
that anyone who adopted Arnold Schoenberg's twelve-tone
method in musical composition could not have had an original
method or style of his own; which is disproved even by the
music of Schoenberg's own pupils, such as Anton Webern and
Alban Berg. One could take up Wittgenstein's grammatical
conception of philosophy and apply it in original ways, as
many students of his have done15.
But there is one obvious possible cause for resistance
even for those who have understood his idea and who are not
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intimidated by its implications, and that is that
Wittgenstein is simply wrong. Our entire discussion so far
has been directed towards explaining his point of view and
defending its importance in his philosophy. Let us conclude,
then, by considering the merits of his idea.
6.5

Was Wittgenstein Right?

"Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of
our understanding by means of our language" (PI 109), says
Wittgenstein. We have asserted that behind this thesis lies
the belief that language is predisposed to represent
everything in terms of physicalistic relations and objects,
and that philosophical problems arise out of our failure to
recognize and avoid this tendency to express everything in
physicalistic terms. Moreover, we have said above that this
is all there is to philosophical perplexity: it is all based
on errors of grammar, and these are overwhelmingly of the
physicalistic sort. Can this be correct? Or is it a vast
oversimplification of the sources of philosophical
puzzlement?
Let us identify the idea that some sources of
philosophical perplexity are due to misapplied physicalistic
grammar as the Weak version of the argument, and the idea
that all such sources are due to such misapplications as the
Strong version. It seems to me that the Weak version is
closely related to a more general philosophical view that is
neither new nor particularly controversial, the idea that
the misuse of language is a source of error in philosophy.
This is arguably already a feature of Aristotle’s
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philosophy, for instance; the Categories and de
Interpretations can easily be understood as attempts to head
off such errors, and his criticisms of Plato's theory of
Forms seem at once logical arguments and arguments about the
use of words ("since things are said to be 'good' in as many
ways as they are said to be... clearly the good cannot be
something universally present in all cases and
single...")16. But the idea becomes explicit no later than
Hobbes, who makes a big point of it. Both Hobbes and
Berkeley, moreover, consistently identify the use of
metaphor and analogy as the specific way in which
philosophical errors arise. Around the time Wittgenstein
developed his ideas, there was also a quite prominent
tendency to identify the lack of adequate definitions as a
prime source of philosophical confusion; this is explicitly
emphasized, for instance, by Ogden and Richards in The
Meaning of Meaning, and by the New Realists in The New
Realism17. This seems to be inspired by similar
considerations about grammatical confusion and illicit word
transfers between distinct conceptual realms. In itself,
therefore, the belief that errors of "grammar" account for
many philosophical confusions is widely held. It may be that
the appeal of this view has more to do with intuition and
experience than with rigorous argument. But any argument for
it would come down to an interpretation of why a particular
philosopher makes a particular kind of error, and that has
to finally rest on things like our feeling for language and
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background assumptions about its use. That does not seem to
be a good reason not to give it serious consideration.
Wittgenstein's particular argument for this idea, and
thus the Weak version of his thesis, may be reconstructed as
follows:
(1) Ordinary language is primarily constructed around
the physicalistic mode of expression.
(2) Because ordinary language is constructed around the
physicalistic mode of expression we often use this mode
of expression for nonphysical concepts, by applying
physicalistic terms metaphorically.
(3) When we apply physicalistic expressions
metaphorically we tend to lose sight of the metaphor,
whereupon we discover (or generate) philosophical
problems by extending the physicalistic grammar of the
transferred expressions to the nonphysical concepts we
are investigating.
Let us consider these theses independently. With regard
to (1) I can find no direct precedent for Wittgenstein's
view. Wittgenstein does not provide any specific argument
for it, and it would seem that the only way to demonstrate
it would be to proceed by cases, showing in one case after
another that common discourses are built around
physicalistic expressions and spatiotemporal metaphors. An
effort in this direction can be found in the above-mentioned
work of Lakoff and Johnson. They defend the idea of what
they call the "systematicity" of metaphors, i.e., that we
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maintain the semantic relations between terms when we use
them metaphorically. For instance:
CONSCIOUS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN
Get up. Wake up. I ’m up already. He rises early in
the morning. He fell asleep. He dropped off to
sleep. He's under hypnosis. He sank into a coma.
Physical basis: Humans and most other mammals sleep
lying down and stand up when they waken.18
From this example both the strength and weakness of the
thesis can be seen. It is an interesting fact, at least,
that we sometimes apply orientational concepts to states of
consciousness. On the other hand (a) all of the above
examples of "UP" metaphors look as much like literal
references to standing up as metaphorical references to
gaining consciousness, and (b) there are many other ways we
talk about conscious states that do not clearly employ
orientatonal metaphors at all. To be conscious "of"
something might imply nothing more than the "aboutness" of
consciousness. Perhaps, though, an argument could be made to
the effect that virtually all prepositions have some
original spatiotemporal significance.
This suggests that more work needs to be done if (1) is
to be convincingly demonstrated. But I see no reason to
doubt that this effort would meet with considerable success.
How hard would it be to show that most of our talk about
consciousness centers around spatiotemporal orientation if
we include not just "up/down" metaphors but "inner/outer"
metaphors, metaphors related to geometrical and pictorial
form (mental "images", "clear” ideas), metaphors related to
tactual relations ("having", "grasping" or "rejecting" an
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idea, "rough" ideas), and of course the mereological
metaphors of composition and decomposition we discussed in
Chapter 5? The fact that most of the metaphors we are
talking about are "dead" metaphors19 does not undermine the
thesis but in fact supports it, for it shows how deep in the
structure of language these metaphorical expressions are
embedded. So there seem to be reasons to think that this
thesis could be demonstrated if someone were inclined to
make the arduous effort of investigating our language
thoroughly.
Nevertheless, it bears mentioning that although (1)
certainly is part of Wittgenstein's system of ideas, it is
not necessary to hold it in order to demonstrate (3), i.e.,
that we tend to make grammatical mistakes when we adopt the
physicalistic mode of expression for abstract or nonmaterial
concepts. For this could be the case whether or not language
was particularly oriented towards the physical. We could
remove the first clause of (2) (call this (2*)), and make an
independent argument for (2') and (3). This would remove one
source of support for (2') but not every conceivable reason
for holding it.
In any case, let us assume that the antecedent of (2)
has some merit and consider the consequent, that we often
utilize physicalistic terms metaphorically (or through some
other linguistic trope - metonymy, etc.) to describe or
understand the nonphysical. Though it is hardly a common
idea, it is not completely without precedent, as is shown in
the following historical synopsis by David E. Cooper:
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Hegel thought that metaphors were originally required
by people to represent "mental” (geistig) phenomena in
terms of the "sensory" (sinnlich) phenomena which,
necessarily, their understanding had first encompassed.
Vico thought differently: metaphorizing the mental in
terms of the physical was a fairly late development, in
an age "in which philosophies had begun to become more
refined" .20
Though Hegel’s reference is to "'sensory' phenomena" he
clearly does not mean that we cognize the mental in terms of
other mental experience but in terms of things we interact
with through our senses. Vico's disagreement would only make
Wittgenstein's thesis a later development; both seem to
agree that we understand conceptual things in terms of
physical objects or relations.
Though (2) clearly represents a development of the
argument that begins with (1), it is not so clear what kind
of additional support is needed for it if (1) is accepted.
For if it is true that language itself is physicalistically
oriented, it is true precisely because we often express much
more than physical relations by means of physically-oriented
language. So expressing some nonphysical concepts in
physicalistic terms will be a virtual necessity, imposed by
the fact that language, and to the degree that our mental
capacities are language-dependent cognition too, does not
have the internal complexity to maintain completely distinct
modes of expression for all types of discourse. Indeed, how
could this fail to be the case? For if we ask ourselves how
fine-grained language would have to be to maintain such
distinctions, it seems obvious that it could not be
psychologically manageable and at the same time avoid
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cutting across conceptual lines altogether. What would
language be like if, for instance, we had a completely
independent pool of prepositions to express the relations of
concepts, ideas, intentions, etc. to minds and brains
(instead of "in" the head ideas would be "shmin" the head,
lunatics would be "shmout" of their heads, etc.)? Would we
need another set for numbers, and one for colors? Would we
be able to express the relationships between these
prepositions and physicalistic ones, or would we need
another set to do that, and so on?
Moreover, how could we be certain that language
contained the right distinctions if it did cut so finely?
Perhaps some natural languages would make distinctions along
conceptual lines that others did not recognize, just as
English has separate words for "mind" and "spirit" while in
German and French the same term is normally employed (Geist
or esprit). Moreover, the finer distinctions would not
necessarily eliminate philosophical problems generated by
analogies from one conceptual domain to another (assuming
for the moment that such problems exist); the same problems
could arise in different ways, e.g., it might be proposed
that there are relations that the finer-grained language
does not capture (rather than distinctions that it glosses
over) , and this would be considered a philosophical problem
in that system.
It seems, then, that language can never be more than a
rough guide to conceptual or philosophical distinctions, and
therefore that it can be pretty much taken for granted that
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language will favor some modes of expression and deemphasize others. Moreover, speaking from the point of view
of a fictional creator of language, there is at least one
obvious argument for making physical relations the bedrock
of all others in language: they are the ones whose
expression and understanding have the most survival value,
and therefore we master these techniques most thoroughly. In
addition, a very large percentage of our mental apparatus is
devoted to visual perception; but this is primarily oriented
towards discriminating physical objects and their motions.
Hence physicalistic models also have a ready advantage in
being the easiest to visualize.
Thus it seems to me that if we acknowledge the
likelihood that (1) is correct, we have little choice but to
accept (2) as well. The whole matter then comes down to (3),
i.e., to the question: does the use of physicalistic models
or metaphors pose a problem? Does it lead to errors? Or are
the results of using such models in some way protected from
error by the fact that physicalistic analogy is prescribed
by language itself, that it is our easiest way of handling
abstract concepts, and that it is in any case unavoidable?
No support for Wittgenstein is likely to come from
theories of metaphor on this point, especially not from
Lakoff and Johnson. There is a general conviction among
those who have studied metaphor that it is as integral to
language as literal speech is, and the idea of it being a
"problem" to follow a metaphor is replaced by the idea that
this is how new meanings get created. Thus I think the
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question turns on one's view of the specific instances of
the putative fallacies discussed in Wittgenstein's
manuscripts and lectures: for example, those that are
supposed to show that we misconstrue visual space or
infinity or other nonphysical domains by following
physicalistic models. Many of these examples have been
presented above, especially in Chapters 1, 2, and 5. As
should be obvious from our discussion, I believe that at
least some of these examples are convincing, and most of
them ring a bell. To deny this would be to assert that,
e.g., the picture of the mind as a closed container for
mental objects has never or rarely misled philosophers. But
problems about mind-body interaction and knowledge of other
minds do not arise from ordinary logical falacies; something
more subtle must be going on or these problems would not
persist for centuries. Its own self-description suggests
that physicalistic assumptions played a large role in the
language of logical “atomism" and helped generate a false
conception of meaning that captured the imagination of some
of the best philosophers of the early 20th century. Just as
in the sciences a wrong model (or picture) can be the basis
of much more significant and lasting errors than an
erroneous equation, so it would seem that in philosophy it
must sometimes be the case that the difficulties we face lie
in the basic assumptions on which our models are based.
Thus I take the Weak version of Wittgenstein's thesis
to be basically correct. It is certainly sometimes the case
that we are misled by physicalistic analogies, and that one
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reason we are is that we are most comfortable with - our
language and thought most easily accommodates - the
representation of both concrete and abstract things in terms
of physicalistic relations. Let us proceed, though, to some
additional considerations that might help us put this result
in context.
Wittgenstein's insight, if we accept it as I have
proposed, has some obvious application to traditional
epistemology. Much of the exposition we have given it has
had a roughly Cartesian or Lockian view of the mind as a
kind of silent nemesis; the differences over innate ideas
are less important than the strong inner/outer emphasis in
both empiricist and rationalist epistemology. Why, then,
would the difficulty have gone unnoticed for so long, until
Wittgenstein pointed it out? I think the answer lies in the
fact that the orientation in the philosophy of mind,
language, phenomenology, logic and mathematics in the early
20th century created especially fertile ground for
recognizing the problem. For one thing, it seemed quite
promising at the time to construe formal logic as a general
foundation for philosophy. At the core of the logical
Weltanschauung was the analysis of the declarative sentences
of natural language into "object" and "concept". Now, it is
inherent in the syntactic nature of formal logic that at
least in first-order propositions semantics has no effect on
syntax; that is, the exact same formal moves can be applied
regardless of what terms stand in the object position. Frege
says in "Ober Sinn und Bedeutung", "Places, instants,
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stretches of time, logically considered, are objects; hence
the linguistic designation of a definite place, a definite
instant, or a stretch of time is to be regarded as a proper
name."21 In the Grundgesetze he adds, "I count as objects
everything that is not a function, e.g., numbers, truthvalues, and... value-ranges"22. Russell, too was quite
explicit about this:
Points, instants, bits of matter, particular states of
mind, and particular existents generally, are things in
the above sense, and so are many terms which do not
exist, for example, the points in a non-Euclidean space
and the pseudo-existents of a novel. All classes, it
would seem, as numbers, men, spaces, etc., when taken
as single terms, are things...23
Note the contrast of "particular existents generally" with
"terms which do not exist". Russell held that anything that
could be referred to had "being" but only some had
"existence": "Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras
and four-dimensional space all have being, for if they were
not entities of a kind we could make no propositions about
them.1,24
Now, this conception of logic is not in itself a
misplaced metaphor; one may begin to be suspicious when
Russell talks about the "being" of numbers and chimeras, but
that is not the point. The very strong emphasis on the
logical equality of all sorts of objects, at least until
these are complex enough to generate the self-reference
paradoxes to which Russell's theory of types was addressed,
was a necessary step in the development of formal logic. But
it virtually demanded that some work be done to reassert the
underlying difference between what can be formally asserted
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of any object whatsoever insofar as it is merely taken as an
individual, i.e., insofar as it can be manipulated according
to syntactic rules, and what can be asserted of each
particular type of object once the semantics of the names is
brought back into consideration. This work begins with
Wittgenstein's assertion in SRLF that various simple
subject-predicate sentences have different logical forms. At
that point the project of examing the variety of logical
spaces was initiated. Such a project could not but lead at
some point to consideration of the relationship between the
most obvious conceptual space, that of physical objects and
relations, and the rest of what we talk about.
Another factor, or group of related factors, has to do
with phenomenology. Russell thought sense-data were a part
of the physical world. This seems ontologically extravagant,
though of course he had his arugments for it. His theory of
descriptions though, which had been a model of philosophical
theory for Wittgenstein, was directed largely against
Meinong, who of course had proposed glamorous objects of all
sorts to account for what seemed to be nonreferring
expressions ("the golden mountain"). Mach, James and the New
Realists had proposed various substances as the material of
both the physical and the mental: "elements" (Mach) , "pure
experience" (James), or "neutral stuff" (Holt and Russell).
At the same time these philosophers had tried to back away
from these substances, suggesting in the same breath that
such terms were essentially pleonastic. Other examples could
be found, such as Russell’s realism about relations in the
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Theory of Knowledge and Moore's version of ethical realism.
All of this betrays a general confusion, not in the mind of
any one philosopher but in the general philosophical
Zeitgeist: philosophers tended to gravitate towards
realistic hypotheses about entities and substances to solve
philosophical problems, while being generally intolerant of
extravagant ontologies. This suggests nothing so much as
that philosophy was in the grip of a model that was
straining at the seams, and yet philosophers could only see
this model from the inside and so continued to repeat its
basic ideas. The physical world is composed of objects which
are composed of matter which is just connected particles.
Scientific problems are solved by discovering what these are
and what laws they obey. Philosophy in the early 20th
century depended on analogies from this model for many of
its basic ideas. But the situation was ripe for a
Wittgenstein to come along and reveal the model and the
fallacy of reasoning from it.
There are other trends that lead to the same
conclusion. Probably the main one is in the philosophy of
mathematics, especially the theory of infinity and
continuity. Brouwer's provocative denial of the law of the
exlcuded middle25 caused a good deal of ferment just before
Wittgenstein began his manuscripts. We will not rehearse
again Wittgenstein’s arguments against the notion of
infinity as an unimaginably large collection of objects or a
string that never stops. The only point here is that these
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fallacies too were not just historical problems but were
very much a part of the intellectual milieu.
In short, taking all these trends together makes it
seem less odd that Wittgenstein should have reached the
conclusion he did. There were enough threads to lead
Wittgenstein in the direction he went. What was needed in
addition was a bit of inspiration and a lot of stamina for
withstanding the temptation to go (or keep going, after the
TLP) in the same direction. Wittgenstein had a sufficient
amount of both.

We return at last to the Strong version of
Wittgenstein's idea. It consists of adding a fourth
proposition to (1>-(3) above:
(4) All (or very nearly all) philosphical problems are
a result of (3) .
I can think of only one source of supoort fpr this idea: the
more general belief that all philosophical problems are
linguistic in nature, and that philosophy of language can
solve every philosophical difficulty. The thesis can be
taken descriptively, in which case it says that philosophy
of language is the Rosetta stone that philosophers have long
sought to untangle the traditional difficulties for which
the primitive tools of metaphysics and epistemology were
formerly used. It can also be taken prescriptively, in which
case it is equivalent to saying that we should not call
anything a philosophical problem if it cannot be solved (is
logically immune to being solved) by the philosophy of
349
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language. If the philosophy of language is the source of all
philosophical solutions it is always conceivable that
Wittgenstein’s grammatical philosophy is the right way to
approach it.
I do not propose to spend much time studying this
position. It seems prima facie obvious that not all
philosophical problems are pseudoproblems, to be untangled
when the linguistic errors are revealed. It may be that all
problems have linguistic components that require
clarification, but this does not mean they will disappear
when the clearest possible language is employed. In any
case, it certainly does not seem warranted to say that all
or nearly all such clarifications must reveal an
overextended physicalistic analogy. I doubt that the problem
of consciousness is amenable to such treatment. Neither is
the Gettier problem. Nor are virtually any problems in
applied ethics based on misapplications of physicalistic
thinking. It is possible that some problems in aesthetics
can be seen this way, such as some problems about fictional
characters; but questions about art and expression or
emotion are not likely to be alleviated by such methods.
Wittgenstein's dependence on the idea expounded here plays
very little role in his own discussion of Moore’s "proof" of
an external world in On Certainty. Perhaps these are not the
kinds of problems Wittgenstein had in mind; but if the point
is not applied universally it is not clear where the lines
should be drawn. Not every philosophical problem can be
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expressed in as neat a form as the Sorites paradox. Thus the
Strong version of the argument cannot be correct.
But it would be unfair to conclude this essay on such a
note. It is rare in philosophy that someone comes up with a
new method for solving a wide variety of problems.
Wittgenstein's idea, if it has significant applications,
stands in something like the position of Platonic dialogue,
Aristotelian logic, Humian skepticism, Hegelian dialectic
and Fregean analysis. It is a new way of doing philosophy,
and one that over the course of history may turn out to put
certain kinds of problems, and with them certain ways of
thinking, behind us. Wittgenstein's ideas about the grammar
of physics deserve to be put in the company of great
philosophical ideas. All such ideas begin with a simple
insight which gathers force from the variety of ways it can
be applied. That is what Wittgenstein did with the notion of
a grammar of physics.
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NOTZS
1. This observation is almost certainly directed against the
following passage from Russell's Principles of Mathematics,
or a similar passage of Russell’s:
[P]articular classes, except when they happen to be
finite, can only be defined intensionally, i.e., as the
objects denoted by such and such concepts. I believe
this distinction to be purely psychological: logically,
the extensional definition appears to be equally
applicable to infinite classes, but practically, if we
were to attempt it, Death would cut short our laudable
endeavor before it had attained its goal. Logically,
therefore, extension and intension seem to be on a par.
(6,#71; p.69)
Wittgenstein, as we explained in Chapter 1, thought the
extensional definition was a conceptual error, not an
empirical impossibility.
2. Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p.25. Some of
the elipses remove a point that is important to Lakoff and
Johnson's thesis but not, so far as I can see, to
Wittgenstein's: that the ultimate basis of our physicalism
is our sense of our own bodies as discrete, bounded,
physical entities.
3. They do credit Wittgenstein's concept of family
resemblances with influencing certain aspects of their work,
but their discussion of influences suggests that the present
citation was more influenced by psychologists like Jean
Piaget and J. J. Gibson (see Metaphors We Live By, pp. xixii) .
4. See Harry P. Reeder, "Wittgenstein Never Was a
Phenomenologist".
5. Wittgenstein wrote to Russell in 1913:
I was very interested to hear your views about matter,
although I cannot imagine your way of working from
sense-data forward. Mach writes such a horrid style
that it makes me nearly sick to read him; however, I am
very glad that you think so much of a countryman of
mine. (LRKM 20; dated by Russell January 1913)
In this passage Wittgenstein refers to Russell's sympathy
for Mach's phenomenalism (this was several months before
Russell set out to refute neutral monism in his Theory of
Knowledge). He clearly rejects the idea of it and then
indicates he has read Mach, though he does not say what.
Since he refers in various places to Mach’s "thought
experiments" and to his drawing of his room it is usually
assumed that he read The Analysis of Sensations, though it
352
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

could conceivably have been Erkenntnis und Irrtum, where
"thought experiments" are discussed in more detail but the
phenomenalism is more in the background.
6. See Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Karl Menger
correctly points out that Lenin overindulges a comparison of
Mach with Berkeley, mainly in an effort to discredit him
(Menger, Reminiscences..., p.21). Mach's tremendous
influence in Austria and beyond is an establsihed fact of
intellectual history; for references relevant to the present
material see Menger, Reminiscences, p.23; and Janik and
Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna, p.133.
7. Worship of formal logic was in fact one of the hallmarks
of this trend. References to logic, formal logic, the logic
of relations and logical analysis abound in the collection
of writings published as The New Realism, including in their
original manifesto, the "Program and platform of six
realists" (The New Realism, pp. 471-480) . Edwin Holt bases
much of his theory in The Concept of Consciousness on
mathematical logic. No wonder Russell found that he could
live with this philosophy after all.
8. Husserl associates his "Regions" with Kant's categories
and hence his "regional axioms" with synthetic a priori
judgements (Ideas #16). He is far from making this an
important thrust of the work, though, and it is somewhat
curious that Wittgenstein responds to Schlick's question as
if he must have had Husserl in mind. Perhaps this reflects
some prior conversations which were not recorded in WK.
9. Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, p.vi.
10. See Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", #11, in Marx and
Engels (1968) p.30. This manuscript was found in Marx’s
Nachlass and published posthumously by Engels, who calls it
"notes hurriedly scribbled down for later elaboration,
absolutely not intended for publication..." ("Ludwig
Feuerbach and the End of German Classical Philosophy",
p.595) .
11. Arthur W. Collins, "On the Question 'Do Numbers
Exist?'", pp.35-6.
12. Arthur W. Collins, The Nature of Mental Things, p.x.
13. E.D. Hirsch, Vailidity in Interpretation, p.54.
14. Collins says, "I am most influenced by Wittgenstein"
(The Nature of Mental Things, p.xviii) . Hirsch's book
displays Wittgenstein's influence throughout; by combining
lessons from the TLP and the PI, particularly the ideas that
meanings must be determinate and that they are publicly
available, he reaches the unusual position of having a
Wittgensteinian yet largely Platonistic conception of
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meaning. Thus he defines a "verbal meaning" as a "willed
type" where the "type" is sharable (p.48).
15. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.T. Geach, Norman Malcolm, Gilbert
Ryle, Stephen Toulmin and John Wisdom are all examples of
this. But there are others whose work owes a great deal to
Wittgenstein who did not study with him or purport to be
disciples but whose use of his ideas is integral to their
work. I believe there are many of these philosophers; the
most prominent ones who come to mind at the moment are N.R.
Hanson, E.D. Hirsch and Kendall Walton.
16. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1096a.
17. See Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, pp. 15,
111, 121-131 and elsewhere; The New Realism, pp.22-3.
18. Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p.15.
19. From this metaphor we can also see that we talk about
language in systematic metaphors: we speak of dead
languages, of the growth of language, of vivid expressions.
For an examination of metaphors of language as economic
value see Jacques Derrida, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the
Text of Philosophy".
20. David E. Cooper, Metaphor, pp.140-1.
21. Frege, "On Sinn and Bedeutung", p.164.
22. Frege, Grundgesetze V.I, 1,2, in Beaney (1997) p.213.
23. Russell, Principles of Mathematics, #48, p.45. In this
context we should also take note of the terminology of G.E.
Moore, e.g., in "The Refutation of Idealism": "Any sensation
or idea is a 'thing, ' and what I have called its object is
the quality of this thing" (p.23).
24. Russell, Principles of Mathematics, #427; p.449. This
entire section of the Principles, which is directed against
Lotze, is an exposition of Russell’s realism.
25. See Brouwer, "Mathematik, Wissenschaft und Sprache".
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APPENDIX It WXTGSNSTKXM ON 8UBJSCT-FRZDXCATK FORM
The following three sets of passages are found at three
different points in Wittgenstein's 1929-30 manuscripts. Much
of this material has not been previously translated or
published (other than in the Wiener Ausgabe) . These passages
constitute an ongoing examination of the use of subjectpredicate form in analysis, as practised by both Frege and
Russell. In the first set of remarks, much of what he says
is inspired by an effort to come up with an original theory
of numbers. This project is pursued on and off in Band I and
Band II, after which his interest in it fades rapidly.
Wittgenstein characterizes his theory as "extensionalist"
but it clearly has intensionalist components too. To
summarize it very briefly, he holds that a number is a
property of the objects picked out by a concept rather than
a property of the concept itself, as Frege held. The concept
is necessary to pick out the objects, but the objects it
picks out have whatever number they have independently of
the concept. This should be enough to understand the context
of at least the first two sets of remarks. But the interest
of the remarks lies less in their relationship to
Wittgenstein's theory of numbers than in their exploration
of the fundamental assumptions behind the concept of
analysis.
Though Wittgenstein explores subject-predicate form in
many different ways, his critical thoughts on the matter
center on one general theme: the effect on our thinking
about the logical forms of sentences that comes out of
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treating every grammatical substantive in the same way. It
is clear that Wittgenstein thinks this is misleading. His
reasons for this are initially given in SRLF, in a passage
drawn from some of the remarks below. But the remarks here
do not constitute an argument so much as an investigation.
Their importance is twofold. First, they are one path by
which he reached his grammatical philosophy, in which it is
essential to distinguish the grammar of each "space" in
spite of the superficial similarity of the subject-predicate
sentences that have sense in different spaces. Second, in
questioning whether nouns that denote processes, events, and
"complexes" in general, as well as those that denote sounds,
colors, and physical objects can all be treated in the same
way he moves a step closer to seeing that philosophical
problems arise when we take the grammar of all substantives
on the model of the grammar of physical objects.
It is useful to compare these remarks not only with
SRLF but with a later series of remarks, many of which were
eventually collected into a short typescript called "Complex
and Fact", which was printed as an Appendix to both the PR
and the PG. The original remarks are found near the end of
Wittgenstein’s Band VI manuscript; see WA 111,302,7 111,304,9. In these remarks Wittgenstein complains of the
problem of transposing the physical conception of a
"complex" onto the concept of a "fact", and says, "The root
of this muddle is the confusing use of the word 'object'"
(WA 111,304,8; Pi? p.303; PG p.201). The intimate
relationship of these remarks to the passages on subject356
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predicate form below is confirmed by the fact that
Wittgenstein clipped "Complex and Fact" together with a
typescript called "Concept and Object, Property and
Substrate" (PG pp.202-7; see von Wright’s comment on p.489)
which contains several of the remarks printed below. The two
typescripts were in fact attached to a third, called
"Objects", and the three were given consecutive paging;
together they look very much like the beginning of a
critique of the TLP. Thus another measure of the importance
of the following remarks is that they lead to a critique of
Wittgenstein's earlier philosophy that is explicitly
informed by the central idea we have been discussing: that
taking the grammar of physical objects to be a model for all
language leads to philosophical confusion. That is of course
one of the main lessons of the opening of the PI as well.

S1RZKS 1
Wiener Ausgabei 1,63,4 - 1,66,1
Manuscript: Band II pp.109, 111, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120
Published works: SRLF; PR IX,93,118-9
Date: March 1929 (roughly)
WA I,63
4
Let’s think of two planes; on Plane I are figures which
we want to depict (abbilden) on Plane 2 through some
projection method. Then we have the possibility of
determining a projection method (for example, that of
orthogonal projection) and then to interpret the pictures on
Plane 2 corresponding to this method of depiction. But we
can also follow a completely different course: we determine,
for instance, on some ground that the pictures in Plane 2
should all be circles whatever the figures in Plane 1 might
be. That is, different figures in Plane 1 will be depicted
through different projection methods in Plane 2. And then to
understand the circles in 2 as pictures I would have to say
of each circle which projection method belongs to it. But
the mere fact that a figure in 2 is represented as a circle
would say nothing at all. - So it goes with reality if we
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depict it in subject-predicate sentences. That we use
subject-predicate sentences is only a matter of our
symbolism (Zeichengebung),* the subject-predicate form is in
itself not yet a Logical Form and it is a means of
expression of innumerable fundamentally different logical
forms like the circles on Plane 2. The sentences: "The clock
is round", "The man is tall”, "The patch is red", "The
picture is beautiful", have in their form nothing in common.
5
If my theory is correct that objects with the
multiplicity of real numbers enter into elementary
propositions this points to a more general conception of
number - like Frege’s and Russell's - as I myself already
had. I said then that numbers followed from the concept of a
calculus, and there is certainly something in that.
WA 1,64
1
Naturally one difficulty of the Fregean theory is the
generality of the words "concept" and "object". For since
one can count tables and sounds and vibrations and thoughts
and trials, it is difficult to bring all of them under one
roof (unter einen Hut zu bringen)1.
2
Concept and object, but that is predicate and subject2.
And we have just said that subject-predicate is not a
[single] logical form.
------------------- [PJ? #93 ends here.]---------------3
Now one could first show that each sentence must be
able to be represented as a subject-predicate sentence, for
if I pick out one from among their objects I can call that
the subject and everything else the predicate. (That means I
can write it in the manner: "f(x)".)
4
But that in itself would still not be general enough
for the application of the cardinal numbers, for I can after
all even count complexes (events, etc.).
5
Though that only means that there is even a subjectpredicate sentence in which the subject is some complex of
objects.
6
The question would now be, for instance, whether
everything can be the subject, or only determinate forms. But can't we count some tension the complexes have in common
with one another that makes them subjects?
7
Then can't a subject-predicate sentence generally be
formed thus: I write any sentence at all in the form "F(A)"
in which under "F(D" I understand any variable which can be
formed out of it, under "<I>(A)" those other variables which
complete the sentence "F(A) " for the first.
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8
And here the equivalent is to give up the one-sided
method of writing (Schreibweise), and to write "FA" or AB,
where now both signs are equally justified.
9
But how is it: I can just as well count the properties
that one object has as the objects that have one property?
WA 1,65
1
There appears to be a certain difference there. For as
it appears through logical multiplication or addition any
sentence at all can enter in the predicate but not in the
subject.
f(a) & p
2
On the other hand can't I form just as general a
subject when I say something of a process or of a fact?
(For instance: "I am pleased (at the fact that, etc.)")
3
A language which existed partly out of written signs
but partly in that one would move these signs through space
in a determinate way.
4
Does it make sense to say: "In one place is only one
color at a time"? That is obviously a tautology if one
determines the sense as coordinated with “and”; in the other
case it is nonsense.
5
Is the most general situation that: I have a
propositional variable (Satzvariable) and count the values
that make it into a true proposition^] Or in other words I
count the true values of the variables.3
6
(Then I could also say: I always count the true
propositions of a determinate form.)
7
Instead of saying "there are two objects which have
this property (Eigenschaft) " one should really say "there
are two which possess (besitzen) this property". (That it is
an object is self-evident.)
8
I can say: wherever I have a propositional variable I
can form (bilden) a subject-predicate proposition. But where
I have a subject-predicate representation I also have a
number (Anzahl) in the Fregean sense. So generally do we
actually use them in our language when we form predicates,
concepts, as I have just now enumerated (aufgezMhlt) them.4
9
As I once described my theory of numbers: the Fregean
theory repelled me because it seems to me too specialized
(speziell). This error disappears when one apprehends the
subject-predicate proposition in its full generality.
WA 1,66

359
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1
(Nevertheless there remains with me an uneasiness that
would disappear if I could get hold of another theory that
would not help itself to the subject-predicate concept.)
SSRXIS 2
Wiener Ausgabe: 11,8,2 - 11,9,5
Manuscript: Band III pp.10-14
Date: mid-1929.
WA 11,8
2
If ones looks at addition as an event in the
propositional form, what is the most general way it occurs?
3
My opposition to the Fregean interpretation was always
that it appeared to me to be too specialized.
And that comes out of this, that not every numerical
statement is the statement of a real function.
4
"There are four men in this room", "In my visual field
are four red circles." In order for "x is a red circle" to
have sense x must already be [of] the logical form of a
color patch in my visual field. (And analogously for the
first sentence.) It seems to me that this theory of numbers
is just a remnant of the subject-predicate theory of
sentences (or should I only say: that it is immediately
connected with this.)
5
This is how I feel: In our ordinary language each
numerical statement is the statement of a concept, that is,
of a predicate, but I believe that the most [widely] varying
logical structures are disguised by this predicate form, and
that only through an artificial method of representation can
it appear as if we were dealing with concepts here.
-------------------vi, 115} ---------------------6
Not even a certain generality is essential to a
numerical statement. If I say e.g. "I see three circles of
equal size arranged equidistant from one another."

7
If I give a correct description of the visual field in
which three red circles stand on a blue ground, there
certainly would not enter into this the expression
"(Ex,y,z) : x e circular and red & y e circular and red etc."
360
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8
The typical thing is that in the propositional form
F(n) I must be able to insert one number after another [for
underlining (? - seems like a transcription error)] and
every time the proposition must through this insertion alone
receive a completely determinate sense. {Not in PR 115}
MA 11,9
1
Admittedly one could write: There are three circles
which have the property of being red. But here enters the
distinction between the figurative [uneigentlichen] objects,
color patches in the visual field, tones, etc. etc. and the
elements of knowledge, the real objects.
It stands out that the proposition about the three
circles does not have the generality or the indeterminacy
that a proposition of the form (Exyz) 0x & 0y & 0z
possesses. Namely, in this case one can say: I really know
that three things have the property 0, but I don’t know
which [ones].
In the case of the 3 circles one cannot say that.
"There are now three red circles of such and such size
and position in my visual field" completely determines the
fact and it would be nonsense to say, I still don't know
which circle it is [PR: "circles they are"].
2
[If] we think of "objects" like a stroke of lightning,
the simultaneous occurence of two events, the intersection
of a straight line with a circle, etc. for all these cases
the 3 circles in the visual field are an example.
3
Naturally one can interpret the subject-predicate, or
what is the same thing, the argument-function form, as a
norm of representation and chen it is admittedly important
and characteristic that in each case when we use numbers the
number may be represented as the property of a predicate.
Only we must be clear in that case that we now have nothing
to do with objects and concepts, as the result of an
analysis (Zerlegung) , but rather with norms into which we
have squeezed the proposition. And it has of course a
significance that it can be brought under these norms. But
this squeezing-into-a-norm is the opposite of an analysis
(Analyse). Just as in order to study the natural growth of
an apple tree, one does not look at an espalier tree, unless
it is to see how this tree holds up under this constraint
[Zwang).
4
That one can count the coincidence of trials and lunar
eclipses, admittedly says that we have a concept of logical
form, but naturally it does not show that we are in
possession of a |logical| analysis of these events. That is
to say, that the Fregean theory of numbers is applicable so
long as we do not intend an analysis of propositions. This
theory explains the concept of number for the form of
expression of ordinary language. {Not in PR 115}
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5
Frege, though, would have said (I recall in a
discussion) that the coincidence of a lunar eclipse and a
trial would be an object. And what is the matter with that
(was ist dagegen einzuwenden)? Only that we then use the
word "object" in an ambiguous way (in zweideutiger Weise
verwenden, lit. "with a double meaning") and thus confuse
the results of the logical analysis.
-------------------------- { E n d p r VI,115} -------------------WA 11,10
1
It is a matter, namely, of which meaning the variables
in the sign "(Ex)0x" should assume. Whether one thus admits
a proposition "(Ex)x is a trial, etc."[.] [A]nd that one can
just [do], if one does not thereby cause confusion that the
same form is used in the analysis of propositions.
2
And since one does not need the sign "(Ex) etc" for
speech about trials, and in any case analysis of these
things would yield a completely different picture; so it
would probably be better to restrict (vorzubehalten) the
sign "(Ex) etc" to logical analysis.
NOTE: This section of the manuscript continues with remarks
on the idea that some number n of objects already contains
the possibility of being described as the sum of two smaller
numbers of objects.

SKRXZS 3
Wiener Ausgabe: 11,202
Manuscript: Band III pp.298-300
Date: 15 February, 1930 (the day before he began Band IV)
"The concept of a possible predicate." What is, e.g.,
the subject of which I state that it is a Meeting or a
Storm? Of course I can say: what I see here is a meeting and
not a crowd. But if I say: "the meeting went stormily" ("die
Versammlung verlief stiirmisch")5] do I say here that a
certain event which has the property of being a meeting is
going stormily? But even if this is so, still that of which
I can say that it is a meeting must have another nature than
that, for instance, of which I can say that it is a lamp. Or
is the proposition that a meeting is a lamp actually just
false?! At most, insofar as, for instance, the visual image
of a lamp and the visual image of a meeting belong to the
same category one can thus imagine that someone sees a
meeting and takes it for a lamp. In any case, that of which
one can say, e.g., that it is a musical piece is another
form from that of which one can say it is a piece of blue
sky.
What then is the subject of the predicate "white
circle"? Naturally one can say, "I have seen something that
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was not a blue rectangle, but rather a white circle". And
here the Something is the subject and apparently means as
much as [the] patch in my visual field.
Is it now an analysis if I say the proposition "the
white circle is on the red rectangle" means: something that
is a white circle is on something that is a red rectangle? I
would think that the state of affairs is completely
described through the statement white circle, red rectangle,
and the positions; and any subject whose predicates were
those concepts doesn't come in at all. Of course one cay say
"this is over that" and this is a white circle and that a
red rectangle[.]
But the words "this" and "that" are used in
categorically different senses, just like predicates. For if
I say "this is the color red", "this is a circle", “this is
the tone c", then I have used the word "this" in three
completely different ways[.] [W]hat emerges from that is it
is something else to point at a body, at a color, or at a
tone. (And here the word "to point" is just as ambiguous as
the word “this” was earlier.)
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MOTBS
1. Cf PG, pp.307-8, where this comment is criticized.
2. See PR IX,93,119, where this is translated "subject and
predicate", which turns the Fregean distinction upside down.
3. Up to this point I have translated "Satz" as "sentence,
which seems more natural in the context of the discussion of
subject-predicate form. But it is unavoidable from this
point on in this series of remarks to vary the translation
between "proposition" and "sentence” depending on the
context.
4. See Russell, Principles of Mathematics (V,32,#249): "the
idea which the Germans call AnzMhl, the idea of the number
of terms in some class..." There does not seem to be an
equivalent English word; "enumeration" is close, but could
be misleading, as it implies an actual counting which is not
indicated in the German usage. On the other hand "enumerate"
is a standard sense of aufgezMhlen but (just to make things
more confusing) this is not exactly the way Wittgenstein
uses it here. The idea, which comes from Frege, is that
predicates pick out a class of objects. Wittgenstein seems
to be saying that because it is so obvious he has only just
begun to notice that predicates contain the Anzahl of their
classes within them; but this is a little hard to believe,
since the idea comes straight out of Frege, so perhaps his
meaning is not obvious. This idea is a key point of SRLF,
and perhaps also a reason he repudiated that work.
5. I retain the literal form for obvious reasons in spite of
the awkward adverb.
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APPENDIX II: ORGANIZATION OF TBS PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS
It appears, from a comment by Rush Rhees in the
published translation of the PR, that Wittgenstein did not
actually indicate the chapter divisions in his typescript
(PR p.348). David Stem, who has seen a copy of the
typescript, confirms this1 (personal communication). The
chapter numbers in the PR were added by Rhees. There is,
however, a logic to the divisions, far from obvious but
discernible after some study. Each chapter contains remarks
which Wittgenstein collected from various parts of his
manuscripts with an eye to organizing them, with little or
no modification, into a treatment of a particular subject.
It would be a difficult task indeed to make out the
beginning and end of each subject if the typescript were one
continuous series of remarks. This suggests that there were
in fact some notations or page breaks indicating the end of
one series of remarks and the beginning of another,
corresponding to Rhees's chapters. For instance, in
practically every case, where a chapter ends and a new one
begins, the series of manuscript remarks that the first
chapter ends with also ends, and the next chapter begins in
a different part of the mansucript. The section numbers also
frequently correspond to the beginning and end of a more or
less contiguous series of remarks in the manuscripts; where
the remarks in a section are not completely contiguous in
the manuscript there are usually markings in the manuscript
that indicate which marks were and which were not to be
included in the PR. All in all, then, the chapter divisions
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make enough sense to attribute to Wittgenstein the intention
to organize the PR around some such divisions; and the
section numbers, though not a perfect guide to the grouping
of remarks in the manuscripts, give at least a rough sense
of how remarks of different chronological origin are put
together.
It is only after reading the PR and the mansucripts
very carefully that one can get a good sense of what each
chapter is about. In some cases the distinction between one
chapter and the next seems quite fuzzy even after many
readings. Chapters X and XI, for instance, seem to be close
enough in subject matter to be combined into a single
chapter, as do XIII and XIV. Moreover, since the same
terminology - “phenomenological language", “hypothesis",
"space", "verification", etc. - is used throughout, without
the benefit of the original context, it is easy to see in
the PR nothing more than a hodge podge of vaguely related
topics in phenomenology and even more distantly related
matters in the philosophy of mathematics. The exclusion of
many of the remarks that show the course of Wittgenstein's
development and the doubts he had at various points also
contributes to this impression. A further reason for it is
that a large percentage of Wittgenstein's manuscript remarks
are examples or applications of the fundamental ideas he is
thinking about, and these remarks are often put forward with
only the most minimal general introduction, or none at all.
This makes it appear as if the specific subject matter of
one or more remarks is actually the main topic under
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investigation? whereas more often than not there is a quite
general concern that is only understood by stepping back as
from a large painting, until the brushstrokes and color
patches are submerged in the form of the whole.
Speaking most broadly, the PR is Wittgenstein's
Phenomenology. But it contains remarks from various phases
of his conception of what a phenomenology would be: a
phenomenological language, a description of spaces
corresponding to the modes of sensation, or a general
grammar of propositions pertaining to our perceptual
experiences. Since Wittgenstein could not have wanted to
convey to readers the ideas he had abandoned by the time he
compiled the PR he must have wanted the older remarks to be
seen in the light of the ones that expressed his more
developed views. We must therefore assume that the
overriding idea is that phenomenology is grammar, which he
in fact says in his first few remarks in the typescript,
albeit in a way that already suggests ambivalence to the
reader who does not know the original context of the
remarks. Thus the PR is a kind of philosophical grammar of
phenomenological spaces.
With this in mind, the structure of the work can be
gleaned. In the first few chapters Wittgenstein presents the
general philosophical principles on which a phenomenology
would be constructed. The second broad section includes some
very general applications of these principles: space, time,
intentions and the ego, and an overview of visual space.
(These might also be counted as themselves among the
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principles; the ideas are not developed far enough in the
work as a whole to argue decisively for one view or the
other.) This section ends with a solution to the color
exclusion problem which is largely continuous with what he
said in SRLF, but with more detail2. Thus there is a kind of
closure to this broad section: phenomenology has been
introduced as an answer to the problems of the TLP, and the
most important part of that solution has been offered.
In the next section Wittgenstein discusses the concept
of numbers and other topics in the philosophy of
mathematics, as well as generality and quantification
theory. The latter appear here largely because of their
integral place in Frege’s theory of numbers. This section of
the PR can be thought of as a groundwork for a phenomenology
of number. That may seem an odd way to characterize a
section in which one of his main concerns is to reject the
Fregean theory that numbers should be understood as objects.
For given that numbers are clearly not sensations, one might
well wonder what a phenomenology of numbers could be if they
are not objects in something like Frege’s sense.
Nevertheless, what Wittgenstein says about them still has
the ring of a phenomenology: he relates number to
appearances, the visual field, and phenomenological
properties of objects, and he introduces a "stroke” notation
for numbers which trades partly on direct visual
recognition. Some of this may relate indirectly to his
attempt, in Band I and some of Band II, to develop what he
considered an extensionalist theory of numbers (see Appendix
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I); the theory could roughly map onto a phenomenology in the
sense that one would want a concept of number that was
adequate to explain the enumeration of objects given in
experience, like visual circles or color patches. In any
case, however vague or incomplete his ideas on it may have
been, this section of the PR deals with the relationship
between number and phenomena.
Following this he moves into a new section in which the
subjects of infinity, rule-following, number series and
proofs are discussed. The context and purpose of these
disussions in relation to phenomenology can be understood by
contrast with the previous section: there he deals with
numeric properties of discrete phenomena, here he considers
the mathematics of continuous phenomena, including physical
space, visual space, the color spectrum, and time. Moreover,
the discussions in this section show by example how to talk
about all intensional phenomena. This whole section
represents a preliminary attempt by Wittgenstein to get his
ideas about rule-based grammars together, and thus ties in
the phenomenological interests with his later work on rulefollowing.
After this Wittgenstein takes a more in-depth look at
visual and color space. He concludes with an overview of the
distinction between physical propositions (hypotheses and
natural laws) and phenomenological ones, thus concluding the
work more or less where it began. In theory at least, these
sections have been enriched by the mathematical
investigations; at least, that seems to be the only
369
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reasonable explanation for separating the discussion of
visual space from earlier discussions of the same subject.
Perhaps Wittgenstein had a better idea of what was thus
accomplished than we can offer here.
This is a reasonable plan of construction; but one can
certainly raise objections to its execution. The connection
of the rule-following material with the rest is never
directly shown or argued for. The resurrection of the
picture theory in Chapter III does not seem well integrated
with the rest of what he says. The whole subject of
expectation, and intention in general, is arguably never set
in very clear relation to the grammatical philosophy until
the PG or even the PI. It is very hard to discern a
principled difference between the earlier and later
discussions of visual space. Moreover, as argued above, many
facets of his philosophy that are spread throughout the text
are meant to be read in the light of the transformation of
his views that began in late 1929, but in fact give the
appearance of self-contradiction, indecision, and ambiguity.
Be that as it may, there is a definite conception to
the construction of the PR, and had it been carried out more
carefully and under less pressure it might have shown how
far Wittgenstein had already advanced towards his later
philosophy when he compiled it. The following is a proposed
Table of Contents for the PR; not an "Analytical Table of
Contents" as provided by Rhees but a set of chapter headings
and descriptions of their contents. The chapter headings
proposed are hardly the only possible ones, but they suffice
370
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to show the overall plan that I believe Wittgenstein had in
mind, even if he did not notate it in his typescript. In
supplying the titles of Parts I-V I do not meant to suggest
that Wittgenstein himself would have used these titles, only
that they represent his overall conception of the work. If
the chapters and sections I am proposing capture something
close to Wittgenstein's own conception of the PR then the
least we can say is that it was a more carefully thought out
work than it is usually taken to be. Moreover, it would
justify our giving it a new title too:
THE GRAMMAR OF PHENOMENA
PART I: Basic
I.
II.
III.

Principles of Phenomenology
Grammar
Meaning and Verification
Intention and Picture

PART II: General Applications in Phenomenology
IV.
Space
V.
Time and Memory
VI.
Self and Sensation (Pain)
VII.
Visual Space and Time
VIII.
Color Exclusion (Elementary Propositions)
PART III: The Phenomenology of Number
IX.
Generality
X.
Number
XI.
Number and Generality
PART IV: The Nature of the Continuum (Rule vs. Extension)
XII.
The Concept of Infinity
XIII.
Proof, Rules and Systems
XIV.
Proof
XV.
Continuity
XVI.
Continuity in Mathematical Logic
XVII.
Irrational Numbers
XVIII.
Real and Rational Numbers
XIX.
Negation
PART -V; Phenomenology and the Grammar of Phvsics
XX.
Visual Space
XXI.
Color
XXII.
Phenomenology and Physics (Hypotheses and
Natural Laws)
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NOTES
1. "My best guess is that he didn't work on this collection
for long: he collected everything he’d written that he
thought was along the right lines..., grouped it by rough
topics - probably piling up passages on related topics in
separate folders - and then pasted it all into a book so
that Russell could look it over. 'Chapters' makes it seem
more considered, revised, and carefully organized than that.
It might be better to think of them as topical groupings, or
proto-chapters” (Personal communication by email, 9 August
1999) . Stern doesn't say explicitly that there were no
markings corresponding to the published chapter divisions,
but that seems to be the implication. But I am less
concerned about whether there were specific markings than
whether the divisions were in some way indicated and are not
just a product of Rhees's editing.
2. There is a debate in the literature regarding this point;
some feel that the solution here is fundamentally different
from what he said in SRLF. I do not agree, but since my main
interest here is not the color exclusion problem I pass over
this point. Accounts of the putative differences between the
solutions are given in James Austin, "Wittgenstein’s
Solution to the Color Exclusion Problem"; Don Sievert,
"Another Look at Wittgenstein on Color Exclusion"; and
Albert Newen, "Die Entwicklung der Wittgensteinischen
Sprachphilosophie von 1929-1932".
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APPENDIX IIIi PRASES OP WITTGENSTEIN'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL LANGUAGE PROJECT

This chart is of course an overly schematic way of representing the process of development
of Wittgenstein's ideas but it is helpful to keep the various materials and stages
synchronized. Within this scheme there are other short stages; e.g., Wittgenstein's ideas
at the very beginning of PHASE I were closer to those of PHASES II and IV than to the rest
of PHASE I. PHASE V is really the phase of constructing a new system, of which the
Philosophical Remarks is the expression.
PHASE
I

U )

DATES
2 FEB - JUNE(?)
1929

MANUSCRIPTS
Band I-II (ending
on verso p.105 of
Band I1); SRLF

WIENER AUSGABE DESCRIPTION
1,4,1-1,189,5 "Two-worlds" version
of phenomenological
language project

II

JULY(?) 1929

Band
Band
Band
Band

1.190.1 1.196.1

First crisis and
critique of phenomeno
logical language project

III

late JULY(?)
- SEP 1929

Band III p.l Band III p.153

11,3,1 11,89,11

Attempt to resurrect
the phenomenological
language project

IV

6 OCT 1929
- JAN 1930

Band III p.153
- end (p.300)
of Band III

11,90,1 11,203,4

Second crisis, and
final rejection of
phenomenological language
and his early system

V

16 FEB 1930
- MAY 1930

Band IV, TS 208,
TS 209 (the PR)

Constructive phase;
11,207,1II,242,3(last phenomenology as grammar
day of remarks
before the PR)

-4

u>

II (p.108 of
I) - end of
II (p.134 of
I)

NOTIS
1. Wittgenstein's Band I-II manuscripts were not consecutively
paged during composition; e.g, some of Band II was actually
written on the verso pages of Band I.
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